

injurious magic, and the emperors Valentinian and Valens forbid "impious prayers, magic rites and sacrifices to the dead during night-time."¹⁰⁰ The Ciceronian law thus already testified to this anxiety, which one would be tempted to relate to the *lex Cornelia*. Cicero, moreover, also points to one basis for the legislative prohibition; it is the people and the senate that have the monopoly on strange rites, and they want to control the ritual behavior of the marginal group of women.

PORTRAIT OF THE MAGICIAN, SEEN FROM THE OUTSIDE

WHO IS THE MAGICIAN, that figure as changing as the content of his art, in turn diviner, priest, doctor, charlatan, philosopher, or charismatic "godlike man"? What did the magician do in ancient societies? More than eighty years ago, in his fundamental essay on magic, Marcel Mauss formulated a general rule: "It is . . . public opinion that creates the magician and the influences he has. The individuals to whom the practice of magic is attributed already have . . . a distinct condition within the society that treats them as magicians."¹ If this is true, it is necessary to ask what opinion the Greeks and Romans had of the magician. How did they recognize and define the magician, and how did they distinguish this figure from other fairly similar but less detested figures? In an attempt to analyze the person as seen from the outside, we can focus on two magic trials, one that took place in Rome under the republic, and the other that occurred in Africa, in the middle of the second century of the empire.

We recall the law of the Twelve Tables and the threats that it expresses against all those who "by their songs (or charms) would take away the harvest of a neighbor." We know of only a single trial in which this law played a role. Pliny the Elder speaks of it, following Calpurnius Piso, the annalist of the second half of the second century B.C.²

The story appears simple. One man regularly obtained a harvest much larger than that of his neighbors. Thus, people began to envy him and even to hate him (*in invidia erat magna*: the Latin gives both senses). One day this man finds himself accused of having appropriated the harvest of others by unlawful practices. Pliny's wording of the charge—*fruges alienas perliceret veneficiis*—rather faithfully reproduces the text of the law of the Twelve Tables in the version of Servius, with the exception of the term *veneficia*, which is too recent.³ But the text is worth taking a closer look at.

Pliny's account does not come from book XXX, his history of magic, but from a context concerned with the virtues of the ancestral Roman farmers; his interest here is not sorcery, but *mores maiorum*, the agricultural virtue of the ancient farmers whom the Romans were proud of having once been. This is how he tells the story:

I cannot resist reporting an example taken from antiquity, which can show that the custom was of presenting before the people even affairs concerning agriculture and how the men of that time defended themselves. C. Furius Cresimus, a freedman, reaped from a small field harvests much more abundant than his neighbors with vast properties; so he was much envied and suspected of having attracted the harvests of others by evil spells. Summoned for this reason before Spurius Albinus, the curulian edil,

and afraid of being convicted by the voting of the *tribus*, he brought all his farming equipment to the forum and all his slaves, sturdy and, as Piso says, very well-groomed and well-dressed people, well-made tools, heavy pickaxes, weighty plowshares, well-fed cattle. Then he said, "These are my evil spells, citizens, and I cannot show you or bring to the forum my nights of work, my watches, and my sweat." So he was unanimously acquitted.

Pliny explicitly names two participants in the trial, the town councillor, Spurius Albinus, and the otherwise unknown hero, C. Furius Cresimus. It has been proposed to identify the town councillor with Spurius Postumius Albinus, consul in 186 B.C. and praetor three years earlier, thus placing the event in the first decade of the second century B.C. The identification has been disputed, but nothing prevents dating this affair to the first half of the second century B.C. Pliny stresses the low social standing of C. Furius Cresimus: he is a freedman, literally *e servitute liberatus*, a man freed from slavery (a curiously high-flown and nontechnical expression). He must be of eastern origin, since he bears a common Greek name, Chresimos, which became his cognomen upon gaining his emancipation. His adversaries are clearly rich people, of a much higher social condition; we are thus in the presence of a considerable social distance, a situation more likely than any other to produce conflicts.

The conflict breaks out at the moment when year after year (Pliny suggests a certain duration), the harvest of Cresimus's small farm does not tally with his social standing, a situation that, given the competition between unequal rivals, constitutes a reversal of the original gap; the poor man, the freedman, threatens to become rich, even richer than the others, thereby endangering the social structures. At this point, others react. The marginal one, who does not seem to abide by the rules of the game, is accused of *incantamenta*, because his so-threatening

success can be due only to unlawful means. Confronted with the risk of a social turnabout, the others in turn respond by another reversal: they change the farmer into a sorcerer.

This accusation must not be taken lightly. We do not know exactly what penalty was risked by the person judged guilty of an *incantamentum*. This person would certainly have been cast out of the society, as was (much later) stipulated in the *lex Cornelia*, either by exile or by death.⁴ Cresimus thus prepares himself the best he can. The trial takes place in the forum, and Pliny stresses the public nature as well as the participation of the *tribus*, the "tribe" to which Cresimus belonged. There is thus a confrontation between Cresimus and the whole of the society, represented by the tribal association, while the magistrate serves as mediator. Cresimus succeeds in convincing his group that his success resulted not from magic but from the good quality of his work.

What kind of arguments did he use in his defense? Pliny says it with a certain pomposity: Cresimus presents himself as a more industrious farmer than the others. He knew how to prove that he, too, the former eastern slave, had those virtues of which the Romans were so proud, and that he had more of them than the others had. Hence, a new gap opens, thus reversing once again the social relation between the freedman and the rich citizens; it is the former slave from the east who appears to be a truly perfect Roman. The reaction on the part of the *tribus* is immediate and unanimous; his fellow citizens acknowledge his explanations and are willing to reintegrate him. In addition, he acquires such a renown that Pliny still remembers him as a fine example of ancient virtues.

A person who was accused of magic was thus one on the margins of society, who, through his or her actions, set off a process that seemed to threaten the social structures; that person's success provoked a crisis within the group. The goal of the trial for magic is to resolve the crisis, either by permanently

casting out the one who threatened the social structures or by definitively integrating that person. In either case, the social structures will be reaffirmed and order reestablished. Through this trial for magic and this game of shifts, someone from the outside—provided the person gains a trial—is firmly and definitely integrated into the society; from the fringes, that person was settled inside.

AN AFRICAN DRAMA: THE TRIAL OF APULEIUS AT SABRATHA

Between 156 and 158 A.D., Apuleius, a young orator and Platonic philosopher, born in an imperial Africa rich in talented men, had to appear before the proconsul Claudius Maximus, who then governed the African province and held his court of law in Sabratha. Apuleius pleaded as lawyer for his wife, Pudentilla. In the course of this trial, his adversaries reproached him for being a magician. In the face of the enormity of this reproof, Apuleius dared them to accuse him formally. They did so, and Apuleius became the defendant in a trial for magic. Five or six days after the first accusation, still in Sabratha, the trial of Apuleius took place, in which he defended himself, obviously with success. His defense has come down to us through his writings—in his *Apologia sive de magia*.⁵

Here lies the first problem that faces the historian. What we have is a literary text published after the trial. Nothing suggests the amount of alteration that the original defense may have undergone; we must rely on that text, which is in any case carefully worked out and full of learned information. Such an elaboration may be surprising, especially when we realize that the original defense must have been written in barely a few days, with the possible help of a private library. The same kind of problem is posed for the speeches of Cicero. We sometimes

know how much time and work lie between the actual speech of Cicero and its subsequent publication. The case of Apuleius, the sophist, is no better; it is unlikely that he did not rework the wording of his speech. Worse yet is that for the speeches of Cicero, we often have other sources, whereas for everything concerning the details of the African trial, Apuleius remains our sole witness. But we have no other choice than to rely cautiously on this text.

