

DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

Imperialism, Internationalism, and Archaeology in the Un/Making of the Middle East

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ABSTRACT Archaeological materialities and imaginaries have been deeply entwined in colonial rivalries and struggles for self-determination that have lasting legacies across the Middle East. Neoimperial ambitions and conflict over territory, religion, oil, and antiquities have similarly been accompanied by heritage claims and the rhetoric of high cultural humanism. Throughout the twentieth century, foreign occupation and military adventurism emboldened archaeological elites, including Hogarth, Kenyon, Lawrence, Woolley, and Bell, to implement expansive new designs for a one-world archaeology. Whether situated in London or Jerusalem, Western archaeologists were instrumental in the colonial carve-up that extended to historical sites, concessions, collections, and even the creation of new states, often working through international agencies, such as the League of Nations and UNESCO, under a banner of salvage and uplift. The connected histories of archaeology, espionage, and the end of empire have cast a long shadow, prompting deeper analysis of archaeologists' role as participants and beneficiaries. It is thus timely to reconsider disciplinary histories and interventions—from the colonial era through two World Wars to recent regional conflicts with the attendant international responses—and to interrogate archaeology's century-old ambitions and practices that are replicated in new technics of "oversight." [*espionage, war, archaeology, military-industrial-academic complex, Middle East*]

RESUMEN Materialidades e imaginarios arqueológicos han estado profundamente entrelazados en rivalidades coloniales y luchas por la autodeterminación que tienen legados persistentes a través del Medio Oriente. Ambiciones neoimperiales y conflicto sobre territorio, religión, petróleo, y antigüedades han estado similarmente acompañados por reclamaciones del patrimonio cultural, y la retórica de humanismo cultural elevado. A lo largo del siglo XX, la ocupación extranjera y el aventurismo militar motivaron las élites arqueológicas, incluyendo Hogarth, Kenyon, Lawrence, Woolley y Bell, a implementar nuevos diseños expansivos para una arqueología de un mundo. Ya sea situados en Londres o Jerusalén, los arqueólogos occidentales fueron instrumentales en el reparto colonial que se extendió a sitios históricos, concesiones, colecciones, y aun la creación de nuevos estados, a menudo trabajando a través de agencias internacionales, tales como la Liga de las Naciones y UNESCO, bajo el estandarte de salvamento y elevación. Las historias conectadas de arqueología, espionaje, y el final del imperio han proyectado una larga sombra, dando lugar a un análisis más profundo del rol de los arqueólogos como participantes y beneficiarios. Es por lo tanto oportuno, reconsiderar las historias e intervenciones disciplinarias —desde la era colonial durante las dos guerras mundiales hasta los conflictos regionales recientes con las consecuentes respuestas internacionales—

e interrogar las ambiciones y prácticas centenarias de la arqueología que son replicadas en las nuevas técnicas de “supervisión”. [espionaje, guerra, arqueología, complejo militar-industrial-académico, Medio Oriente]

ARCHAEOLOGICAL ADVENTURISM

In July 1943, amid the turmoil of World War II, a remarkable document was penned, titled *Archaeology after the War*.¹ Drafted by three archaeologists based in Jerusalem—American rabbi Nelson Glueck, French priest Roland de Vaux, and Polish-born Eleazar Sukenik (father of archaeologist and general Yigael Yadin)—it imagined a time after the cessation of hostilities, when the archaeological landscapes of the Middle East could be carved up and apportioned to British and American institutions. The three appealed to the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA), the American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR), Chicago’s Oriental Institute, London’s Institute of Archaeology, and Britain’s Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF). In the international meeting that followed, the authors proposed that antiquities found within any modern nation-state would have not only *national* but *international* interest and thus should be subject to an international convention.

Hosted by the American School of Oriental Studies in Jerusalem while the war was still raging—at that time, the Battle of Kursk on the eastern front, the bombing of Rome, and the ongoing horror of the Nazi concentration camps—the meeting laid bare the full force of archaeological self-interest. Framed almost entirely around excavation in the Middle East, *Archaeology after the War* was formulated to protect the “origins” of “Western Civilization” through processes of enhanced internationalism. Albeit premised on multilateral cooperation and some measure of technical assistance, the document reveals the unidirectional and imperial imperatives of its drafters. They called for the “scientific ownership of finds,” a standardized lexicon of all archaeological terms, access to all excavation discoveries, a Council for Near Eastern Archaeology, and a master plan for archaeology across the entire region.

Some forty experts met to set the agenda for archaeology against a backdrop of the unrivaled atrocities being perpetrated in Europe and the programmatic destruction of culture and heritage. Given the colonial conditions of the day, it was easy for Western scholars to argue in favor of international legislation and oversight because the antiquities of their own nations were not under discussion. As the composition of the assembly reflects, the agenda was shaped by colonial concerns about maintaining control leading up to the endgame of empire—and archaeology was a high-profile part of that equation.

The British archaeological elite quickly capitalized on the Jerusalem initiative. Just two months later, Kathleen Kenyon, acting director of the Institute of Archaeology in London, drew upon the initiative and organized a conference titled “The Future of Archaeology.”² Before excavating

Jericho, Kenyon had worked at Samaria with Sukenik; she was on the council for the British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem, and her father, Sir Frederick Kenyon, was a biblical scholar, president of the British Academy, and director of the British Museum. In 1913, he was working with the military, alongside T. E. Lawrence, Leonard Woolley, and David Hogarth, assisting Winston Churchill and Lord Curzon in Middle Eastern matters (Bernhardsson 2005; Satia 2008). Kenyon advised Britain’s foreign secretary, Lord Balfour, that “a great service would be rendered to the cause ... if competent archaeologists could be officially attached to armies operating in Mesopotamia and Palestine.”³ Similarly, his eldest daughter, Kathleen, was deeply invested in maintaining British interests abroad, specifically in the Middle East. Kenyon’s correspondence reveals her ambition to establish archaeology formally as a university-trained career, with access to international excavations, sanctioned by official permits. She wrote that “discussion of this can’t be left till after the war, when everyone will be mixed up in a whirl of reconstruction, and those bodies which aren’t ready with plans will be badly left out.”⁴

The London conference saw a virtual who’s who of the British archaeological establishment, including V. Gordon Childe, Leonard Woolley, Mortimer Wheeler, Jacquetta Hawkes, Dorothy Garrod, and Grahame Clark. Members of the British government were invited from Whitehall and Downing Street, including the secretaries of state for the colonies and for dominion affairs, as well as representatives of the India Office and the Foreign Office. Allied government representatives were invited from France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and the USSR. Captain Anthony Blunt, later famously outed as a Soviet spy and one of the Cambridge Five, attended. Many British archaeologists were deeply involved in wartime efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere; these included Wheeler, Woolley, Garrod, Glanville, Clark, Piggott, and Mallowan. Indeed, the British Academy archives reveal just how many archaeologists participated in intelligence activities, primarily mapping and photographic surveillance, as compared with related disciplines.⁵ The British sought to extend their technologies of rule, shrouded in redemptive claims of restoring civilization. Heritage had become part of a total war.

