

Holmes 15 (1988) p. 151-16

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IN SEARCH OF THE OCCULT: AN ANNOTATED ANTHOLOGY

C. Robert Phillips, III

... it is plain that magical practices are of a totally different kind from religious practices, as being the result of a different mental attitude towards the supernatural; they belong to a ruder and more rudimentary idea of the relation of Man to the Power manifesting itself in the universe.

W. Warde Fowler

An actual religious system implies a great advance from the savage state.

Charles Singer

What is magic?¹ Every generation of scholars, whether classicists, anthropologists, historians of religion, or others, thinks it knows. Every generation produces its own definitions, which have often said more about the interpreters than the phenomenon.² Every generation builds on its predecessors, sometimes continuing their definitions, sometimes reworking them. Inevitable cacophony results.

Georg Luck has bravely entered the cacophony with *Arcana Mundi: Magic and the Occult in the Greek and Roman Worlds*.³ He has been brave to make his selections, he has had to determine what he considers "magic" and "occult"—and this is no easy task. Brave because, regardless of definition, there exists an enormous quantity of evidence; any specialist could carp at the absence of a favorite "important" text. Finally, and most importantly, brave in presenting more than merely the evidence: he generously offers introductory material to individual selections and often lengthy introductions to his sections, in both cases presenting information that frequently ranges beyond the traditional purview of classical studies. Unfortunately, this very generosity may lead to bogus quibbles. The introductory material transcends the anthology format, and yet does not claim to be a full-scale study. Thus some may unfairly criticize Luck's book for what it is not, rather than appreciate it for what it is.

Luck groups his material into six sections ("Magic," "Miracles," "Daemonology," "Divination," "Astrology," "Alchemy"), the significance of which receives extended discussion later in this review. As one might expect from so distinguished a classicist, the translations are readable and accurate; occasional differences do not merit discussion. The author has thoughtfully sifted literary, epigraphical, and papyrological texts from the beginning to the end of classical antiquity to present a wide-ranging, eye-opening selection.⁴ Commendably, few "howlers" appear in the wide-ranging introductory material; thus the occasional example, such as (35) "... according to Acts, Simon and Peter challenged each other before the emperor Nero in Rome," does not undermine confidence in the book's sound scholarship.⁵ Luck emphasizes

the literary evidence, as Morton Smith has noted; oddly, though, legal texts are absent.⁶ But the absence of archaeological evidence is not odd, given the incomplete state of many excavations and their widely scattered publication; one should recall that A. H. M. Jones's celebrated *The Later Roman Empire* did not offer archaeological evidence.⁷ Luck's selection of curse tablets and papyri could usefully be expanded.⁸ The book's literary evidence becomes sparser for the later empire. Thus it only summarizes (19-20, 256) the famous divination incident of A. D. 371-72 (Amm. Marcell. 29.1), unfortunately omitting details of the interesting conclusion on the misinterpretation of prophecy (29.1.33 with 31.14.8). The linking of the pagan "usurper" Eugenius with unsanctioned religious activities merits mention (Ruf., *H.E.* 2.33), and likewise the two last examples known to me linking paganism with such activities in Evag., *H.E.* 5.18, and John Eph., *H.E.* 3.29-30.⁹ The various charges of "magic" leveled against heretics and Jews could expand the scope of the first section.¹⁰ Finally, the section "Astrology" would benefit from examples of the expulsions of astrologers.¹¹

At the same time, some of Luck's conceptualizations of the phenomena, as they appear implicitly in his principles of selection and arrangement of the texts, explicitly in his own formulations, do not always accord with current social science theories about unsanctioned religious activity. Readers should be aware of those differences and ponder the methodological differences among classical studies, anthropology, and history of religions. *Arcana Mundi* may not be as current on theory as some might wish, but it still operates in a refreshingly wide perspective. Its many virtues challenge a reviewer to balance gratitude with friendly, constructive criticism.

I

What is "magic"?¹² Nineteenth-century England thought it knew. Magic, in its view, was a "primitive" mode of thought, primitive defined as that which did not accord with the reasonableness that the socio-economic elite attributed to itself and its institutions." As Dr. Tylor observed long ago, the more civilised the race, the more apt it is to associate magic with men of inferior civilisation."¹³ The study of "primitive" thought constituted a virtual growth industry for nineteenth-century British academics, stimulated, aided, and abetted as they were by the torrent of ethnographic reports pouring in from administrators, missionaries, and tourists throughout the colonial empire.¹⁴ Moreover, the British presence in India had given access to a vast corpus of Sanskrit texts deemed indisputably the ancestors of the earliest texts from Mediterranean antiquity. Now that Sanskrit could be translated, it appeared possible to push back by many centuries linguistic and societal "origins."¹⁵ Thus the study of "primitive" thought offered not only intrinsic interest, but also the possibility of juxtaposing comparative material with well-known classical texts in the context of evolutionist

interpretative strategies to explain "scientifically" that which had hitherto received unsatisfying explanations, namely how the past produced the present.¹⁶

"Primitive" thought meant childlike, savage, muddled thought, the inability to conceptualize causal relationships. clearly: "As for savages, they were characteristically sunk in ignorance and pathetic incapacities of reason, their imaginations imbued with magical prejudices and their rational faculties stunted for lack of occasion, at best, to elaborate the critical concepts of empirical cosmology."¹⁷ Magic became thus either bad religion or bad science, depending on the particular investigator's *a priori*; this led to postulated evolutions of either magic/religion/science or magic/science/religion, the former favored by social scientists, the latter by clergy.¹⁸ Bad religion because it had not evolved to the obvious logical perfection of Christian theology. Bad science because it had not evolved to the obvious logical perfection of contemporary science and technology. And evolve it should have, for Darwin's "scientific" demonstration of the apparent correctness of species evolution seemed to others just as applicable to society as a whole, a concept that they elaborated sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly to make European society the predictable and predicted outcome.¹⁹ Sir Edmund Leach has recently summarized the implications (his emphases):

First *science* was distinguished as knowledge and action which depends upon the 'correct' evaluation of cause and effect, the specification of what is correct being determined by the syllogisms of Aristotelian logic and the mechanical determinism of Newtonian physics. The residue was *superstition*. From superstition was then discriminated *religion*. The minimal definition of religion varied from author to author . . . ; the residue was then *magic*. Magic was then refined by some into white magic (good) and black magic (bad). Black magic, renamed *sorcery*, was then discriminated from *witchcraft*, and so on.²⁰

Leach adds immediately: "The practical value of such categories is very slight," a remark which Thomas Luckmann parallels: "The supernatural/empirical opposition is, I think, a vestige of 19th-century scientism which has led and misled much anthropological, sociological, and 'religionswissenschaftliche' theorizing about religion."²¹

Anthropologists and specialists in comparative religion did more than proffer evolutionist views; they joined also with classicists and Sanskritists in a common enterprise. The University of Oxford rapidly became a focal point, owing largely to the prolific presence of Sir Edward Tylor, Reader in Anthropology, along with R. R. Marett, classicist by training and anthropologist by trade.²² Their lecture topics are revealing:²³

TYLOR:

1892: Anthropology as Related to Ancient and Modern History

1895: Early Stages of Knowledge (Science, Magic, Mythology, History)

The Relation of Savage Life to the Higher Forms of Civilisation

1898: Anthropology of Ancient Civilised Nations

1899: Anthropology in Classical Literature

1907: Anthropological Evidences in History (especially Classical)

MARETT:

1909: Magico-Religious Origins

1910: Primitive Religions (informal instruction)

1911: Psychology of Magic

1912: Classical Origins in the Light of Anthropology

The works of Cyril Bailey, W. Warde Fowler, L. R. Farnell, A. Pickard-Cambridge, and H. J. Rose, all then at Oxford, among others, clearly show the influence of the two anthropologists.²⁴ Again, Max Müller, appointed Professor of Comparative Philology in 1868, not only busied himself in the technicalities of the ancient Indian language, but also utilized his expertise in conjunction with material from the other fields to promulgate a linguistically based view of the development of society.²⁵ At Cambridge, Sir James Frazer and Jane Harrison pursued anthropology, classical studies, and comparative religion simultaneously throughout voluminous writings.²⁶ Lively correspondence among the confraternity provided mutual assistance, while their former Oxbridge students often made careers in the colonial empire and regularly reported information to their erstwhile masters from the perspectives of those masters.²⁷ Traditional classicists saw rich lodes of data and conceptualizations to be worked: "If we consider the writings of eminent scholars who wrote about Greek and Roman religion and mythology before the appearance of Dr. Tylor's *Primitive Culture*. . . we see at once what an immense advance has been effected by that monumental work, and by the stimulus that it gave to others to follow the same track."²⁸

Many contemporary classicists still think they know what "magic" is. A. A. Barb spoke of the "syncretistic, rotting refuse-heap of the dead and dying religions" in late antiquity, noting of the resultant "empty shell" that "the masses filled it with all the refuse of superstitions, questionable white magic, and an apparently alarming amount of *goëtia*, that is to say unequivocal black sorcery;" Peter Salway observed that "ghosts, black magic, and curses were taken seriously in the Classical world, and are part of that darker side of Classical religion;" H. H. Scullard in eminently Tylorian terms about Roman religion of the Republic noted "the dark forest that surrounded the minds of their ancestors."²⁹ These opinions could easily have been written a century ago, a fact of which many classicists seem unaware, despite such cognizance on the part of contemporary anthropologists and specialists in comparative religion.

The admittedly complex causes of the current dichotomy merit examination. From the 1930s onwards, classicists in America and England turned their backs on what they considered the false and excessive conclusions of social science methodologies in favor of what seemed the "hard" and truthful text-based empiricism of German classical studies. Their move proved ultimately fruitless, for three reasons. First, they continued to accept the earlier conceptualizations, as the quotes from Barb, Salway, and Scullard demonstrate, while claiming

to reject the methodologies.³⁰ Second, they thought that empiricism offered "hard" facts that would speak for themselves without the ventriloquism of the investigator. This is patently not so.³¹ Third, they identified German classical scholarship with empiricism, a false equation although the Germans made it also. A brief look at German classical scholarship of the nineteenth century explicates.

German classical scholarship dominated for the first two-thirds of the century.³² A prime concern was to establish a reliable data base; Karl Lachmann (1793-1851) promulgated rules for a "scientific" palaeography that would recover accurate literary texts from the often chaotic groups of manuscripts.³³ German scholars soon produced an immense series of texts, which the firm of B. G. Teubner began to publish from the 1830s onwards.³⁴ This encouraged others to adopt similar methods for marshalling and evaluating the evidence for all aspects of classical antiquity, leading to immense encyclopedias and lengthy bibliographic summaries. Understandably, the empiricism that marked the compilation activities also dominated the use of the compilations. As for ancient religion, although some, such as Mannhardt for comparative religion and Samter for classical studies, utilized both comparative material and anthropological theories, the majority simply wove the data into narratives where the facts would supposedly "speak" for themselves.³⁵ Wissowa spoke for many Germans in deriding the anglophone comparativism and theorizing of Sir James Frazer's *Golden Bough* as not offering "etwas Wesentliches für das Verständnis der römischen Religion zu gewinnen."³⁶

Three historical circumstances bear upon Wissowa's position. First, the Germans lacked the vast colonial empire of the British, and hence ready access to comparative material on which to base theorizing.³⁷ Second, despite previous Continental antecedents, evolutionist theorizing remained a British product in the hands of its progenitor, Charles Darwin, and his *epigono*i. Third, and most importantly, the empiricism that the Germans proffered hardly constituted the ideal value-free enumeration of facts.

For example, consider the Roman festival of the Lemuria (May 9/11/13; Ov. *Fast.* 5.419-92) which stipulated midnight rituals to appease ghosts. German scholarship on Roman religion took the passage as empirically accurate. Thus Wissowa summarized the ritual, offered certain parallels, and noted ". . . dass die Geister der Verstorbenen zu gewissen Zeiten wieder die Oberwelt heimsuchen und, damit sie den Lebenden nicht schaden, durch besondere Gaben versöhnt werden müssen, tritt mit voller Deutlichkeit bei dem dreitägigen Totenfeste der Lemuria . . . hervor . . ."³⁸ Although this appears rigorously objective, closer examination reveals a different situation. The description appears in Wissowa's second chapter under a section (103 ff.) "Die di indigetes." He describes previously (19) that group: "Die erste Aufgabe römischer Religionsforschung muss demnach die Ermittlung des ursprünglichen

Kreises der *die indigites* bilden," and elsewhere he characterizes them as "den eigentlichen Kern und Mittelpunkt der altrömischen Religion."³⁹ Two conceptualizations lurk: first, that there existed an original "kernel" out of which Roman religion developed—an evolutionist position despite Wissowa's aforementioned dismissal of the evolutionist Frazer.⁴⁰ Second, that through studying the survivals of these original forms, one could recover information about the original Roman religion. This "doctrine of survivals" constituted a favored evolutionist interpretative strategy.⁴¹ Thus, however much Wissowa strove merely to present the data, his arrangement of that data contained an implicit interpretation.

The British and German approaches to Greco-Roman religion had parallelisms. Both felt they were being true to the ancient data: the Germans because of their emphasis on empirically "hard facts," the British because they felt they had bested the Germans in combining the ancient facts, which the Germans had so helpfully compiled with comparative material and theories, both produced "scientifically" and hence just as empirically "hard."⁴² Again, the British and Germans alike were wont to call certain religious phenomena from classical antiquity "magic." Some of those phenomena might be those which did not conform to what they considered religion, even though the ancients felt differently. Other phenomena might be those which the ancient texts themselves portrayed as disreputable. Anachronisms arose. The nineteenth century deemed bad religion or bad science to be magic, as it defined all three; the Germans did so largely unwittingly, the British in context of their comparative theorizing. Both not only read their definitions into religious information the ancients considered unobjectionable, but also assumed automatically that when an ancient seemed to consider a particular phenomenon as bad religion or bad science, it too was magic. Underlying this is the dubious notion that monolithic conceptual systems existed in antiquity. But some ancients considered Jesus a dabbler in black arts, while to others he expounded the True Religion.⁴³ Likewise for his erstwhile competition, Apollonius of Tyana.⁴⁴ Astrologers could be revered if they gave useful predictions to those in power, reviled if they did not.⁴⁵ Put differently:

... if you do something I dislike, my religious system's theology of evil can label it and thus conceptually liquidate it as one of the dark sides of the cosmos which deserve eternal vigilance. I can sincerely or mendaciously accuse you of magic, but if my system has other adherents, you are in trouble. Moreover, if I happen to possess physical coercive power, I may work considerable authoritarian mischief, both against you and also in support of my system which, *ipse dixi*, stands for the True Cosmic Order.⁴⁶

Consequently a profusion of confusion exists. Ancients could, on various grounds, claim certain phenomena to be magic. But those grounds varied. Likewise, on various grounds, they could claim certain phenomena to be evil, malicious, or unsanctioned, without applying "magic" to them.⁴⁷ Multiplying this by the variety of modern definitional strategies produces the confusion. The way out will not be easy.