The accusation is clear and simple: (1) Apuleius is accused of *magica maleficia*, and (2) his adversary insists on the *crimen magiae*, Apuleius will repeat the word *magia* many times. Although here he does not use the more technical term *veneficium* (which, however, appears further on, in chapter 78), it is, without a doubt, the *lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis* that is at issue. Apuleius's situation must have been beset with danger. In 199 A.D., the prefect of Egypt threatened with capital punishment those who indulged in divination, magic or otherwise, and the jurist Paul—if he is indeed the author of the *Sentences*—attests to the existence of this charge at the start of the third century A.D.⁶ Nevertheless, it seems clear that Apuleius sought the trial in order to be cleared of the suspicion of being a magician; rumors must have spread for a time in Oea, a situation which, in such a small town, could not fail to be embarrassing or even dangerous.

Apuleius's defense allows a glimpse of how his adversaries had formulated the charge: Apuleius was accused of erotic magic. The chief testimony is a passage from a letter written in Greek (in that corner of Africa, people were at the least bilingual) by Pudentilla, a letter in which she ironically echoes the accusations made by her son against Apuleius: "Thus it happened that all of a sudden, Apuleius became a magician, and I was bewitched by him and I am in love."⁷ The letter had been written before the marriage of Pudentilla and Apuleius; these accusations and rumors had been abroad for some time.

To get a good understanding of the accusation, we need to reproduce the background of this affair in its setting, that of a small provincial town.

Apuleius, a native of Madaurus (the Algerian Mdaourouch, in the region of Constantine), had studied at the Athenian Academy. If we are to believe an allusion slipped into the *Metamorphoses*, his teacher was Sextus, the nephew of Plutarch. Apuleius's own works all reveal this Platonic education, in which, however, are mixed certain Aristotelian elements.⁸ He is proud of this lineage and held the title of *philosophus Platonicus*, as is attested on the sole inscription in his honor that has been preserved for us.⁹

After his studies and some journeys, Apuleius returned to Africa. During one trip to Alexandria, he visited some friends in the little town of Oea. When he fell ill there, a friend from his years in Athens, Sicinius Pontianus, looked after him, invited him into his home, and healed him. This thoughtfulness, it seems, was not altogether lacking in ulterior motives. Pontianus had a widowed mother, whose age is discussed in the defense without exact numbers being indicated (but she cannot have been more than forty). Pontianus had the idea of marrying her to his friend. At first Apuleius refused, but he stayed on in the house as a tutor to a younger brother, Sicinius Pudens; and inevitably, a friendship developed between this still-young widow, Aemilia Pudentilla, and the young philosopher. They studied together (which is not without interest for the intellectual history of Roman women), and finally the marriage was decided on.

Now the villains come onstage. Aemilia Pudentilla was not only intelligent and attractive, but also very rich—a matter of some four million sesterces. After the death of her husband, the father-in-law, Sicinius Amicus, who wished Pudentilla's fortune to stay in the family, had proposed another of his sons, Sicinius

Clarus, as a new husband. Pudentilla had successfully opposed this attempt, as she was opposed to all the advances of the town's leading citizens, and above all to the advances of the third Sicinius brother, Aemilianus. Of this brother, prototype of the villain, Apuleius has left a dark and repellent portrait. In the midst of these small-town quarrels and intrigue, the philosopher comes onstage, worldly but ill, who takes hold of the widow and, above all, the fortune.

Rumors of *magica maleficia* begin at the moment that the marriage is planned. Pontianus himself seems to have believed the rumors; but according to Apuleius, it is without any doubt a matter of sinister machinations set in motion by Sicinius Aemilianus, aided by a certain Herennius Rufinus, Pontianus's father-in-law, who was, of course, as motivated by those millions as was his son-in-law.

This story deserves attention. As in the case of C. Furius Cresimus, the underlying issue here is a challenge to the social structure; and again, we find rivalry, with rather unequal competitors. On the one hand, there are the members of the family of the Sicinii, well-established in the area and no doubt prosperous; on the other hand, there is the foreign philosopher, a marginal figure—both as a foreigner and as a philosopher—whom his adversaries blamed for his poverty at the same time that they accused him of homosexuality, another marginal trait in this society. Here again, this rival walked off with the victory and the prize (the millions, not to speak of the woman); thus, the society and its categories are in danger. In accusing him of magic, Apuleius's adversaries tried to explain this reversal of fortunes. We must take seriously their beliefs, which Pontianus himself, though trained in Platonistic philosophy, held. Mainly, by laying the charge of magic, the adversaries were trying to incite the very closed society of this town to get rid of an element that threatened the established structures; the situation

was not without its dangers. The aggressiveness of all persons concerned still speaks to us from Apuleius's account of how Herennius Rufinus had, for the first time, accused him of magic: "This trafficker of his wife was swollen with such anger, in such a blazing rage, that he uttered against the purest and most chaste of women . . . talk worthy of his own bedroom . . . calling her a prostitute, me, a magician and sorcerer (and this in the presence of many persons, whom I shall name, if you wish); he would kill me with his own hands."¹⁰ Rufinus makes use of a quasi-technical description (*magus et veneficus*), which calls to mind the *lex Cornelia*, and he also makes his accusation *pluribus audientibus*: the affair concerns not just the two men. The final threat—to kill Apuleius with Rufinus's own hands—sounds as if he wished to anticipate the capital punishment laid down by the *lex Cornelia*.

Unlike the freedman Cresimus, the philosopher Apuleius did not try to integrate or reintegrate himself into the town's society. This fact is shown by the rhetorical strategy of his *Apologia*. Apuleius right away explains that he considers his plea not a private defense, but rather a defense of philosophy. He announces in his second sentence, "I am pleased with it, I declare it, at having, before a judge such as you, the opportunity and the good fortune of justifying philosophy to laymen and of exculpating me myself."¹¹ And, later on, "I defend not only my own cause, but that of philosophy."¹² Next, he tries in the first chapters to establish that he is a philosopher by skillfully repeating the start of the charge: "You thus a little while ago heard how this accusation began: 'We accuse before you a philosopher, good-looking and—abominable crime!—of an equal eloquence in Greek and in Latin.' It is, if I am not mistaken, with these very words that Tannonius Pudens began his indictment against me."¹³ Then, in the course of this defense, several times he clearly contrasts magic and philosophy.

This strategy requires that he clearly mark himself off from

his adversaries. He implies that they are *imperi*, uninitiated laymen; that their lawyers are not eloquent, but *stulti*, and that Aemilianus himself is only a rustic with no education, a considerable exaggeration, for Apuleius leaks the information that Aemilianus himself pleaded in Rome on the forum. He intimates that Pontianus's father-in-law is a debauched old man and that the mother-in-law is an old prostitute . . .

Correspondingly, all along his defense, Apuleius tries to link himself with the proconsul Claudius Maximus. The proconsul, who has had a philosophical education, knows his Plato ("The very words of that divine man are still in my memory: let me recall them to you, Maximus"), his Aristotle ("You denounce as a crime in me what Maximus and I admire in Aristotle"); he has read the philosophers of old, and he is in possession of their wisdom: in short, he is, like Apuleius, a philosopher.¹⁴ From the reference to his *austera secta*, it has been inferred that he was a Stoic; we know of a Stoic named Claudius Maximus: he was Marcus Aurelius's philosophy teacher, and there exists, among scholars, a certain tendency to identify the philosopher with the proconsul, who was also governor of the Upper Pannonia between 150 and 154 A.D.¹⁵

Moreover, Apuleius goes to a lot of trouble not to appear a beggar philosopher, but rather a good citizen. After a long digression on philosophical poverty, in which he glorifies the sack and the cloak typical of the philosopher, he stresses that he comes from a well-to-do family, that his father and he himself, after his father's death, were *duoviri principis*, priests in the imperial cult of their hometown, a dignity open only to the local elite. He manifestly does not wish to appear to be one of those itinerant philosophers of cynical extraction who, in his epoch, were not too well thought of.¹⁶

For Apuleius, the problem, obviously, is not the fellow citizens of the little town of Oea. His goal is not that of integrating

himself into the provincial society, but of establishing himself as a member of that elite of the itinerant intellectuals of the imperial society, which was not too different from the elite—also itinerant and nearly as intellectual—of the senatorial administrators of the Empire.¹⁷ His concern is not merely a matter of private aspirations of the cosmopolitan Apuleius; the facts of the juridical system of the High Empire leave him no other choice. It is significant that the trial is not conducted in the agora of Oea, amidst the citizens, but before the proconsul in another town some sixty miles away. Although a certain number of citizens of Oea attend the trial, it is not the affair of their community, and they cannot influence its unfolding; the trial is entirely in the hands of the proconsul and his *consilium*. The society that threatened to make Apuleius a sorcerer has no occasion to take an active part in the proceedings. This new asymmetry gives rise to obvious dangers; how can a position be regained in a group that tried to resolve the imbalance by trying to resort to expulsion but that does not have the power either to reestablish a new balance or to resolve the crisis by its own means? Neither Oea nor Apuleius did manage to resolve the difficulty, for we find him some years later with his wife, well established as an orator in Carthage.

