

The Latino Threat

**CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS,
CITIZENS, AND THE NATION**

SECOND EDITION

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INTRODUCTION

ON MARCH 24, 2009, Pat Buchanan stated on MSNBC: "Mexico is the greatest foreign policy crisis I think America faces in the next 20, 30 years. Who is going to care, 30 years from now whether a Sunni or a Shia is in Baghdad or who's ruling in Kabul? We're going to have 135 million Hispanics in the United States by 2050, heavily concentrated in the southwest. The question is whether we're going to survive as a country."¹ Buchanan's apocalyptic pronouncement went beyond immigrants from Latin America to warn about the threat posed by their children and subsequent generations.

A report from the Southern Poverty Law Center in August 2009 warned of the rapid growth in militia groups across the United States.² There were various reasons for this rise, with the stress of the recession and a liberal administration led by a black president being the most important. But the center also cited "conspiracy theories about a secret Mexican plan to reclaim the Southwest" that are part of the public debate about immigration.

On April 23, 2010, Arizona's governor Jan Brewer signed the United States' toughest immigration law. What soon followed were similar laws in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah, as various states seemed to compete to pass the most draconian anti-immigration legislation. Although in June 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down most of Arizona's immigration law, it did allow police to continue asking anyone suspected of being in the country illegally for their immigration papers.³ In Arizona, passage of the immigration law was followed by attacks on teaching Chicano studies in high school. Arizona's banning of Chicano studies and textbooks was based on




Figure I.1. Sharron Angle political ad, using a photograph of Mexicans taken in Mexico.
SOURCE: Andrew Price for www.good.org.

the argument that such classes fomented anti-Anglo (non-Latino white) hatred and promoted the idea of a Latino takeover of the U.S. Southwest.⁴

In the 2010 U.S. Senate race in Nevada, Republican Sharron Angle ran against Democrat Harry Reid. Angle's campaign aired an advertisement that featured three Latino-looking male youth (Figure I.1). Each was standing looking directly at the camera, wearing casual clothing, sweatshirts and jackets. One wore a baseball hat backwards. Across the image were the words, in bold, "ILLEGAL ALIENS." One would think that these three Latino males were the hardest-working models in political ads that year, as they turned up in other advertisements as well. What's important here is that the ad did not provide identifying information on the young men, such as where they were born or even if they really were "illegal aliens." For all we knew, they could have been well-paid actors, college students, or immigrant workers. The reality is that these three Mexican men were photographed in Mexico. There is no evidence they were ever in the United States as undocumented immigrants.⁵ However, being "Mexican looking" was enough to create the message that Latino immigrants represented a problem and that a vote for the political candidate would help fix the problem.

Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain was in Tennessee on October 15, 2011, where he responded to a question about his views on erecting a fence between the United States and Mexico. Cain replied that if elected president, he would build a border fence: "It's going to be 20 feet high. It's going to have barbed wire on the top. It's going to be electrified. And there's going to be a sign on the other side saying, 'It will kill you—Warning.'"⁶ Mr. Cain said later that he was joking but then quickly added, "... but not really." How could a presidential candidate joke about electrifying human beings?

This book grew out of my attempt to unpack the meanings of these views about Latinos. Rather than considering them in isolation, I began to see them as connected, as part of a larger set of concerns over immigration, particularly from Mexico and other parts of Latin America; the meaning of citizenship; and the power of media spectacles in contemporary life. The Latino Threat Narrative provides the raw material that weaves these concerns together.

The Latino Threat Narrative posits that Latinos are not like previous immigrant groups, who ultimately became part of the nation. According to the assumptions and taken-for-granted "truths" inherent in this narrative, Latinos are unwilling or incapable of integrating, of becoming part of the national community. Rather, they are part of an invading force from south of the border that is bent on reconquering land that was formerly theirs (the U.S. Southwest) and destroying the American way of life. Although Mexicans are often the focus of the Latino Threat Narrative, public discourse, as I elaborate in Chapter 1, often includes immigration from Latin America in general, as well as U.S.-born Americans of Latin American descent. Thus, the broader and more inclusive term *Latino* is used throughout this book, while recognizing that Latinos actually vary greatly in terms of their historical backgrounds and success in integrating into U.S. social and economic life.

The contemporary Latino Threat Narrative has its antecedents in U.S. history: the German language threat, the Catholic threat, the Chinese and Japanese immigration threats, and the southern and eastern European threat. In their day, each discourse of threat targeted particular immigrant groups and their children. Each was pervasive and defined "truths" about the threats posed by immigrants that, in hindsight, were unjustified or never materialized in the long run of history. And each of these discourses generated actions, such as alarmist newspaper stories (the media of the day), anti-immigrant riots, restrictive immigration laws, forced internments, and acrimonious public debates over government policies. In this sense, the Latino Threat Narrative is

part of a grand tradition of alarmist discourse about immigrants and their perceived negative impacts on society.⁷

However, the Latino Threat Narrative recognizes that Latinos are different from past immigrants and other ethnic groups in America today. Latinos have been in what is now the United States since the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, actually predating the English colonies. Since the Mexican-American War, immigration from Mexico and other Latin countries has waxed and waned, building in the early twentieth century, diminishing in the 1930s, and building again the post-1965 years. These migrations paralleled those of other immigrant groups. But Mexicans in particular have been represented as the quintessential "illegal aliens," which distinguishes them from other immigrant groups. Their social identity has been plagued by the mark of illegality, which in much public discourse means that they are criminals and thus illegitimate members of society undeserving of social benefits, including citizenship. Latinos are an alleged threat because of this history and social identity, which supposedly make their integration difficult and imbue them, particularly Mexicans, with a desire to remain socially apart as they prepare for a reconquest of the U.S. Southwest.

The Latino Threat Narrative is pervasive even when not explicitly mentioned. It is the cultural dark matter filling space with taken-for-granted "truths" in debates over immigration on radio and TV talk shows, in newspaper editorials, and on Internet blogs. Unquestioned motives and behavior attributed to Latino immigrants and their children permeate discussions over amnesty for undocumented immigrants, employer sanctions, driver's licenses, prenatal care, education for the children of immigrants, citizenship for "anchor babies" (U.S.-born children with undocumented-immigrant parents), and even organ transplants for immigrants. Although some aspect of the Latino Threat Narrative can be found in almost any discussion of immigration in contemporary public discourse, what I attempt here is a more systematic elaboration of this narrative. I will also contest the basic tenets of this narrative, an ambitious aspiration for a cultural critic admittedly not unlike Don Quixote's attacking windmills.⁸

In addition, I want to connect the Latino Threat Narrative to what I see as the contemporary crisis in the meaning of citizenship. The Minuteman Project's activities in Arizona in 2005 (see Chapter 6) were about more than drawing attention to the perils of an uncontrolled border and unauthorized immigration. The Minutemen were also decrying what they perceived as the

dilution of the rights and privileges of U.S. citizenship because of massive immigration. The Latino threat is profoundly implicated in the second theme of this book, the contested terrain of citizenship in a world where national borders are increasingly permeable. What citizenship means in this changing landscape is not clear. But what is certain is that a legalistic definition of citizenship is not enough. Other meanings of citizenship—economic, social, cultural, and even emotional—are being presented in debates, marches, and public discourse focused on immigrants, their children, and the nation.

"Citizen" and "noncitizen" are concepts used to imagine and define community membership. According to Benedict Anderson, members of modern nations cannot possibly know all their fellow members, and yet "in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. . . . It is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship."⁹ Anderson eloquently argues for the importance of print media in the construction of "imagined communities" and subjectivities that lay the foundation for nationalism and modernity.¹⁰ In a similar vein, Jürgen Habermas has argued that the public sphere relies on the circulation of print commodities.¹¹ I extend this thinking to the image-producing industries in order to explore how the media help construct the imagined community through representations of both inclusion and exclusion.¹²

Both the Latino Threat Narrative and struggles over the meaning of citizenship pervade media-infused spectacles where immigration or immigrants are the topic. Broadly speaking, events or public performances that receive an inordinate volume of media attention and public opinion become media spectacles.¹³ It is difficult to escape media coverage and the incessant "talk" about immigration.¹⁴ Border surveillance, reproduction, fertility levels, fears of immigrant invasions and reconquests, amnesty programs, economic impacts, organ transplants, and the alleged inability to assimilate Latino immigrants and their offspring are all fodder for media attention.

Immigration-related media spectacles force us to reconsider what we mean by the word *spectacle*. *Spectacle* comes to us from Middle English and is an Anglo-French term with roots in the Latin *spectaculum*, derived from *spec-tare*, to watch, and *specere*, to look at. In other words, a spectacle is something watched or looked at. It is the object of the viewer's gaze. The *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* includes this sense of the word in its definition but adds more connotations: a spectacle is "something exhibited to view as unusual,

notable, or entertaining; especially an eye-catching or dramatic public display" or "an object of curiosity or contempt."¹⁵ These definitions of *spectacle* may capture, to a certain extent, what occurred in the immigration marches and other immigration-related events considered here. However, these events push us to think about the meaning of spectacles in society and how they help construct subjective understandings of "citizens" and "noncitizens."

When immigration-related events or issues receive extensive media focus and become media shows, there is more going on than merely relating the news. As Guy Debord has observed, in modern technological societies, life has become "an immense accumulation of *spectacles*" and "all that once was directly lived has become mere representation."¹⁶ The images we constantly consume not only inform us of life around us but also help construct our understanding of events, people, and places in our world.¹⁷ In short, media spectacles are productive acts that construct knowledge about subjects in our world. This is particularly the case for how we internalize who we are as a people. How we, as a nation of diverse people, derive our understanding of who to include in our imagined community of fellow citizens is a product of many things, not the least of which is what we glean from the media.¹⁸ Debates over immigration, citizenship, and national belonging are informed by the events we witness through the media's representation of immigrant spectacles, whether they are promoting concern for the plight of immigrants or anti-immigration events.

How newcomers imagine themselves and are imagined by the larger society in relation to the nation is mediated through the representations of immigrants' lives in media coverage. Media spectacles transform immigrants' lives into virtual lives, which are typically devoid of the nuances and subtleties of real lived lives (see Chapter 1).¹⁹ It is in this sense that the media spectacle transforms a "worldview"—that is, a taken-for-granted understanding of the world—into an objective force, one that is taken as "truth."²⁰ In their coverage of immigration events, the media give voice to commentators, pundits, informed sources, and man-on-the-street observers who often invoke one or more of the myriad truths in the Latino Threat Narrative to support arguments and justify actions. In this way, media spectacles objectify Latinos. Through objectification (the process of turning a person into a thing) people are dehumanized, and once that is accomplished, it is easier to lack empathy for those objects and to pass policies and laws to govern their behavior, limit their social integration, and obstruct their economic mobility. Portraying Latinos as objects or things makes it easier to see immigrant marchers as a chaotic mass rather than as

people struggling to be recognized as contributing members of U.S. society (Chapter 7), or Latinas represented in advertisements as beer bottles—literally things—rather than human beings (Chapter 3).

Through its coverage of events, the media produce knowledge about, and help construct, those considered legitimate members of society as well as those viewed as less legitimate, marginalized, and stigmatized Others.²¹ Thus media spectacles—such as those that occurred around organ transplants for noncitizens, Minuteman Project activities, and immigrant marches examined in the chapters that follow—help define what it means to be a "citizen," a task that can be undertaken only by also defining its contrasting concepts: "alien," "illegal alien," "foreigner," and "immigrant." Where do Latinos stand in relation to these concepts? Are Latino immigrants worthy of the rights and benefits of citizenship if they are supposedly unwilling to integrate into U.S. society? Are Latinos who were born in the United States suspect as citizens because of the disloyalty to the nation implied by the Latino Threat Narrative? The very act of asking such a question casts U.S.-born Latinos as "alien-citizens," perpetual foreigners despite their birthright.²²

Before proceeding, we need to clarify the context within which the Latino Threat Narrative gains tremendous currency and which has provoked a crisis over the meaning of citizenship. Adding to this necessary contextualization is a brief overview of recent legislation to control immigration. Debates over immigration reform provide ample opportunities for the Latino Threat Narrative to be invoked. In addition, immigration reform legislation is an exercise in inclusion and exclusion when it comes to defining who is legitimately able to join the community of citizens.

