Matthew Carr, "A Gated Continent," Fortress Europe: Dispatches from a Gated Continent (2016), 11-24.

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A Gated Continent

> National borders are hugely symbolic. They define the territory over which a state exercises sovereignty; they are an integral part of its identity; and they traditionally represent the point at which a person seeking to enter the country must demonstrate their admissibility.
>
> —Proposals for a new European Border Guard, House of Lords, United Kingdom, 2003–4

At first sight Europe's new borders present something of a paradox. For nearly half a century, western Europeans regarded the Berlin Wall as the incarnation of Communist tyranny, whose "closed" borders were guarded by concrete barriers, watchtowers, and armed guards. In June 1987 Ronald Reagan famously urged the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down this wall" as proof of his commitment to perestroika. Twenty-nine months later an astonished world watched as crowds hacked their way through the wall during the tumultuous autumn of 1989.

In the euphoric atmosphere that prevailed in many Western capitals, the more visionary proponents of globalization hailed the advent of a new "borderless" world in which such barriers would become obsolete. In *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace* (1990), the influential business strategist and management guru Kenichi Ohmae argued that national borders were no longer relevant to a global economy connected by twenty-four-hour interdependent cycles of production and consumption that encompassed even the most distant countries.

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Economists, politicians, and corporate CEOs all echoed the same theme. More than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, some of these expectations have been fulfilled. Today we inhabit a world in which commodities, capital, and information effortlessly permeate national frontiers, and vast sums of invisible money are ghosted back and forth across the world at the click of a computer keyboard in "cross-border equities" and "cross-border portfolio transactions." It is a world that seems closer than ever to bearing out Marshall McLuhan's prediction of a global village where technology has "extended our central nervous system in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time,"[1] where Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace link millions of people in transnational virtual communities, where dozens of twenty-four-hour digital news channels with global reach now emulate CNN's ability to "go beyond borders," and a ubiquitous and seemingly irresistible McWorld of Starbucks and Zara, Hannah Montana and Rihanna, Benetton sweaters and the Nike swoosh extends from Paris to Shanghai.

It is a world in which many countries have dispensed with some of the traditional tenets of national sovereignty. In Europe, South America, Asia, and the Americas, governments have established regional economic frameworks and free trade zones and dismantled customs barriers and regulations that once limited foreign trade and investment.

Yet this same period has also been marked by a new global emphasis on borders. Across the world governments have reinforced their national frontiers with fences, walls, and other technological barriers. This process of "re-bordering," as the American political scientist Peter Andreas puts it, is not limited to the nation-state. From Cape Town and Manila to São Paulo and Los Angeles, moneyed urban communities have retreated into gated blocks of flats or walled-off neighborhoods, monitored by closed-circuit cameras and private twenty-four-hour security guards. In other countries town councils and municipal authorities have built walls to keep dangerous or harmful people out—or keep them in.

In 2010 the town council of Ostrovany in eastern Slovakia built a wall to separate the local Roma settlement from the surrounding community. In 2009 government officials in Rio de Janeiro began the construction of a series of "environmental walls" around some of the largest slums or *favelas* in preparation for the 2016 Olympic Games, walls that critics alleged were intended to keep their inhabitants out of sight. At the height of the Iraq insurgency in Baghdad, the U.S. military built a series of blastproof twelve-foot concrete barriers around markets and Sunni and Shia neighborhoods. In

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2010 the Iraqi government announced its intention to enclose Baghdad itself within these "protective security walls."

All these walls and barriers have their own rationalizations and objectives, from security and crime prevention to lifestyle protection, but all of them share a common determination to limit and control the movements of unwanted and potentially dangerous people. While cities and gated communities seek to acquire the powers of inclusion and exclusion that traditionally belonged to the state, states across the world have increasingly sought to become gated nations and transform their borders into impregnable walls.

These tendencies have been particularly striking—and anomalous—among the liberal democracies that "won" the Cold War. In Europe, the United States, and Australia, national borders have acquired a political importance that was entirely absent throughout their global confrontation with the Soviet Union. And before we can consider the very particular trajectory that these tendencies have taken in Europe, we need to consider the broad historical trajectory of the barriers that Ohmae and so many others believed were destined for obsolescence.

