JUSTICE AND URBAN TRANSFORMATION: PLANNING IN CONTEXT

Much of planning theory dwells on planning processes and the role of the planner without analyzing the socio-spatial constraints under which planners operate or the object—urban space—that they affect. Such a narrow focus results in theoretical weakness arising from the isolation of process from context and outcome. Instead, in my view, planning theory should address the following questions: (1) What is the relationship between the urban context and planning activity? In other words, what are the background conditions that facilitate and constrain planning for a just city? (2) How does planning affect city users, including residents, commuters, and visitors?[1] (3) What principles should guide plan formulation, content, and implementation? Although responses to these questions do require examination of the planner's role and strategies, they also demand exploration of the field of forces in which planners function and a formulation of what a better city might be in relation to justice. This chapter and the three that follow explore the context and evaluation of urban policy by examining some of the broad issues that arise in planning

1. Guido Martinotti (1999) notes that, with increased travel, cities are host to large numbers of transients ("users"). Their legitimacy is often challenged by critics of the commodification of urban space. Visitors and commuters, however, are significant elements in modern urban development and constitute a large cross-section of the population; thus, they too should be considered when formulating a concept of justice in the city.

practice and analyzing them in terms of the dilemmas involved in producing a more just city. Chapter 6 addresses the third question of guidelines for just urban planning. The discussion does not go so far as to investigate the broader concept of the good city. Justice is only one component of the good city, but it is the focus of this book, which restricts itself to local approaches to achieving greater justice in wealthy countries. The analysis is limited to the relations between equity, diversity, and democracy, which I indicated earlier to be the principal components of urban justice. Thus, in looking at these questions I do not focus on some of the considerations—for example, good city form or environmental sustainability—that would be encompassed in a more expansive investigation.

The Tradition of City Planning

The impetus for the development of planning lay in a critique of the industrial city and a desire to re-create cities according to enlightened design principles. Whether the focus was on greenfield sites, as in Ebenezer Howard's garden city model, or on redeveloping the existing city, as in Georges-Eugène Haussmann's Paris and Daniel Burnham's City Beautiful, planning devoted itself to producing the desired object. Early planners proceeded without much reflection about the process by which the ideal city was formulated—its implicit theoretical arguments dwelled on the nature of the good city instead of how one derived either the ideals or the means to attain them. It was taken for granted that the function of planning was to impose a consciously chosen pattern of development upon the urban terrain; the method of making the necessary choices was not problematized. Rather, good planning was assumed to be guided by experts who, on the basis of study and experience, would devise plans in the public interest. Beyond Patrick Geddes exhortation to "survey then plan," little attention was directed toward methodology and the result was embodied in a physical design (Hall 2002, 355–56). The public interest constituted the moral basis of planning, but its content was taken for granted rather than analyzed, and it was assumed that its realization would benefit all.

To be sure, there was, during the first part of the twentieth century, some attention to process, as American progressive reformers, in their effort to rid government of bias and corruption, successfully pressed for independent planning commissions and European governments incorporated planning into meritocratic bureaucracies. These moves, a part of a general impetus to divorce public policy determination from political influence, rested on a view that a sharp line separated politics from administration and a belief that experts could develop policies in isolation from selfish interests. Here, as among the later theorists discussed below, the content of good policy was expected to be a result of good procedures and did not need to be analyzed in advance. Later, historical deconstructions of the period revealed the biases of technocratic professionals and their business supporters, showing that insulated decision making and allegedly meritocratic selection procedures favored upper- and middle-class interests.[2]

The development of an explicit theory directed at prescribing the planner's modus operandi began with the publication of Karl Mannheim's *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* in 1935.[3] It laid the philosophical foundations for later theorizing by describing a democratic planning process that would enable experts to plan under the guidance of the public through their elected representatives. Mannheim's ambition exceeded that of *city* planning—inspired by the ideals of reform liberalism, he envisioned the national state's participation in economic and social planning. He argued that, if the planning bureaucracy was subject to parliamentary control, it could apply its technical expertise to the solution of social problems without impinging on freedom:

> The new bureaucracy brought with it a new objectivity in human affairs. There is something about bureaucratic procedure which helps to neutralize the original leanings towards patronage, nepotism, and personal domination. This tendency towards objectivity may, in favourable cases, become so strong that the element of class consciousness, still present in a bureaucracy which is chosen mainly from the ranks of the ruling classes, can be almost completely superseded by the desire for justice and impartiality. (Mannheim 1940, 323)[4]

2. See, for example, Hays (1995) and S. Cohen (1964) for a discussion of the Progressive period in the United States and Crozier (1964) for discussion of the impact of public bureaucracy in Europe.

3. This book was written in German and published in Holland. The English-language edition appeared in 1940 and was substantially revised and enlarged by the author.

4. Polanyi (1944) similarly argued that freedom, rather than being limited by state planning as contended by extreme liberals such as Friedrich Hayek, required planning.

In his acceptance of the role of impartial expertise and of legislative control of planning goals, Mannheim laid the foundation for the direction taken by academic planners during the postwar period:

> The subject [of physical planning] changed from a kind of craft . . . into an apparently scientific activity in which vast amounts of precise information were garnered and processed in such a way that the planner could devise very sensitive systems of guidance and control. . . . Instead of the old master-plan or blueprint approach, which assumed that the objectives were fixed from the start, the new concept was of planning as a *process*. . . . And this planning process was independent of the thing that was planned. (Hall 2002, 360–62)

Famous for transforming city planning from primarily a design profession into a social science after the Second World War, theorists at the University of Chicago and the University of Pennsylvania and their followers laid out the rational model and methods for testing policy alternatives (Sarbib 1983; Hall 2002, 359–63). They incorporated the thesis that general goals could be stipulated in advance within a democratic political process, and that the formulation of the means to reach those goals and the process of implementing those means could be conducted impartially by disinterested appointed officials (Dror 1968; Faludi 1973). Democracy constituted the value content of the strategy. Presumably goals democratically derived were inherently equitable, and the means for achieving these ends could be scientifically discovered.

Along with rationality, planners' claim to influence was increasingly based on an ideal of comprehensiveness—by looking at the region, city, or neighborhood as a whole, they could coordinate the different elements of urban development: land use, transportation, production facilities, and so forth, which otherwise were the domains of separate, noncommunicating bureaucracies (AIP 1959). Using the tools of modern statistical and economic analysis, experts could measure the interactions among different subsystems precipitated by alternative policies and then evaluate the extent to which each development scheme maximized achievement of the specified goals.