Foreshadowing international organizations like UNESCO, the archaeologists who met in 1943 in London proposed that “plans should be made soon to fit in with the post-war re-organization of cultural and educational activities.” Hence, the sentiments, logics, and practices that were initiated before, during, and after World War I would be rehearsed in the conflicts to follow, forming a lethal nexus of military and academic opportunism. In both world wars, the

furtherance of empire, not only territorial and political but intellectual and scientific, was enabled through archaeological fieldwork and expertise.

In what follows, I argue that archaeological access and adventurism constitute the micropolitics of war. Clausewitz famously said that war is the continuation of political commerce by other means; I suggest that archaeological sites, antiquities, and practitioners themselves were imbricated in those political intrigues. One can trace how imperatives to govern the material vestiges of the past in order to shape the future were effectively materialized through archaeology throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Competition and control, contestation and conflict over archaeological access and excavations afforded moments of redrawing, reinscribing, and reinforcing territorial and historical mastery in the Middle East. And with that came a reinvigorated imperialism, paternalism, and opportunism. Acquiring archaeological concessions in the region was often as much about securing supplementary resources, whether oil or antiquities (often inseparable transactions), as it was about claims to religious or civilizational inheritance. Indeed, American and British politicians were fighting over oil refineries and infrastructure (Mitchell 2011) in parallel with concessions and antiquities, all amid the turmoil of World War II, when the two nations were allied. Technocracy has typically supplied the means by which expert archaeological and national political agendas converged, from the field surveys and spying of the early 1900s to the satellites, drones, and aerial reconnaissance of today (Satia 2006, 2007, 2014). Genuflections to internationalism and collaboration have often served as expert cover for extending imperial claims.

CIVILIZING BUSINESS

It is useful to trace the convergence of interests (military, political, economic, and academic) from the lead-up to World War I and establishment of the League of Nations to World War II and its aftermath, with the foundation of UNESCO. Reverberations can be felt throughout recent conflicts in the Middle East, and archaeological expertise continues to be drawn into those self-same entanglements. In 2014, when Daesh literally bulldozed the 1916 Sykes–Picot line, drawn up by the British and French to divide the spoils of Greater Syria, their actions demonstrated how others remember those portentous lines in the sand.

The architect of the Sykes–Picot Agreement, the British Arabist Mark Sykes, had helped establish the Arab Bureau in Cairo as part of British military intelligence in order to collect and disseminate propaganda and intelligence. Archaeologist David Hogarth, director of the British School in Athens and keeper of Oxford’s Ashmolean Museum, was selected to run the bureau. Hogarth recruited other Oxford archaeologists, including T. E. Lawrence, Leonard Woolley, and Gertrude Bell.⁶ As is well documented, these archaeologists were all wittingly involved in covert military activities; as

Lawrence himself once wrote, the British had entered the Middle East like sphinxes.⁷

In 1913, the British War Office engaged the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) to map large unrecorded areas of the Wadi Araba to the southern end of the Dead Sea, with the imputed purpose being to “find any evidence of the wanderings of the Israelites during the Exodus period” (Moscrop 2000, 207). Hogarth commissioned Woolley and Lawrence for the survey, later published in 1915 as *The Wilderness of Zin* (1936). An archaeological mapping exercise (albeit an illegal one) provided the perfect cover for espionage. Founded by the Archbishop of York in 1865, the PEF linked English Protestantism, patriotism, destiny, science, and England’s role in a global colonial competition. At the PEF’s inauguration, the archbishop remarked that “this country of Palestine belongs to you and me. It is essentially ours.”⁸ The map of Palestine created by the PEF surveyors from the War Office effectively became the map of Britain’s Mandate for Palestine after World War I and defined its border with the French Mandate in Lebanon. Its legacy formed the basis of proposals to divide the land between Palestine’s Arab and Jewish populations and ultimately defined the borders of the State of Israel, and thus at least one border for several modern Middle Eastern states. As Michael Ondaatje (2018) elegantly wrote, “most of the great battles are fought in the creases of topographical maps.”

T. E. Lawrence famously said of his survey work with Woolley in Sinai, “we are obviously only meant as red herings, to give an archaeological color to a political job.”⁹ Ultimately, that survey provided essential training for his later actions in the war, and the team served as a model for the larger groupings and offensives to follow (Moorhead 2003). At the outbreak of war, Lawrence claimed that it was “his connection with Middle East archaeology and with the Sinai survey which led him to finding suitable war work.”¹⁰ Woolley was given a commission in the Royal Artillery while Lawrence worked for Military Intelligence. His principal function was as a map officer in the Arab Bureau, using his archaeological skills and experience of the sites and landscapes acquired through his years of survey and excavation. By 1916, however, after the Arab Revolt, Lawrence had left his paper war in Cairo for the field. As Richter argues (2008, 235), “Archaeology not only served as a useful cover for espionage on multiple occasions, but was also a source of skills useful in both archaeology and intelligence, such as surveying, languages, photography, making detailed descriptions or sketches, report writing, personal contacts, and an intimate and usually personal knowledge of geography. Archaeology and espionage could be carried out side-by-side since the skills and techniques used could easily be utilized by both, and therefore one activity informed the other.”

Woolley and Lawrence were dispatched from their excavations at the Bronze Age site of Carchemish, a Hittite capital recorded in the Bible that today straddles the frontier between Turkey and Syria, to conduct their now-famous

Zin survey ([1915] 1936). Through their Oxford University connections, Woolley and Lawrence were selected by Sir Frederick Kenyon to lead the Carchemish excavations (Winstone 1990, 36). Woolley secured his permit from the Ottoman Kaymakam (district governor) at gunpoint: "Taking my revolver out of its holster I got up and walking to the side of his chair put the muzzle against his left ear. 'On the contrary,' I said, 'I shall shoot you here and now unless you give me permission to start work to-morrow'" (Woolley 1920, 156). Woolley and Lawrence were sent to Carchemish not only to excavate but also to gather intelligence on the Germans, in what Lord Kitchener referred to as "archaeological whitewash" (Winstone 1990, 60); he himself had taken part in an earlier British survey of Palestine in the 1880s. With his team, Kitchener had triangulated and surveyed some three thousand square miles of Palestinian territory, recorded all known archaeological sites, taken thousands of photographs, copied inscriptions, and conducted research on biblical sites. He further compiled reports of the names, religion, and water supply of each and every village (Cassar 2016, 5–6).