IMMIGRATION AND THE NATION

The number of immigrants to the United States has been growing steadily since 1960 (Figure I.2). The proportion of foreign-born in the U.S. in 2005 was 12.4 percent, which is approaching the historic high of 14.7 percent foreign-born in 1910, during the peak years of immigration during the early twentieth century.²³ Estimates of undocumented immigrants currently living in the country range from 10 to 12 million, with most coming from Mexico (57 percent) and other Latin American countries (23 percent).²⁴ These trends have led to public concerns over immigration and legislative proposals to reform the nation's immigration laws.²⁵

The U.S. Congress seems to be on a ten-year cycle for taking up major immigration reform legislation. After passage of the monumental 1965 immigration




Figure 1.2. Immigration to the United States by decade, 1820–2010.
 SOURCE: 2011 *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics* (Department of Homeland Security, 2012).

law, President Jimmy Carter, in the 1970s, floated the possibility of an amnesty for undocumented immigrants and sanctions for employers who hired undocumented workers, neither of which gained much political ground at the time.²⁶ Almost a decade later, Congress passed, and President Ronald Reagan signed into law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). The major provisions were sanctions for employers who hired undocumented immigrants and an amnesty program for over a million undocumented immigrants. Although touted as legislation to end undocumented immigration, IRCA was relatively ineffective.

The Immigration Act of 1990 made some adjustments to immigration law, such as increasing from 500,000 to 700,000 the number of legal immigrants allowed into the United States each year. It also created a lottery program for visas to help lure immigrants from countries that had not been part of recent immigration flows, especially countries in Europe. But major immigration reform came six years later.

In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. This law toughened the requirements for undocumented immigrants to adjust their status to that of a legal immigrant and streamlined the judicial process by turning deportation decisions over to an immigration court, thus reducing the levels of judicial review open to immigrants. It also streamlined the deportation of criminals and widened the range of deportable offenses. Among the changes to the nation's immigration law included in this act was a provision making immigrants' sponsors responsible

for public benefits used by immigrants. This provision, according to Sarita Mohanty et al., "created confusion about eligibility and appeared to lead even eligible immigrants to believe that they should avoid public programs."²⁷

It should be noted that Congress also passed welfare reform in 1996 that targeted immigrants. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ended the federal government's sixty-one-year commitment to provide cash assistance to every eligible poor family with children.²⁸ This law was expected to save the government \$54 billion over the following six years, with nearly half of those savings, or \$24 billion, to come from restricting legal immigrants' use of food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and aid for low-income elderly, the blind, and the disabled. Legal immigrants were barred from using Medicaid for five years after their entry.²⁹ Undocumented immigrants, who already were denied virtually all federal assistance, continued to be barred from assistance except for short-term disaster relief and emergency medical care. Benefits, however, were soon restored to some at-risk populations, especially the elderly.³⁰

On December 15, 2005, the House of Representatives passed HR 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act.³¹ The bill represented yet another expression of the "get tough" attitude toward undocumented immigration.³² Among its many provisions were more border fences and surveillance technology, increased detention provisions, employer verification of employees' work eligibility, and increases in the penalties for knowingly hiring undocumented immigrants. Moreover, it would have made living in the country as an undocumented immigrant a felony, thus removing any hope of becoming a legal immigrant. The bill also broadened the nation's immigrant-smuggling law so that people who assisted or shielded illegal immigrants living in the country would be subject to prosecution. Offenders, who might include priests, nurses, social workers, or doctors, could face up to five years in prison, and authorities would be allowed to seize some of their assets. The House's bill was clearly an exercise of exclusion, whereas the immigrant marches it generated were public displays of a desire for inclusion.

The U.S. Senate, in May 2006, passed its own version of immigration reform that included a guest worker program for immigrants and a legalization program, a "path to citizenship," for some undocumented immigrants. Importantly, many of the draconian measures in the House bill did not become part of a final version of immigration reform promulgated under the George W. Bush administration, but the willingness of the House of Representatives to

pass such measures sent a clear message to undocumented immigrants about their stigmatized status in the United States.³³

Through the media, politicians desiring to restrict immigration have been able to represent undocumented immigrants as undeserving criminals and possible terrorists. Sometimes it seems that the spectacle surrounding immigration reform is more important than enacting new laws. For example, rather than arriving at a compromise bill on immigration, the House of Representatives sponsored more than twenty public meetings throughout the nation to discuss immigration reform, in what one newspaper editorial called the "endless summer" of 2006.³⁴ After that round of immigration reform failed to result in a new law, Congress, with President Bush's support, again took up immigration in May 2007, where it met a similar fate.³⁵

Immigration reform laws and the politics surrounding reform proposals frame the public discourse over immigration. If the decibel levels in the debate are sometimes high, it is because the stakes are too. Who we let in to the nation as immigrants and allow to become citizens defines who we are as a people. Conversely, looking at who we ban from entry, or for whom we create obstacles to integration into society and to membership in the community of citizens, also reveals how we imagine ourselves as a nation—that is, as a group of people with intertwined destinies despite our differences.

CONCEPTUALIZING CITIZENS AND NONCITIZENS

The Latino Threat Narrative, immigration patterns, and the contemporary crisis over the meaning of citizenship are a triple helix of mutual influences.³⁶ However, what is meant by "citizen"—who is eligible for citizenship and who qualifies for the rights and benefits of citizenship—has always been a matter of contention, at least in U.S. history.³⁷ Consider the types of questions surrounding citizenship that were debated early in this nation's history: All *men* may be created equal, but are they equally eligible for citizenship?³⁸ Should only white males with property have the privileges of citizenship? What about women, slaves (three-fifths of a person for enumeration purposes), and Native Americans? Not all immigrants were deemed eligible for citizenship. Asians were ineligible during much of the twentieth century.³⁹ Historically, poor, unmarried single women, whose morality was thus questionable, and the sick and infirm were deniable as immigrants and thus also ineligible for citizenship.⁴⁰ The legacies of these issues continue to be found in contemporary immigration policies.

The intertwined logics of race and national hierarchies based on theories of social evolution framed struggles over definitions of citizenship and immigrant desirability during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴¹ Although race continues in importance, the crisis over citizenship in today's world has moved to a different register, one complicated by globalization—a term that refers to how the world and its people are increasingly becoming integrated into one giant capitalist system. The spread of world capitalism also carries with it a spread of Western—often American—culture. Anyone who travels notices how common American fast-food restaurants have become in the world, a process sometimes referred to as the McDonaldization of society.⁴² But globalization is more than the movement of capital and the search for cheap labor. It is also about the movement of people, ideas, material culture, and commodities (e.g., movies, music, "traditional" Chinese medicine), as well as a whole host of flows unmoored from fixed nation-states.⁴³

Globalization has led to questions about the rights and privileges of citizenship and whether citizenship extends beyond the limits of the nation-state.⁴⁴ Indeed, the proliferation of types of citizenships now under consideration is an indication of the current crisis surrounding the meaning of citizenship. Some argue that there are "economic citizens," who through their labor contribute to the well-being of society.⁴⁵ Others argue for transnational citizenship, postnational citizenship, transmigrant citizenship, transborder citizenship, or flexible citizenship, each of which recognizes that migrants often maintain lives that extend across the borders of nation-states.⁴⁶ Then there are "denizens," legal residents of a country who are not naturalized citizens but enjoy some economic and political rights.⁴⁷ Victoria Bernal observes that an "emotional citizenship" emerges through the use of the Internet by the widely dispersed Eritrean refugees.⁴⁸ Others point to social inequalities that create a segmented citizenship, as some members of society are more valued than others, who often become stigmatized.⁴⁹ Some also argue that immigrants and minorities are engaged in a struggle for cultural citizenship, reflecting their claims for inclusion in society.⁵⁰

What, then, do we mean by citizenship? As a key concept in American culture, citizenship can, and does, have many meanings.⁵¹ It can range from the notion of being a "good citizen," implying responsible membership in a social group, to strict legal definitions of rights and privileges. Incorporating immigrants into society entails a transformation from "other" to "us." However, becoming part of the "us," or to be included as part of the "we," as in "we the

people," is a contested process partly because it is not clear what this process entails.⁵² Meanings of such seemingly concrete and objective terms as "citizen" and "citizenship" fluctuate over time and place. And immigration always complicates the notion of citizenship.⁵³ Should immigrants and their children be included as citizens? Under what conditions should they be included in the national body? How we answer these questions depends on the way we perceive immigrants, which in turn is often based on what we know of them through their "virtual" lives, which are constructed through media representations.⁵⁴ The problem is that real lives of immigrants and their children may not correspond to their media-constructed virtual lives, as Chapter 2 suggests.

In a thorough review of the literature, Linda Bosniak found that there are four distinct understandings of citizenship: as legal status, as rights, as political activity, and as a form of collective identity and sentiment.⁵⁵ It is from the last of these definitions of citizenship that issues of cultural citizenship emerge. These four elements of citizenship find their analogues in the public debates and events focused on immigration, whether the actors are immigrants themselves or those posturing for restrictive immigration policies and greater surveillance of borders. Through the interplay of these four elements in daily discourse, the media, and government policies, we construct and define "citizens" in contrast to "noncitizen" subjects, as well as put pressure on society to broaden the definition of citizenship (the immigrants and their supporters' agenda).

Citizenship as Legal Status

Simply put, for many, citizenship is about legal recognition. In this sense, citizenship refers to formal membership in an organized political community.⁵⁶ But, as Bosniak observes, problems arise over defining who is entitled to acquire citizenship and deciding where to draw the line between citizens and "aliens" when it comes to allocating rights and privileges (voting, education, health care, driver's licenses, etc.).⁵⁷ For the millions of undocumented immigrants in the United States, as well as other countries, the lack of a formal legal status becomes a salient factor in this framing of citizenship.⁵⁸ Moreover, collapsing a lack of legal status with criminality adds another justification for denying undocumented immigrants legal recognition or amnesty, which would, the argument goes, be tantamount to rewarding criminals with a path to citizenship.

Citizenship as Rights

For many, especially anti-immigration groups such as the Minuteman Project, citizenship is also about rights, privileges, and responsibilities. What

distinguishes citizens from aliens are precisely the rights and privileges reserved for citizens. However, immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, also have rights in many nations, including the United States, where the Constitution speaks of "persons," not citizens, when describing inalienable rights.⁵⁹ Consequently, immigrants have enjoyed rights to juridical due process, fair labor standards and practices, education, emergency medical care, and more.⁶⁰ Complicating this issue further are claims to basic human rights or rights based on universal or extranational agreements, such as the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁶¹

Rights accorded to immigrants put pressure on the concept of citizenship, extending it beyond a narrow legal definition to include economic and cultural rights as part of the conceptualization of citizenship.⁶² However, since rights are part of a process of defining citizens and aliens, affording rights to immigrants can reflect, for some, a dilution of citizenship, reducing its value in a calculus of privileges.⁶³ Not surprisingly, anti-immigrant discourse and actions are often framed around rights and privileges—that is, reducing the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants, an idea that has found its place in immigration policy. For example, the 1996 immigration law made it more difficult to become a legal resident, broadened the criteria for deportation even for permanent legal residents,⁶⁴ and lessened opportunities for due process in deportation cases. The 1996 welfare law removed immigrants from eligibility for many social services. In addition, there are persistent calls to deny undocumented children access to public education, to deny citizenship to the U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants, and to deny public housing and medical care to undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants are refused driver's licenses in many states. In effect, these policies redefine the value of citizenship by reducing the rights and privileges accorded to immigrants. The controversy over organ transplants for immigrants, especially those illegally in the country, is particularly revealing of the battle over citizenship rights and privileges and is examined in Chapter 5.