Apuleius's defense, which is rich in information, enlightens us not just about his private affairs. It is a crucial text for understanding the image of the sorcerer in his society and for perceiving the very clear distinctions among the magician, the philosopher, and the doctor assumed by this defense—presumably against a society that tended to blur these distinctions.¹⁸

To find and analyze the features of magic activity as Apuleius's fellow citizens represent it, we must examine the whole of the accusation as Apuleius presents it to us.

After a long introduction (which barely touches on the problem of magic), Apuleius finally reaches those details that he long

ago promised to clear up: "That said, consistent with my plan, I go on to examine all the insanities uttered by Aemilianus here present. And first, you have noticed it, what was raised at the beginning as being the most likely to confirm the suspicion of magic, is that I paid the fishermen to procure me certain species of fish."¹⁹ Apuleius does not deny this accusation but, on the contrary, amplifies it: all his friends, all his slaves received the order to bring him any fish—alive or dead—that seemed to them out of the ordinary. But the explanation that he gives is very innocent: Apuleius was writing a treatise on fishes and their procreation. As a decisive proof, he has some passages from the treatise read before the court.

Now his adversaries had been more precise. They had mentioned three species of fish—the *lepos marinus* (the "sea hare"), a poisonous fish, and two kinds of fish whose names echo the words for the male and female sexual organs. Apuleius pokes fun at the obvious difficulty of the lawyers, who have to pronounce these touchy words (it is one of those passages that suggest that the construction of Norbert Elias would at the very least need to be modified to take account of ancient societies): in his society, a free and easy way of using sexual terms was a sign of culture. Adam Abt, in his detailed commentary on the magic part of the *Apologia*, proved that the two Latin names proposed by Apuleius, *veretillum et virginal*, not attested to elsewhere, can repeat the Greek words *bálanos* ("gland") and *kteis* ("comb"), which have an obvious sexual connotation (obvious in the case of "gland," whereas "comb" in Greek also denotes the female organ), but have no parallels in the world of magicians.

What is more important to us than these vagaries is to understand how these African bourgeois imagined the function of magic, especially when Apuleius claims (and we have no way to contradict him) that it was in fact not just those specific fishes that he was seeking.

Concerning the *lepos marinus*, which actually is not a fish, but a large marine slug, it suffices to know that it is very poisonous. The person who uses it must therefore be a *veneficus* and consequently becomes guilty according to the *lex Cornelia*. The ancients told terrifying tales about this animal: Pliny the Elder ranks the *lepos* from the Indian Ocean with the *araneus* and the *pastinaca* (the stingray) among the most poisonous marine animals; a single contact with it caused immediate vomiting. In his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, Philostratus reports that the young prince Titus died of the poison made from a *lepos* and administered by Domitian—a death predicted by Apollonius, who had warned him "against death from the sea." Philostratus adds that Nero too had often rid himself of his enemies thanks to the *lepos* served in a course of seafood.²⁰

One detail proves that the accusers really suspected a *veneficium*. It is only in the case of the *lepos* that they insist on the fact that Apuleius cut up the fish—an insistence that offends Apuleius, who was in the habit of cutting up fish for the purpose, of course, of making anatomical examinations.²¹ For the accusers, however, cutting up any old fish was not the same thing as cutting up the sea hare; in their minds the latter was cut up only in order to collect the poison.

Regarding the two "sexual" fish, Apuleius is very clear on the motivation for these choices. To his accusers, the verbal association would suggest the use of these fish for erotic magic, which the philosopher finds stupid: "What indeed could be sillier than to conclude, from a relationship between words, qualities of the same order as between things?"²² But this is a philosophical polemic rather than an account of the truth. We indeed know enough about plants, animals, or even stones to which popular medicine or magic attributed a property derived from their name, although it is sometimes hard to decide whether the name preceded or followed the usage. It is enough to cite the example,

taken from Pliny, of the *reseda* or *mignonette*, whose etymology is discussed by linguists, but whose name was popularly connected with the verb *resedare*, "to soothe an illness." This purpose gave rise to a beautiful rite: "In the vicinity of Rimini, a plant is known which they call *reseda*. It clears up abscesses and all inflammations. Those who use it add these words: 'Reseda, be the sedative of illnesses. Do you know, do you know what chicken [perhaps, or: what sprout] planted its roots here? That it has no head or feet.' Three times they repeat this formula and three times they spit on the ground."²³ It is a fine testimony on the force of oral rites; the cure would not work if one ate the *reseda* without adding the words. Repetition and wordplay (*reseda*, *reseda morbos*) differentiate the spell from ordinary spoken language. The triple repetition of the rite is characteristic (and commonplace): a single repetition may be due to chance rather than to the desire for the repetition; since four times is already too many, we are left with three.

Let us return to Apuleius. There is another problem yet to be solved. Although Abt mustered a dozen examples of similar wordplay, that does not prove that we are dealing with magic. The conviction that the names of things are related to their nature is deeply inscribed in Greco-Roman thought; we are acquainted with the debate, begun by the Sophists, on the relationship between words and substances. By inferring erotic magic solely from the fact that the philosopher was interested in fish with an erotic name (which is already a hypothesis on their part, one contradicted by Apuleius), his adversaries were following a mental habit that was widespread in antiquity and which is not peculiar to magic nor to the domain of popular medicine that we associate with it.

The problem of the origin of words, incidentally, is important to the subject under discussion here, magic. A surprising text proves that fact. In his long treatise against the pagan philoso-

pher Celsus, the Christian apologist Origen attacks Celsus's assertion that the specific name of a divinity is absolutely without importance, because the same god could have different names according to the language spoken by the god's worshippers; this is a perfectly Greek, Herodotean conception. On this basis, Origen works out a general discussion on the problem of the divine name, and then on the problem of the origin of words. He compares three theories, that of Aristotle (for whom words, fixed by usage, had a purely accidental relation to things); the opposite theory of the Stoics (according to whom the first humans had, in the first words, consciously imitated the nature of things with their voices); and the intermediate theory, that of Epicurus, for whom the first men reacted to things more or less accidentally but all in the same way—languages were thus born both by convention and in a natural way. Origen chooses the Stoic solution—at least for "those efficacious names of which certain ones are in use among the sages of Egypt, the more learned among the magi of Persia, and the Brahmins or Samanaeans among the philosophers of India." He thus accepts the idea that some words are more powerful than others, words of Persian, Egyptian, or Indian origin. But Origen is not lecturing on eastern languages; instead, he is aiming at a well-known domain: magic with its strings of exotic words. These words are not inventions, but rather contain a profound rationality, so that "what is called magic is not, as the disciples of Epicurus and Aristotle think, an entirely incoherent practice but, as is proved by experts in this art, a coherent system of which few persons understand the principles."²⁴

Apuleius has a different opinion. Before counting up the names of interesting Greek fish—a long series of learned and rare words—he jabs again at his adversaries: "Now listen carefully: you are going to shout that I am reciting a list of magic words drawn from Egyptian or Babylonian rites."²⁵

In conclusion, from his interest in rare fish, an innocent and purely philosophical interest, after all, his opponents thus inferred practices of *veneficium* and erotic magic, relying on beliefs and opinions that were widespread in their epoch. In doing so, they had interpreted the philosopher's actions according to categories that were certainly different from his own, but which nonetheless were available in their time and society.