The Carchemish excavations and dig house were close to the Berlin–Baghdad railway, and Lawrence's mission was to send Hogarth information on trains and measurements of train lines. Funded by Deutsche Bank and constructed by German engineers, the railway would reach the oil fields and Persian Gulf, bypassing the Suez Canal, which was controlled by British and French interests. When they returned to Carchemish after the Zin survey, tensions were running high, and various hostilities broke out between the German engineers and the British excavators and their workmen (Moscrop 2000, 208). Competition among archaeologists, especially in light of German superiority in biblical archaeology, thus coincided with larger colonial ambitions. Mapping and excavation played a "critical role linking the study of the past with concrete military and political realities" (Richter 2008, 216) and to territorial claims and economic advantage. In other mutually beneficial military and archaeological arrangements, Lawrence and Bell employed their aerial photography expertise, gleaned from the Arab Bureau, to enhance the British military's geographical knowledge and attack strategies in Mesopotamia (Satia 2008, 159). Woolley was later stationed to the Port Said intelligence office, tasked with directing spy planes and reconnaissance and interrogating prisoners of war. With the PEF and its members Hogarth, Lawrence, and Woolley, we see the initial stirrings of what has been termed the military-industrial-academic complex.

Another dramatic illustration of British fervor for the Holy Land was General Edmund Allenby's famous entry through the Jaffa Gate into the Old City of Jerusalem on December 11, 1917. He was accompanied by T. E. Lawrence. Allenby was following plans carefully devised by Mark Sykes, one of the architects of the aforementioned Sykes–Picot Agreement. The Ottoman governor had written to the British two days earlier, informing them, "Due to the severity of the siege of the city and the suffering that this peaceful

country has endured from your heavy guns; and for fear that these deadly bombs will hit the holy places, we are forced to hand over to you the city ... hoping that you will protect Jerusalem the way we have protected it for more than five hundred years."¹¹ General Allenby reportedly claimed that "the wars of the crusades are now complete." Back in London, the British prime minister, David Lloyd George, awaited the capture of Jerusalem as no less than "a Christmas present for the British people." Allenby was advised to take the city before the holidays (see Meskell 2018, 161).

The Christian occupation of Jerusalem sealed the fate of the ancient city, with dramatic consequences for all faiths represented therein and the safeguarding of their historic places. The Balfour Declaration further committed Britain to supporting the establishment in Palestine of a homeland for the Jewish people. As Corbett (2015, 6) argues, the British had rendered the antiquity of the Holy Land's core as Jewish, bolstering a narrative of ownership supported by the Zionist movement. The landscape east of the River Jordan was then reimagined in relation to the idea that Palestine was the home of the ancient Israelites, while those ancient non-Israelite peoples who also appear in the Hebrew Bible were designated to the periphery. Corbett (2015, 3) explains how the very creation of Jordan had its roots in late nineteenth-century imperialism and struggles over "the ownership of archaeological artifacts and the narratives told by them, the geographies of history upon which borders were drawn, and differing conceptions of nations." The components of the future Transjordan lay exactly between the holy landscapes of Jerusalem and the Hejaz (the birthplace of Islam). New sciences, such as archaeology, philology, and eugenics, contributed to this historicity of peoples, Corbett suggests, rewriting their pasts and aspiring to share their futures.

Not simply about territorial claims to empire, archaeology supplied the imputed ideological and moral justification for national ambitions in the Holy Land. These were, after all, religious wars. For the French, capturing the Middle East was about Catholicism and the Crusades. For the British, places like Jerusalem were also about reliving the Crusades and capturing the Holy Lands they thought rightfully theirs, but through redemptive Protestantism. And for the Americans, the relative latecomers, their presence was tethered to the Old Testament and their development of biblical archaeology (Corbett 2015).

Both war and archaeology are global mobilities that share an entwined history. By the close of World War I, the British had "mapped, excavated, and imagined Palestine and Transjordan" into a new reality (Corbett 2015, 16). Significantly, the British Mandate period continues to be regarded as the formative "Golden Age" of archaeology in Palestine (Gibson 1999, 115). By 1920, General Allenby and the high commissioner for Palestine, Herbert Samuel, were elected vice-presidents of the British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem. Imperial ambition generated new forms of governance, uniting archaeology and politics. As secretary of state for war, Winston Churchill assured the House of Com-

mons that the restoration and preservation of monuments in Palestine would be given full attention. The British then devised antiquities legislation that ultimately forged an enduring separation between “living” and “archaeological” heritage, a division that was as unnatural as the new borders they drafted (Corbett 2015, 94). Transjordan was negatively defined in regards to Palestine, being ostensibly *not* the land of the biblical Israelites but of their adversaries. Archaeology could offer no evidential account that bound this territory, created as a colonial afterthought, together.

American archaeologist and rabbi Nelson Glueck conducted some of the first systematic surveys purporting to have uncovered archaeological knowledge of the “others” of the Hebrew Bible. He sought to identify sites belonging to the Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, and Nabateans, crafting them as inferior to their ancient neighbors, whose historicity was part of an increasingly dangerous national competition in British Palestine (Corbett 2015, 115). That imputed inferiority was further extended to the people with whom he worked in Jordan, casting those communities as both calculating and lazy, ignorant of their past and uninterested in its religiosity (Abu-Khafajah and Miqdadi 2019, 5). Conveniently, this enabled Glueck to pronounce Transjordan a landscape inhabited by ancient non-Israelite peoples, and thus unequal by comparison. In his later work, we can trace his construction of ethnic groupings as pure, essential, and bounded, a change that mirrored his political shift from supporting a multicultural Palestine to supporting a Jewish ethno-national state (Sherrard 2012, 151). From colonial fantasies of reliving the Crusades to territorializing the Bible, archaeology was consistently, and often violently, deployed in the service of religious imperialism.

Having constructed their version of the ancient past, the British laid the foundations of Jordan’s modern geopolitical existence after World War I with the creation of the mandates for Palestine and Transjordan (Corbett 2015, 8). Indeed, in his role as director of ASOR, Glueck initially lent support to the British Mandate, though this later changed with his commitment to political Zionism. He went on to spy for the Americans through the Office of Strategic Services, and his archaeological writing had far-reaching consequences in regional conflicts. Military intelligence and political agendas met seamlessly with archaeological expertise and field experience and, in the case of Glueck, motivated his leadership of the 1943 Jerusalem meeting to discuss the future of archaeology.

COVERT EMPIRE

Throughout this “covert empire” of intelligence gathering and past mastering, civilizational agendas mattered—in both the strategies the British state employed and the varying standards of the empire’s “geographical morality” (Satia 2011, 23). This can be demonstrated by mutually constitutive developments in archaeology and aerial photography during World War I. Both were being applied in military reconnais-

sance and strategy: archaeologists in the field and at home were commissioned to read and interpret the data gathered. In Iraq, the Royal Air Force (RAF) deployed archaeological air photography with the technics of surveillance and policing from the air. British archaeologists like O. G. S. Crawford went on to incorporate military techniques and introduce new methods of air photography (Hauser 2007; Melman 2019, 136). In the French Mandate zone, Antoine Poidebard—archaeologist, spy, air force officer, and Jesuit missionary—had already established himself as a pioneer of aerial archaeology (Helbig 2016). Optics of development and security thus share common military-industrial and cultural roots (Satia 2011, 5).