Citizenship as Political Activity

Regarding citizenship as political activity is common among political theorists going back to Aristotle, and its meaning in this sense refers to "active engagement in the life of the political community."⁶⁵ But what is the meaning of "community?" Is the political activity of citizens possible only within the confines of the nation-state? Or has globalization produced new forms of citi-

zenship to include political organizations and activities that traverse national boundaries? It is here that pressures to expand notions of citizenship come into play, with new forms of global citizenship and transnational citizenship becoming part of political discourse.⁶⁶ As the sites of citizenship expand, there has been a rejection of the state as the only site of citizen participation and a move toward a more pluralistic view of citizenship located in the groups and communities where people live.⁶⁷ As Bosniak has noted, these alternative sites of citizenship practices have increasingly been considered as part of "civil society."⁶⁸ This new conception of citizenship provides an opening for immigrant practices of citizenship. Immigrants, even the undocumented, engage in political coalitions, movements, mobilizations, and other practices that would constitute political citizenship in their communities.⁶⁹

Nina Glick Schiller has argued that this opening up of citizenship has led scholars to distinguish between political citizenship and social citizenship.⁷⁰ Claims of social citizenship occur through social practice rather than law, "when people make claims to belong to a state through collectively organizing to protect themselves against discrimination, or receive rights and benefits from a state, or make contributions to the development of a state and the life of people within it."⁷¹ Citizenship as social practice is different from a more cultural or identity-based approach to citizenship.

Citizenship as Identity/Solidarity

Understanding citizenship as based in identity and solidarity recognizes that subjective experiences color how people understand the concept of citizenship. The practices of natives and immigrants alike produce citizen-subjects who have affective ties of identification and solidarity with social groups maintained through direct contact or merely imagined as communities.⁷² Feelings of citizenship, belonging, and social integration can extend from the very local to the transnational. Such sentiments are not entirely determined by legal definitions of citizenship or by the borders of nation-states.⁷³ As Susan Coutin has noted, feelings of belonging arise despite the "legal nonexistence" of undocumented immigrants.⁷⁴ In other words, to feel part of a community is determined not solely by immigration status but also by sentiments influenced by social relationships and cultural beliefs and practices.⁷⁵

It is within this sense of citizenship that claims for cultural citizenship become grounded in experiences and subject-making.⁷⁶ Flores and Benmayor define cultural citizenship as the result of a broad range of activities that

disadvantaged groups use to claim space and rights in society.⁷⁷ More specifically, Rosaldo and Flores define cultural citizenship as "the right to be different with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one's right to belong."⁷⁸ The immigrant marches during the spring of 2006 were instances of claims for cultural citizenship. Immigrants, if only for a brief time, claimed the "town square" as a place for their public performances of civic participation and cultural citizenship.⁷⁹

However, Rosaldo and Flores's definition of cultural citizenship, as claiming the right to be different, may not be enough.⁸⁰ Feelings of belonging and desire for inclusion in the social body exist in a dialectical relationship with the larger society and the state, which may or may not find such claims for cultural citizenship convincing. In this sense, cultural citizenship as subject-making is not a unilateral act, as Ong argues when she refers to it "as a dual process of self-making and being made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society." She adds, "Becoming a citizen depends on how one is constituted as a subject who exercises or submits to power relations."⁸¹

Ong's emphasis on the nation-state's role in defining cultural citizens builds on Michel Foucault's observations on governmentality.⁸² Foucault argues that subjects are created through the modern regimes and practices of governance, such as inscription, inspection, registration, statistics, and in this case, restrictions on immigration and citizenship.⁸³ For Ong, the nation-state, through a process of individuation, constructs people in specific ways as citizens, so that one can speak of citizen-taxpayers, consumers, and welfare dependents.⁸⁴ The practices of governance also define the noncitizen.⁸⁵

In addition to the state, civil society also plays a role in disciplining immigrants with proper normative behavior and constructing their identity.⁸⁶ For example, the many groups organized around the politics of restricting immigration are constantly engaged in individuating different types of immigrants from citizens, defining citizenship, and limiting immigrants' claims to cultural citizenship.⁸⁷ A way to challenge citizenship claims is through discourse that calls into question a group's loyalty to the nation, danger to the nation, and legitimate claims to membership in the nation. The Latino Threat Narrative is such a discourse.

As this discussion suggests, *citizen* and *citizenship* have various meanings that move us away from overreliance on legalistic definitions. Citizenship as social participation and as subjective understandings of cultural identity also must be taken into account when trying to understand notions of belonging in today's world. The objective here is to explore these questions in various

sites where issues of immigration and citizenship have become contested terrain. Of interest are such seemingly disparate subjects as the Minutemen in Arizona, immigrant marches, Latina reproduction, and organ transplants. All of these subjects raise serious debate over who is a legitimate member of society and deserving of the rights and privileges of citizenship. Importantly, the Latino Threat Narrative pervades these sites of contestation over belonging to the nation.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Part 1 examines the development, over the last forty years or so, of a set of taken-for-granted assumptions or "truths" about Latin American, mainly Mexican, immigrants and their offspring. This first part takes an admittedly empirical approach because sometimes critiquing discourse is not enough; at times counterevidence must be brought to bear on the truth claims being put forward in the Latino Threat Narrative. However, I pursue this cultural criticism, knowing that it is difficult to destroy myths that have developed over a long time and in some respects go back to the nineteenth century.⁸⁸ Such myths have organic-like lives of their own.⁸⁹ Once given birth, they grow and take on ever more elaborate and refined characteristics until they are able to stand on their own as taken-for-granted "truths."

Chapter 1 focuses on how popular discourse and the media represent Latinos as an invading force that is conspiring, in Quebec-like fashion, to reconquer the U.S. Southwest. Moreover, Latinos, according to this discourse, are unable, or unwilling, to learn English and generally integrate into U.S. society. These representations constitute the "virtual" lives of immigrants and their imagined threats to the nation. The Latino Threat Narrative underlies much of the public debate over immigration and immigration policy, as well as the struggle over citizenship examined in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 moves to a different register, one that interrogates the veracity of various premises of the Latino Threat Narrative. According to the narrative, Mexicans (and other Latin American immigrants are often lumped with Mexicans here) are unable or unwilling to integrate into U.S. society, preferring to remain linguistically and socially isolated, and, in the narrative's more sinister renditions, they and their offspring are part of a conspiracy to take over the southwestern United States. I examine these issues, using data on immigrants and the children of immigrants in Orange County, California.

Chapter 3 looks at reproduction and fertility as sites of political debate over the nation and citizenship. In the Latino Threat Narrative, Latina fertility is represented as a threat to the nation, and Latinas and their children are a key component of the reconquest hypothesis. Issues range from population explosions to birthright citizenship, but at the core of the politics of reproduction are representations of the "hot" Latina and her "out-of-control" fertility. Latinas are represented as locked into a cultural tradition and Catholic religious doctrine that renders them slaves to childbearing. Through such representations, Latinas are integrated into a stratified system in which their reproduction is feared rather than valued. Their very bodies symbolize key aspects of the Latino Threat Narrative. Not surprisingly, the politics of reproduction does not stop at Latinas' bodies but also focuses on their children.

Chapter 4 reconsiders Latina fertility and reproduction through the lens of empirical findings from two research projects in Orange County, California. Although it may be impossible to refute deeply held beliefs, Latina reproductive behavior and fertility levels do in fact change in response to new historical contexts and life circumstances and across generations in the United States. Latina sexuality and reproduction are not out of control. Latinas have, on average, fewer children over time in the United States within the first generation, and the trend continues across generations.

Part 2 focuses on media-infused spectacles surrounding organ transplants for undocumented immigrants, Minutemen along the Arizona-Mexico border, and immigrant marches. These cases became spectacles because of the public performances of the actors involved and because of the large volume of media attention and public opinion they generated.⁹⁰ Each case was the topic of myriad news stories on radio, television, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet. Pundits in each of these media explored the politics of these events, sometimes in reasoned debate but more often pandering to anti-immigrant sentiment. Evident in these cases is the way in which the Latino Threat Narrative informs struggles over the meaning of citizenship—that is, who is a legitimate member of society and thus deserving of the privileges of citizenship.

Foucault's ideas about biopolitics, surveillance, discipline, and governmentality—that is, the techniques for control of the conduct of populations—frame the analysis of events in these chapters.⁹¹ Immigrants internalize a subject status as a result of the pervasive Latino Threat Narrative, media representations of their lives, debates over their inclusion or exclusion from the community of

citizens, and government policies targeted at them. Immigrants and their families also resist the pervasive negative representations of their lives. At the same time, the targeting of immigrants allows citizens to reaffirm their own subject status vis-à-vis the immigrant Other.

Chapter 5 examines organ transplants as a site of biopolitics over citizenship and its privileges. The body of the nation and the body of the citizen merge metaphorically and literally when considering organ transplantation. The particular case of Jessica Santillan, the unfortunate recipient of a "bungled transplant," reveals the way in which undocumented immigrants, in particular, raise intense debate over who constitute legitimate recipients of "citizen organs."⁹² Characterizing "illegal alien bodies" as undeserving of citizen organs actually increases the biovalue of immigrant bodies, in that this disciplinary discourse ensures a net flow of organs from immigrants to citizen bodies.

Chapter 6 takes a critical look at the Minuteman Project's surveillance in the Arizona desert in the spring of 2005. Emerging out of nowhere, the Minuteman Project quickly captured the imagination of those who believed that immigration was a problem and that illegal Mexican immigration in particular had to be stopped. The Minutemen created a media spectacle on the Arizona-Mexico border as a way to both reaffirm the privileges of citizenship and influence policy makers to enhance border surveillance and promote anti-immigration reform. The taken-for-granted "truths" of the Latino Threat Narrative developed in Chapter 1 form the backdrop for the Minuteman Project's activities.

Chapter 7 explores the cultural and political significance of the large marches and demonstrations by immigrants and their supporters in the spring of 2006. The marches were a response to the proposed bill HR 4437, especially the provisions that would have made felons of all undocumented immigrants in the country. In addition, however, the marches were also about something much grander, the immigrants' laying claim to social and cultural citizenship and to respect, even for those lacking authorization to be in the country. Marginal groups in a society can use spectacles as a way of defining citizenship from the bottom up because it is through such public events that citizenship is performed and constructed.⁹³ What we find is that organized public events are not restricted to the strong and powerful; though perhaps more difficult for those without resources, the weak also can perform citizenship through public spectacles.⁹⁴ Through acts such as the immigrant marches, citizenship is performed and becomes part of an identity represented to the larger society.⁹⁵ When immigrants marched en masse, they performed the role of citizen-subjects, but

citizens of a particular sensibility: the economically contributing, entrepreneurial, government services-avoiding neoliberal citizen-subject.

Finally, Chapter 8 moves from Latina reproduction to the media spectacles surrounding the children of immigrants. Of increasing political interest are undocumented immigrants brought as children by their parents. Referred to as the 1.5 generation, they have been raised and educated in the United States. A social movement has emerged around immigration reform known as the DREAM Act, which would allow some of the 1.5 generation to gain legal residency and thus a path to citizenship. Called DREAMers, these young undocumented immigrants have come out of the shadows to advocate for their cause, amid a vitriolic debate framed by the Latino Threat Narrative. The U.S.-born children of immigrants, who are U.S. citizens, have also witnessed the legitimacy of their citizenship being questioned. They have become the targets of media discourse that labels them "anchor babies," and are said to be part of a nefarious plot to get their parents legal status. Such rhetoric has spurred attempts to change the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by removing birthright citizenship. As unlikely as such drastic changes might be, the media spectacle focusing on anchor babies and citizenship underscores the pervasiveness and inherent stigma-producing power of the Latino Threat Narrative.