The same findings hold as to the other points of the accusation. The second argument was that a young boy and a woman fell into a trance, in the presence of Apuleius. In the case of the boy, Apuleius blames his adversaries for not having a precise knowledge of magic divination. Their account of the circumstances—incantations performed without witnesses, in a secret place with a small altar, a lamp, and in the presence of only a few close friends—had been correct; nevertheless, they were not sufficiently precise: "For the fable to be complete it would have been necessary to add that the same boy had revealed many things to come. For here is where we learn what creates the practical interest of the incantations: I mean the predictions and the oracles." And immediately, Apuleius reveals the source of his knowledge about these things, which is an account by the philosopher (*sic!*) Varro of an event that happened in Tralles during the wars against Mithridates and of a meeting organized by the Roman Pythagorean Nigidius Figulus, a story that also involved the younger Cato. Apuleius has no direct experience of such magical rites, but he is in a position to refer to some perfectly respectable Roman philosophers. Less respectably perhaps, he could also have cited a perfect parallel from the magical papyri.²⁶

Once more, as in the case of the fish, Apuleius contrasts magic and science: the two victims were epileptic. Apuleius concentrates his scientific argument on the second case, that of a woman who had come to see him and who had an epileptic fit

when visiting him. In this case, the proof was easily provided; Apuleius had obtained the testimony of the doctor who treated her and who himself had sent her to the philosopher for a second professional opinion. By means of a long quotation from Plato's *Timaeus*, Apuleius manages once again to prove that philosophers too were perfectly capable of giving an etiology of the illness.

Since the treatise *On the Sacred Disease*, the problem posed by epilepsy has been well-known. The writer-doctor of the Hippocratic treatise rejected the idea of a divine cause, which understood the illness as demonic possession; this demonic view justified the intervention of itinerant priests in the role of exorcists. A few centuries later, Plotinus, in his attack on magicians, invokes the same arguments.²⁷ The case of Apuleius is more complex. The accusers indeed do not seem to have known that young Thallus was epileptic. What seemed significant to them was that the presence of the philosopher had been enough to provoke the trance, in the course of a suggestive ritualistic setting, to which Apuleius later adds the sacrifice of a rooster or a chicken, *gallinas hostias*. He was even capable of giving a technical name to this ritual: he "initiated (the child) by an incantation."²⁸ The term *initiare*, "to initiate," is, however, a bit vague. In the magic context, the corresponding Greek verb, *mueisthai*, is most often encountered in connection with divinatory rites; the rooster sacrifice is even vaguer, but is also found in divinatory rites.²⁹ The story thus seems coherent.

The ritual evoked is, moreover, relatively commonplace. It is a nocturnal rite solemnized by a very small group. The magical rite is again defined in contrast to the common civic rite, because civic sacrifices take place during the day, with the participation of all the citizens, whereas the magicians use the night for their sinister rites—Heraclitus already called them "wizards who wander in the night."³⁰ This rite is conceived as a sacrifice, but with

a rather uncommon victim: the rooster or hen hardly figures in the civic ritual. In Greece, it is the marginal healer Asclepius who receives the rooster, and this animal is sacrificed to the powers invoked in the rites of the papyri and *defixiones*.³¹ Our Africans thus have a fairly precise knowledge of the nature of a magical sacrifice, although Apuleius is right to stress that the ritual or initiation as they described it would not have made sense.

The case of the woman, whose illness was well-known, seems less clear. Apuleius committed himself to taking care of her, but during the treatment she fainted—in the eyes of the accusers, she fell victim to a spell.³² This whole affair has a whiff of exorcism, and this suspicion is strengthened by the rather naive argument advanced by Apuleius: "My adversaries either must establish that I am a magician and a maker of evil spells to find a cure for the illnesses . . ." as if the exorcist were an unknown in his society.³³ But once again the picture presented is vague. We learn nothing about the demonological or theological superstructure necessarily implied by the exorcism. There is neither a precise reference to the complex ritualistic processes of the exorcism nor one to the rite used to identify the superhuman power, to make contact with it, and to drive it out.³⁴

Apuleius's society was well acquainted with exorcism. Even apart from the testimonies provided by the Gospels or the Acts of the Apostles, for example, concerning the exorcism of a woman in Thessalonika, on the periphery of Greece itself, a sufficient number of pagan texts exist, from short recipes contained in the magic papyri to longish accounts reported in the literary texts.³⁵ In his *Philopseudes* (*The Friend of Lies*)—a satirical text that, however, contains much valuable information on the ideology and the practice of magic—Lucian describes the technique of "singing out" (*exáidein*) a demon from those "who make

a demon" (*toûs daimonoûntas*), who, that is, are possessed by a demon. His interlocutor even saw an exorcist in action, a Syrian from Palestine, capable of making direct contact with the demon and of having the latter replying—in Greek or in a barbaric language, according to his country of origin; speech contact (*communio loquendi*, to cite Apuleius) was indispensable in exorcism, for it is the force of the word that expels the demon. The exorcist made him swear, and, if he resisted, the exorcist threatened him, after which one could even see the demon go up in black smoke.³⁶

In the case of Thallus, Apuleius is well aware that his argumentation is not entirely convincing—but do we have to assume that he cheats? His adversaries having spoken of an exorcism, would he himself intentionally distort this accusation? This possibility is unconvincing. Not only was Claudius Maximus well-informed, but also he could always interrogate more witnesses; moreover, in the presence of the other party, such a crude maneuver had no chance of leading to something. It is therefore preferable to assume that what Apuleius says represents the accusation and to conclude that his accusers did not have a precise knowledge of what a *magus* could do. They must have supposed him capable of making a subject go into a trance without any divinatory intention, capable of curing someone possessed without any resort to the demonological apparatus. Clearly, the philosopher is better informed than are his accusers.

We come to the third point of the accusation, according to which Apuleius possessed some *instrumenta magiae*, wrapped up in a cloth and preserved in the library "next to the household gods in the home of Pontianus."³⁷ There is nothing out of the ordinary about that, and Apuleius had an easy game. He did not hide instruments of magic, but ritual objects referring to the different mystery cults in which he had been initiated. However, the

opinion that the magician possessed secret objects was very widespread. We shall come across a very complete set of similar *sacra* when it is a matter of rites.

The fourth point is that in a house, the philosopher and a friend of his performed some nocturnal rites, *nocturna sacra*. This time again, everything is vague. The only indications left by these rites were traces of smoke on the wall (traces of torches or of sacrificial fire?) and some feathers from a bird, the animal sacrificed on the occasion of these rites. These traces seem sufficient to evoke magic. It is a nocturnal thing (Thallus already went through his initiation during the night), and its rituals are solemnized only in small groups (see Thallus); the animals sacrificed are not those of the civic ritual, or more precisely, not only those of the civic ritual. It is thus that in the papyri, in which ewes and pigs are only rarely mentioned, a certain number of birds, in addition to ibises and sparrowhawks, Egyptian animals, are in return well attested to even though they are practically absent from civic ritual, which is communal and takes part during the day. It seems that the presence of a certain number of deviant features sufficed to conjure up the vision of magical rites in the mind of Apuleius's fellow citizens.³⁸

The fifth point is much more precise. Apuleius, it goes, secretly made a statuette in the form of a skeleton, sculpted in rare and precious wood, a statuette that he used for his magic rites. He venerated it in costly rites (*impensio*) and gave it the Greek name of *basileús*, king.³⁹

It is unimportant that Apuleius was able to prove that this accusation was false, that he did indeed possess a statuette of precious ebony, and that it was just a Hermes, sculpted by a well-known craftsman of the town. Apuleius had commissioned it to be made from common boxwood; without his knowledge, Pontianus had instead supplied the sculptor with the much more precious ebony, in order to surprise his friend. What does matter

is the belief of the others: a magician used *in magica maleficia*, for his magic rites, a superhuman power represented by a statuette and associated with the world of the dead. Still, one should not forget that, according to the magical papyri, ebony was the perfect wood for a magical statuette of Hermes; Apuleius's long (and somewhat contorted) explanations rather make one wonder whether he might have known this.⁴⁰