Coupled with new technologies of transport, including mechanized desert travel and aviation, aerial photography was, according to Satia, simply another weapon in the arsenal of a new world order that had emerged through peace treaties and international agreements. One need only see the stunning aerial images of Middle Eastern sites taken by the Royal Flying Corps, advised by Lawrence and Bell, both to survey and later to bomb villages, and consider their drone counterparts today in what Satia calls “the panoptic ambitions of aerial control.” Along with Churchill, Lawrence was convinced that “aircraft could rule the desert” in what was called “pacification.” Lawrence argued that for the Arabs, “it is not punishment, but a misfortune from heaven striking the community.”¹² Taking full control of Iraq in 1922, the RAF patrolled the country from a network of bases, bombing villages and tribes as needed to put down unrest and subversive activities. Despite the horrific violence inflicted, the British justified their actions in order to save and restore the “cradle of civilization” and the land of the Bible (Satia 2011, 34–39). Wartime plans for colonial occupation and development could thus be mobilized to justify destruction as preservation, the ultimate aim being restoration of Iraq’s historical greatness. Again, it was *redemption*, not conquest, that stirred the British establishment and its archaeological elite and that would be extended to governing archaeology on the ground.

By the end of the Great War, archaeology and archaeologists had become firmly entrenched in Middle Eastern state-making. Under the mandate system, “hierarchical civilizational notions and the idea of rule as guardianship under international oversight” moved from old empires to new ones (Melman 2019, 130), the British and French victors of the Great War. This necessitated a new regime for antiquities, too. In the case of Iraq, Gertrude Bell was instrumental in carving up territories in her later role as Oriental secretary to the high commissioner of Iraq. Moreover, as honorary director of antiquities, she decided on the share of archaeological finds apportioned to foreign expeditions for their museums. Often described as a king-maker, Bell has been the subject of numerous books (e.g., Cooper 2016; Howell 2007, 2010; Lukitz 2005) and exhibits across Britain, as well as films, full of imperial and class nostalgia. Under civilian cover, coupled with her elite family networks, she traversed

the British Empire from Egypt to India (Bell 1907, 2014, 2015). But Bell was also officially recruited to glean vital information from those travels and compile secret intelligence files “as part of her duty” for the British government (Bell 1940, 3). As historians have recently argued, she shaped policy much more than previously recognized. In private, she confessed her role to be “rather like the Creator.”¹³ She mediated between the Arab government in Iraq and British officials, famously remarking, “I’ll never engage in creating kings again; it’s too great a strain.” As confidante to King Faisal throughout the early 1920s, she supervised the selection of appointees for his cabinet and other leadership posts in the new government.

Governing archaeology also worked to fend off French regional ambitions, providing Britain with an uninterrupted path for bringing Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean and ultimately reinforcing British control from India to the Middle East. One could tell a parallel story of French efforts in what is today Lebanon and Syria, with similar colonial ambitions to retain their historic foothold in Egypt. Archaeology had an important and contentious role to play in this competition and the civilizing missions that followed. Yet, as Edward Said (2014, 225) noted, “there were no French Lawrences or Sykeses or Bells.”

After the war, at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, archaeological matters were inserted into the terms of peace, finding their way into the Treaty of Versailles. Lawrence and Bell were there to deliver these arguments and to “speak for” the Arab cause. Britain obtained mandates over Palestine and Mesopotamia and inserted archaeological clauses into the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.¹⁴ A committee was established with one archaeologist from each of the Big Four (Britain, France, Italy, and the United States). One British Foreign Office memo summarized the political centrality that archaeology opportunistically granted:

Archaeologists are notoriously touchy and quarrelsome, even for men of science, and there will probably be great difficulties in reaching any agreed form of organisation and, still more, of policy, but it might be well to consult Sir Arthur Evans, Mr. Hogarth and one or two other leading British authorities (a) on the provisions to be inserted in the various mandates and (b) on what international organisation, if any, should be recognised under the League of Nations. The matter is of some importance both because archaeology proper is a fruitful cause of jealousy and friction and because archaeology is an extremely useful camouflage for politics.¹⁵

More than simply “useful camouflage,” archaeology had become the very matter of politics, suturing past and future in the furtherance of empire. At war’s end, through the moralizing stance of internationalism and cooperation, governing archaeology and access to antiquities took on an even more public role in the bargaining between nations. Competition was rife, demonstrated by Kenyon’s veiled 1919 threat against monopolies, clearly directed at the French: “any nation whose law on antiquities imposes harsh conditions on foreigners or which maintains a selfish monopoly of archae-

ological privileges in its sphere of control should modify its methods if it desires to enjoy rights of research outside its own provinces.”¹⁶ Through the international Treaty of Sèvres, representatives urged equal treatment in terms of archaeological research and excavations for the nationals of all member states, although this was never ratified (Luke 2016; Vrdoljak 2008). While vested interests remained the same, both archaeologists and politicians realized that stewardship over archaeological places and objects could no longer appear as overtly tethered to empire as had been the case before the war. Thus, a paternalistic ethos infused the League of Nations, promising assistance for the Middle East and its global heritage in the context of postwar rebuilding.

The place of archaeology as a field science and discrete discipline within international planning and world-making was critical to the League of Nations and its International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC). The League of Nations (between 1920 and 1946) had grand ambitions for archaeological and cultural sites after the war, particularly concerning fostering research into ancient civilizations, the protection of selected sites, and the establishment of permanent museum collections. While much was made of the league’s international representation, the truth was a rather more European and North American affair, with scant (if any) mention of scholars from Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific, or concern for their pasts. In 1937, representatives met in Geneva to discuss, once more, the adoption of an internationally agreed-upon system of antiquities and excavations.

That same year, a panel of largely European and American experts met in Cairo for an international conference on archaeological excavations. Echoing the Treaty of Sèvres, their aim was to establish “a system of international co-operation in the matter of antiquities and excavations calculated to develop archaeological research, and conducive to improved knowledge of ancient civilizations.”¹⁷ A first step in this grand plan was the formulation of a treatise dealing with the technical problems of archaeology, considering its juridical aspects—particularly in light of foreign missions—and developing standards for international documentation. The results were published first in French (1939) and then in English (1940). The *Manual on the Technique of Archaeology Excavations* aimed to regulate recording, conservation, publication, training, and funding (International Museums Office 1940). There were provisions for dividing the spoils between host countries and the international excavation teams and museums: this was disguised as a “wide scheme of exchange and co-operation.”¹⁸ There were colonial cadences about the necessity of winning the “confidence of native populations,” revealing the tacit limitations of internationalism (1940, 9). The manual has been somewhat forgotten in the history of archaeology, but its claims for archaeology as a science and many of its recommendations have endured. That document inspired those scholars who met in Jerusalem, like Nelson Glueck, and in London, led

by Kathleen Kenyon, who in the midst of a world at war were already making plans for the future of archaeology.