A Brief History of Borders

What are borders for? Most dictionary definitions of *border* contain the notion of an edge, limit, or periphery that distinguishes one area from another. The *Oxford English Dictionary* is more specific in defining it as "a boundary between two countries or other areas." These boundaries may consist of manmade barriers, such as walls, fences, dikes, and ditches, or they may consist of rivers, mountains, and other natural obstacles that constitute borderlands, marches, and frontier zones of indeterminate status that act as buffers between rulers or rival centers of power, such as the "debatable lands" that separated England from Scotland in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Borders may be agreed upon through custom and negotiation, or they may be contentious and provisional, the result of changing geopolitical alignments, military defeats, or unilateral attempts by one state to absorb the territory of another. From Hadrian's Wall and the Great Wall of China to the Maginot Line, states have fortified their frontiers as a barrier against potential aggressors or invaders. In the course of history such barriers have often been imbued with symbolic meanings and connotations. In classical times the fortified frontiers or *limes* (limits) of the Roman Empire were often imagined as a

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fragile dividing line between Roman civilization and the barbarian world beyond. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hapsburg military victories over the Ottomans in Hungary were followed by the establishment of chains of fortresses that marked Europe's eastern frontier between Christendom and Islam.

Other borders have acquired their own imaginative distinctions—between civilization and barbarism, East and West, tyranny and freedom—and these associations have sometimes been dramatized by evocative sobriquets, from Churchill's "Iron Curtain" to the "green line" of civil war Beirut or the "bloody borders" that the late political scientist Samuel Huntington once identified as a specific characteristic of Islam.

In theory, borders mark the point where one state ends and another begins, but national borders are a relatively recent historical innovation. In medieval and early modern Europe the local boundaries of lordships, parishes, and city-states were at least as significant as national frontiers or the changing boundaries imposed by kings and emperors. As states extended their political control over wider territorial areas and larger groups of people, it became increasingly important for their rulers to know the limits of their authority and to determine clear boundaries between themselves and their neighbors and rivals—an objective that was made possible through the advent of scientific methods of land surveying and cartography.

It was not until the early seventeenth century that European maps began to show state borders for the first time. In 1604 the Dutch geographer Mattheus Quadt published an atlas of Europe that marked state borders with dots and color washes rather than lines to indicate their tentative or disputed status. These borders were not necessarily accepted by neighboring states—or by those who lived inside them. It would take more than three hundred years of slow political evolution and often violent conflict before the notion of the modern state with exclusive jurisdiction over sovereign borders was fully accepted in Europe.

This transformation was dependent on various factors: the growth of centralized state bureaucracies with authority over taxation and military recruitment, the spread of secular nationalism, the advent of capitalism, and the gradual absorption of localities and regions into national economies with distinct currencies, tariffs, industries, and markets. The consolidation and advance of the European state system was paralleled by the imperialist mapping of the world, in which European colonial powers established borders and boundaries to demarcate their empires and spheres of influence. By the

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early twentieth century the territorial nation-state had become the cornerstone of the international system, and the bordering of the modern world was completed during the period of decolonization and the formation of dozens of new states in the aftermath of World War II.

Defining Boundaries

Borders are often described as an essential component of international stability, in an extrapolation of the principle that "good fences make good neighbors." But they have often been a cause of violence, both between states and within them. This is not merely a question of boundary disputes over territory and resources. National borders are not just political divisions between states. They also seek to confirm or inculcate a shared sense of identity and belonging and an exclusive set of national rights and privileges among the people who live inside them. To the nineteenth-century German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, the frontiers were the "skin" that surrounded the living organism of the nation-state.[2]

Whether these identities are imagined in terms of a shared national history, language, ethnicity, or ideology, they are often dependent on the state's ability not just to know where one national community ends and another begins but also to decide who has the right to live inside them. In ancient Greece expulsion from the political community or polis was one of the worst punishments that could be inflicted on those who broke its rules. In Sophocles' *Antigone,* the tyrant Creon describes such a transgressor as "a person without a city, beyond human boundary, a horror to be avoided."