II

The book's subheading, *Magic and the Occult in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, raises the organizational problems with which Luck has had to contend. Do magic and the occult constitute the same things? What is their relationship to religion? Now Luck's section headings might seem to provide an answer: "Magic," "Miracles," "Daemonology," "Divination," "Astrology," "Alchemy." But Luck would surely never claim that categories two through six indisputably constitute the occult, however that word be defined. Quite apart from the first category, the following five all could, and did, constitute parts of ancient religion.

The fourth part, "Divination," shows all this *in nuce*. A lengthy introduction (229-60) examines the practice in the Ancient Near East, Etruria, Greco-Roman paganism, and Christianity. The wide-ranging references will be instructive to many; it is good to see, for example, the *Didache*, the less well-known treatises of Plutarch, Isidore of Seville, and Varro's *Antiquitates*, along with the better-known material evidence of the Greek tragedians, Cicero, and Seneca. But the selection of texts (261-305) becomes curious in this context. Despite the helpful analysis of the Delphic oracle (245-46, 248-50), its famous responses which Herodotus retails and Thucydides's trenchant comments on prophecy (2.54) in connection with the plague at Athens in 430 B.C. do not appear.⁴⁸ Absent too are Livy's omens and the collection of Julius Obsequens.⁴⁹ Now it may be that Luck would claim that those responses are well-known and need not appear here in the interests of conserving space. But elsewhere Luck offers selections from the equally well-known authors Homer, the tragedians, Vergil, and Lucan. Again, in line with the book's subtitle, perhaps it might be claimed that Herodotus and Thucydides describe "official" divination and the book must be true to its "magic and the occult" rubric. But that explanation founders on the appearance of the very official Cicero.

Some material appears elsewhere when it might more appropriately be placed here, and some material appears here that might belong more appropriately elsewhere. In the former case, Lucan's description of Erichtho (6.413-830) appears (195-204) among the "Daemonology" texts (176-225), although it treats necromancy, a subject which clearly belongs with "Other Methods of Divination" (253-57).⁵⁰ In the latter case, Philostr., *AT* 5.12 (p. 290) defending Apollonius against charges of magic, ought to appear in the "Magic" section especially because *goês* actually appears in the text. What about Aelius Aristides? The "Miracles" section offers two examples from *Oratio* 24 of incubation and subsequent healings at Epidaurus (147-51). Now I would not quarrel with that category, but the examples could also merit a place in the "Divination" section since incubation involves both healing and prophetic dream. Finally, because they offer medical cures, the "Alchemy" section might also claim them.⁵¹

These individual cases for multiple homes demonstrate the problem with Luck's categories. To a non-adherent in antiquity, magic,

daemonology, and possibly astrology would be appropriate ways to categorize an uncongenial religious phenomenon, whereas the adherent might opt for miracles, divination, and alchemy. Such polarization appears clearly in the cases of the two "holy men" Apollonius of Tyana and Alexander of Abonuteichos.⁵² In the former case, we can see the division of adherent and non-adherent clearly with Philostratus's *Life* and Eusebius's *Against Hierocles*, respectively; it would have been helpful if Luck had included selections from the latter work to balance those he did give from Philostratus. As for Alexander, we possess only Lucian's negative account. Probably never was opinion so divided, as the anti-charlatan Lucian sought to demote a figure whom multitudes and highly placed Romans alike took seriously.⁵³ Hence its absence from *Arcana Mundi* is regrettable. One is tempted to ask in all these cases "which is it"? And the answer must be "either, depending on the adherence, or lack thereof, on the part of the observer."⁵⁴

Similar problems of selection and categorization could apply to all the other sections. I now focus on Luck's first section, "Magic," for three reasons. First, it has lapidary position, both in the subtitle and in the order of sections. Second, its very length (introduction: 3-60; texts: 61-131) dwarfs the other sections and thus commands more attention. Third, the term "magic" itself, as I have demonstrated, lies squarely at the center of the long-standing debate about the relations of magic, religion, and science, both in classical antiquity and later.

Luck sensibly begins (3): "Settling on a precise definition of magic is not easy . . ." He offers an equally sensible definition (*ibid.*): "... a technique grounded in a belief in powers located in the human soul and in the universe outside ourselves, a technique that aims at imposing the human will on nature or on human beings by using supersensual powers." I observe in passing that this definition could apply equally well to "religion." He notes (*ibid.*) that the fundamental question devolves upon powers: who uses them and for what end, and here he implicitly aligns himself with Peter Brown's persuasive observations.⁵⁵ He recognizes the difficulty of drawing a distinction between magic and religion (4): "Many approaches to the problem have been tried, but none seems to work well." Finally, he knows that a group in power can relegate what it deems unsavory in the religion of those it rules to the realm of magic (6): "The truly outlandish elements in a foreign religion seem to have been rejected and despised by the conquerors and classified as witchcraft . . ." All of these claims show a refreshingly non-doctrinaire position.

Luck also juxtaposes different positions. His third sentence (3) observes that "... magic is but one of the occult sciences." Again, he seems to accept the nineteenth-century notion that "magic" belongs to a society's "primitive" beginnings (5): "There is reason to believe that some fundamental magical beliefs and rituals go back to the cult of the great earth goddess."⁵⁶ Then there is the nineteenth-century notion that

"magical" thought was muddled thought (*ibid.*): "The early Greeks may well have misunderstood the nature of some foreign religions and cults . . . Hence, a good deal of magical lore may simply reflect the beliefs and rituals of ancient religions and rituals in countries of which the Greeks had only some vague knowledge."

Such palpable contrasts often appear together (9):

Ancient magic could arrive at the same results as science, but it did not attribute them to human reasoning or experimentation: rather, it credited them to direct or indirect contact with a supernatural power. Ancient magic usually dealt with the material world, but that world was thought to be governed and controlled by invisible presences.

Several problems lurk here. First, that the same differentiation that the nineteenth century first postulated, namely magic as bad science, constitutes an appropriate way to view "magic" and "science" in antiquity. Second, and consequently, that the concomitant definitions of "magic" and "science" hold for antiquity. Neither position is plausible, as this review attempts to demonstrate. Third, and most importantly, that "science" constitutes a source of indisputable truth, a position directly descended from the Enlightenment's boundless faith in human rationalism coupled with apparent initial success in "scientific" experiments as it so defined them.⁵⁷ This is also not so, because the epistemological status of science has undergone reconceptualization. Thomas Kuhn has demonstrated that "science" constitutes a series of agreed-upon "paradigms" to make sense of phenomena. The perceptions of those phenomena, and the paradigms used to explain them, can and do change in what Kuhn calls the "paradigm shifts" of "scientific revolutions."⁵⁸ Consequently, to use science as an explanatory system imputes to it an inappropriate claim to absolute truth. But Luck implies just such a claim in his subsection "Ancient Magic and Psychic Research Today" (46-53), although with the commendable effort to legitimate certain ancient phenomena that have been dismissed traditionally as quackery.⁵⁹

Luck should not necessarily be censured for using the traditional categories of magic, religion, and science. Those categories represent cumulative philosophizing by the best nineteenth-century intellects. Too, they have had a long, fruitful heuristic life. But now, in light of the very considerable rethinking of those categories, a situation quite analogous to what Kuhn describes has arisen: the traditional paradigms no longer work, and investigators are casting about for new interpretative structures.