Ironically, however, the vision of achieving agreement on general priorities and then applying planning expertise expressed through the rational model wholly ignored the devastating attack on positivism mounted by Mannheim himself in his essay on the sociology of knowledge. Here, in a striking foreshadowing of postmodernist/poststructuralist critique, he stated:

> For each of the participants [in a discussion] the "object" [of discourse] has a more or less different meaning because it grows out of the whole of their respective frames of reference, as a result of which the meaning of the object in the perspective of the other person remains, at least in part, obscure. . . . [This approach] does not signify that there are no criteria of rightness and wrongness in a discussion. It does insist, however, that it lies in the nature of certain assertions that they cannot be formulated absolutely, but only in terms of the perspective of a given situation. . . . Interests and the powers of perception of the different perspectives are conditioned by the social situations in which they arose and to which they are relevant. (Mannheim 1936, 281, 283, 284)

As applied to urban planning, Mannheim's assault on universalism jettisons the notion of a value-free, unbiased methodology and denies that forecasters can assume that past experience will simply repeat itself in a new historical context. Thus, the assumptions underlying the use of quantitative cost-benefit analysis to weigh alternatives within the rational model are undermined. Furthermore, the notion that a singular choice among alternatives will prove generally beneficial rather than creating winners and losers becomes questionable. Mannheim proposes instead the use of reason and comparative analysis rather than a formally rational methodology. Such an approach is necessarily value-laden and calls for various forms of knowledge, not simply the expertise acquired through scientific training. His thesis is a clear precursor of Habermas's concept of rationality. Mannheim differs, however, from contemporary communicative theorists in that he expects an educated elite, working within his flexible definition of reasoned reflection, to plan on behalf of society at large. His views perhaps find their most recent echo in the work of Anthony Giddens (1990). In both his explanation of people's willingness to trust expertise and in his description of reflexivity, by which knowledge circles in and out of society, Giddens presents an approach to knowledge that is neither relativist nor positivist, but, as he puts it, "relationist" (or, one might say, dialectical).

As discussed in chapter 1, the belief that fact and value can be separated, which underlies the application of the rational model, has been strongly attacked. The ideal of comprehensiveness has also sustained much criticism. Thus, Alan Altshuler (1965) notes that comprehensiveness requires planners to rank all the manifold interests within the city into a single set of goals and have available the technical capacity to find the means to reach those ends. He doubts that they possess this capability. Charles Lindblom (1959), whose work echoes the skepticism of such management theorists as Herbert Simon, argues that the combined desire for rationality and comprehensiveness is both impractical and undesirable. He characterizes the actual planning and policy-making process as incremental, based on a strategy of "muddling through." As reflected in his oxymoronic title, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" he declares this cautious method of "partisan mutual adjustment" to be more effective in reaching desirable outcomes than the synoptic planning method idealized within the rational model.

In the 1960s and '70s, the intellectual current that had questioned the claims of planning to rationality and comprehensiveness was strengthened by theorists who regarded the presumption of disinterestedness as a mask for the power of property developers and upper-class groups.[5] In response to the social agitation of the times, a dissident but nonetheless influential movement within the profession forced planners and urban policy makers to become more concerned with the impacts of decisions on the politically powerless—especially those displaced by highway and urban renewal programs (Hoffman 1989). For this group of thinkers the underlying moral justification for planning shifted to remedying the disadvantages produced by poverty and racial discrimination instead of producing a plan that would maximize an alleged public interest.

These critics of planning were in agreement over the causes and consequences of planning actions but differed as to the potential of planning to effect desirable change, given the power of capital. One group, operating within a neo-Marxist paradigm, emphasized the structural underpinnings of the system and basically argued that equitable planning could only occur after a complete transformation of the system of private property.[6] Needless to say, this conclusion proved very discouraging to progressive planners who by then were also working for community-based

5. Among the most influential were Herbert Gans (1968), who revealed the social-class composition of the supporters of planning and showed the depredations of urban renewal; David Harvey (1978), who argued that the "ideology of planning" was simply a rationalization of the class interests of developers; and Manuel Castells (1977), who regarded environmentalism as instrumental in protecting upper-class privilege.

6. See Castells (1977); Harloe (1977); Harvey (1978); Foglesong (1986).

organizations rather than solely for city governments and business groups.[7] One response to this seeming impasse was to chart courses whereby planning could, in fact, achieve fairer outcomes.[8] The more practice-oriented attempts presented exemplary policies but without describing and justifying their underlying value positions or a deep probing of the strategies and conditions that could produce their desired results.[9]

There are now growing efforts to develop middle-range theory that embeds planning practice within a larger, postpositivist theoretical framework that is more in accordance with Mannheim's relationist strategy than a purely technical approach (Fischer 2003).[10] I use the term middle range here because, although some of these works extend to countries at various stages of political and economic development, the primary focus is on norms governing policy within democratic Western metropolises in the first part of the new millennium. In other words the arguments are not at a global level of generalization. Thus, while, as argued in the introduction, broad concepts of justice have a universal resonance, their specific content is restricted in relation to both place and time rather than applying to all cities in an entire historical epoch. The remainder of this chapter discusses some of the issue areas most significant to a conceptualization of the just city based on the three principles of democracy, diversity, and equity as forming the moral basis of planning and policy.

Democracy

Calls for democratic control of decisions made within urban bureaucracies arose in the 1960s and '70s in response to two perceptions: that

7. See Fainstein and Fainstein (1979); Hall (2002), chap. 10; Brooks (2002).

8. See Clavel (1986); Krumholz and Forester (1990); Mier and Alpern (1993); Hartman (2002). Many of the communicative planning theorists (e.g., John Forester, Judith Innes, Patsy Healey, James Throgmorton) use actual cases as the basis for their theorizing concerning the ways in which progressive planners can improve the negotiations around divisive issues. They refrain, however, from offering policy prescriptions except in regard to the mode by which planners interact with other stakeholders.

9. Fainstein (1999) and Sayer and Storper (1997) comment on the failure of most left-wing writing on urban policy to specify the values beneath their analyses.

10. This has particularly been the case for discussions of communicative rationality, but it is increasingly so also for consideration of the just city as the concept applies to participation (Purcell 2008; DeFilippis 2004), public space (Kohn 2004; Mitchell 2003), infrastructure (Flyvbjerg 1998), the environment (Low and Gleeson 1998), and tourism (Hannigan 1998; Fainstein and Gladstone 1999).