History is filled with examples in which unwanted people have been driven "beyond human boundary" in an attempt to preserve or confirm the character of the state or the collective identities of those who live inside their borders. In some cases states have sought to achieve these objectives by closing their borders to prevent their populations from leaving—and also by preventing unwanted or extraneous people from entering. In the Middle Ages, the gates in the fortified walls of city-states constituted the primary border checkpoints, where undesirable people could be excluded or prevented from entering. This group included heretics, vagrants, beggars, prostitutes, "masterless women," lepers, Gypsies, Jews, and the "wandering poor."

Modern states have pursued the same powers of exclusion, but it was not until the nineteenth century that the territorial border became the point

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where potential intruders were scrutinized and denied entry. In 1561 the English Privy Council became anxious at the potential impact of continental immigration on religious stability and ordered the local authorities across London "to searche out & learne the holl number of Alyens & Strangers" in the city.[3] In 1601 the Tudor institution known as the Bridewell Court—a premodern combination of workhouse and correctional facility for "disorderly" paupers—expressed its alarm at the "great numbers of negars and Blackamoores which . . . are crept into this realm," and Queen Elizabeth subsequently issued a royal proclamation ordering their removal.[4]

These ordinances were themselves a testament to the permeability of state borders. Aristocrats and merchants might carry royal permits or letters of safe conduct, but such documentation was not always obligatory or necessary, and even travelers who were less well-heeled were able to cross European frontiers without being checked on entry. As late as the eighteenth century, European travelers were generally monitored by town and local authorities rather than by officials at state frontiers.

During the nineteenth century, screening procedures at the border became more common, from registers of incoming ships at ports and harbors to designated officials with the ability to impose quarantine, inspect cargoes, and check lists of passengers. Some European countries also mandated internal passports and documentation to control the movements of people inside their borders, from the work record or *Wander-Buch* (wandering book) that apprentice journeymen were obliged to carry with them in preunification Germany to the internal passports that tsarist rulers imposed on their subjects.

For much of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, however, control over state borders was generally weak and sporadic, and this at a time when more people were emigrating than at any previous point in human history. Between 1840 and 1914, some 50 million Europeans emigrated to the Americas and the colonies, and some 20 million indentured Indian and Chinese workers were recruited as indentured "coolie" laborers in South Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Rim. There were also large-scale migratory movements within Europe itself, from Italian construction and factory workers in France and Switzerland and Polish agricultural laborers in Bismarck's Germany to the Irish navvies in Victorian Britain.

Many of these journeys were made with little or no documentation. During the French Revolution and the subsequent revolutionary wars, both France and Britain introduced restrictions on aliens, aimed at vetting foreigners with

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dissident political views, but these restrictions fell into disuse following the Napoleonic Wars. For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, passports and visas were discretionary and often were not required at all.[5] Writing from exile in 1941, Stefan Zweig nostalgically recalled his globetrotting years before World War I, when "everyone could go where he wanted and stay there as long as he liked. No permits or visas were necessary, and I am always enchanted by the amazement of young people when I tell them that before 1914 I travelled to India and America without a passport. Indeed I had never set eyes on a passport."[6]

"Paper Walls" and the Creation of Illegality

These barriers were not entirely absent, and the freedom granted to a middle-class Austrian writer was not universal. For many nineteenth-century governments, migration was a positive and even essential phenomenon, one that provided a source of labor and population growth in their own countries and their colonial territories overseas, as well as a safety valve in economically depressed regions whose populations might otherwise have turned against their rulers.

In the last decades of the century, however, a number of governments began to introduce immigration restrictions for the first time against specific racial or national categories of immigrants. In 1882 the U.S. government passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, following a racist "yellow peril" campaign by California politicians; the ban remained in place until 1943. In 1897 the British colony of Natal introduced a language test, barring entry to anyone who could not fill out an application form in English—a test that was specifically intended to eliminate "coolie" labor from India. The "Natal formula" was introduced in Australia in an attempt to limit the entry of Chinese migrants, and was subsequently adapted to other nationalities.

A number of governments began to introduce immigration restrictions in Europe in the same period. These efforts were partly intended to protect the indigenous labor force from competition following the global recession of the last two decades of the century, but then, as now, certain categories of immigrants were also depicted as inimical to the identity of the state. In 1885 the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck ordered the expulsion of forty thousand Polish workers from Germany to prevent "the Polonization of a large segment of the Prussian population." In 1912 the French government

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obliged all "nomads"—a denomination that generally referred to the country's 4 million Italian immigrants—to carry documents with their fingerprints and photographs. Even in laissez-faire Britain, Parliament approved the Aliens Act of 1905, which limited the entry of "destitute foreigners"—a category that was generally understood to mean Jews fleeing poverty and persecution in tsarist Russia.