INSTRUMENTALIZING ARCHAEOLOGY

Peace was short-lived, and Europe was soon engulfed in another world war. And once again, archaeologists began strategizing about dividing the spoils between host countries, between international excavation teams and museums; this, too, was thinly disguised under a veneer of cooperation. In the midst of the conflict, Seton Lloyd sent a confidential proposal to Mortimer Wheeler titled *Post-War Archaeology* detailing how British interests could be better served in the Middle East, bypassing the national concerns of host countries like Iraq and Turkey.¹⁹ Spending the war working in Iraq, Lloyd described the huge demand for historical information requested by Allied troops: maps, pictures, and expeditions to famous sites. Archaeology, access, and opportunism were once again tied to conflict and occupation. It would be misleading to separate the serious concerns of war from archaeological pursuits “understood to be entirely subordinated to geopolitics, subject to the whims of foreign policy, and made irrelevant as the realpolitik of war takes over” (Lisle 2016, 6).

Archaeologists were engaged in different aspects of espionage, intelligence gathering, and military service during World War II. Apart from those already discussed, including Glueck, who worked for the OSS, forerunner to the CIA (Richter 2008, 233–34), there was Mortimer Wheeler, who served in the Royal Artillery during World Wars I and II with the Armored Division, the Desert Rats, in Libya. There, he managed to survey the Classical site of Lepcis Magna, save it from the RAF’s own radar installation amid the ruins, and plan for its future protection: “exactly the kind of undertaking he relished, with its combination of archaeology and soldiering” (Hawkes 1982, 216). Later, Colonel Wheeler used his archaeological knowledge to assist in strategic planning for the invasion of Italy. The Mesopotamian specialist Max Mallowan was attached to the RAF nearby at the archaeological site of Sabratha, Libya. The RAF made available air photographs from their military operations, for the purposes of archaeological assessment, to their British colleagues who had assumed control of archaeological institutions in Libya (Woolley 1947, 17). Charles McBurney saw service in the Western Desert, using his archaeological training to survey some twelve hundred miles of coastline. On the domestic front, Dorothy Garrod, Disney Professor of Archaeology at Cambridge University, was stationed at Medmenham Abbey, where she interpreted aerial photographs for the RAF, assessing the bomb damage to German industry. Archaeologists Grahame Clark, Glyn Daniel, Charles McBurney, Charles Phillips, and Stuart Piggott were her colleagues (Caton-Thomson 1971). Eric Birley, fluent in German and a formidable codebreaker, worked for Military Intelligence and was instrumental in the D-Day landings. And Sir Leonard Woolley was working once more as archae-

ological advisor to the War Office, this time monitoring the collateral damage and charged to “direct and supervise measures for the protection and conservation of ancient monuments and works of art in territories where British troops” were stationed (Woolley 1947). The most legitimate aim, he noted, for creating a Monuments and Fine Arts service for the army “was the preservation of its own good name. As the champions of civilisation, the troops must be guarded against all charges of vandalism” (1947, 7).

There were prominent German archaeologists, too, like Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, excavator of Tell Halaf, who worked for the Nazis (Gossman 2013). He had been active during the previous war, aiding the construction of the Berlin–Baghdad railway by negotiating with the local tribes (Richter 2008, 228). He fostered anticolonial propaganda against the English and French and incited a Muslim holy war. An entire team of German archaeologists, including Conrad Preusser, Paul Maresch, Walter Bachmann, and Hans Lührs, that had just finished excavating in Mesopotamia was enlisted by Oppenheim to his “jihad bureau” (McMeekin 2010, 202). As members of the Karbala expedition, headed by Fritz Klein, their mission was to suppress the influence of Great Britain and Russia through insurrections and ignite a holy war, as well as to win over the Ottoman Empire as an ally (Veltzke 2014). As Richter explains, in both world wars, the skills of archaeology, coupled with a knowledge of history and geography, could be mobilized to establish political control, advance military strategy, and gather intelligence. It should not be surprising that many of the archaeologists involved in covert war work joined Kathleen Kenyon in London to determine the international standing of British archaeology and secure its interests, as laid out in her “Future of Archaeology” conference.

Just as archaeology was deployed in times of conflict, so too was it instrumentalized for the objectives of a new world order. The Jerusalem and London conferences in 1943 put archaeology, foreign expeditions, and access to antiquities at the forefront of yet another iteration of internationalism, where national interests would be vigorously protected under the banner of rebuilding and restoration. Archaeological opportunism was cloaked in the same colonial interests as before; however, Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter made outright dominion over former subject states more difficult and self-determination more realizable. By 1945, the most ambitious civilizational mission would be proposed by the successor to the League of Nations, and it rehearsed many of the same cultural aspirations for the Middle East. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, or UNESCO, was established as an intergovernmental organization specifically aimed at fostering peace and offering humanitarian assistance after the ravages of war, and cultural humanism was high on its agenda.

The formation of the United Nations was a largely British rather than American endeavor, ostensibly tied to the endgame of empire and the continuance of British colonialism and control over its dominions (Mazower 2009;

Sluga 2010). UNESCO's first director-general was British biologist and eugenicist Julian Huxley, brother of Aldous. Huxley's intellectual circle included a number of prominent British archaeologists who advised on cultural matters, particularly in the Middle East. As we have seen, the development of archaeology was already intimately tied to territorial struggles, to empire, and to colonized peoples. Material culture and monumental heritage had been long embroiled in international campaigns and conflicts. Yet we can trace a subtle shift in "colonizing" strategies, from the League of Nation's attempts to secure archaeological access through to a network of international excavations to UNESCO's monopoly on the global export of expertise (see Meskell 2018).

Huxley traveled extensively throughout the Middle East on a kind of archaeological odyssey that was subsequently published in his popular book *From an Antique Land* (1966). His personal notebooks from the Middle East are filled with ancient timelines, records of visits to excavations, sketches of prehistoric pottery, and notes on Gilgamesh.²⁰ Nine countries later, he had visited some of the most extraordinary archaeological sites in the Middle East, including Byblos, Petra, Jerash, Palmyra, Memphis, and Giza, among others. He consulted epigraphic and excavation reports and publications, reading the popular works of archaeologists Flinders Petrie, Breasted, Murray, Bell, Layard, Rawlinson, Frankfort, Ceram, and Childe as background for *From an Antique Land*. Huxley also knew personally and enlisted many of the great figures of twentieth-century British archaeology in his plans for the future of UNESCO: Woolley, Wheeler, Lloyd, Hawkes, Garstang, Childe, and Kenyon. These same individuals who worked to secure British national archaeological interests abroad during the colonial period now served as advisors to the purported new world order of internationalism, which underwrote UNESCO's utopian mission.