"street-level bureaucrats," including planners and social welfare workers, made decisions affecting urban residents without regard to their knowledge, opinions, and interests (Lipsky 1980); and that public agency staff came out of sharply different social strata from those affected by their decisions. The latter view led, in the United States, to accusations of "internal colonialism," particularly in the case of white personnel operating in black neighborhoods (see Blauner 1969). Citizen participation was to overcome the injustices caused by lack of responsiveness and failures of empathy, as well as being a value in its own right through its furtherance of democracy.[11]

In an article that is still frequently cited, Sherry Arnstein develops a "ladder of citizen participation." She argues that the stronger the role of disadvantaged groups in formulating and implementing policy, the more redistributional will be the outcomes: "In short, it is the means by which they ['have-not citizens'] can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society" (Arnstein 1969, 216). Arnstein (224) recognizes that the minority communities demanding control are not monolithic and that there are well-founded critiques of community power: it can encourage separatism, inefficiency, opportunism. Nevertheless, she concludes that without a redistribution of decisional power, there will be no redistribution of benefits. In line with Arnstein's argument, community groups demanded power based on the view that only by gaining control over policy could local citizens ensure that governmental actions would benefit them. Thus, "community control" became a central goal of urban activists during the 1960s and '70s.

Subsequently, however, highly mobilized protests faded in both Europe and the United States, causing pressure for citizen involvement to diminish. Programs such as Model Cities in the United States and the Community Development Project in the United Kingdom, which required community participation, disappeared, while public-private partnerships between business and government flourished.[12] In the United States planners who had been moved to neighborhood offices and advocated

11. See the overview provided by Altshuler (1970).

12. Frieden and Kaplan (1975) describe and evaluate the Model Cities program; Marris (1987) analyzes the Community Development Project. Ceccarelli (1982) and Fainstein and Hirst (1995) trace the rise and decline of urban political movements. Mayer (2003) shows the ways in which activists have been co-opted by participatory institutions under neoliberal approaches.

on behalf of community groups lost their jobs (Needleman and Needleman 1974). Planning was largely recentralized in American city halls, although some cities continued to experiment with various forms of citizen empowerment. In the United Kingdom all sorts of partnership arrangements that called for citizen participation proliferated, but it was unclear how much real influence community groups actually had. The situation varied substantially in continental Europe—in Amsterdam, for example, there has been considerable local consultation, while in Paris the top-down tradition has continued. The strongest model, where citizens actually determined budgetary expenditures, was until recently extremely rare.[13]

One such example, the Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP) in Minneapolis, where capital budget funds were allocated to community organizations under a twenty-year program, illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of the citizen participation model. Under this program existing community groups were required to become more broadly inclusive of their neighborhoods and, through a series of meetings, to devise a neighborhood plan. After more than a decade of operation, an extensive evaluation of the program concludes that it was quite successful in achieving its principal objective of neighborhood revitalization. Unsurprisingly, its achievements, in terms both of eliciting widespread participation and obtaining results, varied from neighborhood to neighborhood. In relation to the crucial issue that concerns us here—the creation of just outcomes—the evaluators find that, although more affluent homeowners tended to dominate deliberations, some wealthy communities did support construction of low-income rental housing. On the other hand, the authors admit, in response to critics who accused community groups of insensitivity to low-income residents, especially in regard to affordable housing, that "the NRP has not substantially addressed the preoccupations of many activists concerned with equity and justice" (Fagotto and Fung 2005, 60). They argue, however, that more active intervention by program staff could have oriented participants to a stronger concern with equity.

13. The most frequently cited instance of participatory budgeting, often held up as a model, is that of Porto Alegre, Brazil. An estimated one hundred European cities had adopted the concept by 2008; an evaluation of them concludes that only a minority genuinely empowered the participants; in these cases institutional change was accompanied by "social mobilization" (Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke 2008, 175)

The NRP case points to two conclusions. First, the equity outcomes of citizen deliberations are unpredictable and are likely to vary according to the particular values of the active participants. Second, planners can affect the character of deliberation and move participants toward a greater commitment to just outcomes. In Minneapolis, planning department staff tended to play a passive role, inhibited by their belief that democratic planning precluded their taking initiatives and shaping people's opinions (Fainstein and Hirst 1995). Their normative position rested on the primacy of democratic deliberation as the governing value. The tension between democracy as practiced and equitable outcomes arises because citizen participants usually prefer policies that benefit owners more than renters. In general, middle-class homeowners are more likely to participate than lower-income renters and are more effective in doing so.

The initial demands for citizen participation in bureaucratic decision making originated with low-income groups wanting increased benefits. As time passed, however, participatory mechanisms primarily became a vehicle for middle-class interests. As such, they represented a move toward democratizing the planning process but not usually in the direction of redistribution, and they always posed the threat of co-optation. Since participation is typically organized by areas, it draws together people with only limited common interests. Moreover, neighborhood activists are never more than a small proportion of a community; thus, their claim to legitimacy is always suspect. Sometimes they may genuinely reflect a broad constituency, but they may also become a narrow clique unwelcoming to outsiders and serving their own personal desire for prominence.

Usually the achievements of neighborhood participatory bodies are limited to modifications of preexisting development schemes, small-scale improvement programs, blocking funding cutbacks, and symbolic recognition. They may act as springboards for individuals aiming at citywide political power, but successful neighborhood-based elected officials often reorient their affiliations after gaining office. Context matters—if participants are not backed by widespread mobilization, they are unlikely to carry much weight. Moreover, in cities suffering from a withdrawal of capital investment, neighborhood participants are no more able than the mayor to stem the tide and often yield to the logic that only through subsidies to developers are any investments likely to happen. In cities under development pressure they may be able to gain concessions in terms of community spaces, social services, and affordable housing; their ability to halt gentrification, however, is restricted by their lack of control over private-market activities.

What we can say in general about institutionalized citizen participation is that it increases the information available to policy makers by providing local knowledge (Corburn 2005); it makes decision making more democratic and open but not necessarily more equitable; it can lead to parochialism and corruption but in that respect it may not be any more dangerous than traditional modes of governance. It is rarely transformative, but it does, like the old-fashioned political machine, provide a training ground for developing leadership skills and a path of upward political mobility.

Diversity

My use of the term diversity as denoting one of the three criteria of urban justice is problematic. In addition to the tensions between diversity and other values that will be discussed below, claims for diversity can be challenged as simply strategic rather than in themselves germane to justice. Thus, Chris Hamnett argues that

> diversity has been pushed as a positive quality in its own right by [London Mayor Ken] Livingstone amongst others, but I think this is dubious and was simply a tactic/strategy to portray London as diverse and therefore a richer city culturally. I think tolerance is a much better criterion, as it embodies implicit positive qualities that different groups are either accepted or valued equally or are seen as having a right to exist and to access resources. This could apply to tolerance of the homeless or other groups, not simply different ethnic groups.[14]

I take his point and could have used the term "recognition" or "openness to others"—the word "tolerance," which he proposes, implies a certain patronizing quality. Diversity, however, is a convenient shorthand, encompasses reference to the physical environment as well as social relations, and refers to policy ambitions that go beyond encouraging acceptance of others to include the social composition of places.