These restrictions were often driven by the scientific racism and eugenicist doctrines of the period, which depicted immigration by those of "inferior" or "degraded" racial or national groups as a threat to purity of the national "stock." In 1893 Justice Milieus de Villiers of the Orange Free State justified the exclusion of Asians on the grounds that "every European nation or nation of European origin has an absolute right to exclude alien elements which it considers to be dangerous to its development and existence."[7] In *Efficiency and Empire* (1901), the anti-immigrant lobbyist Arnold White warned that "rule by foreign Jews" threatened "the best forms of our national life."

Before World War I such restrictions were not easily enforced and borders were often porous. In the United States, the Mexican border was virtually an open frontier until the creation of the U.S. Border Patrol in the early 1920s, and Chinese migrants routinely avoided the increasingly rigorous identity and documentation checks at Angel Island in San Francisco by crossing the land frontier from Mexico. In Germany Poles were often able to avoid expulsion or slipped back across the border after being expelled, while Italian immigrants continued to live and work in France without the documentation they were theoretically obliged to obtain.

Such evasions became more difficult during World War I, when governments introduced tighter visa restrictions and began to demand proof of identity at ports and border entry points. By the end of the war, the presentation of passports, visas, and travel documents at the border had become a more or less universal obligation, and the same requirements were continued into the security-obsessed postwar years. Looking back on the period between the two world wars, Stefan Zweig described a general phenomenon in which "all the humiliations previously devised solely for criminals were now inflicted on every traveler before and during a journey. You had to be photographed from right and left, in profile and full face, hair cut short enough to show your ears; you had to have your fingerprints taken—first just your thumbs, then all ten digits; you had to be able to show certificates of general health and inoculations, plus papers issued by the police certifying that you had no criminal record; you had to be able to produce documentary proof of

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recommendations and invitations, with addresses of relatives; you had to have other documents guaranteeing that you were of good moral and financial repute; you had to fill in and sign forms in triplicate or quadruplicate; and if just one of this great stack of pieces of paper was missing, you were done for."[8]

In a compartmentalized international system where rights and protection abroad were contingent on the possession of a passport and visa, travelers who attempted to cross national borders without the required documentation were not only illegal trespassers in someone else's territory but also stateless nonpeople to whom governments owed no obligations. In the first half of the twentieth century, however, this new world of bordered states and "paper walls" came under unexpected pressure, as a new category of illegal traveler appeared on the international stage.

Refugees

Enforced exile and population displacements were not a historical novelty in twentieth-century Europe. But the massive population displacements that took place in the aftermath of World War I were unprecedented in both their scale and their repercussions. Millions of people were driven out of their countries during the violent redrawing of national boundaries that followed the collapse of the Hapsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires, and many of them became permanently stateless when their governments revoked their citizenship for ideological reasons.

These refugees not only constituted a series of potentially destabilizing humanitarian crises for neighboring states but also raised the question of who was responsible for actually dealing with them. For the first time in history, governments were obliged to look for collective solutions to deal with a stateless population that challenged the concept of a world system in which rights and protection were dependent on membership in a particular state or nationality.

In 1922 the League of Nations issued special passports, known as "Nansen passports" after its High Commissioner for Refugees, the explorer Fridtjof Nansen, to refugees from the Soviet Union, which enabled their holders to cross (some) international borders legally with limited consular protection. This improvised expedient was partly successful because of the willingness of countries such as France to accept large numbers of Russian refugees

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after World War I, which eventually made it possible to resolve the postwar refugee crises.[9]

The international response to these crises nevertheless established the refugee as a deserving category of illegal migrant, with special claims on the world's conscience that could—in certain circumstances—override the principle of state sovereignty over national borders. But such acceptance was not unconditional, and the generosity shown toward refugees from Soviet Russia was not extended to Jews fleeing Nazi persecution in Germany and Austria in the 1930s, where the prevailing international consensus was notoriously embodied by the 1938 League of Nations conference at the French town of Evian-les-Bains to consider the international response to the persecution of Jews under Hitler.