1 THE LATINO THREAT NARRATIVE

*It is time we stopped thinking of our nearest neighbors
[Canada and Mexico] as foreigners.*

Ronald Reagan

*By a psychological and cultural mechanism of association [with
'alien' and 'illegal' undocumented workers] all Latinos are thus
declared to have a blemish that brands us with the stigma of being
outside the law. We always live with the mark indicating that
whether or not we belong in this country is always in question.*

Renato Rosaldo

DESPITE RONALD REAGAN'S PLEA for a more civil political discourse,¹ the tone of the public debate over immigration became more alarmist between 1979 and 1999, when the anthropologist Renato Rosaldo commented on the stigma accorded all Latinos,² and this trend has continued up the present time.³ The events of September 11, 2001, heightened a public discourse on the dangers the United States faces in the contemporary world. President George W. Bush developed a general strategy for the national security of the United States while critics focused on the dangers inherent in forging an empire in the modern world.⁴ Americans seemed willing to allow the constitutional rights of foreigners and immigrants to be diminished so long as those of citizens appeared to remain intact, a dangerous bargain at best.⁵ But if there has been one constant in both pre- and post-9/11 public discourse on national security, it has been the alleged threat to the nation posed by Mexican and other Latin American immigration and the growing number of Americans of Mexican descent in the United States. The themes in this discourse have been so consistent over the last forty years that they could be said to be independent of the current fear of international terrorism. However, the events of 9/11 "raised the stakes" and added a new and urgent argument for confronting all perceived threats to national security, both old and new.

The Latino threat, though old, still has currency in the new, post-9/11 world. Consider Samuel P. Huntington's views expressed in an article in the March–April 2004 issue of *Foreign Policy*. Huntington compared Latinos, especially Mexicans, with earlier waves of European immigrants and found that “unlike past immigrant groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into mainstream U.S. culture, forming instead their own political and linguistic enclaves—from Los Angeles to Miami—and rejecting the Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream.”⁶ He also made these assertions: “Demographically, socially, and culturally, the reconquista (re-conquest) of the Southwest United States by Mexican immigrants is well underway”; “In this new era, the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico, and the fertility rates of those immigrants compared to black and white American natives.”⁷

Huntington’s statements are all the more remarkable given the historical context in which they were made. At the time, the United States was waging war in Iraq, deeply involved in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, and still searching for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives worldwide. And yet amidst all these crises, Huntington singled out Latin American, particularly Mexican, immigration as America’s most serious challenge. But this threat did not suddenly surface after 9/11; Huntington had raised the alarm a year before the attack on the World Trade Center. In 2000, Huntington wrote in the *American Enterprise*: “The invasion of over 1 million Mexican civilians is a comparable threat [as 1 million Mexican soldiers] to American societal security, and Americans should react against it with comparable vigor. Mexican immigration looms as a unique and disturbing challenge to our cultural integrity, our national identity, and potentially to our future as a country.”⁸

Rather than discarding Huntington’s rhetorical excesses as bombastic hyperbole, we are better served by attempting to clarify the social and historical context of such pronouncements. How did Mexican immigration, the Mexican-origin population, and Latin American immigration in general come to be perceived as a national security threat in popular discourse? Such ideas do not develop in a vacuum. They emerge from a history of ideas, laws, narratives, myths, and knowledge production in the social sciences, the natural sciences, the media, and the arts. In other words, they exist within a “discourse,” a formation or cluster of ideas, images, and practices that construct knowledge of, ways of talking about, and forms of conduct associated with a particular topic, social

activity, or institutional site in society.⁹ As Stuart Hall has noted, “These *discursive formations*, as they are known, define what is and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices in relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity; what knowledge is considered useful, relevant and ‘true’ in that context; and what sorts of persons or ‘subjects’ embody its characteristics.”¹⁰

Mexico, Mexican immigrants, and the U.S.-born of Mexican origin are the core foci of the Latino Threat Narrative, but the threat is often generalized to all Latin American immigrants and at times to all Latinos in the United States. In the discursive history of Mexican immigration, specific themes of threat emerge, become elaborated, and are often repeated until they attain the ring of truth. This is a story with a number of interwoven plot lines, or narrative themes: the construction of “illegal aliens” as criminals, the Quebec model, the Mexican invasion and *reconquista* (reconquest) of the United States, an unwillingness to learn English and integrate into U.S. society, out-of-control fertility, and threats to national security. An examination of these themes provides the necessary context for understanding the debates over citizenship and immigrants’ rights in the United States that are discussed in the following chapters.

CONSTRUCTING THE “ILLEGAL ALIEN”

Restrictions on immigration and citizenship have always been about how we imagine who we are as a people and who we wish to include as part of the nation, whether this is explicitly recognized or not. Underscoring this observation is Mae Ngai’s authoritative history, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*, which concentrates on the early twentieth century but illuminates much that is being debated in the early twenty-first century. The immigration reforms of the 1920s created major restrictions in the flow of immigrants, in the process producing hierarchies of people and nationalities. Western and northern Europeans were the desired immigrants, and their movement hither was the goal of the national origins quotas. Southern and eastern Europeans, Asians, Africans, Mexicans, and other Latin Americans were less desirable, even when demand for their labor made their immigration necessary. The 1920s also witnessed a profound new importance placed on the territorial imperative of national borders, which coincided with new techniques of surveillance, the creation of the Border Patrol, and immigrant health examinations. Out of this new order of border control emerged the “illegal aliens,” those who bypassed border controls and found ways to enter the country. The large-scale restrictions of the 1924 immigration law “generated illegal immigration

and introduced that problem into the internal spaces of the nation." As Ngai argues, "Immigration restriction produced the illegal alien as a *new legal and political subject*, whose inclusion within the nation was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility—a subject barred from citizenship and without rights."¹¹

Mexican immigrants quickly became associated with the term *illegal alien*. According to Ngai, "As numerical restriction assumed primacy in immigration policy, its enforcement aspects—inspection procedures, deportation, the Border Patrol, criminal prosecution, and irregular categories of immigration—created many thousands of illegal Mexican immigrants."¹² However, it was ironic that Mexicans became so closely identified with the term *illegal*, since they were not subject to numerical quotas and were defined as "white," unlike Asians, and thus were not excluded as racially ineligible for citizenship. The "whiteness" of Mexicans was a legal definition that was a by-product of Mexico's signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo at the end of the U.S.-Mexican War. Mexicans living in what was now U.S. territory were allowed to become U.S. citizens, a privilege reserved for "white" immigrants at the time. Despite such legal definitions, Mexicans were still considered "not-white" in the public imagination.¹³ Italian immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a similar problem. Their racial designation was ambiguous in that they were viewed as undesirable and inferior to earlier waves of northern and western European immigrants, yet Italian "whiteness" in contrast to African, Asian, and Mexican Americans was never in doubt.¹⁴

Asians and Mexicans became legally racialized ethnic groups.¹⁵ I use *racialized* here to indicate that these are not genetic-based categories of race but, rather, labels that are socially and culturally constructed based on perceived innate or biological differences and imbued with meanings about relative social worth.¹⁶ Asian immigrants were denied a pathway to citizenship, and Mexicans were associated with illegal alien status and subjected to Jim Crow segregation throughout the U.S. Southwest. Legally racialized because of their national origin, Mexican and Asian immigrants found themselves cast as permanently foreign and faced obstacles to their integration into the nation.¹⁷ For example, in 1925, David Starr Jordan, past chancellor of Stanford University and an ardent eugenicist, commented that "the Mexican peon, who for the most part can never be fit for citizenship . . . is giving our stock a far worse dilution than ever came from Europe."¹⁸ As a result, these racial formations produced "alien citizens"—"Asian Americans and Mexican Americans born in the United

States with formal U.S. citizenship but who remained alien in the eyes of the nation."¹⁹

Such perceptions complicated debates over legalization programs for undocumented immigrants at the time. Some believed that undocumented immigrants should be allowed to legalize their status, while others wanted them deported. Not surprisingly, therefore, legalization programs in the early twentieth century were applied unevenly, reflecting hierarchies of nationality and race. At that time, hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants, primarily from Europe, were allowed to adjust their status to that of legal immigrants and eventually citizens. Americans viewed as unjust the deportation of ordinary immigrants with homes and families in the United States. Deportation was justifiable for criminals, but not for otherwise law-abiding immigrants who had established roots in the country. This reasoning, however, did not apply to Mexicans, who also desired to adjust their status. They were subject to a different logic that began with the premise of criminality because of their illegal entry into the nation. As Ngai observed, "By contrast [to European undocumented immigrants], walking (or wading) across the border emerged as the quintessential act of illegal immigration, the outermost point in a relativist ordering of illegal immigration."²⁰ The current opposition to allowing undocumented immigrants to become legal immigrants (the "pathway to citizenship") begins with the same association of illegal entry with criminality, and Mexicans are still the prototypical "illegal aliens."²¹

Also prevalent in the early twentieth century was the belief that providing immigrants with rights, even the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, diminished the value of citizenship.²² This belief still has currency in contemporary debates over allowing undocumented immigrants access to driver's licenses and publicly funded education, medical care, and housing.²³ To some, such rights and privileges appear as rewards for illegal entry. Rather than rewarding "illegals," public opinion often declares that they should be punished and removed from the country. Thus, for some, universal access to these rights and privileges blurs the line between citizen and noncitizen and thus cheapens citizenship.

The historical lesson is that "illegality" is socially, culturally, and politically constructed.²⁴ As people move across ever porous national boundaries, their status is determined by policies in those nation-states, not by some essential quality inherent in the migrant's genetic code or personal philosophy of life. Policy makers, using Foucauldian techniques of governmentality, construct

classifications to further bureaucratic control of populations, including, and perhaps most especially, migrants.²⁵ Being an unauthorized migrant, an "illegal," is a status conferred by the state, and it then becomes written upon the bodies of the migrants themselves because illegality is both produced and experienced. But illegality itself is a status resulting from political decisions made by governmental representatives who could just as well have decided to allow migrants to enter under the sanction of law, as legal immigrants, legal workers, or legal guest workers. The migrants themselves are the same people, whether deemed legal or illegal by their receptive states. What marks the illegal is the receiving state's unwillingness to recognize the conditions that create a demand for labor, most notably falling fertility rates, aging populations, and values that construe certain jobs as "immigrant jobs." As a result, a legal fiction emerges, one that recognizes that x number of migrant laborers will be attracted to most of the industrialized nations but also recognizes that politicians will respond to the fears of immigration among their constituents by allowing in far fewer legal immigrants/workers than the actual flow.²⁶ The surplus could have been allowed to enter legally, but instead the "illegal" entrant is constructed. The total flow, the x number of in-migrants, continues, albeit under these constructed categories of legal and illegal migration. What follows is an examination of the condition of illegality, not so much in the actual lives of "illegal aliens" but in the representations of that condition in public discourse.

INVASION, RECONQUEST, AND THE QUEBEC MODEL

Since its formation in the 1920s, the idea that Mexican undocumented immigrants are "criminals" has continued in public discourse, but in the 1970s a new trope was added: Mexican immigration as an invasion of the United States.²⁷ Over time, the invasion theme evolved, with the elaboration of the notions of a Mexican reconquest of the U.S. Southwest and what I call the Quebec model. In the Quebec model, the Quebecois independence movement among French-speaking Canadians is held up as an example of the threat posed by Spanish-speaking Mexican immigrants and their descendants, who supposedly maintain linguistic and socially separate lives from the rest of U.S. society. These themes are repeated so often that they become a taken-for-granted set of assumptions about the inability and unwillingness of Mexican immigrants and their children, extending for generations, to become part of society. Huntington's observations, above, are among the latest renditions of these assumptions, but as we will see, they build upon a long history of such assertions about the threat of Mexican immigration, Mexican Americans, and Latinos in general.