For a start, one might bracket as overly value laden the modern definitions of magic, religion, and science, and then proceed differently.⁶⁰ Any society will divide the world into what it considers ordinary reality and extraordinary reality. It will use a variety of what it considers secular knowledge, including what moderns have traditionally called "science" to explain and manipulate the ordinary reality. As for the extraordinary reality, it will use what it defines as sacred knowledge.

Here a very fluid system obtains. Usually a group of religious specialists is privileged to possess, explicate, and utilize that sacred knowledge; sometimes that group will be coextensive with the group that controls secular knowledge; sometimes it will cooperate with it. It will utilize a number of strategies to legitimate the correctness of the sacred knowledge it offers: ancestral tradition, alleged oral and/or written divine revelations *in illo tempore*, the apparent efficacy of the sacred knowledge in dealing with extraordinary reality. Sometimes it will employ secular coercive power to further its persuasion.⁶¹ Sometimes it will self-consciously use fraud.⁶² The system will be remarkably stable and self-perpetuating, provided that there exists an infrastructure of those who accept its tenets.

Sooner or later, however, alternate conceptualizations will begin to crack the erstwhile epistemological monolith.⁶³ Those alternates can focus on quite specific matters such as the interpretation of a particular text, more general ones such as the importation of a new divinity into a polytheistic system, and virtually earth-shattering ones in which the traditional boundaries of ordinary and extraordinary reality are called into question, this last sometimes, although not always, as a result of the two more particular alternates. If the proposers of those alternates win adherents, the danger to those in charge of maintaining traditionally-conceived ordinary and extraordinary reality is palpable. Put simply and in secular terms, they may be out of a job. In more complex terms, they may be sincerely outraged at the affront to the secular and/or sacred order of things because, on their view, they possess the "true" knowledge.⁶⁴ In all terms, something must be done about alternate conceptions that those in power regard as deviant. Put differently, how will they deal with the possibility of pluralism?

Many possible strategies exist. "The trouble begins whenever the 'strangeness' is broken through and the deviant universe appears as a possible habitat for one's own people. At that point, the traditional experts are likely to call for the fire and the sword—or, alternatively, particularly if fire and sword turn out to be unavailable, to enter into ecumenical negotiations with the competitors."⁶⁵ Practically, the deviants may be executed (medieval heretics), physically isolated and used for specific goals (Jews and Muslims in medieval Europe), made the subject of vigorous conversion attempts (Spanish Inquisition), or some combination of those options. Those in power legitimate their means through claiming that the deviants have set themselves in opposition to the traditionally revealed "right" order of the universe, the correctness of which the ongoing traditional social order demonstrates. Moreover, they will utilize their lexica to find terms with which to categorize the deviants in order to make a more plausible case both for the correctness of received tradition and for the liquidation, whether conceptual or physical, of the deviants. Socio-economic location provides one means: the deviants may be foreigners, women, members of the lower socio-

economic status groups, or some combination of those.⁶⁶ The attendant societal "knowledge" that those in power protect and promulgate will claim such groups do not constitute "real" members of society, and as a function of that depraved status are not only prone to "wrong" thinking but also surely deserve violent repression.⁶⁷ Various traditional stereotypes of those groups will receive fresh emphasis and be reinterpreted as further offenses, sacred and secular, against the traditional cosmic order: immorality, psychic instability, treason.⁶⁸

Into this maelstrom of charges against the deviants will appear probably the most all-encompassing conceptual liquidation strategy of all, the charge of unsanctioned religious activity. That charge is part and parcel of the other charges, but also transcends them, because it implies that, through unsanctioned religious activity, the deviants have aligned themselves with the anomic forces of the cosmos, the evil and destructive forces from which the traditional religious experts and their skills have protected society. Put differently, the deviants traffic, on some level, with the destruction of order. Each society has its lexicon: *magic, witchcraft, sorcery; asebeia, goêteia, Magos; ars nefanda, ars secreta, magia*. "The list seems endless."⁶⁹

There are several implications for classical studies, taking these more theoretical considerations in concert with the historical considerations outlined in part one. First, given the variety of words for unsanctioned religious activity, one must attend not only to the precise words used in a given instance, but who is using them, and the form in which that information is transmitted. It will not do to call a curse tablet or papyrus "magical" simply because it seems contrary to "official" Greco-Roman religion. The user may have considered it a profound part of her or his theological system.⁷⁰ In the absence of a name, a less value-laden descriptive term seems appropriate. Second, it will not do to take a particular phenomenon the ancients named, such as astrology or necromancy, and rename it "magic" or "sorcery." Rather, one should examine what additional description the source gives, and for what reasons. Where there exist competing descriptions (Apollonius of Tyana) or descriptions that imply a counter-characterization (Alexander of Abonuteichos), one must evaluate the interests of those making the descriptions rather than willy-nilly accepting one.⁷¹ Third, and most generally, an investigator must always remember that monolithic systems of sacred and secular "knowledge" have little ontological status even in modern times, and still less so for classical antiquity. A value-laden description in one source, such as a Tacitean tableau of astrology as a black art, cannot be generalized to all of society.

Thus I would make claims for other terms and methodologies. To use "magic," "religion," and "science" is to use terms fraught with modern implications. Such terms cannot be used accurately for other societies, ancient or modern, because they will then function as conceptual straitjackets, imputing kinds of phenomena and valuations of those

phenomena to societies that may not possess them. Rather, one should consider how a society, or parts of society, conceptualizes the relations between ordinary and extraordinary reality—and, in that latter case, their lexica for dealing with what they consider “deviant” conceptions of extraordinary reality, always remembering that one person’s deviance may be another person’s orthodoxy. Unfortunately, those on the winning side of a deviance/orthodoxy confrontation are in a position to liquidate not only their opponents, but also their opponents’ texts and inherent conceptualizations, substituting a self-serving tradition that implies that, once again, the “true” theology has triumphed.⁷² Put differently, there is need to consider equally what is said and unsaid.

III

The historical grounds of part one and the theoretical grounds of part two thus raise questions about the utility of Luck’s divisions of material. Although I have focused on divination and magic, the other sections are also subject to the kind of “leakage” between categories. Magic can be miracle, or divination, or astrology, or daemonology, or alchemy. And each could be any of the above. Or, as O’Brien puts it to the thoroughly bemused Winston Smith in George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in connection with what two plus two equals: “Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are three. Sometimes they are all of them at once.”⁷³

The aforementioned questions of terminology and category do not imply a covert attempt to denigrate the value of Luck’s book; in particular, although he has chosen to group his evidence in a manner with which I do not entirely agree, the value of having that evidence, and his explications, remains very considerable. The author has encountered a particularly bruising “paradigm shift” in the Kuhnian sense, the results of which are by no means yet evident. My revised categories represent one contribution to that shift, but others are possible within the context of rejecting nineteenth-century strategies.⁷⁴ Luck’s breadth of reading in the social sciences clearly indicates his interest in contributing to the shift as well.⁷⁵ Readers should remember that the explanatory material comes in the context of an anthology, where providing essential background must be the prime requisite; a full-scale study would doubtlessly address many of my points. Moreover, one has to use some principle to group evidence; I cannot yet offer subdivisions to my category of “unsanctioned religious activity.” Whatever be the case for categories, the simple fact of offering such a wide variety of evidence and learned, wide-ranging explanatory material will earn every reader’s gratitude. The specialist will find much new material here, and the nonspecialist will find a new world. Georg Luck has made an impressive entry into the quagmire of the study of unsanctioned religious activity; his further productions will be most welcome.