Huxley (1966, 15) said that to "write about the Middle East is to write something about history." He referred to archaeology as both "solid history" and a science. He proposed to the world's leaders that the immense archaeological wealth of the Middle East might be truly beneficial for the rest of the world, as well as for the nation, if one considered archaeology as "resources of the region as a whole."²¹ Huxley (1943) had written admiringly of Roosevelt's Tennessee Valley Authority, and he had great plans for the development of archaeology in intellectual, social, and economic terms. Thus, the postwar rescue of Middle Eastern antiquity became about reinstating civilization itself. Espousing his own brand of "scientific humanism," Huxley subscribed to the kind of "liberal, humane . . . informed scholarship and rational inquiry" that Said (2014, 227) critiqued for being tinged with the White Man's Burden and Orientalism. Surrounded by the great archaeological luminaries of his generation and with access to some of the world's most exciting archaeological sites and excavations, Huxley saw a role for the discipline in this new international organization. "He

who controls the past controls the future" could well have been his motto.

Huxley's directorship at UNESCO was cut short, however, at the behest of the United States: the initial quasi-colonial British and French dominance at UNESCO was nudged out by US liberal ideology, as new forms of liberal developmentalism wrested the Middle East away from old-style imperialism. As reflected in the Atlantic Charter, Britain and the United States had very different ideas for the postwar world, particularly as regarded managing the Middle East, with its vast cultural and natural resources. Yet, despite the genuflections to cultural salvage and technics of heritage uplift that accompanied postwar utopian thinking, there remained one constant: saving Middle Eastern sites was akin to saving civilization itself, and rebuilding efforts would have benefits beyond borders.

UNESCO's early monumental salvage campaigns included archaeological survey and excavation, often supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF), like those along the Nile and the Euphrates (Luke and Meskell 2019). Postwar American technologies could be tested out and showcased during those missions, including radiocarbon dating and neutron activation analysis (NAA). Indeed, J. R. Oppenheimer himself suggested the possibility of using NAA to determine the provenance of archaeological materials (Speakman and Glascock 2007, 179). As before, archaeological fieldwork was intimately linked to surveillance and mapping, employing new aerial survey techniques and photogrammetry, but this time by American archaeologists like William Y. Adams in Nubia (Edwards 2010; Meskell 2018, 38), rather than the British. Those field archaeologists sent to Nubia, like Adams, Fred Wendorf, Philip Hobler, Frank Eddy, and Mark Papworth, were North American specialists who lacked expertise in Egyptian archaeology. However, much like Lawrence and Woolley, some were asked by their government to assume intelligence operations while working in Nubia. Papworth, for example, was approached by the State Department and asked to record troop movements around Khartoum. He later revealed that such requests did not strike him as unusual at the time: "this was just the sort of thing one did during the Cold War. They had us jumping at our own damn shadows" (quoted in Price 2003, 31). Price's (2008) extensive research into the historic connections between anthropology and espionage reveals that William Langer, CIA analytical division chief, regularly enlisted archaeologists to use fieldwork as a cover for intelligence gathering. On the Soviet side, Italian archaeologist Maurizio Tosi (also known as "The Cobra") was active in Cold War operations for over two decades, employing his Middle East and South Asian fieldwork as a cover (Lawler 2010). While American archaeologists sent to spy in Central and Latin America are well known, there were also Middle Eastern specialists, often sponsored by complicit private foundations like Carnegie and Rockefeller.

UNESCO's Nubian Monuments Campaign coincided with increasing US Cold War involvement in the Middle

East (Meskell 2018, 32), as well as a positivistic strain in Americanist archaeology further supported by the NSF. In the wake of the Suez crisis, the Soviets helped Nasser to finance the Aswan Dam, while the Kennedy administration funded excavation and preservation efforts along the Nile, with additional monies from the Food for Peace program accumulating in Cairo. Similar Cold War containment paranoia played out in Syria when construction of the Tabqa Dam in the Raqqa Governorate, also backed by the Soviets, threatened ancient sites along the Euphrates River. After the Nubian experience, and increasingly suspicious of politicization at UNESCO (Graham 2006), the United States dispatched its own expeditions from prestigious universities to conduct salvage archaeology in Raqqa, with money from the NSF. British colonial expertise in the region had been edged out by American technical assistance schemes, while archaeological fieldwork and salvage efforts remained suitable strategies to pursue political, economic, and diplomatic advantage.

The Oriental ambitions of British agents like Bell and Sykes, who traveled through Raqqa to claim the territory of the past, had come full circle: not through empire and occupation this time, but via American liberal developmentalism and UN technical assistance programs. Nonetheless, mastery over archaeological landscapes, coupled with their redemptive potentials and expansive claims to civilization, remained high on the agenda. Yet the attitudes of the early scholar-spies toward the past and people who inhabited the region would be the harbinger of future conflicts over heritage and identity, political alliances, resources, and territory. In these structural efforts to save the postwar world, archaeology soon became the handmaiden of the heritage industry, and field research was replaced by conservation, architecture, engineering, and consultancy culture, affording lucrative new opportunities (Meskell 2018).

OVERSIGHT

In light of events unfolding in the Middle East, there is a need to remember how occupation, conflict, intelligence gathering, and access to sites and antiquities share a lengthy and dirty past. Throughout the histories of colonialism, occupation, and foreign intervention in the Middle East, archaeology and archaeologists have played significant roles and derived consequential benefits: whether control over the past and its material remains or the predictive optics and analytical mastery gained through future-oriented satellites and drone technology. Those recursive linkages afforded by the opportunism of war and conflict have so often been followed by the concomitant rhetorics of rescue. It is uncomfortable for us to see ourselves reflected in these ongoing “heritage wars”—and recognize that “salvage” is a burgeoning industry—where we too are beneficiaries.

Disciplinary complicity in spying and military activity through surveillance, reporting, and other forms of oversight, including participating in the controversial Human Terrain System, has been the subject of recent scholarly

revelations (Bernbeck 2012; Price 2008, 2011). Less covertly, archaeologists continue to work alongside the military in the Middle East (Rush 2012a, 2012b) and provide strategic advice through international organizations like Blue Shield (Stone 2011), attempting to mitigate military logics and monumental preservation efforts.

Indeed, there has been more than a century of political and legal debate over the destruction of cultural property in wartime. From World War I onwards, archaeologists have been caught up in the lethal business of oversight, either mapping to save or mapping to bomb (Allais 2018; Hauser 2007), underwritten by the civilizational justifications of loss and salvage. The “military humanism” that emerged reveals an ineluctable relationship between destruction and preservation, of destroying to preserve or, at its most pernicious, dying to save. Today, a vast and well-resourced research industry has developed around the conflict in Syria and Iraq and subsequent loss of material heritage, diverting attention from the slow-burning unresolved situation in Palestine or the wars of collusion in Yemen (Khalidi 2017, 2019). Practitioners remain firmly entrenched in saving sites and monuments, securing control and access through international governance, and offering oversight and assistance. The archaeological adventurism and opportunism of the early twentieth century has been refashioned into new forms of international expertise. More sobering, still, is that the academic topics we formulate and seek to have funded, according to Cabot (2019), have simply been recalibrated to the insidious practice of “crisis chasing.”