As legal immigration began to increase after 1965, public anxiety over undocumented immigration was also increasing. Although it was difficult to estimate the actual numbers of unauthorized immigrants in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, Leonard F. Chapman Jr., then-commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), publicly announced that alarmingly high numbers (as many as ten to fifteen million or more) of "illegal aliens" were "flooding" into the country at the time.²⁸

The media's display of such large numbers carries meanings apart from their mathematical references. Because it is difficult to assess the accuracy of such numbers and what they mean—for example, their relative impact in a nation as large as the United States—such numbers become images. They jump off the page or the television at the reader or viewer, but these numerical images are flat, in that they lack the depth of understanding that comes with historical context, economic explanations, and social science elaboration. Consequently, numbers such as these invoke simplified responses—low/high, good/bad, affirmative/alarmist, assurance/fear—depending upon the prevailing sentiment toward immigration. An assured response to such purportedly large numbers might be that the nation's economy is doing so well that it is attracting and absorbing many eager new workers. However, in this case, at that time, the media's display of these numbers underscored beliefs that there were "too many" undocumented immigrants. Thus, even though these numbers turned out to be exaggerated, the authority of their source—the INS—meant that they entered public discourse as a symbol of alarm.²⁹

For example, the December 1974 cover of the *American Legion Magazine* depicted the United States being overrun by "illegal aliens" (Figure 1.1). Most of the cartoon people in the image are Mexicans storming, en masse, across the U.S.-Mexico border, breaking down a sign that reads "USA BORDER" and another one reading "KEEP OUT." Other immigrants are landing by boats along the East Coast, flying in and swimming from the Caribbean, parachuting across the Canadian border, and all of them are converging upon, and inundating, the nation's institutions, most notably welfare, education, housing, jobs, and medical care. Such images were to become more frequent in the nation's magazines over the next three decades, contributing to an increasingly alarmist discourse on Mexican immigration.³⁰

The Quebec model first surfaced, ever so subtly, on the cover of the December 13, 1976, issue of *U.S. News and World Report*, which featured the headline "Crisis across the Borders: Meaning to U.S." The cover illustration was a map of North America with two arrows, both beginning in the United States, one




Figure 1.1. Cover of the *American Legion* magazine, December 1974. Illustration by James Flora. © Jim Flora Art LLC. Used by permission.

pointing to Mexico and one pointing to Canada. The crisis in Mexico was the potential for increased migration to the United States. The problem in Canada was Quebec, where many French-speaking residents were pushing for greater sovereignty and even separation from the English-speaking provinces. The Quebec movement was, perhaps, particular to the Canadian context, especially the effect of the 1967 Canadian law concerning bilingualism and biculturalism put into place by Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau.³¹ The particularities of the Canadian context undermine the comparison with Mexican immigration's implications for the United States, but, as we will see, the Quebec independence movement came to serve as a metaphor, or civics lesson, for the threat of national division inherent in the "Mexican problem."

The invasion theme continued to be represented in the nation's magazines for the next three decades. The April 25, 1977, issue of *U.S. News and World Report* featured the cover headline: "Border Crisis: Illegal Aliens Out of Control?" The specific "out of control" behavior was clarified in the accompanying article as Mexican immigrants' use of welfare and medical services, displacing citizens from jobs, and turning to crime, all of which threatened the economic security of the nation. The article also referred to Mexican immigrants as "invaders" and asserted that the "U.S. has lost control of its borders" (p. 33).

On January 29, 1979, the same magazine published yet another cover on the "invasion," with the headline "Illegal Aliens: Invasion Out of Control?" The magazine notes that "up to 12 million" undocumented immigrants might have been in the United States at the time and that by the year 2025 they could account for 10 percent of the population. The negative implications of undocumented immigration raised by the magazine included displacing U.S. citizens from jobs, use of welfare, and crime. But even more important was the internal threat posed by the children of immigrants, an idea that is central to the reconquest theme and the Quebec model. Labor secretary Ray Marshall was quoted as saying that illegal immigration "sows the seeds of a bitter civil-rights struggle in the 1990s by the children of today's illegal aliens" (p. 41). The magazine story asserted that the threat was magnified because "the traditions of Mexican Americans remain undiluted, refreshed daily by an influx of illegal immigrants from the mother country" (p. 42). "Undiluted traditions" was another way of saying that Mexican Americans did not assimilate into American society and culture. They remained separate and apart—so separate and apart, in fact, that there was no mixture, no dilution. Characterizing Mexican Americans as foreigners who remain foreign (undiluted) gave added urgency to the invasion metaphor of the article and the cover.

The 1980s witnessed continued repetition of the invasion theme and an elaboration of the Quebec model. *U.S. News and World Report's* issue of March 9, 1981, featured an illustrated map of the North American continent, including Mexico. The United States was the focal point of the map, and the stars and stripes of the U.S. flag covered it. To the north was Canada, with the image of a Mountie holding the Canadian flag and a French Canadian holding the Quebec flag in one hand and raising his other hand in a defiant, closed-fisted gesture toward the Mountie. To the south was Mexico, where a line of men emerged from the mountains and walked single file toward California. The man in front had his left foot ready to step on the red and white of California, at about San Diego. The headline read "Our Troubled Neighbors—Dangers for U.S." The Quebec "problem," the magazine made clear, was a model for what was prophesied to become the Mexican "problem," a reconquest of the United States.

The reconquest theme was reiterated in the early 1980s. *Time's* June 13, 1983, issue featured an article on Los Angeles titled "The New Ellis Island." *Time* warned its readers that "Los Angeles is being invaded" (p. 18); that "the statistical evidence of the immigrant tide is stark" (p. 19); and that there was a "staggering influx of foreign settlers" (p. 20). Immigration, according to the magazine, had caused dramatic changes in the ethnic composition of Los Angeles. But *Time*

singled out Mexicans, who, because the Southwest was once part of Mexico, arrived "feeling as much like a migrant as an immigrant, not an illegal alien but a *reconquistador*," or reconqueror (p. 24).

The now fully elaborated triple threat of invasion, reconquest, and a Quebec-like separatist movement soon took on even greater currency in public discourse. *U.S. News and World Report's* cover on March 7, 1983, announced: "Invasion from Mexico: It Just Keeps Growing." And in the April 1, 1985, edition of the *New Republic*, House majority leader Jim Wright worried about "a Balkanization of American society into little subcultures" (p. 25). In that same issue, Richard Lamm, the ex-governor of Colorado, feared that immigration would result in "a vast cultural separatism" and that the children of Latino immigrants would not grow up as loyal Americans but might instead lead "secessionist" riots in the Southwest to "express their outrage at this country" (p. 25).

The reconquest and separatist inclinations of Mexican immigrants and their offspring were also the theme of the August 19, 1985, cover of *U.S. News and World Report*, which announced: "The Disappearing Border: Will the Mexican Migration Create a New Nation?" The accompanying article, titled "The Disappearing Border," stated the "reconquest" theme as if it were a fact, with little need of supporting empirical evidence:

Now sounds the march of new conquistadors in the American Southwest. The heirs of Cortés and Coronado are rising again in the land their forebears took from the Indians and lost to the Americans. By might of numbers and strength of culture, Hispanics are changing the politics, economy and language in the U.S. states that border Mexico. Their movement is, despite its quiet and largely peaceful nature, both an invasion and a revolt. At the vanguard are those born here, whose roots are generations deep, who long endured Anglo dominance and rule and who are ascending within the U.S. system to take power they consider their birthright. Behind them comes an unstoppable mass—their kin from below the border who also claim ancestral homelands in the Southwest, which was the northern half of Mexico until the U.S. took it away in the mid-1800s. Like conquistadors of centuries past, they come in quest of fabled cities of gold. America's riches are pulling people all along the continent's Hispanic horn on a great migration to the place they call El Norte. (p. 30)

Importantly, in the *U.S. News and World Report* narrative of invasion and reconquest, it was not just recent Mexican immigrants who posed a threat but even those Americans who were descended from the first Spanish-speaking

explorers of the Southwest. Not even 400 years of living in the Southwest, and over 150 years of that period as U.S. citizens, reduced the threat posed by Latinos (note the quote's reference to Hispanics, not Mexican Americans) in the Southwest. Apparently, according to this argument, they had remained socially and linguistically separate, biding their time for a "revolt" and takeover. In other words, the conspiracy for the reconquest of the Southwest had been in operation for generations and spanned centuries. That so far-fetched and unsupported a scenario could be seriously presented in a national magazine attests to how deeply the taken-for-granted assumptions about invasion and reconquest had, by this point, entered into public discourse. No critical perspective on the assumption of difference was put forward here, a difference so great and incommensurable that the people so designated were not even subject to the normal expectations of social and cultural change.³² It was as if Mexican Americans and other Latinos existed in an ahistorical space apart from the life that took place all around them. They were cast as "alien-citizens," perpetual foreigners with divided allegiances despite being U.S. citizens by birth, even after many generations.³³ Such notions became an acceptable part of public discourse even among otherwise learned scholars.

Indeed, during the 1990s, the Mexican invasion and reconquest were at the heart of a veritable publishing industry that emerged, playing on the public's fears of immigration. Among the many books on the topic that have appeared since the early 1990s are Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.'s *Disuniting of America*; Peter Brimelow's *Alien Nation*; Georgie Anne Geyer's *Americans No More*; Patrick J. Buchanan's *Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization*; Victor Davis Hanson's *Mexifornia: A State of Becoming*; Samuel Huntington's *Who We Are: The Challenges to America's National Identity*; Tom Tancredo's *In Mortal Danger*; Jim Gilchrist and Jerome R. Corsi's *The Minutemen: The Battle to Secure America's Borders*; and Patrick Buchanan's second book on the topic, *State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America*. These works often explicitly refer to the Mexican invasion, the Quebec model, and the Mexican reconquest of the U.S. Southwest.

Schlesinger's *Disuniting of America* was an important contribution to the literature on the threat of immigration to the nation. Here was the archetypical Harvard liberal intellectual raising the alarm about the social separatism caused by bilingual education, the cult of ethnicity promoted by multiculturalists, and the disintegrative effects that would occur if immigrants and their offspring

did not assimilate. He also cited the example of Canada (the Quebec model) and its inability to make a federal multiethnic state work. Schlesinger's observations were not entirely novel, but they carried great weight, and his ideas were echoed in the writings of many other authors, including those mentioned below. He was also the first of three prominent professors, the others being Samuel Huntington and David Kennedy, who warned of the disuniting potential of Latin American immigrants, especially from Mexico.

In 1994 Patrick Buchanan, a nationally recognized conservative politician, expressed his deep concern that a Quebec-like threat loomed large in America's future. In an opinion article in the *Los Angeles Times*, Buchanan reasoned that sometime in the near future the majority of Americans would trace their roots not to Europe but to Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Pacific islands.³⁴ He thus asked: What would it mean for "America" if, for example, South Texas and Southern California became almost exclusively Latino? He provided the following answer: "Each will have tens of millions of people whose linguistic, historic and cultural roots are in Mexico," and thus, "like Eastern Ukraine, where 10 million Russian-speaking 'Ukrainians' now look impatiently to Moscow, not Kiev, as their cultural capital, America could see, in a decade, demands for Quebec-like status for Southern California."³⁵ For Buchanan, Latino immigrants and their children posed the risk of a separatist movement, which would very likely seek to take over U.S. territory and return it to Mexico's control.