Moreover, any private devotion attached to such a domestic image could, in the Roman world, lead to an incrimination of *superstitio*, of excessive religious fervor. Suetonius tells about Nero, who fervently adored the statue of a girl as his personal tutelary spirit "like a most powerful divinity." Nero had been given the image by an unknown admirer on the same day that a conspiracy against his life had been uncovered; thus, he hoped that it would reveal future perils as well.⁴¹

Scholarly efforts were made to identify this "King," without a convincing result.⁴² There actually exist divinities called "King" in the magic papyri, but they are not infernal beings. Nevertheless, the papyri provide certain indications. In all cases, the "King" is a powerful demon whom the magician obtains as his *parhedros*, a superhuman helper and assistant. In a prayer taken from one of the Berlin papyri, the magician, after some preparatory rites, finally invokes the one who must become his assistant: "Come to me, King, I call you, god of gods (in another text, king of kings), powerful, infinite, immaculate, inexplicable, Aion fixed forever, remain unmoving by my side, starting today and for all of my life."⁴³ The name *King* refers not to a subordinate demon but to the supreme power that the magician hopes to obtain as his all-powerful assistant. We are in a world in which the "kings"—the pharaohs, the Hellenistic kings, and the Roman emperors—were accepted as holders of an almost unlimited power (the word *king* was ambiguous only in the language of Rome itself, which was marked by its republican memories).

Thus, in the opinion of his adversaries, the magician Apuleius had access to immense, but ill-omened, powers, which come, as the skeleton proves, from the world of the dead. This detail, once again, is unusual. Indeed, the literary and iconographical documentation on the *parhedroi* never mentions skeletons; nor do the powers attested to *parhedroi*, demonic helpers, in the papyri come from the world of the dead. On the other hand, the known images of skeletons have nothing to do with magic; they belong to domestic luxury.⁴¹ The association of the magician with the infernal world is found elsewhere, in the literary texts that inform about necromancy, and in the universe of the curse tablets. To judge from the frequency of binding-spells, it is by them that the ancient person most often came in contact with magic. We note, here again, that Apuleius's fellow citizen had no precise idea of what a magician was.

Moreover, Apuleius himself was well aware of these popular notions about magic and magicians. In a passage where he refutes the unjustified accusation of magic, he gives a list of the behaviors that could be interpreted as typically magic, although they are, in fact, innocent enough and even religious—inscribing a wish on the thigh of a statue, offering a silent prayer in a temple or not praying there at all, making an offering, making a sacrifice, picking up a sacred branch.⁴⁵ Not everything, in this list, is as innocent as Apuleius would have us believe. Certainly, the leaving of votive gifts, the performance of a sacrifice, and the use of herbs (*verbenae*) are part of the everyday civic and private religious practices. The other acts are more dubious. The ancient human was in the habit of praying aloud; the silent prayer, which was the exception, was barely distinguished from the absence of prayer.⁴⁶ Furthermore, such a prayer was dangerous, and there is no lack of testimonies that the recitation of a silent prayer set off an accusation of magic. In the framework of the civic and communal religion, speech addressed directly and

without societal control to the gods was not well thought of. This perception is not confined to pagan antiquity; in seventeenth century England, a Latin prayer could also be a sign of a sorcerer ("charmer"), no doubt because it is a prayer that is unintelligible to the group.⁴⁷ The same goes for the wish inscribed on the leg of a votive or cult statue as a means of direct access to the divinity who resides in the image. This belief was very widespread. Seneca suggests that it was customary to bribe the keeper of the temple to have access to the statue and whisper wishes in its ear; this combines silent prayer and physical contact with the statue.⁴⁸ According to Lucian, people were in the habit of pasting onto the statue of the healing heroes either tablets containing prayers or coins as the recompensation for the healing. Here again, one sought physical contact in order to communicate one's problems better.⁴⁹ It is not unimportant that here it is a matter of heroes and consequently of a being who was human, and of whom the statue still remains more or less in the image of the figure endowed with power. We do not have an example of *defixiones* pasted or inscribed on such statues, but some might have existed. We shall in any case see that many *defixiones* come from sanctuaries of divinities such as Demeter.⁵⁰

These observations are confirmed by another passage in which Apuleius produces a proper definition of magic. After proposing a philosophical definition that repeats the one given in Plato's *First Alcibiades*, Apuleius concludes that magic is thus not opposed to religion, but, on the contrary, is the purest expression of it. Then, he attacks another definition, *more vulgari*: "What if, however, my opponents as common people judge that the *magus* is in fact he who, by keeping up verbal communication with the immortal gods, has the power to bring about everything he wishes by the mysterious force of certain incantations. . . ?"⁵¹ With more emphasis than his accusers, Apuleius underscores two things: the theological superstructure of ancient magic, and the

magician's autonomy in relation to the gods. The magician speaks directly to the gods, and he has direct access to them; that relationship is what determines the force of his spells, which are not ordinary words, but words packed with divine power. These gods, on the other hand, and this contradicts all the beliefs of ancient humans, do not impose limits on the will of the magician. It is not the gods who define the space of human power, but the magician acts according to his or her goodwill with regard to both humans and the gods.

The second definition contrasted philosophers and the crowd, the common person. Apuleius immediately repeats this dichotomy: the ignorant people (*imperiti*) have always accused the philosophers who devote themselves to the study of nature—although then the accusation is not one of magic, but one of irreligiosity and atheism. What, then, is the difference between philosophy and magic in Apuleius's society?

There is a dichotomy immediately perceptible just about everywhere in the *Apologia*. For Apuleius, the contrast between philosophy and magic reflects the contrast between education and ignorance, or more precisely, between urban education and rustic ignorance. It is thus a matter of social distance, in that the same facts are interpreted differently according to the speaker's social position.

This way of seeing things is characteristic for the literary tradition. From the moment Theocritus represented his sorceresses, in the second *Idyll*, as "petites-bourgeoises," this distance is well attested and established in literature, and its transformation by Virgil into an Arcadian setting hardly affects it. The social reality is, however, more complex. Up to the end of antiquity, we certainly still find the old women of dubious reputation who perform erotic or healing rites.⁵² On the other hand, even in the simplest case of binding spells, many names

on the tablets of *defixiones* belong to the upper classes, and even to the elite.⁵³ It was the "doors of the rich" that the seers and beggars of Plato visited.⁵⁴ The Romans Vatinius, Nigidius Figulus, or C. Scribonius Curio (according to the story told by Cicero) belong to the late-republican elite; the accusations of magic known from Tacitus concern people belonging to the same elite of early Imperial Rome. It was not just the death of Germanicus that was surrounded with rumors of magic for which his colleague Piso was held responsible; in Julio-Claudian times, magic seems to have been an established weapon in the political struggle.⁵⁵ In the later empire, Libanius was not the only orator to fall victim of a binding spell—or to be blamed for magical aggression; under Constantine, the powerful Christian Ablabius accused his rival, the pagan philosopher Sopatrus, of magical rites, and then caused his downfall; two centuries later, another philosopher, Boethius, died as a victim of a similar accusation.⁵⁶ It is not hard to understand why this elite looked for protection against magical attacks—witness a series of splendid medals, used as amulets in Rome in about 400 A.D.⁵⁷ Even students—the future elite—dabbled in magic, as the scandal at the then famous Law School of fifth century Beirut demonstrates.⁵⁸ It is but reasonable that the Imperial lawgivers differentiated, when deciding about penalties for magic, between members of the upper class and the *humiliores*.⁵⁹

It thus seems that in no era were things as simple as people like Apuleius would have it. But the idea that magic was characteristic of the lower classes survived to the end of antiquity. Transformed into the opposition between natural and demoniac magic, the idea lived on through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance;⁶⁰ in the eighteenth century, it became an ethnographical concept that, integrated into the evolutionistic construction of Tylor and Fraser, survives in scientific thought as in

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the distinction that the common language makes between magic and sorcery. We only begin to glimpse the problems posed by such a "two-tiered" model.⁶¹

Certainly, in contrasting the magician and the philosopher, Apuleius, it has been said, played on a theme that had been known from the time of Heraclitus and Plato. But here again, differences must be stressed. Apuleius is not opposed to magic as such, neither in the name of a philosophical theology, as Plato had done, nor in the name of science, as did the author of the treatise *On the Sacred Disease*. In fact, Apuleius establishes different distinctions from those used by the *imperiti*. This difference is perfectly clear in the passage following the introductory chapters, in which he once again dissociates himself from the crowd and effects a more precise distinction between *irreligiosi* and *magi*. Among the philosophers, the *irreligiosi* are those who do not (or nearly not) believe in the gods as active agents in the world, who explain the functioning of this world by appealing to purely mechanical laws, as do the Atomists, always an easy target for the accusation of atheism. The so-called *magi*, that is, the theological philosophers, not only explain the functioning of nature and the world by the intervention of the gods (*providentia*, which does not necessarily imply a rigid *heimarmene* after the Stoic model), but also wish to know, through an excess of curiosity, how the divine administration of the world functions.⁶² The *imperiti*, on the contrary, accept neither the lack nor the excess of religiosity, but only the happy medium. This circumstance corresponds to what has already been noted; in the eyes of the crowd, *magia* presents itself as the excessive search for contact with the gods.