Though governments agreed in principle to provide protection to Jewish refugees, a number of delegates argued that their countries were already "saturated" with Jews and that a further influx would exacerbate racial tensions and create a "Jewish problem." Various countries had already introduced tight quotas on Jewish immigration, and because the Nazis identified Jewish émigrés as Jews in their passports, many were able to find a safe haven only through complicated and unauthorized border crossings or by using forged documentation. Escape became even more difficult when war broke out and Jews found themselves trapped in occupied Europe when Nazi plans changed from expulsion to extermination.

It was partly in response to these failings that the newly formed United Nations adopted the Geneva Convention on Refugees in 1951, subsequently extended with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967, in which states agree to provide protection to refugees who leave their countries "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."

This definition left various questions answered. Who decided whether the fear of persecution was "well-founded"—governments, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or refugees themselves? How could refugees prove their persecution? What happened when such proof was not available and their claims were rejected? The convention was enacted in the aftermath of World War II, when the resettlement of Europe's displaced populations was seen as essential to the continent's political and economic stability. In 1948, Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared, "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." This principle was

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drawn up in response to the closed borders of the European dictatorships of the 1930s and their Communist successors in the immediate postwar period, which were primarily intended to prevent their citizens from leaving their countries rather than entering them. It was not accompanied by any corresponding obligation on the part of states to accept people who try to cross their borders without authorization.

With the onset of the Cold War, the obligation to provide refugee protection—and allow potential refugees to leave their countries—was politically expedient for many Western governments, and a safe haven in Western Europe was generally available to all who escaped from the Communist bloc, regardless of whether their motives were "economic" or "political." Less than half a century later, however, European governments were beginning to seek ways of evading these obligations in an attempt to limit or prevent the entry of refugees from an unexpected and less desirable source.

The Coming of Fortress Europe

For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the great migratory movements that shaped European history were directed outward to the Americas and the colonial world, or took place within the continent itself. In the years that followed World War II, this historic pattern was reversed, as a number of European countries tolerated or actively encouraged immigration from the Third World and their former colonies in order to make up for the postwar shortage in unskilled labor.

North Africans in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; Turkish *Gastarbeiters* (guest workers) in Germany; Indians, Pakistanis, and West Indians in Britain—all formed part of a new migratory phenomenon that was initially regarded by the governments concerned as a pragmatic and short-term expedient. Instead many of these migrant workers began to establish themselves in their adopted countries and brought their families with them. For the first time in their history, white European societies found themselves faced with the permanent presence of significant nonwhite populations within their territories. This transition was often achieved in the face of bitter and sometimes explicitly racist opposition, emanating primarily from the conservative and far-right parts of the political spectrum.

As early as the 1960s, however, even left-of-center governments such as the British Labour Party had begun to impose new visa requirements and

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entry restrictions that were specifically designed to curtail Third World immigration, and these efforts intensified during the global recession that followed the 1973 oil crisis. By the mid-1980s the legal avenues for unskilled Third World migration into Europe had been drastically curtailed across the continent, and many European governments—and the European Union as a whole—were becoming increasingly concerned with the phenomenon of illegal immigration.

These concerns coincided with an increase in the global refugee population, much of which was due to wars, civil wars, and political conflicts in the Third World. Most of the world's refugees remained inside their own borders or close to the countries they were forced to leave. From the mid-1980s onward, however, there was a significant increase in the numbers of refugees seeking protection in the West, and these numbers surged to new heights during the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Where European governments had once welcomed refugees from Eastern Europe during the Cold War, they were less well-disposed toward Iranian or Turkish Kurds, Sri Lankans, and other Third World refugees, who were increasingly portrayed by politicians and the media as "economic migrants" seeking to evade the continent's immigration restrictions.

By the end of the Cold War "asylum seeker" was firmly enshrined in European political and media discourse as a subcategory of refugee whose legitimacy had yet to be proven and whose claims were frequently assumed to be suspect. These suspicions were often steeped in racialized assumptions, as "asylum seeker" became code for Third World immigrants in general. But they were also fueled by the belief that Europe's immigration restrictions were being violated on a massive scale. To many Europeans the refugees from the Balkan wars, the African "boat people" arriving on Mediterranean beaches, and the impoverished Albanians who arrived on commandeered hulks at the ports of Brindisi and Bari were the most visible expression of an invisible and potentially limitless tide of impoverished and desperate migrants that threatened to engulf the continent.