In examining this century-long series of arrangements, I have focused on archaeological technics as one theme, while the moral justification of uplift and salvation has been another. Taken together, these forms of “oversight” constitute a suite of recursive practices, linkages, and associations with lasting effects. One illustration of this recursivity is the recuperation of Lawrence and Woolley’s 1913 *The Wilderness of Zin* survey. Archaeologists used modern aerial reconnaissance and GIS to reevaluate the significance, accuracy, and utility of their findings for Middle Eastern archaeologists today (Saidel and Christopherson 2005). Others have attempted to excavate the material traces of Lawrence’s wartime participation in the Arab Revolt, to recount the story of his campaigns from their own archaeological fieldwork recording the “hilltop redoubts, blockhouses, campsites and scatters of expended munitions, discarded military equipment and the detritus of everyday army life” (Faulkner 2016, xiv; see also Saunders and Faulkner 2010). In doing so, British archaeologists claim to be “testing” his accounts, proving those “detractors who have portrayed him as a liar, a charlatan and a self-promoter are wrong, and that Seven Pillars should be regarded as one of history’s great war memoirs” (Faulkner 2016, xv). As a final example of this recursive looping, at the time of their redemptive archaeological expedition, Lawrence’s *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* was being re-deployed by the US military to train American soldiers in counter-insurgency.

Assessing our disciplinary borrowings—remote sensing, scanning, and mapping, aided by data from drones or declassified spy satellites—reveals all the familiar technics of war, indirectly providing opportunities derived from conflict, territorial and sovereign rearrangements, covert reconnaissance, and military might. As Pollock (2016) reminds us, aerial photography and satellite imagery derive from military and intelligence-gathering activities, while our technologies for mapping and viewing have developed in tandem with the expansion of modern surveillance. Moreover, as she cautions, the use of “surveillance technologies to examine the past does not exclude the present: When satellite imagery is used to search for archaeological sites and their spatial relationships to landforms, images of contemporary settlements and land use are also part of the picture. This intrusion into people’s lives takes place without consent, informed or otherwise” (220–21; see also Pollock and Bernbeck 2018). Much of this seems lost on practitioners today, as many are exploiting recently declassified Cold War Corona satellite data covering the Middle East, lauding the technology for revealing and salvaging “lost” sites. Archaeology is publicly acknowledged as being a primary, albeit passive, beneficiary of this technology. A classic example of Haraway’s “god-trick,” such technologies literally proffer the “view from above, from nowhere” (1988, 589; see also Wickstead 2009), presuming to neutrality and objectivity but in actual fact only serving to distance the subject and elide the political in the interests of unfettered power.

Drawing upon the politics of verticality, drones are the classic example of “oversight” and distancing technologies. Drones have seamlessly replaced the RAF’s twentieth-century aerial mastery in the Middle East with similar threats of incursion and violence in places like Palestine, Pakistan, and Yemen (Moyn 2013; Satia 2014). Gusterson (2016, 2019) describes in chilling detail the reality of communities “living under drones,” specifically those weaponized by the United States and Israel. Drones have become ubiquitous in archaeological research, as was conventional air photography, whether for assessing damage to sites in armed conflict or tracking scales of looting in the Middle East. Our disciplinary faith in technology and heavy reliance upon it have remained constant, from the radiocarbon revolution to our use of geospatial satellite data. Archaeologists continue to be linked to, and gain from, covert military technology, as Nader argued two decades ago, and not even in new ways, but ones that re-center the same configurations and reinforce a century’s legacy of mutual involvement and benefit. There is a “seduction inherent in Cold War tools, especially for archaeologists” (1997, 137). Aerial policing, surveying, mapping, and recording (Lutz 2007) once again merge archaeological interests with military and political agendas in what Eisenhower called the iron triangle: the military-industrial-academic complex.

Moving from the theme of technics to salvage, from Orientalist organizations like ASOR to individual field archaeologists, many players have found a new profile and

purpose amid ongoing war and conflict in the Middle East in what has become the business of restoring reputational capital. A new industry made up of postconflict documentation, training programs, and rebuilding has enabled new funding sources for archaeologists, often from the same countries that were once the colonizers. Following Lisle (2016, 184), we should be wary that cosmopolitan claims of inclusion, diversity, and tolerance might also mask boundary-making practices, sometimes in the name of securing world peace. To that effect, scholars have begun exposing the benefactors of similar civilizational agendas today, including the burgeoning Syrian refugee research industry in Britain. Sukarieh and Tannock (2019, 670) claim that aid money has been diverted into grant schemes, often outsourcing research to local assistants, who increasingly complain about exploitation and alienation. Far from the self-proclaimed noble aid-based project of “helping the world’s most vulnerable” by providing “global partnerships” and “capacity building,” the British government has mandated that all foreign aid must directly serve national security and foreign policy (Sukarieh and Tannock 2019). Khafajah and Miqdadi (2019, 12) question the nature of participation: how it operates within heritage-based development projects, what kind of inequalities it produces, and what, if any, potential exists for local involvement. There is a resonance here with the imperial agents of the early twentieth century, like Gertrude Bell, who felt she was “really part of Mesopotamia and not part of an army of occupation.”²² International research has become a significant business operation for many UK universities, further extending the military-industrial-academic complex. And funding academics is a way of whitewashing the fact that Britain accepts one of the lowest numbers of Syrian refugees, overall and proportionately, of any large European country (Sukarieh and Tannock 2019, 669).

Bringing history into the present, I argue that the modalities of conflict and destruction continue to breathe life into some very traditional, colonial, and flagging cultural institutions. As Abu-Lughod (2002, 787) warns, we should be mindful about the provenance of these salvage campaigns, what they imply about our attitudes, and who is ultimately served. Seeking to “save” others infers cultural superiority and justifies the violence it unleashes instead of recognizing our own larger responsibilities and historical embeddings. From that perspective, UNESCO’s *Revive the Spirit of Mosul* project is more likely about winning support for a new, controversial French director-general than about asking people on the ground what should be saved, reconstructed, or jet-tisoned (Isakhan and Meskell 2019). For Paris-based diplomats, the Middle East conflict has rejuvenated their poor public image and boosted their limited finances after the US financial withdrawal in 2011. Technocratic programs reinforce a sense of superiority in cultural and technical matters by Westerners, whether channeled through the League of Nations or UNESCO, that deserve to be challenged. Gertrude Bell (2015, xiii) described such interventions as “vast schemes for the government of the universe.” However,

as history reminds us, those claiming to bring knowledge and civilization are often ultimately the destroyers, looters, and beneficiaries of other people's pasts.