In *Alien Nation*, Peter Brimelow argued that Hispanics were particularly troublesome, going so far as to claim that they were "symptomatic of the American Anti-Idea," an idea that is neither defined nor clarified.³⁶ But Brimelow leaves no doubt what he means: "Symptomatic of the American Anti-Idea is the emergence of a strange anti-nation inside the U.S.—the so-called 'Hispanics.'" The growth of an anti-nation inside the nation is a way of retelling the threat characterized by the Quebec model. In this case, in addition to Hispanic population growth, Brimelow asserted that the various groups of people lumped together as "Hispanics" had, in effect, an artificial identity because of their differences. But because U.S. government agencies treated them as a homogenous "protected class" and encouraged bilingualism and the teaching of Spanish, Hispanics were now much less encouraged to assimilate to American culture. "In effect," Brimelow noted, "Spanish-speakers are still being encouraged to assimilate. But not to America."³⁷

In *Americans No More*, Georgie Anne Geyer argued that excessive immigration, especially unauthorized immigration, and the rights accorded immigrants were diluting the meaning of U.S. citizenship. Mexicans, in particular, posed a threat to California, and thus the nation, because their "high" birth rates were changing the demographic and political landscape. Geyer worried that "illegal aliens, with no commitment to the country and no respect for its common principles," were forming "their own political power groups to challenge the old citizens' America."³⁸ In her version of events, reconquest through reproduction would lead to disastrous demographic and political changes: "By the end of the 20th century, America itself had changed—it was in danger of drifting toward becoming a Third World nation, and crucially important parts of it, like once-glorious California, were actually moving backwards in time and backwards in development."³⁹

In November 1996 the eminent Stanford historian David M. Kennedy wrote in the *Atlantic Monthly* about the Quebec model and "the Reconquista."⁴⁰ Despite the seeming interdependence between Mexico and the United States, Kennedy argued that Mexican immigration did not follow the pattern of pluralism supposedly exhibited by European immigrants. Mexicans were from a single cultural, linguistic, religious, and national source, and they concentrated in one geographical region, the Southwest. The United States, according to Kennedy, had had no experience comparable to this regional concentration of Mexican Americans. According to Kennedy, the possibilities of this trend were that Mexican Americans could, if they chose to do so, "preserve their distinctive culture indefinitely":

They can challenge the existing cultural, political, legal, commercial, and educational systems to change fundamentally not only the language but also the very institutions in which they do business. . . . In the process, Americans could be pitched into a soul-searching redefinition of fundamental ideas such as the meaning of citizenship and national identity. . . . If we seek historical guidance, the closest example we have at hand is in the diagonally opposite corner of the North American continent, in Quebec. The possibility looms, that in the next generation or so we will see a kind of Chicano Quebec take shape in the American Southwest, as a group emerges with strong cultural cohesiveness and sufficient economic and political strength to insist on changes in the overall society's ways of organizing itself and conducting its affairs.⁴¹

By using the word “Chicano,” Kennedy was expanding the threat to include U.S.-born Mexican Americans, who, in this scenario, would maintain a distinctive culture and language “indefinitely.” The heretical idea that U.S.-born Chicanos were steeped in U.S. culture and spoke English was not a part of the scenario—otherwise where would be the threat? Kennedy simply assumed that U.S.-born Chicanos had so little social, cultural, political, or economic capital in U.S. society that they would want to form a separate country. Otherwise, if these “truths” were not self-evident, proof of a reconquest conspiracy and proof of Latino unwillingness to integrate socially and culturally would have to be provided in no uncertain detail. But because these taken-for-granted truths were self-evident, merely invoking the Quebec example served as ample evidence that a certifiable Latino threat existed.

Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren also found an increase in alarmist rhetoric and imagery in their analysis of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Los Angeles Times* between 1965 and 1995. They searched for the words “undocumented,” “illegal,” or “unauthorized” paired with “Mexico” or “Mexican immigrants” and the words “crisis,” “flood,” or “invasion.” Massey and Pren found that “the use of the negative metaphors to describe Mexican immigration was virtually nonexistent in 1965, at least in major newspapers, but thereafter rose steadily, slowly at first and then rapidly during the 1970s to reach a peak in the late 1970s, roughly at the same time illegal migration itself peaked.”⁴² They attributed the increase in negative rhetoric to politicians, who discovered the advantages of raising fears about Latino immigrants and illegal immigration, and to the media’s realization of how much could be gained through continued use of verbal and visual images of the border under siege.

It must be noted that not all public discourse on immigration was alarmist, especially during the latter half of the 1990s, which experienced an economic boom. With low unemployment rates and significant job growth, suddenly immigrant labor was in demand. It was as if Ross Perot’s warning of a “giant sucking sound” finally took place, except the jobs created were in the United States and not in Mexico, as he predicted would occur as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994. So many undocumented workers were drawn to jobs in the United States that about 8.8 million were estimated to be there in 2000 and 10.3 million in 2004.⁴³ Moreover, the expanding economy created a hyper-demand for immigrant labor that pulled Mexican immigrants to ever more “exotic” locations in the Midwest and the southeastern United States,

including North Carolina, Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Georgia.⁴⁴ It was also perhaps due to economic expansion and the need for immigrant labor that alarmist public discourse was superseded, if only for a few years, by more moderate views on immigration. George Will, in *Newsweek*, argued that today’s immigrants, including Mexicans, were no different from Italians and other earlier waves of immigrants.⁴⁵ The AFL-CIO suddenly changed its policy to one that favored legalizing and unionizing undocumented immigrants.⁴⁶ Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan noted that immigrants were good for the economy.⁴⁷ And George W. Bush, shortly after assuming the presidency in 2001, put forward an ambitious immigration reform plan that would have legalized Mexican undocumented immigrants and created a new guest worker program for Mexican workers.⁴⁸ Negative reactions to Bush’s proposals dredged up the reconquest theme, as evidenced by a cartoon of the U.S. president with Mexico’s president, Vicente Fox (Figure 1.2).

Time magazine’s June 11, 2001, cover image illustrated just how subtly the idea of reconquest, or a Mexican takeover of the United States, could be evoked (Figure 1.3). Here were two smiling Latino children dressed like American children anywhere might be dressed. Although the image of the children might have evoked a sense of pleasantness, the text raised an alarm about Mexican immigration: “Welcome to Amexica: The border is vanishing before our eyes, creating a new world for all of us.” Because the term *Amexica*, made up by



Figure 1.2. Cartoon of George W. Bush and Mexican president Vicente Fox, in response to Bush’s immigration reform proposals, by Rick Tuma. Courtesy of CNSNews.com.



Figure 1.3. Cover of *Time*, June 11, 2001. © 2007 Time Inc. Reprinted courtesy of the editors of *Time Magazine*.

blending parts of the words *America* and *Mexico*, was framed by the “vanishing border” statement, it was Mexico that was intruding on America, slowly taking it over or obliterating it. Colors were used to reinforce the message; the letters are in red, white, and blue, except the C, which is in green, a key color of the Mexican flag. Suddenly the rather pleasant-looking children were revealed as part of a reconquest of America, which was occurring because the “vanishing border” was letting them, and others like them, into the country, thereby creating a “new world.”

POST-9/11 AMERICA

In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the U.S.-Mexico border became associated with a new threat, the gateway through which possible terrorists might enter.⁴⁹ On January 25, 2002, President Bush released a statement from the White House, *Securing America's Borders Fact Sheet: Border Security*: “America requires a border management system that keeps pace with expanding trade while protecting the United States and its territories from threats of terrorist attack, illegal immigration, illegal drugs, and other contraband.” *Time* magazine's cover for September 20, 2004, showed the U.S. flag being torn apart

by two light-brown hands. The text stated: “Special Investigation—America's Border: Even after 9/11, it's outrageously easy to sneak in.” In this image, the flag represented both the fabric of the nation, which was being torn apart, and the border between safety and terrorists trying to enter the country. The implicit message was that this shredding of the nation's border and the flag must be stopped.

The new threat of terrorism resulted in calls for controlling the border as a means of improving homeland security. As Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, put it: “Blocking the enemy's ability to enter our country must be a central objective of homeland security.”⁵⁰ That none of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 carnage crossed the U.S.-Mexico border illegally was beside the point. Post-9/11 concerns with “the terrorist threat” and national security resulted in greatly increased funding for border surveillance and control, including passage of a bill to build a seven-hundred-mile fence along the U.S.-Mexico border. Despite the added urgency of the new terrorist threat, the old triple threat posed by Mexican immigration has continued to play a key role in public discourse on immigration after 9/11.

Not long after 9/11, Patrick J. Buchanan's book *The Death of the West* was published. The book's subtitle laid bare the author's perspective: *How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization*. In a chapter titled “La Reconquista,” Buchanan continued arguments he had published in the *Los Angeles Times* almost a decade earlier. Not only was the Mexican population in the United States growing rapidly, but there was also the problem of assimilation: “Mexicans not only come from another culture, but millions are of another race. History and experience teach us that different races are far more difficult to assimilate” (p. 125). So this “Mexican race” had difficulty assimilating for reasons that were biological, what Buchanan perceived as their inherent difference. This racial problem was different from a supposed lack of desire to assimilate, which was cultural. But Buchanan added this to the mix as well:

Unlike the immigrants of old . . . [m]illions of [Mexicans] have no desire to learn English or to become citizens. America is not their home; Mexico is; and they wish to remain proud Mexicans. They have come here to work. Rather than assimilate, they create Little Tijuanas in U.S. cities. . . . With their own radio and TV stations, newspapers, films, and magazines, the Mexican Americans are creating an Hispanic culture separate and apart from America's larger culture. They are becoming a nation within a nation. (pp. 125–26)

Notice how quickly and easily Buchanan's focus on immigrants had expanded to include their children, and even later generations of Mexican Americans, who were creating a separate culture and nation. A few pages later, Buchanan put forward the Quebec model as the "predictable" future of California: "America's largest state is on its way to becoming a predominantly Third World state. No one knows how this will play out, but California could become another Quebec, with demands for formal recognition of its separate and unique Hispanic culture and identity" (p. 140).

Victor Davis Hanson published *Mexifornia: A State of Becoming* in 2003. Hanson, a fifth-generation Californian from a farming family, lamented for times gone by, for the good old days when "the offspring of Selma's immigrant farmers learned English, they intermarried, and within a generation they knew nothing of the old country and little of the old language":

Now Selma is an edge city on the freeway of somewhere near twenty thousand anonymous souls, and is expanding at an unclenched pace, almost entirely because of massive and mostly illegal immigration from a single country: Mexico. . . . I was deeply attached to the old town, now vanished. It was by no means perfect, but it was a society of laws and customs, not a frontier town like the current one, in which thousands reside illegally, have no lawful documentation, and assume that Selma must adapt to their ways, not the reverse. (p. 2)

Hanson found that in America today schools were not interested in assimilating immigrants and their children. He deplored the "identity politics" of Chicano studies programs. He believed that the children of Mexican immigrants lacked an interest in becoming part of U.S. society, which led to their dropping out of school, becoming gang members, and causing problems. Compounding the problem, as Hanson saw it, was that Mexican immigrant families adhered to a culture that stressed having many children.

Both Hanson and Buchanan pointed to the cultural politics of Chicano studies programs and professors and to the student organization MEChA (Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán), a college student organization, for perpetuating an ideology that claims the U.S. Southwest as Aztlán, the mythical homeland of the Aztecs. This so-called ideology of Aztlán became fused with the Quebec model in public discourse surrounding the 2003 race for governor of California. Cruz Bustamante, the lieutenant governor, ran against actor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Schwarzenegger won. One of the key issues raised about Bustamante was his participation in MEChA when he was an

undergraduate student.⁵¹ Opponents characterized MEChA, and thus Bustamante by association, as an organization that advocated the Chicano takeover of the American Southwest because it was once Aztlán and thus rightfully theirs.⁵² An image that appeared on the September 5–11, 2003, cover of the *OC Weekly*, published in California's Orange County, satirically represented Bustamante as an Aztec warrior, a representation the magazine was critiquing, not advocating. The illustration had Bustamante wearing an eagle headdress complete with large feathers and large Aztec earplugs, as he stared off into space. The text read: "Fear of a Brown Planet: Cruz Bustamante Rises, Conservatives Freak Out." Thus, Cruz Bustamante, despite his protestations, had become an Aztec warrior, a separatist, a member of the "Brown Klan," and a militant intent on "reconquering" the American Southwest.

Business Week's March 15, 2004, issue raised the possibility that a separate Hispanic nation might emerge within the United States. The bold headline on the issue's cover visibly shouted "Hispanic Nation," followed by "Hispanics are an immigrant group like no other. Their huge numbers are changing old ideas about assimilation. Is America ready?" (Figure 1.4). Also included on the cover was a photograph of a Latino family that stood in ironic opposition to




Figure 1.4. Cover of March 15, 2004, edition of *Business Week*. Reprinted by permission. Copyright 2004 by The McGraw-Hill Companies.

the cover's text; the family's dress suggested that they were solidly middle class and the caption noted that they lived in Cicero, Illinois, outside the traditional areas of concentration for the Latino population—California, Texas, Florida, and New York.

Despite this visual incongruity, the cover's text represented the Latino population as unique in contrast to other immigrant groups, who did not form separate independent nations in the United States and for whom assimilation was, supposedly, a smooth and linear process. Assimilation for other immigrant groups, historically and today, has been set up as a banner example of the "old ideas about assimilation." We can only assume that the Hispanics that were the subject of *Business Week's* 2004 cover were changing these old ideas in ways that reflected not assimilation but rather the social, cultural, and linguistic separatism that would result in a separate nation. In other words, *Business Week* offered yet another rendition of the Quebec model.