Apuleius does not accept these distinctions. The philosophical search for the divine is not magic, just as philosophical research on nature is not atheism. His accusers, however, were not entirely consistent; in the case of the fish, Aristotelian

research on nature will bring forward an accusation not of atheism, but of magic. Therefore, Apuleius's fellow citizen distinguished only between the happy medium and the lack of balance. Religion is the happy medium, any lack of balance is viewed as magic.

In the same discussion of fish, Apuleius had introduced another idea: ". . . and if it was certain remedies that I sought to get from fish?"⁶³ Following this, he refutes the malevolent interpretation of the story of the *lepos*, which leads him to contrast the philosopher, the doctor, and the sorcerer: ". . . is, to your mind, knowing some remedies, and seeking to obtain some, the doing of a magician, and not rather that of a doctor—nay, of a philosopher, who will not use them to earn money but to help other humans. The doctors of old were even well acquainted with charms as remedies for wounds: that is what Homer teaches us, our surest authority in matters of antiquity . . ." There follows the story of Odysseus taking part in the hunt for the wild boar.⁶⁴

There is thus a twofold contrast. The first is the one between the doctor and the philosopher, both in search of natural remedies, but the one as a professional who must live from his art, and the other as a disinterested benefactor of suffering humanity (a contrast that was repeated in the case of the epileptic woman in which the philosopher is presented as the true scholar). The second contrast is between the doctor and the sorcerer, who are differentiated by their intentions, an idea with which we are well acquainted.

We measure the intellectual distance between this passage and the conceptions of the Hippocratic author of the treatise on the sacred illness. Hippocratic medicine rejected *mageia* as an inadequate technique that sought healing by referring to an erroneous cosmology. Apuleius is not so radical. In his eyes, it is possible that the philosopher, the doctor, and the sorcerer start with the

same cosmology. The distinction is made in terms of intentions, which can be good or bad, and within these two more or less honorable categories.

The case of Apuleius is thus a fine example of the general rule formulated by Marcel Mauss. Although Apuleius is not a magician, the society makes him into one. In his opinion, this confusion between the philosopher and the sorcerer has two causes. On the one hand, it is the curiosity of the naturalistic philosopher that lends itself to erroneous interpretations, according to which the cutting up of a fish looks like the preparation of a *veneficium*, whereas the diagnosis of a case of epilepsy is understood as an exorcism. On the other hand, it is the curiosity of the theological philosopher, whose private religion is more intense than the norm tolerates, that gives rise to other malevolent interpretations. Both a statuette of a god, adored as a personal divinity, and ritual objects coming from mysteries in which the philosopher was initiated are considered as signs of that too-close intimacy, of the *communitas loquendi cum deis*, which constitutes, in people's eyes, the most characteristic sign of the sorcerer.⁶⁵

In short, the sociological analysis derived from Mauss, who saw not only the sorcerer as a marginal figure, but rather the marginal person as a possible sorcerer ("any abnormal social condition prepares for the practice of magic"), becomes, in the society of Apuleius, a religious analysis: "Any abnormal interest in the sacred can lead to the suspicion of magic."⁶⁶

HOW TO BECOME A MAGICIAN: THE RITES OF INITIATION

IN THE PRECEDING PAGES, we gradually approached the figure of the magician, starting with the study of the different names taken by this personage in the Greco-Roman culture—from *gōēs* to *maleficus*, with *māgos/magus* as its center. With C. Furius Cresimus and Apuleius, we encountered two men wrongly declared sorcerers by their society. After the case of these unintentional magicians, we must now examine the case of those who became magicians by their own accord; who were they, and how did they become magicians?

AN EGYPTIAN PROLOGUE

According to the opinion of the ancients, we must seek these magicians in Egypt.¹ "When we were sailing up the Nile, there was among us a man from Memphis, one of the sacred scribes, an extraordinary scholar who knew everything that Egypt could teach him. He told us that he had spent twenty-three years in the secret chambers under the earth, where Isis had taught him how to become

- Apologia LI, 10: "magi et malefici hominis"; LXI, 1 "magica maleficia"; *Metamorphoses*, IX, 29 "devotionibus ac maleficis"); compare Abt, *Die Apologie des Apuleius*, p. 90ff; Butler and Owen, *Apulei Apologia Sive Pro Se De Magia*, p. 3 (below, p. 257n5).
87. Isidore, *Etymologiae* VIII, 9; see Kieckhefer 1989, p. 11f.
88. Later, this changes; see Paulus, *Sententiae* V, 21 (FIRA 2, 406), who attacks the "vaticinatores, qui se deo plenos adsimulant, qui novas sectas vel ratione incognitas religiones inducunt, qui de salute principis vel summa rei publicae mathematicos hariosos haruspices vaticinatores consulit: non tantum divinatione quis, sed ipsa scientia eiusque libris melius fecerit abstinere."
89. Tacitus, *Annals*, II, 27; XII, 22.
90. The Marsi are attested to since the annalist C. Gellius, frg. 9 Peter (ap. Solin. 2, 27–30); see Tibullus I, 8,20 and the commentary of Kirby Flower Smith, p. 347.
91. This is also the opinion of Marcel LeGlay and Raffaella Garosi; see n. 49.
92. See Tamsyn Barton, *Ancient Astrology* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 32–63.
93. Virgil, *Eclogue* VII, 97ff.
94. Herodotus IV, 105.
95. Paolo Poccetti, "Su due laminette plumbee iscritte nel Museo di Reggio Calabria," *Klarchos* 101–104, 1984, pp. 73–86; id., "Nuova laminetta plumbea osca dal Bruzio," in *Crotone e la sua storia tra il IV e III secolo A.C.* (Naples: Arte Tipografica, 1993), pp. 213–232; more texts come from the 4th cent., id., in M. Gualtieri (ed.), *Roccagloriosa* vol. 1 (Naples: Centre Jean Bérard, 1990), pp. 141–150.
96. Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, XXVIII, 19: "Moreover there is not one who does not fear being spellbound by maleficent prayers."
97. Cicero, *Brutus*, 217; see Gager 1992, 120. The same story shorter in *The Orator*, 129.
98. Helmut Engelmann, *The Delian Aretalogy of Sarapis* (Leyden: Brill, 1975), p. 9 Z. 85ff.
99. Cicero, *Laws*, II, 21.
100. Paulus, *Sententiae* V, 23,15 (FIRA 2, 410) "qui sacra impia nocturnave, ut quem obcantarent defigerent obligarent, fecerint facien-

dave curaverint, aut cruci affiguntur aut bestiis obiciuntur." *Codex Theodosianus* 9, 16, 7 "ne quis deinceps nocturnis temporibus aut nefarias preces aut magicos apparatus aut sacrificia funesta celebrare conetur."