Modern Mosul, also known as ancient Nineveh, has magnetized salvage missions from numerous fronts, each with the self-serving aim of institution-building and institution-saving. The British Museum's recent blockbuster exhibition on Ashurbanipal and Nineveh (controversially sponsored by British Petroleum, formerly Anglo-Persian Oil) seems oriented toward breathing new life into a much-criticized colonial institution scrambling to display public relevance. The linkage between archaeology, war, and industry was laid bare as protesters occupying the museum chanted "crisis colonialism" and "stolen artifacts."²³ Despite the outcry, and the museum's rebuttal that all objects were excavated and exported with the full knowledge and permission of the Ottoman government, the exhibit underscores the marketability of the Middle East, particularly in the metrics of corporate social responsibility. Before entering the museum gift shop, the final exhibit showcased renewed British access to archaeological sites in Iraq, photographs of new excavations, and plans for securing British permits, thus taking us full circle to the adventurism of Hogarth, Lawrence, Woolley, and Bell.

Likewise, in early 2019 the J. Paul Getty Trust invited representatives from UNESCO, NGOs, and academia to discuss potential legal and political frameworks for the protection of heritage in conflict zones. What was striking in these discussions about the fate and future of Middle Eastern sites was that there was no representation from the countries under discussion, whether Iraq, Syria, or Yemen, harking back to the 1940s and the meetings organized in Jerusalem and London. Here, too, the lack of international diversity and national representation masquerades as an issue of expertise, just as the concept of "safe havens" is instrumentalized by Western institutions to describe themselves as "caretakers" of other people's pasts, what Kersel (2016) calls "acquisition apologetics." Cultural property is deemed universally significant and thus may move freely, unlike people affected by conflict. By conflating people and things in that rhetoric of refuge, we continue to privilege our materials, ancient objects, and sites while ignoring the human toll of war—specifically, the refugees and others who we have collectively failed to assist (Carruthers 2017, 232). We forget this at our peril—or, rather, the peril of others.

In all of these historic arrangements—political, economic, military, and academic—archaeology has routinely found itself variously entangled in conflict. First, in the early part of the twentieth century, archaeology was a convenient camouflage for spying and surveillance, reconnaissance, and mapping, and archaeologists of various nationalities used their skills to advise their militaries during World War I. Many of those same individuals were responsible for drawing the political boundaries of new nations, extending colonial ambitions and "securing antiquity" for their own empires. Second, and following directly from those colonial

imperatives, archaeologists were instrumental in establishing and informing the international institutions and conventions that regulated the practice of archaeology and access to artifacts. As witnessed in the Jerusalem and London meetings, archaeological self-interest was ignited by fears of loss and the end of empire. Access and control were bolstered by the ex-imperial powers through the civilizational rhetorics of salvation in the Middle East. This was accompanied by disregard or paternalism with respect to sovereignty and self-determination; those sentiments were scarcely relinquished during the establishment of UNESCO. Third is the enduring and mutually beneficial arrangement between military and archaeological objectives, witnessed in the current crisis-chasing and saving of "global heritage." Rhetorics of rescue provide expert cover, once more, to wrest antiquity from those whose history it is and to question their ability to determine the future of that past. As someone who witnessed the consequences of a world war firsthand, Adorno (2005, 89) wrote that we want "to break free of the past: rightly, because nothing at all can live in its shadow ... [and] wrongly, because the past that one would like to evade is still very much alive."

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NOTES

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1. Original letter sent out to raise question of convening the conference "Archaeology after the War," UNESCO Archives, file reference OIM XII 6.
2. Senate House Files, "Future of Archaeology" conference, Box 238, University College London.
3. F. G. Kenyon to Foreign Secretary A. Balfour, November 12, 1918, file reference FO 371/3398, The National Archives,

- London. See also <https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/state-affairs-fills-grave-disquiet-distress/>. Consulted November 28, 2019.
4. Letter from Kathleen Kenyon to J. W. Crowfoot, February 17, 1943. Senate House Files, "Future of Archaeology" conference, Box 238, University College London.
5. <https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/humanities-scholars-who-worked-military-intelligence-second-world-war>. Consulted November 28, 2019.
6. There has been a recent flurry of exhibitions and books about Lawrence, including by archaeologists (Anderson 2014; Faulkner 2016; Saunders and Faulkner 2010; Stejskal 2018), much of it stemming from the British romantic desire to celebrate the centenary of World War I, in light of Brexit and their own end of empire.
7. Cited in Satia (2008, 141).
8. Speech by the Archbishop of York, Palestine Exploration Fund, Report of the Proceedings at a Public Meeting, London, June 22, 1865, p. 4.
9. T. E. Lawrence to his mother, January 4, 1914, in *T. E. Lawrence: The Selected Letters* (Brown 1994, 56).
10. See Brown (1994, 62).
11. Text of the Decree of Surrender of Jerusalem into British Control, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/revisiting-british-conquest-je-2014121381243881138.html>. Accessed November 29, 2019.
12. T. E. Lawrence, June 1930, quoted in B. H. L. Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (New York: Macmillan, 1933, 159). For full discussion, see Satia (2011, 40).
13. Letter from Gertrude Bell to Florence Bell, December 5, 1918, in *Gertrude Bell: From Her Personal Papers*. See also Satia (2008, 173).
14. FO 608/240, <http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C2058238>. Their justification was that there was "no security that the representatives on the spot of each mandatory power will have any sympathy with antiquarian matters."
15. FO 608/116/6 Foreign Office Minutes, March 24, 1919 (see Corbett 2015, 88).
16. See the National Archives FO 608/116, Article 422 of the Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920 (National Archives FO 93/110/81), <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C2058080>. For discussion see <https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/blog/peaceful-archaeology/>. Consulted November 30, 2019.
17. *Report of the Committee on the Work of Its Nineteenth Plenary Session, ICIC, League of Nations*. Geneva, August 9, 1937, p. 85. UNESCO Archives, file reference C. 327 M. 220.1937. XII.
18. *Report of the Committee on the Work of Its Nineteenth Plenary Session, ICIC, League of Nations*. Geneva, August 9, 1937, p. 85. UNESCO Archives, file reference C. 327 M. 220.1937. XII.
19. Letter from Seton Lloyd to Mortimer Wheeler, June 5, 1943. Wheeler Archives, Box H/2/2, University College London.
20. Notebooks, Rice University Manuscript Collection, Julian S. Huxley Papers, Travel Materials, Box 103, Folders 4 and 7.
21. *UNESCO Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization in 1948*. Presented to the Third Session of the General Conference November-December 1948 (UNESCO: Paris, 1948).
22. Bell to Hugh and Florence Bell, January 31, 1918, in *Letters of Gertrude Bell* (ii, 441–44).
23. <https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/feb/16/campaigners-protest-against-bp-sponsorship-of-british-museum>. Accessed December 13, 2019.

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