14. Personal communication, June 4, 2009.

Peter Marcuse also questions whether diversity has a transcendent value beyond its political usefulness:

> Diversity is only a value for the outs, not the ins. The classic case is education today [in the United States]. What we want is decent education for blacks. Separation is unequal, because they're screwed in separate schools. So we want to bring them into the same schools as whites, so they'll be treated equally. But we can't say that, given the [decisions of the] present Supreme Court [on affirmative action and quotas]. So we argue that we want diversity [and everyone will benefit from the exposure to others]. It's a euphemism for equality. We don't want Donald Trump in . . . the ghetto; we want ghetto residents to have a chance to live wherever they want. If they live in a great working-class neighborhood, why do we want middle class people there too?[15]

Marcuse thus differs from those who regard a diverse society as inherently preferable to a more homogeneous one; rather, he sees it as only providing leverage in the drive for equality.

Marcuse's argument is difficult to rebut, because the term as it is employed in the United States is often used instrumentally when equality of access to privilege is really meant. In Europe social inclusion takes on a similar instrumental quality. My response is that diversity is a lesser value than equity; however, in an era of massive spatial mobility and consequent heterogeneity as streams of migrants move into urban areas around the world, diversity at the metropolitan scale becomes a necessary virtue. At the same time, this is not always the case at the level of small areas. As discussed in chapter 1, Iris Marion Young's formulation of relatively homogeneous neighborhoods with porous boundaries rather than proportionality in each precinct is a perfectly acceptable formulation.

As used by urbanists, the term diversity has a variety of meanings. Among urban designers it refers to mixing building types; among planners it may mean mixed uses or class and racial-ethnic heterogeneity in a housing development or a public space; for sociologists and cultural analysts it primarily takes on the latter meaning. During the 1960s advocates of physical and social heterogeneity constituted dissident voices against

15. Personal communication, September 22, 2008.

the prevailing doctrine of functional zoning and homogeneity. Most influential among them within the discipline of planning is Jane Jacobs's, whose call for a cityscape based on multiple uses resonated widely. She argues that physical heterogeneity would promote economic and social diversity:

> One principle emerges... ubiquitously, and in so many and such complex different forms [that]... it becomes the heart of my argument. This ubiquitous principle is the need of cities for a most intricate and close-grained diversity of uses that give each other constant mutual support, both economically and socially. The components of this diversity can differ enormously, but they must supplement each other in certain concrete ways. (Jacobs 1961, 14)

Jacobs urges planners to look at the real cities that people love and which are characterized by congestion, multiple interactions among strangers, short streets, and mixed uses. In later works she contends that diversity not only makes cities more appealing but is the source of economic productivity. Her reasoning anticipates the recent, widely publicized argument of Richard Florida (2002, 30), who asserts that urban diversity stimulates creativity, which in turn causes economic growth. Eventually what had been a counterargument to the dominant strand within planning became a new orthodoxy, at least within central cities. Modernist urban renewal, with its stark buildings arrayed on superblocks, came to be seen as a serious error, and mixed use became the guideline for new developments. The relationship in these new projects between physical and social differentiation, however, is not clear.

Toward the end of the twentieth century the concern among philosophers with recognition of the other, as discussed in chapter 1, converged with planning's new emphasis on diversity. The planning theorist Leonie Sandercock (1998, 2003) terms her ideal city *Cosmopolis.* Like Iris Marion Young she links recognition of the other with justice. She describes a metropolis that allows people from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds equal rights to city space, calls for a multiplicity of people that facilitates "the pleasures of anonymity,"[16] which she asserts is closely

16. Whether most people actually do consider anonymity pleasurable is questionable.

related to sexual desire and fantasy, and claims that the function of city planning should be to create urbanity.[17]

The diversity that remains the goal of theorists such as Sandercock is not the local color appealing to Jane Jacobs and creative-class cosmopolitans but rather one captured by Lefebvre's phrase "the right to the city." It refers to the inclusion of all city users within the space of the city, regardless of their cultural differences. Margaret Kohn makes an impassioned argument that the creation of citadels of exclusivity, to borrow a term from Peter Marcuse (see Marcuse and van Kempen 2002), not only restricts enjoyment of urban amenities to the affluent but prevents recognition of the situation of others.[18] In discussing the relations between well-to-do passersby and the homeless, she comments:

> There is no guarantee that encountering a panhandler on the street will elicit sympathy. . . . Democracy does not guarantee that society will advance specific values such as the recognition and celebration of difference or heterogeneity. Some people, perhaps the majority, may feel nothing more than aversion when confronted with a panhandler or bench squatter. . . . Nevertheless, as a society we cannot make decisions about how to solve the problem of homelessness if most citizens are unaware of the nature and scope of the problem. (Kohn 2004, 181)

Still, despite the seeming unanimity of urban theorists on the merits of diversity, they differ substantially concerning the kinds of environments planners should aim to produce—and how and whether conscious planning can create them. Thus, Richard Sennett, commenting on the widely praised development of New York's Battery Park City, laments: "Battery Park City . . . is planned according to current enlightened wisdom about mixed uses and the virtues of diversity. Within this model of community, however, one has the sense . . . 'of an illustration of life' rather than life itself" (Sennett 1990).

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17. Numerous urban historians have regarded the sharp separations between public and private space that have been demanded in most of city planning as a method of isolating women and thereby protecting them from sexual temptation (see Fainstein 2005a for a discussion of feminist critiques of planning).

18. Fincher and Iveson (2008, 13) doubt that provision of large, heterogeneous public spaces encourages "inclusionary interaction."

Planned communities designed with the goal of diversity, whether within inner cities or in New Urbanist or neotraditional greenfields developments, seem inevitably to attract accusations of inauthenticity, of being simulacra rather than the real thing. Thus, planners appear caught in an insoluble dilemma—either leave the market to take its course or impose an oxymoronic diverse order. Although in the past market-driven development produced highly differentiated landscapes as a consequence of local custom, small-plot ownership, minimal regulation, and incremental development, today's large developers, enmeshed within a globalized architectural and property market, build on a grand scale and repeat the successful formulas of everywhere else. The paradox is that the internally diverse character of festival marketplaces, entertainment districts, and live/work environments replicates itself, so that places lose their individuality just as much as had been the case under high modernism.