NOTES

1. *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London: Macmillan, 1911), p. 47; *Religion and Science* (New York: Cape Smith, 1929), p. 9. I am grateful to Larry Alderink and John Helgeland, co-chairs of Greco-Roman Religions Group of the Society of Biblical Literature, for the opportunity to participate with Gail P. Corrington in a panel discussion of Luck’s book at the Society’s 1986 meeting; the author’s presence proved stimulating. Many points in this review receive elaboration in my “The Sociology of Religious Knowledge in the Roman Empire to A.D. 284,” *ANRW*, 2 16.3, pp. 2677-773; readers should note the section on magic at pp. 2711-32. I reference this article as “Sociology” and for the convenience of readers provide selections from its documentation; cf. my articles at notes 46 and 47 below. For an excellent overview of the history of the study of comparative religion as it relates to classical studies, Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion*, trans. J. Raffan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 1-4 with valuable notes on pp. 343-45.

2. “Magic” represents an important example of this tendency, but all phenomena, historical or otherwise, are equally liable. My implicit position is relativistic, that is, that no interpretation can claim to represent absolute truth; on the consequent rejection of empiricism, see below, note 31. Relativism does not imply a know-nothing position but, rather, indicates there is always more to be known. In general, Barry Barnes and David Bloor, “Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge,” in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., *Rationalism and Relativism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 21-47, and my “Sociology,” pp. 2681-97 for the connection with phenomenology.

3. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. Pp. xvi 398. \$12.95 (pb), \$30.00 (hb).

4. For some suggested additions, cf. the following discussion with notes 8-11.

5. Which Mouton Smith has independently pointed out in his review, *CW*, 80 (1986/87), 388. Luck may be referring to other noncanonical “Acts.” Thus *Acts of Peter* 32 describes a contest between the twosome, *Acts (or Passion) of Peter and Paul* retails a contest between Simon and the apostles in Nero’s presence; for the various versions, Edgar Hennecke, *New Testament Apocrypha*, ed. W. Schneemelcher and trans. R. McL. Wilson (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965), II, p. 575.

6. Previous note; for legal texts, below, note 47.

7. Which Peter Brown emphasized in his review-article reprinted in his *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine* (New York: Harper, 1972), p. 49.

8. On Greek curse tablets, C. A. Faraone, *JHS*, 105 (1985), 150-54. The “magical” papyri are now conveniently available in the ongoing publication of H. D. Betz, *The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), vol. I. To Luck’s citation of PGM 1.30, 2.98-102 (pp. 97-99) in connection with Jesus, add 4.3019-20 with my “Sociology,” p. 2732, note 162.

9. For Eugenius, Matthews (below, note 68), pp. 238-47.

10. My “Sociology,” p. 2718, note 116, and p. 2742, note 194 with Marcel Simon, *Verus Israel* (Paris: Boccard, 1964), pp. 394-431.

11. Below, note 45.

12. For the history of the study of religion in the nineteenth century, see Eric J. Sharpe, *Comparative Religion* (New York: Scribner, 1975), pp. 27-143, and Stocking (below, note 14), *passim*. Excerpts from the major theorists, with full bibliographies, appear in J. Waardenburg, *Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973-74), 2 vols. More modern works are anthologized in William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, eds., *Reader in Comparative Religion*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper, 1979), while selections from the theorists’ contemporaries appear in Burton Feldman and Robert Richardson, eds., *The Rise of Modern Mythology 1680-1860* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972). For modern approaches to the problem of defining “magic,” cf. Bryan R. Wilson, ed., *Rationality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), especially I. C. Jarvie and J. Agassi, “The Problem of the Rationality of Magic,” pp. 172-193 and J. M. Beattie, “On Understanding Ritual,” pp. 240-68; cf. the response of Jarvie and Agassi: “Magic and Rationality Again,” *BJS*, 24 (1973), 236-45. In general, my “Sociology,” pp. 2697-732.

13. Fowler (above, note 1), p. 49. The author describes how the ancients viewed their early religion; unwittingly, he describes how his generation viewed the ancients. Cf. my introductory quotes, and notes 17 and 24 below.

14. Talal Asad, ed., *Anthropology & the Colonial Encounter* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973); Katherine George, "The Civilized World Looks at Primitive Africa 1400-1800," *Isis*, 49 (1958), 62-72; Robert J. Hind, "'We Have No Colonies'—Similarities Within the British Imperial Experience," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 26 (1984), 3-35; David Pailin, *Attitudes to Other Religions. Comparative Religion in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). Contrast the different perspectives on Borneo: Charles Hose and William McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo* (London: Macmillan, 1912), 2 vols., and Hans Schäfer, *Die Gottesidee der Ngadju Dayak in Süd-Borneo* (Leiden: Brill, 1946; English trans. R. Needham [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963]); the former sees primitive irrationality, the latter, sophisticated cosmogony. Note that Hose (preface, p. 5) spent twenty-four years as a civil officer in the service of the Rajah of Sarawak. The best introduction to nineteenth-century anthropology is now George Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology* (New York: Free Press, 1987), and cf. Sharpe (above, note 12); regrettably, neither details the relationship with classical studies.

15. Below, note 25 for Max Müller. In general, Raymond Schwab, *The Oriental Renaissance*, trans. G. Patterson-Black and V. Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), esp. pp. 21-128. On the earlier periods, P. J. Marshall, ed., *The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) with valuable introduction at pp. 1-44. Those on the scene did not always share the enthusiasm of those at home; Macaulay's famous "minute" of 2 February 1835 is a classic example of hostility to Indian culture and the Sanskrit language ("fruitful of monstrous superstitions"); cf. Christopher Hibbert, *The Great Mutiny* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), pp. 23-58, and Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India. The Founders of Modern India* (New York: St. Martin's, 1954), pp. 248-65, 279-305. The British were mired in the need to cooperate with the Brahman ruling elite, a group which exercised social and religious monopoly over caste-ridden India and thus indulged in various practices the British deemed repulsive. This involved them directly with lower-caste protest movements which sought to overturn the Brahmins' power through secularization. Cf. below, note 67.

16. As many inherited the Enlightenment position that theological explanations were at best obscurantist, otherwise mendacious; below, note 57.

17. Rodney Needham, *Belief, Language, and Experience* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), p. 179, summarizing the nineteenth-century view; the entire chapter (176-246) merits close reading in these connections. Compare Marett's unpublished lecture "Animism and Savage Morality" (January, 1899; Balfour Library [below, note 27] No. 13), p. 22: "If, however, he is to emerge from savagery and from his petty round of tribal observances—and this he must do, as the world is now, or perish—he must submit to be interpenetrated by those 'civilising ideas,' of which the highest moral religion of the world is perhaps the fittest and most natural vehicle."

18. Among the anthropologists there existed considerable anti-clericalism: E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "Religion and the Anthropologists," in idem, *Essays in Social Anthropology* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 29-45. Triumphantism reigned; thus John Tyndall, "The Belfast Address," *Nature*, 20 (August, 1874), pp. 315-19, reprinted in Cosslett (next note), pp. 172-89, at p. 186 observes: "The impregnable position of science may be described in a few words. All religious theories, schemes, and systems, which embrace notions of cosmogony, or which otherwise reach into its domain, must, in so far as they do this, submit to the control of science, and relinquish all thought of controlling it." The less doctrinaire saw the uses of the new data and interpretative models, thus Max Müller, *Chips From a German Workshop* (London: Longmans, 1867) I, p. 48: "We shall learn to appreciate better than ever what we have in our own religion." On the theologians' response, Moore (next note); Sharpe (above, note 12), pp. 30-31, 147-48; and my "Sociology," pp. 2684-87.