That same year, Samuel Huntington published *Who We Are: Challenges to America's National Identity*, which focused on the threat of Mexican immigration. He repeated the problems with Mexican immigration found in the quotes at the beginning of this chapter. He spoke of a Mexican *reconquista*, a blurring of the border between Mexico and the United States, and the problem of a blending of cultures (p. 221). This was happening, according to Huntington, because "Mexican immigrants and their progeny have not assimilated into American society as other immigrants did in the past and as many other immigrants are doing now" (p. 222). He asserted that the areas where Mexican immigrants and their children were not assimilating were in use of English, educational attainment, occupation and incomes, and intermarriage, adding: "If this trend continues, it could produce a consolidation of the Mexican-dominant areas into an autonomous, culturally and linguistically distinct, economically self-reliant bloc within the United States" (p. 247). In short, as in the Quebec model, the *reconquista* would lead to the formation of a separate nation (p. 230).

Appearing in 2006 was Patrick J. Buchanan's second book on the topic, *State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America*. With chapters titled "The Invasion," "The Aztlán Plot," and "The Return to Tribalism," Buchanan's message that a Mexican invasion was taking place was apparent. Speaking of the *reconquista*, however, Buchanan added a novel twist of transnational conspiracy to the retelling: for over a decade Mexico and its president, Vicente Fox, had pursued a strategy that "aims directly at a reannexation of the Southwest, not militarily, but ethnically, linguistically, and culturally, through

transfer of millions of Mexicans into the United States and a migration of 'Anglos' out of the lands Mexico lost in 1848" (p. 125). Buchanan noted, "In California, the project is well advanced. As native-born Californians depart, Hispanics move toward dominance. As Mexicans come in the millions—one in six is already here—they are urged to seek U.S. citizenship to advance the agenda of the mother country" (p. 125). Later, he explained a bit more about how the takeover would occur: "*La Reconquista* is not to be accomplished by force of arms, as was the U.S. annexation of the Southwest and California in 1848. It is to be carried out by a nonviolent invasion and cultural transformation of that huge slice of America into a Mexamerican borderland" (p. 132).

Also in 2006, Jim Gilchrist, the founder of the Minuteman Project, and Jerome R. Corsi published *Minutemen: The Battle to Secure America's Borders*. Although the book was as much about Jim Gilchrist and the Minuteman Project as it was about undocumented immigration, it reiterated the Mexican invasion theme in a chapter titled "The Trojan Horse Invasion," and the reconquest theme in a chapter titled "The *Reconquista* Movement: Mexico's Plan for the American Southwest."

On May 11, 2010, Arizona governor Jan Brewer signed the state's law on ethnic studies, known as HB 2281. The law reflects the perceived threat of Latinos and their alleged *reconquista* of the U.S. Southwest. As the law states, "A school district or charter school in this state shall not include in its program of instruction any courses or classes that include any of the following: 1. Promote the overthrow of the United States government."⁵³ Anti-immigrant proponents such as John Huppenthal, Arizona's superintendent of public instruction, decided that Mexican American studies programs in Arizona's high schools promoted a takeover of the United States despite the lack of evidence supporting such a claim. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, a report undertaken by Huppenthal's own office actually found no such evidence but did find that the classes promoted ethnic and racial tolerance and increased positive school performance.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the pervasiveness and taken-for-granted assumptions of the Latino Threat Narrative overwhelmed opposition to the school board's actions.

In 2011, Patrick J. Buchanan published his third book warning of America's impending doom: *Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025?* Buchanan notes that recent Mexican presidents have declared that the Mexican nation (people) extends into the United States (pp. 138–39). He also sees evidence of a conspiracy to take over the United States in Mexico's dual nationality

laws. He claims Mexico is constructing a Mexican nation inside the United States, where U.S. citizens of Mexican birth and ancestry place loyalty to Mexico before allegiance to the United States (p. 138). Buchanan then returns to his oft-stated point: "Not only is our melting pot cracked, it has been repudiated in favor of multiculturalism. Immigrants are urged to keep their language, customs, traditions, culture, and national identity. And the largest cohort comes from a country, Mexico" (p. 142). The problem with Buchanan's ad hominem argument about the threat to the nation posed even by citizen Latinos is that there is no evidence to support their alleged lack of allegiance to the United States nor information on changing language use and related cultural behaviors.

In May 2012, the U.S. Justice Department sued Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County in Arizona for "racially profiling Latinos, abusing them in his jails and retaliating against his critics."⁵⁵ These alleged unconstitutional behaviors on Sheriff Arpaio's part were directed against Latino citizens and immigrants alike. Arpaio has achieved a level of notoriety rarely bestowed on a county sheriff. But for Sheriff Joe, being hailed as "America's Toughest Sheriff" harkens back to the exploits of earlier western lawmen, such as Wyatt Earp, Bat Masterson, and Pat Garrett. Why is the sheriff so tough on Latinos? His 2008 book (co-authored by Len Sherman), *Joe's Law: America's Toughest Sheriff Takes on Illegal Immigration, Drugs, and Everything Else That Threatens America*, offers a clue. Latinos threaten America, he writes, because they are not like his own Italian immigrant parents, who did not view America as somehow once belonging to Italy. For Latinos: "A growing movement among not only Mexican nationals but also some Mexican-Americans contends that the United States stole the territory that is now California, Arizona, and Texas, for a start, and that massive immigration over the border will speed and guarantee the *reconquista* of these lands, returning them to Mexico" (p. 48).

THE LATINO THREAT NARRATIVE AS DISCOURSE

Perhaps it is only by becoming aware of the mind-numbing repetition glimpsed in the examples above that we can get a true sense of the degree to which the narratives of invasion, reconquest, and the Quebec model have become taken-for-granted assumptions about the threat posed by Mexican immigrants, by Mexican Americans with multiple generations in the United States, and at times by all Latinos. Although more could have been included, those presented above are enough to demonstrate that the pattern has been established. The discourse of these pundits, authors, and scholars is unified in its representations of

Latinos, especially Mexican immigrants and their descendants, as people who will not and cannot become part of U.S. society. The Latino Threat Narrative, as a discourse, is an example of Michel Foucault's notions of knowledge and power. The objects of this discourse are represented as the Other and as a "threat" and "danger" to the nation through such simple binaries as citizen/foreigner, real Americans / "Mexicans" or real Americans / "Hispanics," natives/enemies, us/them, and legitimate/illegal. Once constructed in this way, Mexican and other Latin American immigrants, and even U.S.-born Latinos, can then be represented as "space invaders"—as Nirmal Puwar has put it—whose reproduction, both social and biological, threatens to destroy the nation's identity.⁵⁶

What I am getting at might better be understood in relation to Antonio Gramsci's notions of hegemony and common sense.⁵⁷ Hegemony is the system of values, attitudes, morality, and other beliefs that passively or actively support the established order and thus the class interests that dominate it. Common sense is the largely unconscious and uncritical way of perceiving the world that is widespread in any given historical epoch. Common sense incorporates within it the prevailing consciousness, or hegemony, that is largely internalized and taken for granted by members of society.

The Latino Threat Narrative works so well and is so pervasive precisely because its basic premises are taken for granted as true. In this narrative, Latinos, whether immigrant or U.S.-born, are a homogenous population that somehow stands apart from normal processes of historical change. They are immutable and impervious to the influences of the larger society and thus are not characterized as experiencing social and cultural change. They are uneducated, monolingual Spanish speakers, segregated into ethnic enclaves. Because they lead separate social and linguistic lives, one must assume that they marry only their own kind. They are locked into Catholic doctrine, leading to high fertility rates. In this narrative, Latinos, especially Mexican immigrants and their children, are seldom represented as agents of positive change, because their unwillingness to integrate denies them the opportunity to influence the larger society in any appreciable way, except in the negative—as a threat to existing institutions (e.g., education, social services, medical). In other words, the Latino Threat Narrative posits a neo-evolutionary scenario but in reverse, the devolution of society. Because of these characteristics, Latinos, especially those of Mexican origin, are said to be outside the practices of citizenship/subject-making and incapable of feelings of belonging.⁵⁸ In this way, the Latino Threat Narrative constructs distinctions between citizens and noncitizens, elaborating

a segmented citizenship in which some members of society are valued above others. Such differences, once constructed and normalized, rationalize and justify governmental practices and policies that stigmatize and punish certain categories of immigrants and their children.

The discursive construction of Mexican immigrants and their children, and often of Latinos in general, resonates with anthropologist Mary Douglas's insights into the cultural constructions of *Purity and Danger*. She argues that culture classifies things and people into categories that make order out of an otherwise chaotic existence. When something or someone is "out of place," it or they are often considered dangerous, as pollution, threatening the purity of those in place—that is, in their "proper" category. Mexicans in the United States are constructed in the discourse examined here as people out of place and thus as a threat to the nation in which they reside. Put another way, one that Benedict Anderson might agree with, the Latino Threat Narrative does not imagine Latinos, whether immigrants or U.S.-born, as part of the national community.⁵⁹ When they do enter into the social imaginary, however, it is as an internal threat to the larger community.

Through news stories, TV and radio talk shows, movies, and more, the media construct social imaginaries, the implicit understandings that form collective subjectivities and make common practices possible.⁶⁰ Social imaginaries, argues Edward LiPuma, exist by virtue of representations and provide the taken-for-granted assumptions about identities (e.g., citizens, immigrants, consumers) and belonging in the world. For people immersed in these social imaginaries "there appear to be no genuine alternatives," for "modern agents have increasingly come to imagine these imaginaries as the unquestionably real and natural ground for acting in the world."⁶¹

The Latino Threat Narrative is a social imaginary in which Latinos are "virtual characters." They exist as "illegal aliens," "illegitimate recipients of organ donations," "highly fertile invaders," and "unassimilable separatists bent on a reconquest of the U.S. Southwest." Their lives are part of a virtual reality, one that is not necessarily tied to empirical evidence. Learning what we know about immigrants indirectly through the media is what anthropologists Daniel Miller and James G. Carrier call virtualism.⁶² Virtualism is a critique of contemporary capitalist society and the problems that result when virtual reality is perceived as reality and then we attempt to make the world conform to that virtual vision.⁶³ We learn about the Latino threat through the media, but the actual lives of Latinos, whether immigrants or U.S.-born, may not correspond to those

constructed, virtual lives. And yet anti-immigrant sentiment and immigration laws are in many ways a response to what we think we know about the Latino threat based on the virtual lives with which we are familiar.

The virtual lives of "Mexicans," "Chicanos," "illegal aliens," and "immigrants" become abstractions and representations that stand in the place of real lives. Rather than actual lives, virtual lives are generalized, iconic, and typified and are turned into statistical means. They are aggregate figures melded into cost-benefit analyses. They are no longer flesh-and-blood people; they exist as images. Because of this, a "global card trick" occurs between virtual personas and real-life personas.⁶⁴ The virtual personas of Latino immigrants—represented as a threat to the nation—make the authority that has accumulated for real immigrants in their role as workers and consumers vanish. The positive contributions of Latino immigrants often disappear in public discourse by means of this card trick. Through their very visible marches and demonstrations, immigrants have attempted to subvert the taken-for-granted truths accorded to virtual immigrants and to assert what they believe are their very real, material contributions to society.

As we make this critique of modern culture, we must always keep in mind that real immigrants do exist. Undocumented immigrants have lives. Immigrants and their children eat, breathe, and dream in cities and towns across America. How their actual lives "live up to" their virtual lives as represented in the Latino Threat Narrative is the subject of the next chapter.

citizenship by birth. Thus, a lack of citizenship status could continue over generations. What we would then have in America is a caste, a category from which certain people cannot escape. Social stigma is often ascribed to castes as abject persons lacking full membership in society. Is this not exactly the situation for which the Fourteenth Amendment was needed in the first place?