The relationship between diversity and equity as components of justice is not straightforward. Richard Florida's (2002) argument, referred to above, finds a happy reconciliation between the values of economic growth and social diversity. Thus, diversity, until recently a value associated more with politically left cultural critics than progrowth coalitions, has become a mantra for public officials aiming at fostering urban resurgence. Florida, however, is misinterpreted if he is taken to imply that diversity promotes equity as well as growth. He explicitly states: "While the Creative Class favors openness and diversity, to some degree it is a diversity of elites, limited to highly educated, creative people. Even though the rise of the Creative Class has opened up new avenues of advancement for women and members of ethnic minorities, its existence has certainly failed to put an end to long-standing divisions of race and gender" (Florida 2002, 80). He could have added that it not only has failed to end racial and gender divisions, but it has seemingly exacerbated income inequality.[19]

19. Sassen (2001) regards the existence of a large, low-wage labor force and the decline of middle income groups as the direct consequence of growth in high-end creative occupations. Although her thesis has been much debated in regard to the causal linkage, it is nevertheless the case that the prosperity of global cities such as London and New York has not spread downwards and these cities display very high levels of income inequality. Hamnett (2003) finds growing maldistribution of income in London, but he attributes it to a combination of growth at the top and unemployment rather than low-wage labor at the bottom.

Recognition, as discussed in chapter 1, is analytically distinct from redistribution and must be regarded as a separate component of the just city. For planning it requires special attention to the creation and governance of public space, but it does not necessarily mandate that each space be open to everyone all the time. We customarily see signs on playgrounds indicating that access is restricted to children and their caregivers; separating rowdy teenagers from toddlers does not transgress our sense of justice. Quiet cars on trains and parts of parks reserved for contemplative activities likewise are not offensive. The key is to limit behavior, not people, and to apply only reasonable limitations. The meaning of "reasonable," of course, is debatable, and here planning intervention ought to be on the side of the most liberal interpretation.

The objection to this argument is that certain kinds of behavior are correlated with certain kinds of people. Skateboarding, loud music, and hanging out are behaviors more likely to be displayed by teenagers and are the sorts of activities that others often find offensive or threatening. Restrictions directed at behavior can become interpreted as discrimination, particularly if people of color are the ones responsible. Although there are no easy resolutions to these kinds of conflict, some amount of spatial segregation offers the best method of coping with clashing styles of behavior, provided that sufficient space is allocated to each group. Spatial segregation is, however, at the cost of a wholly shared environment that forces people to deal with difference.

The issue of diversity is also significant for the designing of neighborhoods. Requiring housing in any area to encompass a broad income range and forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or disability constitute standards conducive to justice. However, requiring people to move against their will in order to achieve racial balance or dispersion of poverty is counterproductive and an infringement on liberty.[20] The example of Chicago is instructive here. Beginning at the turn of this century the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) embarked on a plan to demolish its large high-rise projects and disperse their occupants. It gave most of them housing vouchers to use in the private market and promised a minority the right to return to the mixed-income projects built on the vacated sites. The CHA had for years been under court orders

20. Goetz (2003) argues that involuntary dispersal fails in its aims and exacts severe costs on those dispersed.

(the *Gautreaux* decisions starting in 1966) to desegregate public housing and had made some effort to relocate residents toward that end. It could point to (weak) evidence from studies of resulting moves to the suburbs that identified employment, housing, and educational improvements among African Americans who left voluntarily, using resources provided as remedies required by the court. In the 1980s, with public housing widely considered a failure, social science theories blamed geographical concentrations for the persistence of poverty over generations.[21] CHA officials and the mayor of Chicago justified their destruction of public housing and the displacement of residents by citing these theories: "Since the early 1990s CHA officials have sustained a strikingly consistent articulation of their main policy aims: to reduce the 'social isolation' of the 'distressed communities' that CHA developments had become; to employ the 'mixed-income model' of community development to save public housing; to humanize affordable housing through the use of new urbanist design techniques" (Bennett 2006, 293).

If we put aside for the moment the question of whether the Chicago regime's real aim was actually gentrification, and its justifications of its land-clearing efforts as intended to benefit the poor wholly cynical, we can in the name of diversity favor the goal of reducing social isolation and humanizing affordable housing. The effects of the policies intended to achieve this result, however, are at best mixed. The conclusions that Goetz (2005, 409) reaches concerning a similar program in Atlanta apply equally here: "Against the modest set of benefits experienced by original residents, we must keep in mind the millions of dollars spent on the demolition and redevelopment of the sites, the disruption to households and social support networks by displacement and relocation, and the permanent loss of thousands of units of low-cost public housing."

We see in this example, therefore, that the achievement of diversity may come at the cost of other values. If people are moved against their will, then democracy and equity are not served. If neighborhoods

21. William Julius Wilson's (1987, 1989) arguments concerning the negative effects of concentrated poverty have been especially influential. See also Wacquant (2008), who identifies causes for geographically concentrated urban marginality in the United States and France in shifts within the capitalist political economy and thus moves away from the cultural causes that are prominent in Wilson's portrayal.

FIGURE 1. Cabrini-Green replacement housing (Chicago). Photo by Susan S. Fainstein.

become diverse as a consequence of gentrification, then the remaining low-income residents may lose their sense of ownership of the area even if they receive improved services:[22]

> Changing the spatial distribution of the population or remedying fiscal or service disparities may create a more optimal and equitable spatial allocation, but in some ways it fails to acknowledge basic human aspirations to live in security, in community, or in a revitalized core. In the case of regionalist dispersal programs, the attempt to achieve greater equality has even destroyed human dignity, in an uncanny replay of the urban renewal era. (Chapple and Goetz 2008, 18)

The touchiest and most difficult aspect of the question of forcing diversity comes in terms of requiring exclusionary places to welcome

22. Freeman (2006) depicts the ambivalence of poor people who remain in gentrifying neighborhoods.

people who are different. On the one hand it is simply unethical (and usually illegal) to practice discrimination based on ascriptive characteristics like skin color or nationality; on the other, heavy-handed forced integration contravenes democratic procedures and provokes a backlash. The most positive cases are those such as Shaker Heights, Ohio, where, as Dennis Keating (1994) chronicles, elements in the receiving community facilitate the in-migration of people of a differing race. Yet even in the good examples, where the process of obtaining diversity does not transgress other values, diversity in itself is inadequate to override hostility. In a review of Keating's book, Elizabeth Lasch-Quinn (1996, 229) comments:

> Keating's faith that "interracial contacts will reduce racial conflict or discrimination" determines his ultimate promotion of "greater racial diversity among homeowners living in neighborhoods that otherwise are mostly homogeneous." That contact is needed is undeniable; that it will address the deep divisions in…society without attention to the economic sources for the perpetuation of such divisions, as well as the widespread doubt about the justice of special privileges [like mortgage assistance to those integrating neighborhoods], is belied by the evidence Keating gives of continuing hostility and neighborhood segregation even in those suburbs considered models of racial diversity.