19. The major texts reprinted in Tess Cosslett, ed., *Science and Religion in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). J. W. Burrow, *Evolution and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); James R. Moore, *The Post-Darwinian Controversies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); George Stocking, *Race,*

Culture, and Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). In consequence, the diffusionist theory of J. C. Pritchard lost its dominance: Leach (next note), p. 218, and Stocking (above, note 14), pp. 48-53.

20. Sir Edmund Leach, "Anthropology of Religion: British and French Schools," in Ninian Smart *et al.*, eds., *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), III, p. 243.

21. In the "Comments" section of Karl Rosengren, "Malinowski's Magic: The Riddle of the Empty Cell," *Current Anthropology*, 17 (1976), 678, with valuable bibliography at 684-85.

22. On Oxford's primacy, Richard Symonds, *Oxford and Empire* (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 2-3.

23. Drawn from the lecture lists published as supplements to the *Oxford University Gazette*. Of course, the offer of a lecture series is one thing, the attendance something else, particularly given Oxford's emphasis from the mid-nineteenth century on tutorial instruction; this made lectures less important modes of instruction. Too, dons did not (and do not) necessarily lecture in all their areas of expertise; thus Cyril Bailey lectured infrequently on Roman religion and W. Warde Fowler not at all, whereas at Cambridge Arthur Darby Nock seems never to have lectured on ancient religion, despite his later prominence in the field. For other lectures, below note 27. Others could and did attend the lectures; thus Codrington came to enough of Tylor's lectures to question the latter's use of animism to interpret the former's data, on which see Stocking (above, note 14), pp. 236-37 with note 109.

24. For example, L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), I, p. 9: "The anthropologist does not pretend to do more than supply us with a new key for the interpretation of certain parts of mythology and ritual, but the results of this new science have been already of the greatest value for the student of Greek cults;" cf. p. 5, after a discussion of two alleged earlier stages of Greek religion: "A third stage is that to which Greek religion, as we first know it, had attained: the object of worship is a personal divinity. . . ." The earlier stages were not deemed to be "real" religion, exactly the case then being made for contemporary "primitives;" cf. my introductory quotes and note 17 above and note 28 below. More complex is the idea of *mana*, which Robert Codrington brought back from the Melanesian Mission (Stocking, *loc. cit.*, previous note), Tylor incorporated, and Rose, along with others, linked with the Roman *numen*: H. J. Rose, *Ancient Roman Religion* (London: Hutchinson, 1948), pp. 12-14, quoting Codrington at p. 13, and idem, *Primitive Culture in Italy* (London: Methuen, 1926), p. 7, and observing on Roman *numina* (45): "But their history can be traced back . . . to nothing higher than the savage concept of *mana*. . . ." But compare Weinstock's opposition in his review of the former book, *JRS*, 39 (1949), 166-67, and Rose's rejoinder, *HTR*, 44 (1951), pp. 109-20. Weinstock argues from Roman evidence, but an equally strong case could be made on the incommensurability of Melanesian and Roman material, especially since the former was viewed through Christianizing spectacles. For the continued attraction of the theory, H. Wagenvoort, "Wesenszüge altrömischer Religion," *ANRW*, I,2, pp. 352-56.

25. Joseph M. Kitagawa and John S. Strong, "Friedrich Max Müller and the Comparative Study of Religion," in Smart (above, note 20), pp. 179-213, with 187-88 on the controversy with the evolutionist Lang; H. Lloyd-Jones, *Blood for the Ghosts* (London: Duckworth, 1982), pp. 155-64; Stocking (above, note 14), pp. 56-62. Tylor believed (*Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civilisation*, 2nd ed. [London: Murray, 1870], p. 153) that Müller had found the "key" to Indo-European mythology.

26. In general, Robert Ackerman, "From Philology to Anthropology—The Case of J.G. Frazer," in Mayotte Bollack *et al.*, eds., *Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), II, pp. 423-47, and idem, *J. G. Frazer. His Life and Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), with my review-article forthcoming in *AJP*. More specifically, R. Angus Downie, *Frazer and the Golden Bough* (London: Gollancz, 1970); Jonathan Z. Smith, "When the Bough Breaks," *History of Religions*, 12 (1972/73), 342-71; idem, *Map is Not Territory* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), pp. 208-39; John B. Vickery, *The Literary Impact of The Golden Bough* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). For an example of interactions, Robert A. Jones, "Robertson Smith and James Frazer on Religion: Two Traditions in British Social Anthropology," in George W. Stocking,

Jr., ed., *Functionalism Historicized. Essays on British Social Anthropology* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), pp. 31-58. For Harrison, cf. Waardenburg (above, note 12), II, pp. 100-01.

27. For example, Robert Ackerman, "Sir James G. Frazer and A. E. Housman: A Relationship in Letters," *GRBS*, 15 (1974), 339-364. The Balfour Library of the Pitt-Rivers Museum, Oxford University, possesses a rich collection of unpublished letters of Oxbridge anthropologists. Thus Frazer wrote Tylor on December 4, 1896 (accession F-8) of a projected history of Uganda by a Mr. Pilkington, "a Cambridge man who took good honours in classics and works as the linguist of the mission in Uganda." Equally revealing are the lectures which Ridgeway offered at the turn of the century for the Special Board of Indian Civil Service Studies at the University of Cambridge, e.g., "The Engraved Stones of the Ancients (in relation to primitive religion)," and "Greek and Roman Numismatics, Treated Anthropologically." In general, Symonds (above, note 22) and Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians* (New York: Saint Martin's, 1954), pp. 75-85.

28. Fowler (above, note 1), p. 19; cf. H. J. Rose, "Roman Religion 1910-1960," *JRS*, 50 (1960), 162: "... Tylor's animistic theory has a solid foundation in fact." Of course, the reception was by no means uncritical. Thus on Frazer, who seemed to have functioned as an intermediary between anthropologists and classicists, Fowler could be critical: *ibid.*, pp. 128, 481-85, although more usually highly laudatory (index, s.v. "Frazer"). Likewise, Farnell (above, note 24), p. 2, noted: "To reconstruct the primitive thought requires all the aid that can be supplied by philology, anthropology, and the comparative study of religions, and so far the reconstruction is neither solid nor final. Great results were expected when first philology, with new methods and new material, was applied to the explanation of Greek myths and divine personages. The result has been meagre and disappointing . . ."

29. A. A. Barb, "The Survival of Magic Arts," in A. Momigliano, ed., *The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 104, 108; Peter Salway, *Roman Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 679; H. H. Scullard, *Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 13. Barb has received general approval; thus Ramsay MacMullen, *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 83, observed that the quote "while no doubt a trifle dramatic, conveys the right impression."

30. Thus Feigus Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World* (London: Duckworth, 1977), p. xii, wished to avoid "conceptions drawn from wider sociological studies" since they "contaminated" the ancient material. Millar's position has received considerable criticism, e.g., Keith Hopkins' review, *JRS*, 68 (1978), 178-86; G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London: Duckworth, 1981), pp. 81-82; and my "Sociology," pp. 2689-91. Cf. Ramsay MacMullen's disclaimer of the value of comparative material: *Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100-100)* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 7.