3. PORTRAIT OF THE MAGICIAN, SEEN FROM THE OUTSIDE

1. Mauss, 1973, p. 24: "C'est . . . l'opinion qui crée le magicien et l'influence qu'il dégage . . . Les individus, auxquels l'exercice de la magie est attribué, ont déjà . . . une condition distincte à l'intérieur de la société qui les traite de magiciens."
2. Piso, *Historicorum Romanorum Fragmenta*, ed. H. Peter, Frg. 33 (Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, XVIII, 41–43). Fundamental Garosi: 1976, pp. 33–36.
3. Servius, *On Virgil, Eclogue* 8,99: "TRADVCRE MESSES: magicis quibusdam artibus hoc fiebat unde est in XII tabulis NEVE ALIENAM SEGETEM PELLETERIS."
4. Paulus, *Sententiae* V, 23 ["ad legem Corneliam de sicariis et veneficis"] (FIRA 2, 405–410) mentions the death penalty (by fire, by crucifixion, by the circus animals, or, for the *honestiores*, a more discreet form of death) as the normal punishment; the deportation to the island is imposed only on the possessor of magic books who did not practice the art.
5. The best critical edition is still that of R. Helm in the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana* (vol. 2:1 of the Works of Apuleius), 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1912, often reprinted); critical edition with French translation by Paul Valette in the *Édition Budé* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1960). Still important remains the commentary of H. E. Butler and A. S. Owen, *Apulei Apologia sive pro se de magia liber* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914; repr. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967); and the thesis of Adam Abt, *Die Apologie des Apuleius von Madaura und die antike Zauberei, Beiträge zur Erläuterung der Schrift de magia*. RGVV 4:2 (Giessen: Toepelmann, 1908; repr. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967). See also the analysis in Clerc 1995, esp. pp. 45–49.
6. The edict figures on the P. Yale inv. 299, published by George M. Parassoglou, "Circular from a Prefect: Sileat Omnibus Perpetuo Divinandi Curiositas," in Ann Ellis Hanson (ed.), *Collectanea*

- Papyrologica: Texts Published in Honor of H. C. Youtie* (Bonn: Habelt, 1976), vol. 1, p. 262, no. 30; again in G. H. R. Horsley (ed.), *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity* vol. 1 (Macquarie University: 1984), p. 47, no. 12. For Paul, see n. 4.
7. *Apology*, LXXXIII, 1.
 8. For Apuleius the philosopher, see primarily John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 306–340; and Claudio Moreschini, *Apuleio e il Platonismo* (Florence: Olschki, 1978). The reference to Sextus is found in *Metamorphoses*, I, 2.
 9. St. Gsell, *Inscriptions latines de l'Algérie*, vol. 1 (Paris: Leroux, 1922), no. 2115; [Pb]ilosopho [Pl]atonico [Ma]daurenses cives ornament[o] suo d(e)d(icaverunt) p(ecunia) p(ublica).
 10. *Apology*, LXXVIII, 1 "aquariolus iste uxoris suae ita ira extumuit, ita exarsit furore, ut in feminam sanctissimam et pudicissimam praesente filio eius digna cubiculo suo diceret, amatricem eam, me magum et veneficum clamitaret multis audientibus quos, si voles, nominabo: se mihi sua manu mortem allaturum."
 11. *Apology*, I, 3 "gratulor medius fidius quod mihi copia et facultas te iudice optigit purgandae apud imperitos philosophiae et probandi mei."
 12. *Apology*, III, 5.
 13. *Apology*, IV, 4.
 14. *Apology*, XXV, 10; XXXVIII, 1, XLI, 4; LX, 2.
 15. *Apology*, XIX, 2 "virum tam austeræ sectae tamque diutinae militiae"; see Butler and Owen 1914, p. 56 (for Stoicism); p. 11. A. Stein, *PW* 3, 1899, 2772 nr. 238 (the philosopher); E. Groag, *ibid.* 2773 nr. 239 hesitates on the identification of governor and philosopher; in E. Groag and A. Stein, *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1936), Part 2 no. 933 and 934—Groag is more optimistic.
 16. For the philosopher in later Greek and Roman society, see Johannes Hahn, *Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft. Selbstverständnis, öffentliches Auftreten und populäre Erwartungen in der höheren Kaiserzeit* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989).
 17. Glen Warren Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).
 18. Useful indications are found in Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the*

- Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 95–127; and esp. Graham Anderson, *Sage, Saint, and Sophist: Holy Men and Their Associates in the Early Roman Empire* (London/New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 65–68. For a model at least partially derived from Apuleius, see Paola Zambelli, *L'ambigua natura della magia, Filosofi, streghe, riti nel Rinascimento* (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1991).
19. *Apology*, XXIX, 1.
 20. Greek *τρύγων*, D'Arcy W. Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Fishes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), p. 270f.; Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, IX, 155; Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, VI, 32.
 21. *Apology*, XL, 5.
 22. *Apology*, XXXIV, 4.
 23. Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, XXVII, 131 "Circa Ariminum nota est herba quam resedam vocant. discutit collectiones inflammationesque omnes. qui curant ea, addunt haec verba: 'reseda, morbos reseda, / scisne scisne quis hic pullus egerit radices? / nec caput nec pedes habeat.' haec ter dicunt totiensque despuunt." See Maria Cristina Martini, *Piante medicamentose e rituali magico-religiosi in Plinio* (Rome: Bulzoni, 1977).
 24. Origen, *Against Celsus*, I, 24 (vol. 1, pp. 134–136, Borret); for Herodotus, see Walter Burkert, "Herodot über die Namen der Götter: Polytheismus als historisches Problem," *Museum Helveticum* 42, 1985, 121–132.
 25. *Apology*, XXXVIII, 7.
 26. *Apology*, XLII, 3; PGM IV 850, Charm of Salomon that produces a trance; Abt 1908, p. 240.
 27. Plotinus, II, 9, 14: the only difference is that Plotinus confirms for us that by their powers, the sorcerers would have great renown with the crowd.
 28. *Apology*, XLIII, 7 "carmine . . . initiare."
 29. Butler and Owen, 1914; p. 108ff; Juvenal, VI, 551s.
 30. Heraclitus, DK 12 B 14, see this volume, Chapter 2.
 31. Asclepius: Emma J. and Ludwig Edelstein, *Asclepius: A Collection and Interpretation of the Testimonies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1948, repr. Salem, N. H.: Ayer Co., 1988), vol. 1, pp. 296–299; documents 523–531. Magic: e.g., PGM IV, 30 (white

- rooster). XIII, 377 (in order to prove one's initiation) Audollent 1904, LXII. (defixiones); see Abt 1908, ad loc.; see also Aeneas of Gaza, in Hopfner 1990, p. 562f. (vol. 2, § 339; sacrifice of a rooster typical for necromantic rituals among Chaldaeans, Egyptians, and Greeks).
32. *Apology*, XLVIII, 1.
 33. *Apology*, LI, 10.
 34. See C. Bonner, "The Technique of Exorcism," *Harvard Theological Review*, 1943, pp. 39–49; id., "The Violence of Departing Demons," *Harvard Theological Review*, 1944, pp. 334–336; K. Thraede, "Exorzismus," *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* vol. 7, 1969, pp. 44–117; Peter Brown, "The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity," *Journal of Roman Studies* 61, 1971, pp. 80–101.
 35. For the Acts and Gospels, see esp. Smith 1978 passim; for the papyri PGM IV, 1228; V, 125; XIII, 243.
 36. Lucian, *The Lover of Lies*, 16.
 37. *Apology*, LIII–LVI.
 38. *Apology*, LVII–LX.
 39. *Apology*, LXI, 2.
 40. PGM VIII 13; Abt 1908, 302.
 41. Suetonius, *Nero* 56.
 42. Abt 1908: ad loc.
 43. PGM I, 163ff.
 44. Abt 1908, p. 297f. (also on PGM IV, 2130); Martin S. Smith (ed.), *Petronius: Cena Trimalchionis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 74; Katherine M. D. Dunbabin, "Sic erimus cuncti . . . : The skeleton in Graeco-Roman art," *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* 101, 1986, 185–255.
 45. *Apology*, LIV 7.
 46. Henrik S. Versnel, "Religious Mentality in Ancient Prayer," in H. S. Versnel (ed.), *Faith, Hope and Worship: Aspects of Religious Mentality in the Ancient World* (Studies in Greek and Roman Religion, vol. 2) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), pp. 1–64, esp. pp. 25–28, who refers to Cicero, *De divinatione*, I, 129 and to the amorous prayer in Roman elegy; Pieter W. van der Horst, "Silent prayer in antiquity," *Numen* 41, 1994, pp. 1–25.
 47. Thomas 1971: p. 179.