The above comment points to a further troubling aspect of the push to further social diversity: the tension between heterogeneity and community. Robert Putnam (2007, 137) is concerned to find that "immigration and ethnic diversity tend to reduce social solidarity and social capital. New evidence from the US suggests that in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods residents of all races tend to 'hunker down.' Trust (even of one's own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, friends fewer." Putnam expresses faith that in the long run these negative effects will diminish, resulting in new forms of social solidarity and more inclusive identities, but he offers no evidence that this will transpire.[23] Community

23. In their study of a neighborhood group in the Netherlands that had the fostering of diversity as a primary aim, Uitermarck and Duyvendak (2008, 130) comment: "It seems incredibly difficult to first identify ethnic differences and then to bridge them. The scenario is rather that they are not mentioned, yet bridged, or that they are mentioned but not bridged.…What

itself is, of course, a double-edged value. Although affording members social support, it is exclusionary:

> "Community" has ever been one of the key sites of social control and surveillance, bordering on overt social repression. Well-founded communities often exclude, define themselves against others, erect all sorts of keep-out signs (if not tangible walls).... As a consequence, community has often been a barrier to rather than facilitator of progressive social change, and much of the populist migration out of villages (both rural and urban) arose precisely because they were oppressive to the human spirit and otiose as a form of sociopolitical organization. (Harvey 1997, 1)

Even while contemporary planners, including the New Urbanists against whom Harvey's critique is directed, praise diversity as adding to the appeal of locales and contributing to social inclusion, they simultaneously seek to promote stronger community ties. But can people who perceive little commonality among themselves produce the bonds that give rise to mutual assistance?

Supporters of increased diversity are made uncomfortable by the seeming irreconcilability of community and diversity. Peter Marcuse (2002, 111) tries to overcome the difficulty by distinguishing between ghettoes and enclaves: ghettoes are involuntary spatial concentrations of a particular population group, while enclaves are voluntary and promote economic, social, political, and cultural development. When the enclave cluster is an ethnic minority or gender-identified group seeking to protect its way of life or overcome disadvantage, the term has a positive spin. In fact, by offering sanctuaries for cultural difference, enclaves, while being homogeneous on the micro level, contribute to diversity at the metropolitan level. Citadels, on the other hand, defined as exclusionary areas dominated by the privileged, conform to the negative description offered by Harvey, as quoted above. Thus, urban neighborhoods characterized by lack of diversity may or may not be desirable, depending on their contribution to equity and culture (Marcuse 1997).

In sum, diversity as a planning doctrine reflects an aspirational goal; at the same time the desirability of pressing for it depends very much on

we... see is that people develop the competence to interact together during brief moments and then return to their own network, which can be more or less segregated."

the process by which it is achieved and the class and racial/ethnic context in which it operates.

Equity

Planners face equity issues most directly when devising policies for housing and urban regeneration.[24] In relation to housing policy, the questions of income and ethnic diversity discussed above frame one significant set of decisions and will not be repeated here. Others arise from the extent to which housing is considered a right; determination of appropriate forms of tenure (private market rental; public, nonprofit, or cooperative ownership; individual ownership); and the linkage between housing and regeneration.

Early housing reformers in both the United States and Europe reacted against the insalubrious living conditions of industrial cities. After World War II government took an active role in housing provision on both sides of the Atlantic. As is well known, European states invested extensively in mass-produced rental housing that was built and operated by public entities; in contrast, the United States primarily emphasized the construction of single-family homes and developed public housing only for the poorest segment of the population. The European approach, even when governments were led by relatively conservative Christian Democratic parties, was based on an equity-oriented philosophy of mass public provision.[25] The United States, on the other hand, used demand-side subsidies, including tax deductions and mortgage guarantees, to encourage home ownership. While U.S. policy succeeded in providing decent housing to a substantial proportion of the working class, it contributed to suburban sprawl, discriminated against minorities, and caused public housing to be considered as a shelter of last resort, thereby isolating and stigmatizing its low-income occupants.[26]

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24. Transportation is not discussed in this chapter. However, it is an area under local planning jurisdiction that also has strong equity implications. Investment choices between commuter rail and bus and decisions about fare and route structures have very different impacts on low- and high-income riders.

25. See Harloe (1995) for the definitive comparative study of social housing provision in the United States and Europe.

26. Housing scholars use the term "residualized" to refer to social housing that only serves a narrow, low-income band of the population.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century European and American approaches increasingly converged, as Europe moved away from supply-side strategies and American cities gentrified in the core. Public-sector housing production declined on both continents, while private developers of large housing complexes were being asked to include a proportion of units for low-income households. Existing social housing was restructured—in the United States the HOPE VI program replaced many public housing projects with mixed-income developments under various forms of ownership and management; in Europe governments also demolished existing estates, converting them into mixed-income developments or transferring them to housing associations (Van Kempen et al. 2005). Public subsidies to nonprofit organizations (community development corporations in the United States; housing associations in Europe) or private developers now provide the principal means by which new affordable housing gets built. Market forces rather than democratic decision making determine the size and location of housing investment except in those Northern European countries where the government uses land banking to control property investment; even in those places developer interest is usually key to the release of land. A system of rent supplements has increasingly become the norm in both North America and Europe. In the United States, however, rental assistance is not assured to those qualifying by income, while in most European countries all eligible households receive help.