31. Classical studies has lagged behind other fields in accepting the notion that "hard" value-free facts do not exist. For the philosophical considerations and full references, see my "Sociology," pp. 2688-90 with notes 34-40, and more briefly my "Quae Per Squalidas Transire Personae: Ste. Croix's Historical Revolution," *Helios*, 11.1 (1984), 54-55. A valuable summary of the empiricist position appears in Brent D. Shaw, "Social Science and Ancient History: Keith Hopkins In Partibus Infidelium," *Helios*, 9.2 (1982), 19-20.

32. On its rise, Anthony Grafton, "Polyhistor into Philolog: Notes on the Transformation of German Classical Scholarship, 1780-1850," *History of Universities*, 3 (1983), 159-192, and R. Steven Turner, "Historicism, *Kritik*, and the Prussian Professoriate, 1790 to 1840," in Bollack (above, note 26), pp. 450-89.

33. Notably in his 1850 edition of Lucretius. In general, S. Timpanaro, *La genesi del metodo del Lachmann* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1963) and the second edition, trans. D. Inner, *Die Entstehung der Lachmannschen Methode* (Hamburg: Buske, 1971), with E. J. Kenney, *The Classical Text* (California: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 75-129 and 136-42.

34. E. Menge and H. Marx, "The Firm of B. G. Teubner and Its Connection With Classical Learning," *Arethusa*, 2 (1969), 203-11.

35. For Mannhardt see Sharpe (above, note 12), pp. 50-51. Samter favored animism, which caused Latte (below, note 38) to reject out of hand his theories on the Lares (p. 94, note 1; p.

100, note 2), on which controversy see my "A Note on Vergil's Aeneid 5,744," *Hermes*, 104 (1976), 248, note 3. Comparing *PW*, s.v. *religio* (the volume was written 1914-20) with my citations from the British classicists will provide a good example of the differences of approach.

36. Georg Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Beck, 1912), p. 248, note 3.

37. Of course, the Germans were not without influence. In general, below, note 42. For a specific example in classical studies, Ulrich Muhlack, "Die deutschen Einwirkungen auf die englische Altertumswissenschaft am Beispiel George Grottes," in Bollack (above, note 26), pp. 376-422; more generally, J. W. Burrow, "The Uses of Philology in Victorian England," in Robert Robson, ed., *Ideas and Institutions of Victorian Britain* (London: Bell, 1967), pp. 180-204. For the British colonial empire, above, note 14.

38. Above, note 36, p. 235. And likewise later, Kurt Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (Munich: Beck, 1960), p. 99: "Es ist deutlich, dass man hier Gespenster abwehren will, die sonst Mitglieder der Familie holen könnten."

39. *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur römischen Religions- und Stadtgeschichte* (Munich: Beck, 1904), p. 304 (chapter 15: "Echte und falsche 'Sondergötter' in der römischen Religion"). 40. Compare J. G. Frazer, *Publii Ovidii Nasonis Fastorum Libri Sex* (London: Macmillan, 1929) on the Lemuria. He noted the festival's "quaint simplicity" and "high antiquity" (vol. IV, p. 36), remarking that its use of beans belonged to "the crude fancies of primitive superstition" and constituted "valuable documents for the history of the human mind and the unbroken continuity of human error" (vol. IV, p. 40). Again, after discussing the apparent oddity of the festival occurring on odd-numbered days he claimed that "it is too much to expect that superstition should always be rigorously logical" (vol. IV, p. 46).

40. Compare J. G. Frazer, *Publii Ovidii Nasonis Fastorum Libri Sex* (London: Macmillan, 1929) on the Lemuria. He noted the festival's "quaint simplicity" and "high antiquity" (4.36), remarking that its use of beans belonged to "the crude fancies of primitive superstition" and constituted "valuable documents for the history of the human mind and the unbroken continuity of human error" (4.40). Again, after discussing the apparent oddity of the festival occurring on odd-numbered days he claimed that "it is too much to expect that superstition should always be rigorously logical" (4.46).

41. Sharpe (above, note 12), pp. 47-51, and Stocking (above, note 14), pp. 54, 127-28, 162-63, 218-19 (noting Tylor equated "survival" and "superstition"); cf. my "Sociology," p. 2708, note 88.

42. Earlier in the century the powerful German research machine, particularly through its successes in science and technology, had so thoroughly alarmed the British that they strove to counter it through the "reform" of Oxbridge. The competition soon progressed far beyond its original scope to include all academic disciplines. For Oxford, A. J. Engel, *From Clergyman to Don* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 156-201, 267-72; for Cambridge, D. A. Winstanley, *Late Victorian Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), pp. 263-359.

43. In general, Morton Smith, *Jesus the Magician* (New York: Harper, 1978), with comments on the book's reception in my "Sociology," p. 2716, note 112. Modern parallels with voodoo are instructive: *ibid.*, p. 2726, note 142, and especially the classic demonstration of Walter B. Cannon, "Voodoo Death," *American Anthropologist*, 44 (1942), 169-81; cf. Harry D. Eastwell, "Voodoo Death and the Mechanism for Dispatch of the Dying in East Anhem, Australia," *American Anthropologist*, 84 (1982), 5-18.

44. The most helpful introduction to the study of holy men is Morton Smith, "Prolegomena to a Discussion of Aetologies, Divine Men, the Gospels and Jesus," *JBL*, 90 (1971), 174-99; in general, my "Sociology," pp. 2752-64 with notes 235 and 242. For Apollonius, Graham Anderson, *Philostratus* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 121-239; E. L. Bowie, "Apollonius of Tyana: Tradition and Reality," *ANRW*, 2.16.2, pp. 1652-99; W. Speyer, "Zum Bild des Apollonius von Tyana bei Heiden und Christen," *JAC*, 17 (1974), 47-63.

45. For their response to their expulsion, D.C. 64(65).1.4; on their relations with aspirants to power, Suet., *Otho* 4.1, *Vitell.* 14.4; Tacit. *Ann.* 6.20.2, 16.14. The Romans remained highly ambivalent about them, thus my "Sociology," p. 2729, note 155. In general, F. H.

Cramer, *Astrology in Roman Law and Politics* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1954), with pp. 99-108 on Thrasyllus, and W. & H. G. Gundel, *Astrologumena* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1966).

46. My "Magic and Politics in the Fourth Century: Parameters of Groupings," in Elizabeth Livingston, ed., *Studia Patristica XVIII* (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1985), 1, p. 67. On the implied control of deviance, below note 68.

47. Nowhere does this appear more clearly than in the legal systems, on which see my "Nullum Crimen Sine Lege: Socio-Religious Sanctions on Magic," in C. A. Faraone and D. Obbink, eds., *Accessing the Divine: Studies in Ancient Greek Magic and Religion* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Legal texts require careful handling, since they do not, as often thought, constitute evidence for general societal ideology: Alan Watson, "Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 131 (1982/83), 1121-57, with my thanks to the author for the reference.

48. There exist substantial questions about the authenticity of many Herodotean oracles in Joseph Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), especially pp. 88-144. Nevertheless, the fact of their inclusion in Herodotus's work at the very least constitutes *ipso facto* evidence for his views and those of his contemporaries.

49. Despite their stylized quality: A. Momigliano, "Popular Religious Beliefs and the Late Roman Historians," in his *Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), pp. 143-45.