48. Seneca: *Letter to Lucilius*, 41, 2; see also fragment 36 Hasse of the treatise *De superstitione* (Jupiter Capitolinus).
49. Lucian, *The Lover of Lies*, 20, see Otto Weinreich, *Antike Heilungswunder: Untersuchungen zum Wunderglauben der Griechen und Römer*, RGVV VIII: 1, (Giessen: Toepelmann, 1909), pp. 137ff.
50. See later, Chapter 5, n. 26.
51. *Apology*, XXVI, 6 "sin vero more vulgari eum isti proprie magum existimant, qui communione loquendi cum dis immortalibus ad omnia, quae velit, incredibili quadam vi cantaminum polleat . . ."
52. As a literary figure, e.g., Tibullus, I, 5, 11; Ovid, *The Art of Loving*, II, 329; Aesopus, *Fabula* 91; mythical transformation Diodorus of Sicily, III, 58, 2 (Cybele); late antiquity John Chrysostomus, *Homily on Coloss.*, III VIII (PG 62,358 B) (healing); Theodoretus, *History of the Monks of Syria*, XIII, 10 (erotic magic); Callinicus, *Life of Hypatius*, XXVIII, 1–3 (healing). See Jan N. Bremmer, "The old women in ancient Greece," in Josine Blok and Peter Mason (eds.), *Sexual Asymmetry: Studies in Ancient Society* (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1987), pp. 191–215.
53. For Athens in the classical age, Adolf Wilhelm, "Über die Zeit einiger attischer Fluchtafeln," *Oesterreichische Jahrbeste* 7, 1904, pp. 113–125 (exemplary his conclusions. p. 118); Trumpf 1958, 99; Jordan 1988a: vol. 4, pp. 273–377; F. Willemsen, in W. K. Kovacsovics, *Die Eckterrasse an der Gräberstrasse des Kerameikos* (Kerameikos. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen 14) (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1990), 142 (trierach), 148 (the orators Hyperides and Lycurgus). For Delos (um 100 v. Chr.) *Inscriptions de Délos*, vol. 5, no. 2534.
54. Plato, *Republic* 364 B.C., see earlier, Chapter 2, n. 9.
55. Curio: Cicero, *Brutus*, 217; Vatinius: Cicero, *In Vatinium*, 14; Nigidius Figulus: Apuleius, *Apology* XLII, 3; Germanicus: Tacitus, *Annals*, II, 69; the other cases IV, 52, 1 (26 A.D., *venefica in principem et devotiones*); VI, 29, 4 (34 A.D. *magorum sacra*); XII, 59 (53 A.D., *magicae superstitiones*); XII, 65, 1 (54 A.D., *devotiones* against the empress).
56. Libanius: C. Bonner, "Witchcraft in the Lecture Room of Libanius," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 63, 1932, pp. 34–44; Sopater: Eunapius, *Vitae sophistarum* VI, 2, 9–11 (the philosopher was offered as a scapegoat during a crisis); see also

- Zosimos, *Historia* II, 40,3; Boethius: his own *Consolation of Philosophy* I, 4, 134–148; and Pierre Rousseau, "The death of Boethius: The charge of maleficium," *Studi Medievali* 20, 1979, pp. 871–889. Extensive, but sometimes rambling, discussions in Clerc 1995, esp. pp. 153–237.
57. Andreas Alföldi, "Stadtrömische heidnische Amulett-Medaillen aus der Zeit um 400 n. Chr.," in *Mullus: Festschrift Theodor Klauser* (Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, suppl. 1) (Münster: Aschendorff, 1964), pp. 1–9; an exciting amulet represents a scene of necromancy (5, Taf. 1,4), another one a Bacchic dance in front of Hecate (7, Taf. 2,6), which combines magic and mysteries.
58. Zacharias, *Life of S. Severus*, 61.
59. Paulus, *Sententiae*, 5,23,18 "libri magicae artis . . . penes quoscumque reperti sint, bonis adeptis, ambustis his publice in insulam deportantur, humiliores capite puniuntur."
60. Kieckhefer 1989: 12f.
61. See the arguments of Peter Brown, *The Cult of the Saints. Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Natalie Zemon Davis, "Some Tasks and Themes in the Study of Popular Religion," in Charles Trinkaus and Heiko A. Oberman, *The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion* (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 307–336; Dario Rei, "Note sul concetto di religione popolare," *Lares* 40, 1974, pp. 262–280.
62. *Apology*, XXVII, 1–3 "qui providentiam mundi curiosius vestigant."
63. *Apology*, XL, 1.
64. *Apology*, XL, 3.
65. Later cases in Brown 1972: pp. 124–127 (Boethius, Mummolus of Bordeaux); and Hypatia of Alexandria, according to Maria Dzielska, *Hypatia of Alexandria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
66. Mauss 1973: 24 "Toute condition sociale anormale prépare à l'exercice de la magie."

4. HOW TO BECOME A MAGICIAN

1. E.g., John Chrysostomus, *Homely on Matthew* VIII 4; see Fowden 1986: pp. 79–87.
2. Lucian, *The Lover of Lies*, 34–36.

3. Fowden 1986: p. 166f. wishes to identify him with the magician and priest Pachrates of Heliopolis, mentioned in PGM IV, 2446–2455; but Heinz J. Thissen, "Ägyptologische Beiträge zu den griechischen magischen Papyri," in U. Verhoeven and E. Graefe (Hrsgg.), *Religion und Philosophie im alten Ägypten: Festgabe für Philippe Derchain* (Louvain: Peeters, 1991), p. 296 tries an Egyptian etymology for the latter name: Pa-hrt, "he who belongs to the (divine) child."
4. Caesar, *Bellum Gallicum* VI, 14.
5. Pseudo-Cyprian, *Confessions* 12, see Hopfner 1983: p. 22f. For another sorcerer taught in Memphis, Jerome, *Vita Hilarionis eremita* 12; and already the powerful divinities of the Delian Serapeum came from Memphis, Helmut Engelmann, *The Delian Aretalogy of Sarapis* (Leiden: Brill, 1975); in a Demotic text, it is the capital of sorcery, G. Maspero, *Popular Stories of Ancient Egypt*, trans. A. S. Johns (New Hyde Park, N. Y.: University Books, 1967) (orig. Paris, 4th ed. 1911, p. 425f.).
6. Arnobius, *Against the Gentiles*, I, 43 1, 43: "magus fuit, clandestinis artibus omnia illa perfecit, Aegyptiorum ex adytis angelorum potentium nomina et remotas furatus est disciplinas."
7. Dio Cassius LXXV, 13,2.
8. PGM VIII 41ff. The Christians told a story about how the emperor Julian underwent initiation in an *aduton*: Sozomenus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* V, 2, and the Coptic Christians suspected magic in all Egyptian temples; see the story of the Coptic saint Shenute in Trombley 1993: vol. 2, 211.
9. Origen, *Against Celsus* I, 25. Hopfner 1974: pp. 64–82 (§§ 135–162); for a *defixio* Audollent 1904: no. 74; Daniel and Maltomini: 1992, no. 97b.
10. Celsus (in Origen, *Against Celsus* I, 28) follows Jewish sources in his account of how young Jesus had been forced through poverty to look for work in Egypt, where he learned magic. For all this, Smith 1978: pp. 45–80; still interesting is E. M. Butler, *The Myth of the Magus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), pp. 66–73.
11. Zalmoxis: Herodotus IV, 96; Hellanicus, *FGrHist* 4 F 73; Pythagoras Diogenes Laertius 8,41, following Hermippus frg. 20 Wehrli *Die Schule des Aristoteles*. Suppl. 1 (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe,

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Fritz Graf

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