The abandonment of government-owned housing as the European solution to the housing question does not necessarily represent a move away from regarding housing as a basic right. If the rent supplement is guaranteed and there are units available in which it can be applied, then demand-side subsidies offer the recipient greater choice than was the case in public housing. Although the monotony and bureaucratic ossification that characterized much social housing was not inevitable, they were common enough characteristics to make a move toward mixed-income complexes under a variety of auspices welcome to many. Also, as a larger proportion of the population aspired to ownership, the demand for social housing, which had once encompassed a broad spectrum of the population, diminished. All this meant that the right to housing as it had been implemented in Europe needed to be reconceptualized and served in new ways:

> Social democratic parties struggled but failed to come to terms with the politics and economics of the [post-Fordist] era . . . . They

> failed to move from an increasingly ineffective defence of the economic and social framework of the post-war welfare states to a new set of principles and ideas that might have challenged the ideological dominance of the New Right, and provided a basis for reclaiming the political allegiance of the 'middle mass' of the electorate. (Harloe 1995, 499)

The requisite "new set of principles and ideas" does not necessarily imply a move away from the goal of providing decent housing to all nor does it undercut a commitment to supplying housing on a noncommodified basis, but it does open up the norm of equitable housing provision to vulnerabilities. Harloe asserts that the "middle mass" of the post-Fordist epoch is seeking greater variety and more autonomy in its housing accommodation and that bureaucratized social housing programs were failing to respond to their wishes. Presumably a more decentralized, flexible system could fulfill these criteria without resort to full privatization. Nevertheless, encouraging home ownership for the relatively well-off endangers the redistributional character of subsidized housing.

Dilemmas arise when we consider criteria for evaluating claims to housing assistance. Part of the reason for the shift to nongovernmental ownership of affordable housing is that private owners have greater freedom to discriminate against problem tenants. From the viewpoint of other residents, having criminal or psychologically disturbed neighbors is undesirable, and most occupants probably support their exclusion. Such people must live somewhere, however, and equity calls for providing everyone with a home. On the other hand, democracy would seem to require that people have at least some control over their neighbors, even while current sentiment among social-service providers in favor of mainstreaming tends to deny it. Other issues involve how much rent subsidy should be provided—should a subsidized household be able to afford a better apartment than an unsubsidized one because of the supplement available? A further dilemma arises from the notches created by any means-tested program—that is, the income level at which one no longer qualifies for aid. The family that is one dollar or one euro above the limit will typically feel unfairly treated.

Homeownership for the poor is a slogan that has been popular in the United States but has recently proved disastrous in precipitating the subprime mortgage crisis. Nevertheless, it reflects a generally held sentiment promulgated by politicians but also assimilated by the affected public.[27] Increases in housing values during the postwar period make ownership seem advantageous, and title to one's domicile gives one greater freedom of use. Ownership frequently offers tax advantages. Although the United Kingdom and France have eliminated the tax deduction for home ownership, its continuation in the United States and most European countries has meant that owners in these countries receive a significant financial benefit—and the more affluent the owner, the greater the benefit (Haffner 2002). Reformers in the United States have long called for the elimination of the homeowners' tax deduction, which has a regressive effect, but politically this is a nonstarter. So the question for American policy makers who wish to create greater equity is how to even out the benefits to renters and owners in a way that makes housing more affordable for those in lower income ranges and allows them some of the privileges of ownership.

There is a tight link between policies for urban regeneration and for housing. Broadly speaking, the designation of uses for areas under redevelopment determines who will benefit from regeneration programs; to the extent that areas remain or become residential, who will live in them constitutes the core of redevelopment policy. The 1949 U.S. Housing Act incorporates urban renewal as well as public housing in its mandates and requires that land cleared under the urban renewal provisions be predominately residential. Its successor, the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act, likewise combines housing and neighborhood improvement programs. The Dutch control the form of urban redevelopment through decisions over where to locate housing. After the war, British, French, and German cities were reshaped through the development of social housing. Now mixed-use development that juxtaposes residential and commercial space has become the instrument for shaping urban areas.

The postwar history of urban regeneration programs has involved a repetitive group of conflicts. Generally they can be encapsulated in the phrase growth versus equity. They can take the form of downtown versus the neighborhoods; demolition versus preservation; community stability

27. See Goetz and Sidney (1994); Krueckeberg (1999). Krueckeberg cites a survey of Boston public housing tenants indicating that the majority shared the dream of home ownership. When, during a class lecture, I argued that individual ownership was not appropriate for people with unstable employment and low income, an African American student accused me of prejudice.

versus population change; institutional expansion and subsidized construction of sports facilities versus investments in social housing, education, or community facilities; expressway construction versus public transit; megaevents versus locally oriented festivities. The argument from equity normally takes the second position in each of these dichotomies, but, within capitalist cities that are competing with one another for investment, a reflexive opposition to inducements to investors may leave cities with very little to redistribute.

This conclusion underlies Paul Peterson's contention that only national governments have it in their power to be redistributive and city governments benefit everyone by fostering economic growth. His position, however, ignores the possibility of balancing goals. Further, it does not recognize that policies dismissed as merely redistributive might make a greater long-run contribution to economic viability than supposedly growth-inducing tactics such as subsidizing sports teams. Thus Clarence Stone, in contesting Peterson's argument, proposes that an emphasis on investment in human capital and a longer time frame would lead to policies that are both redistributive and growth producing. Moreover, he considers that neglect of such investment can ultimately prove harmful to a city's interests by producing an unemployable and belligerent population (Stone 2005, 247).

Politicians tend to favor "hard" expenditures in buildings and infrastructure over "soft" investments in human capital because their efforts become visible and are achievable in the short term. Even without direct pressure from business interests for commercial development, politicians feel the need to show something demonstrable to their constituents—democratic participation does not necessarily favor long-run strategies. In European cities, where most urban public expenditures are financed by the national government, local governments are much more inclined to engage in social expenditures than their American counterparts. But, increasingly, their leadership buys into competitiveness arguments that seemingly are supported by their constituencies.[28] Thus, we have seen electoral defeats of Left parties in municipal elections, along with a shift, even among social democratic governments, toward entrepreneurialism.

In summary, housing provision and urban regeneration, two key areas of local public policy since the Second World War, are arenas in which

28. See Judd and Parkinson (1990); Harvey (1989).

the values of diversity, democracy, and equity are in tension. Individual aspirations for privacy and control of one's surroundings; communal sentiments toward preservation and membership in a group of like-minded people; housing shortages and lack of affordability; economic restructuring and consequent obsolescence of land uses; environmental hazards; aging of housing and infrastructure—all these make up the conditions within which framers of housing and redevelopment programs must work. Defining each dispute in terms of what constitutes the most just solution means that the equity implications should always be spelled out and given priority, but depending on the context sometimes other values ought to prevail.

Regionalism: The Politics of Scale

An obvious criticism of any discussion of the just city is in the use of the term "city"; after all, the spatial boundaries of cities are essentially arbitrary, and virtually all cities are nested within metropolitan regions. Moreover, political jurisdictions have little meaning from the standpoint of economic production; production complexes and labor markets are regional in scope. Geographical scholarship has for some years been preoccupied with "the new regionalism," which focuses on the interdependence of firms across metropolitan territories and the movement of capital within and among regions. Political scientists, in the meanwhile, have revived earlier interests in the redrawing of boundaries so as to better reflect economic and social reality. Policy makers in both Europe and North America have promoted new policies for regional and metropolitan governance, based on arguments from efficiency, democracy, and equity.