These "invasion" narratives were often based on hypotheses and fantasies rather than actual numbers. In 2004, the European Commission statistics office, Eurostat, estimated that the total number of non-EU nationals living in Europe's fifteen member states was 25 million, or 5 percent of the total population. Within individual countries, the percentage was sometimes higher. But even in Germany, which had more non-EU immigrants than any other country in Europe, UN statistics listed 10,758,061 people as

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immigrants in 2010, which amounted to only 13 percent of the overall population.

Such statistics were often ignored or inflated in the xenophobic anti-immigrant climate that spread through many European countries in the last decade of the century, and which was reflected in the savage neo-Nazi campaign against *Uberfremdung* or "over-foreignization" that accompanied the unification of Germany, in the electoral rise of the traditional far right and new populist parties across Europe with an anti-immigrant agenda, and in political tensions with Europe's Muslim communities. All these developments reinforced the determination of European governments to enforce the continent's immigration restrictions and prevent unauthorized entry at the border.

Today responsibility for monitoring Europe's borders is shared between national governments, police forces, and immigration officials and some 400,000 border guards in different countries. It also includes the new security architecture of the European Union itself, whose bewildering array of Euro-acronyms includes the new European border agency Frontex, the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT), and the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJC) agencies Europol, the European Police College (CEPOL), and Eurojust. Satellite surveillance, naval patrols on the high seas, a proliferation of immigration detention centers that extends across the continent and beyond, "offshore" border controls, and neighborhood partnerships aimed at monitoring and trapping unwanted travelers before they even reach European territory—all these checks and barriers have formed part of a sustained and far-reaching border enforcement program that has transformed the traditional notion of the border as a territorial dividing line.

These developments have not been confined to Europe. In the United States and Australia, the post–Cold War period was accompanied by an upsurge in nativism, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant hostility—and also by a new political emphasis on borders and border security. In the early 1990s, the U.S. government began to bolster the U.S.-Mexico border with new barriers and fences, surveillance technologies, Border Patrol personnel, and periodic deployments of the National Guard and the army, in an attempt to prevent irregular migration from Mexico and Latin America. In the late 1990s Australia deployed its navy and air force in the Pacific in response to relatively low numbers of asylum seekers seeking to reach Australian territory.

The drift toward militarized borders by the world's leading liberal democracies was accelerated by the 9/11 attacks and the global state of emergency that followed, but security considerations do not in themselves explain the

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new political significance of border enforcement. In 2003 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) described a "migration governability crisis" in which "states feel they have lost the sovereign right to determine who enters and remains in their territories."[10] The restoration of this "sovereign right" has been a key objective in the militarization of Europe's borders. Today European politicians routinely talk of their determination to become "masters of our borders" or "reclaim our borders," as David Cameron recently expressed it.

American and Australian politicians are prone to similar statements. In Europe, however, these developments have coincided with a unique and in many ways remarkably successful experiment in which twenty-seven countries have voluntarily abolished their mutual border controls to allow Europeans unlimited freedom of movement within the continent, in ways that would have been inconceivable in the security-obsessed interwar years that Stefan Zweig lived through. Europe is also exceptional in that its territorial limits have yet to be conclusively defined. Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the European Union has undergone three enlargements, and the process of expansion may not have run its course.

The prospect of further enlargements into the Balkans, and potentially at least to Turkey and Ukraine, could eventually extend the EU's political boundaries to within a few hundred miles of Moscow and across the Black Sea, adding Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan, Syria, and Georgia to the list of EU neighboring countries. In effect, Europe's borders are provisional and transitional boundaries in a political space that is still under construction. But throughout each of the EU's successive enlargements, the incorporation of new member states into the new borderless European space has been dependent on a persistent hardening of Europe's "external" frontiers in a symbiotic dynamic between "soft" and "hard" borders whose origins can be traced back to a meeting on a river in the heart of Europe more than three decades ago.

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Notes

Introduction

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1. A Gated Continent

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Dispatches from a Gated Continent

WITH A NEW AFTERWORD

Matthew Carr

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