50. Likewise Apul., *Met.* 2.21-30 at pp. 212-17, and Heliod., *Aeth.* 6.14-15 at pp. 223-25; add Verg., *Aen.* 7.81-106. For mechanical forms of divination, cf. *Der kleine Pauly*, s.v. Automaten and Mantik, IVb. Such methods could lead to charges of fraud by non-adherents, as in the case of Alexander of Abonuteichus. For these considerations, cf. my "Sociology," pp. 2713-14 with note 104. On the enormous problem of religion and ritual, A. Bharati, "Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion: Ritual and Belief Systems," in Bernard J. Siegel, ed., *Biennial Review of Anthropology 1971* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 230-82, and idem, "The Use of 'Superstition' as an Anti-Traditional Device in Urban Hinduism," *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, N.S. 4 (1970), 36-49.

51. G. E. R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 37-49; cf. 49: "No straightforward account, in which 'science' and 'philosophy' together and in unison stand opposed to 'magic' and the 'irrational', can be sustained in the face of the evident complexities both *within* and *between* the theory and practice of medicine on the one hand and those of the investigation concerning nature on the other."

52. For Apollonius, above note 44; for Alexander, next note.

53. Two consular adherents: P. Mummius Sisenna Rutilianus (cos. suff. A. D. 146: 30, 35, 54) and M. Sedatius Severianus (cos. suff. A. D. 153: 27). In general, my "Sociology," p. 2717, note 114, to which add C. P. Jones, *Culture and Society in Lucian* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 133-48. For charlatans as a Lucianic *topos*, Graham Anderson, "Lucian: A Sophist's Sophist," *YCS*, 27 (1982), 69-78.

54. On this relativistic position, above, note 2.

55. *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 1-26, especially 15-22.

56. For the implied "doctrine of survivals," see above, note 41.

57. For the period's view of religion, Frank E. Manuel, *The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods* (New York: Atheneum, 1967). The best general introduction remains Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, in two volumes: *The Rise of Modern Paganism* (New York: Norton, 1967) and *The Science of Freedom* (idem) with pp. 126-66 on science; cf. my "Sociology," pp. 2700, with note 64.

58. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). Kuhn's ideas have aroused an enormous amount of discussion, on which see my "Sociology," p. 2681, notes 6-8.

59. For a modern example of "scientific" debunking, Martin Gardner, *Science: Good, Bad, and Bogus* (New York: Avon, 1981); cf. my "Sociology," p. 2682, note 9.

60. For these considerations, I am particularly influenced by Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy* (New York: Anchor Books, 1969) and his additional work at note 65 below; for

critiques of Berger, see my "Sociology," p. 2694, note 47, adding Robert Wuthnow *et al.*, eds., *Cultural Analysis* (Boston: Routledge, 1984), pp. 21-76. Two fundamental articles appear in Michael Banton, ed., *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (New York: Praeger, 1966): Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," pp. 1-46, and Melford Spiro, "Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation," pp. 85-126.

61. Forced conversions of Jews to Christianity in the Roman Empire provide an example: MacMullen (above, note 30), pp. 86-101; for an overview of liabilities imposed, A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire 284-602* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), pp. 944-50.

62. A fine example is *Arthasāstra*, a third-century B.C. Indian document attributed to Kautiliya; thus 5.2.44: "To those who do not believe, he (sc. the ruler) should administer poison when they are sipping water or washing themselves and declare it to be a curse of the divinity . . ." (Kangle trans.); more examples: 5.2.35-43 and 13.1.1-21. Cf. D. Chattopadhyaya, *What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1976), pp. 170-215.

63. Of course, the preserved texts show more crack than monolith. Thus Hom., *Od.* 2.181-82, and Liv. 1.16 as obvious examples; cf. my "Sociology," p. 2692-93, note 43, for historical Roman examples.

64. Early Christianity provides classic *exempla* of groups traditionally labeled "heretic," including the Gnostics. On the simple secular level, the Gnostic alternative to Petrine succession questioned the privileged status of those in that succession. Too, the Gnostic openness to women questioned stereotypes of gender and power in a group traditionally male-dominated. The clearest introduction is Elaine Pagels, *The Gnostic Gospels* (New York: Random House, 1979); below, note 72 for heresy.

65. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 122.

66. For foreigners, the worship of Isis at Rome provides one example; on the expulsions of her adherents, my "Sociology," p. 2693, note 43. For women, Euripides's *Bacchae* is famous and likewise later witchcraft accusations: Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, *Salem Possessed* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974) and Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (New York: Scribner, 1971). For lower orders in early Christianity: John Gager, *Kingdom and Community* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975), pp. 22-28, and my "Sociology," p. 2751, note 231, for charges against them; for the caste system of Hinduism, see the following note.

67. The caste system of Hinduism in India provides a virtually "textbook" example. The highest caste, the Brāhmins, controlled the eternal substrate of cosmic order (*brahman*) and the code of conduct (*dharma*) which came from it. Part of this code stipulated that one's social status was governed by one's actions in past lives (*karma*). Thus repression of the lowest social group, the untouchables, received theological justification, because the allegedly depraved previous existences of that group had placed them there. In practical terms, the Brāhmins were able, through monopolizing sacred offices and texts, to maintain the system. On the theology, R. C. Zaehner, *Hinduism*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 36-56, 109-10, 147-49. For caste, A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India* (New York: Grove, 1959), pp. 137-51, and Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus*, trans. M. Sainsbury (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), with p. 143 and note 64d on water prohibitions; my thanks to Norman Girardot (Department of Religion Studies, Lehigh University) for these last two references. On the tensions which arose from the system, Rosalind O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) *passim*, esp. pp. 77-80.

68. On the implied control of allegedly "deviant" behavior, David Aune, "Magic in Early Christianity," *ANRW*, 2.23.2, pp. 1515-16. Notice the deviant behavior associated by Tacitus with unsanctioned religious activity: *Ann.* 2.27; 4.52; 6.29.3; 12.22, 59, 64-65; 16.14, 30-31, with Cramer (above, note 45), pp. 254-67. For the later empire, John Matthews, *Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court A.D. 364-425* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 56-60. For later periods, Thomas (above, note 66), pp. 343-45, 445, note 2, 568-69.

69. As Justice Harry Blackmun capped a long list, admittedly on a much different subject, in his Supreme Court majority decision *Flood v. Kuhn*, (1972) 407 U.S. 258 at 263.

70. Skewing of views often results from the fact that the ancient socio-economic elite rendered its judgements in literary texts, which later socio-economic elites of scholars followed: "Sociology," pp. 2690-94, 2705, note 82, 2732, note 161.

71. Compare the Christianizing assumption on Apollonius of Tyana, s.v. in *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 2nd ed.: "In modern times opponents of Christianity have occasionally used Philostratus to disparage the uniqueness of the Christian Gospel, but the alleged parallels are generally admitted to be unconvincing."

72. Walter Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971); Gager (above, note 66), pp. 76-87; my "Sociology," pp. 2733-52. For a critique, Thomas A. Robinson, *The Bauer Thesis Examined* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1988).

73. First published 1949; quote from chapter 3.2.

74. For example, Winston Davis, *Dojo. Magic and Exorcism in Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980) and P. Steven Sangren, *History and Magical Power in a Chinese Community* (idem, 1987); my thanks to Norman Girardot (above, note 67) for the references. Each author rehabilitates "magic" from its previous value-laden implications, while nevertheless retaining the category.

75. Luck's comments at a panel on his book (above, note 1) indicated precisely this, namely an eagerness to expand further his already formidable scholarly skills through dialogue with scholars in cognate disciplines.

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