The economic logic underlying a focus on the region is largely the same in both North America and Europe: synergies identified in areas such as Silicon Valley and Emilia Romagna imply that other regions could benefit from similar growth strategies. The political underpinnings, however, are different. In the United States, where municipalities are largely dependent on their own tax base to support services, proponents of metropolitan government such as David Rusk and Myron Orfield contend that consolidation is necessary for fair distribution.[29]

29. Rusk and Orfield have been active popularizers of metropolitan government in the United States. See Rusk (2003); Orfield (2002).

Business interests support greater regional coordination for different reasons: they usually are primarily concerned with the inefficiencies resulting from fragmented governance of service provision in such areas as transportation and water resources and with enhancing competitiveness (Kanter 2000). European governments and business interests are also concerned with coordination and competitiveness, but the move toward political regionalism results primarily from decentralization of national governmental functions rather than from consolidation (Brenner 1999). The justifying argument in Europe is that regional governments are more responsive to the public and to local conditions than remote central bureaucracies (R. Putnam 1993).

American scholars concerned with the inequitable distribution of resources between wealthy suburbs and impoverished cities have strongly supported forms of governance that allow urban governments to have access to taxpayers outside their jurisdictions (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2004; Frug 1999). They have also seen fragmented government as causal in racial segregation, and urban sprawl as contributing to the isolation of the poor. Thus, Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom (2004, chap. 7) make a strong argument for preventing bidding wars among municipalities and reining in peripheral growth.

The argument against bidding wars is the most unassailable. Their effect, whether intra-metropolitan or among metropolitan areas, is to intensify the race to the bottom, wherein American cities give away their tax bases in order to encourage growth. These wars are most intense in the United States because of greater municipal autonomy. Even in Europe, however, they go on, usually in the form of regulatory concessions and infrastructure provision rather than tax benefits. Although in theory one can make an equity argument in support of such programs—they could be used to attract firms to high-unemployment areas that they would otherwise avoid—empirical studies do not indicate this effect has occurred.[30] Especially counterproductive are the battles in the United States for major league sports teams, in which municipal governments provide infrastructure, underwrite loans, and give tax subsidies while the teams pocket the revenues from the facilities and from media franchises (Austrian and Rosentraub 2003).

30. See Fisher and Peters (1998); Peters and Fisher (2003).

More problematic is the antisprawl argument. Opposition to sprawl is a virtually reflexive stance for progressive planners, and support for it usually is associated with market-oriented, right-wing commentators.[31] Andrew Kirby, however, when reviewing one of Myron Orfield's books, mounts a challenge from the left to compact development: "Sprawl is actually good for the residents of a city if we assess it in class terms and not racial terms. Bringing new land into development on the urban fringe is likely to bring relatively affordable housing onto the market (just as it did when Levittown was built 50 years ago)" (Kirby 2004, 756). Even more unorthodoxly, Kirby goes on to defend the rigid rules of conduct associated with the homeowner associations that govern common interest developments (CIDs), the term for planned, often gated communities. He speculates that residents will be more willing to accept social diversity if everyone must conform to strict regulations. His argument thus parallels mine regarding behavior in public space—regulating behavior forestalls discrimination based on ascriptive characteristics.

Kirby's silver linings, however, are somewhat overstated. Low-density fringe development does produce cheaper housing, but at the cost of increased transportation expenses in both time and money. Limits on behavior may make people feel safer, but at a price in personal freedom and, if they are simply imposed by the developer, in democracy as well. Environmental costs of sprawl have by now been well documented, although they have possibly been exaggerated (Krieger 2005). Nevertheless, Kirby does demonstrate that the impacts of sprawl on equity and diversity are not as clear-cut as is often supposed. Like many of the issues discussed here, the extent to which a particular pattern of development maximizes equity, diversity, and democracy simultaneously has to be evaluated within a specific context.

Also problematic is the issue of metropolitan or regional governance. Iris Marion Young (2000, 234) calls for a multitiered organization of government, in which regional government frames the relations among subsidiary units. She admits, however, that "everything depends on the institutional design and the political pressures of organized citizens to use regional institutions for undermining exclusion and promoting more equality" (Young 2000, 235). Young cites the examples of Minneapolis–Saint Paul and Johannesburg, which use tax base sharing

31. For example, Garreau (1992); Bruegmann (2005).

to promote equity and which have the power to locate affordable housing throughout their jurisdictions. The impacts of these redistributive measures, however, are at most moderate. In the Twin Cities the Metropolitan Council that governs the region has retreated from earlier activism; Minneapolis, although housing the area's poorest population, is a net contributor of revenue, and the Council has ignored fair housing mandates (Goetz 2003, 89). In South Africa firms and well-to-do citizens have moved beyond the boundaries of the metropolitan district so as to escape its strictures.

All of this indicates that there is nothing about regional bodies that automatically makes them vehicles for greater equity. Moreover, as measures for improving democratic participation they lack both the intimacy of smaller-scale communities and the capabilities and familiarity of higher levels of government, where citizens at least are likely to know who is representing them. Also, in regions where there is substantial income disparity the affluent tend to dominate regional entities. Regionalism can remove from low-income minorities the power they gained through dominating small political units, whether American inner cities or European working-class suburbs. Thus, while metropolitan governing institutions potentially can redistribute income, disperse affordable housing, encompass a diverse public, and offer the possibility of popular control of a level of government with greater capacity than small municipalities, the likelihood that they will produce these results is slim.

Implications

This chapter has shown that in relation to the broad issue areas of urban policy, values of democracy, diversity, and equity may pull in different ways. Within crucial urban policy arenas, context and historical moment make the choice of the most just policy indeterminate in the abstract. Does this mean that we can make no decision rules concerning policies that will further justice in the city? My argument in the concluding chapter of this book is that we can list criteria by which to formulate and evaluate policy comparable to Martha Nussbaum's listing of capabilities even if we cannot go as far as specifying programs. The particular policies that best satisfy the criteria will vary according to time and place, but the fact that we cannot specify *ex ante* the most progressive policies does not mean that we cannot establish bases of judgment.

The next three chapters examine the redevelopment histories of New York, London, and Amsterdam in relation to the issues discussed in this chapter. The purpose is to apply the criteria of justice—democracy, diversity, and equity—to policies adopted and, where they have been found wanting, indicate alternatives that would more closely conform to these values.