EPILOGUE

THE LATINO THREAT NARRATIVE characterizes Latinos as unable or unwilling to integrate into the social and cultural life of the United States. Allegedly, they do not learn English, and they seal themselves off from the larger society, reproducing cultural beliefs and behaviors antithetical to a modern life, such as pathologically high fertility levels that reduce the demographic presence of white Americans. Latinos are represented as an unchanging people, standing outside the currents of history, merely waiting for the opportunity to revolt and to reconquer land that was once theirs. They live to destroy social institutions such as medical care and education. They dilute the privileges and rights of citizenship for legitimate members of society.

When I coined the term "Latino Threat Narrative," I did so to show that what might appear as random or idiosyncratic comments, characterizations, tirades, images, and other representations of Latinos, both immigrants and U.S.-born, are actually part of a more cohesive set of ideas. The Latino Threat Narrative is a discourse that has developed over time and, as such, expresses a consistent set of assumptions. I also believed that it was necessary to discuss the Latino Threat Narrative in relation to a crisis in the meaning of citizenship today. In a world of widespread movement across national borders, citizenship becomes an ambiguous concept, not contained by purely legalistic definitions. The rights and privileges of citizenship, the possibility of trans-border citizens, the practices of social citizenship, and the sentiments of cultural citizenship are all on the table as we try to understand what a sense of belonging and community membership mean today.

Although powerful and productive in its own domain, the Latino Threat Narrative is also meaningful in a discourse on citizenship. Indeed, it plays an important role in public debates over the dilution of rights and privileges of citizenship. Citizenship is about inclusion and exclusion, and the Latino Threat Narrative helps bring those concepts into relief. Struggles over the meaning of citizenship occur every day in many public contexts. Some of these events become media spectacles, generating extensive coverage on TV, radio, and the Internet. Ideas about fertility and reproduction, confrontations over organ transplants, the Minuteman Project's anti-immigration activities, and immigrant-rights marches provide windows into the way the Latino Threat Narrative informs debates over immigration and citizenship. Latinos are represented as societal threats, thus causing them to be cast as illegitimate members of the community and undermining their claims for social and cultural citizenship. Importantly, the Latino Threat Narrative not only frames these events but also serves as a catalyst for action, such as the Minuteman Project's spectacle of surveillance on the Arizona-Mexico border and proposals to eliminate birthright citizenship.

In each of these media spectacles, the effect of characterizing Latino lives along the lines of the Latino Threat Narrative is to raise questions about citizenship. Are Latino immigrants and their children worthy of citizenship if they are unwilling to integrate into U.S. society? Are Latinos born in the United States suspect as citizens because of the disloyalty to the nation implied by the reconquest narrative? The immigrant marches in the spring of 2006 were, in effect, an attempt to address these questions with a spectacular display of belonging and assertions of social and cultural citizenship. The immigrants displayed their intention of becoming part of American society. They waved U.S. flags, recited the Pledge of Allegiance, and marched in orderly fashion. However, asserting social and cultural citizenship is not enough. The larger society must also recognize their membership in the community of citizens. The way the Minutemen and other anti-immigrant groups responded to the immigrants' marches suggests that many people remained unconvinced by such performances of citizenship. By referring to the marchers as "invaders" and "mobs" who were unwilling to speak English, some commentators on the immigrant marches signaled their dogged adherence to the images of the virtual lives of immigrants so pervasive in the media and public discourse. They invoked the Latino Threat Narrative despite the marchers' attempt to counter the assumptions about their lives.

I have attempted to provide evidence from my research that undercuts the Latino Threat Narrative. Over generations in the United States, Latinos increasingly use English in daily life. They increasingly have non-Latino friends and intermarry with non-Latinos. As Latino immigrants move along a path to citizenship, they are increasingly more integrated in terms of income, levels of education, and political engagement. Latinas are not slaves to childbearing. Rather, they are subject to history and economic pressures just as other women with decreasing fertility levels. Latino immigrants are not a drain on organ transplants and other medical resources for citizens. These trends may not be able to destroy the Latino Threat Narrative, but they do undermine some of its basic premises.

How resilient will the Latino Threat Narrative prove to be in the future? Immigration from Mexico has essentially flatlined since the Great Recession began in 2008, especially for California. A lack of jobs in the United States combined with declining fertility rates in Mexico means there are fewer incentives for going to "El Norte." Will this affect the pervasiveness of the Latino Threat Narrative? It's hard to say. But one thing is clear: attitudes should change, if only because of self-interest. As immigrants become a smaller proportion of the workforce, their children, the second generation, will increasingly become the homegrown workforce.¹ But how much they achieve and the quality of the work they can perform will depend on the investment we make in their education. We can't afford to continue to see them as foreign or a threat. Rather, they are us, and their integration into society is good for them and for the nation.

Although the data presented here suggest strongly that Latinos are integrating into U.S. society, this does not mean that Latinos are undergoing a process of homogenization, or what is often called assimilation in the classic, linear sense of a complete loss of identity and one-way adoption of U.S. culture. Latinos are also contributing to a constantly changing U.S. culture and society. They have played a role in helping to shape what America is today and what it will become in the future. Latinos will change, but they will also remain a richly varied population stemming from national backgrounds and regional histories in the United States. In this sense, they are no different from other Americans. The United States is not a homogenous country. Texans extol their local identity as strongly as New Englanders, southerners, and midwesterners.² So, too, Latinos in different regions of the country have their own cultural variations on a theme, as do various generations of Latinos.

The linear assumption of assimilation has other problems as well.³ The assimilation model posits a one-way change as immigrants lose their culture and acquire "American culture." However, what exactly is American culture? Although there are many generally shared cultural beliefs and behaviors across a national community, there are also some very real local and regional cultural differences in what it means to be American. An immigrant in Los Angeles learns a different version of American culture than an immigrant who has landed in New York or Ohio. Even in different parts of the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area, local cultural variations are important.

But perhaps more important is that the assimilation model assumes that American culture is static and unchanging; it is a fixed target. But American culture has never been static. It has always undergone transformations as a result of internal innovations, generational experiences, contributions from its internally diverse inhabitants, and the inclusion of new immigrant populations. Rather than being linear, cultural change is occurring in many directions all the time.

In addition, the assimilation model assumes not only that immigrant assimilation is a linear change but also that a change toward the mainstream is always positive and must be achieved at all costs. However, this thinking can blind us to the downside of assimilation. There is now a great deal of research showing that rapid assimilation—becoming more "American"—can lead to immigrants losing positive and healthy beliefs and practices, such as a decrease in healthy dietary practices and an increase in fast-food consumption, a loss of family values and an increase in the number of divorces), and a reduced respect for parents.⁴ Assimilation can also lead to increases in unhealthy behaviors such as alcohol consumption, smoking, and risky sexual practices.⁵ With more time in the United States, Latinos become more obese, experience more birth complications, and do less well in school.⁶ Moreover, less concern for assimilation and more tolerance for multiculturalism can have positive effects. Irene Bloemraad found that Canada provides much greater institutional support for multiculturalism, as well as support for community-based programs assisting with citizenship processing, than does the United States, which has resulted in much higher rates of naturalization by immigrants in Canada than in the United States.⁷

Furthermore, even though over time Latinos increasingly use English, have more non-Latino friends, and intermarry with non-Latinos, these trends tell us little about changes Latinos are introducing into U.S. culture. Increasing social

and linguistic integration of Latinos underscores a process in which Latinos are also introducing new ideas and ways of being to the United States. Latino ideas of family, work, friendship, emotions, trust, music, humor, sports, artistic expression, and so on are already blending into U.S. culture, both nationally and at local levels. The fact that salsa is a more popular condiment than ketchup is an example of how Mexican culinary culture is changing U.S. culture. Burritos are as much or more an American invention than Mexican, as is much of Tex-Mex food. Then there are sushirritos (sushi burritos) and other hybrid foods occurring as Latinos and other ethnic groups interact. Let us not forget, moreover, that tomatoes, corn, avocados, chilis, beans, certain squashes, peanuts, potatoes, and many more foods are a pre-Columbian contributions to U.S. cuisine, reflecting an earlier period of intercultural exchanges. Because the Latino Threat Narrative views Latinos as a destructive force rather than a creative one, Latino contributions to U.S. culture are obscured or given negative, even paranoid, meanings.

The real danger posed by the Latino Threat Narrative, and the acrimonious debate over Latino immigration that it informs, is that it blinds us to the reality that Latinos are a vital part of U.S. society. Latino integration into society therefore goes unrecognized, either willfully or because of the taken-for-granted assumptions of the narrative. Just as lacking in recognition are Latino contributions to social and cultural life, to what we think of as being American. Perhaps this is because such changes are difficult to observe in process. They are slow and often imperceptible. Also, when so dominant a discourse pervades public culture as does the Latino Threat Narrative, it is difficult for other discourses to blossom, especially when radio and TV talk-show hosts use the supposed Latino threat to bolster their ratings.⁸ What about the Latino Contribution Narrative? For over four hundred years Latinos have been contributing to the social, economic, and cultural life of what is now the U.S. Southwest. Where are the media spectacles celebrating those contributions? In a sense, those who worry about U.S. culture being changed by Latino immigrants and their descendants are correct. Latinos are changing U.S. culture and will continue to change it even as they themselves change, which is a strong argument for Latino cultural citizenship. Anthropologists often take the long view of culture change. Immediate reactions to newcomers (immigrants) in a society often focus on difference. New people in the neighborhood who speak a different language, practice a different religion, and put up signs on stores in foreign languages all raise ethnocentric responses and even fears. Over time,

these differences may become less pronounced, because what was once new and strange can become part of the accepted way things are or even become central to a people's identity and symbols of that identity.

Anthropologists are likely to speak of the culture changes that occur in a world of moving people, ideas, and products as blending, fusion, syncretism, hybridization, or creolization.⁹ These concepts reflect the multidimensional, multidirectional, and often unpredictable changes that take place as people and ideas, beliefs, and behaviors collide and interweave into new cultural formations. Culture is always an emergent form of life.¹⁰ Anthropologists prefer these concepts to the more unidirectional flow of changes presented by models of assimilation, which are often inadequate to capture the complex process of culture change.¹¹ A couple of examples make the point.

For years, a statue of John Wayne dressed as a cowboy has been displayed prominently at Orange County's John Wayne Airport (Figure E.1). But where does the "cowboy" come from? The image of the cowboy that John Wayne personifies has not always existed. The cowboy is a far cry from the image of Daniel Boone and the frontiersman of the colonial states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

When whites and blacks from the colonial states moved west, they encountered people in what is now Texas and New Mexico who were living a life well adapted to cattle ranching and herding. They were vaqueros, Mexican cowboys from whom the Americans learned the cowboy way of life. Imagine how foreign the first American cowboys—with their sombreros, bandannas, ponchos, leather leggings over their pants, boots, ropes, and general demeanor—must have looked. And the words these new types of Americans used for the items and techniques of their trade were essentially foreign too, because many of them were borrowed from Spanish (some of which were in turn borrowed from the Moors in Spain).¹² Following are some cowboy words and their origins:

Spanish	English
vaquero (literally, "man who works with cows")	buckaroo (cowboy)
chaparreras (pant leg coverings)	chaps
la reata (rope)	lariat
lazo (noose on rope)	lasso
reinda (ropes riders used to guide horse)	reins
mecate (rope made of horse-tail hairs)	McCarty



Figure E.1. Statue of John Wayne at Orange County's airport. Photo by author.

jaquima (bitless bridle to tame horses)	hackamore
bronco (wild horse)	bronc
mesteño (trained horse)	mustang
corral (pen)	corral
darle vuelta (to rope and stop cattle in their tracks by quickly snubbing a rope around the saddle horn)	dolly roping
rodeo	rodeo
juzgado (local jail)	hoosegow

But perhaps just as important as the words cowboys borrowed and adapted from the vaqueros were the lifestyle and personal characteristics they adopted: the strong, silent type of man whose time alone on the range made him

independent and self-reliant. Is this not the image John Wayne the cowboy exudes? In a few short years, the foreign-looking and -sounding cowboy became the central figure in the myth of the West, and his qualities and characteristics came to epitomize the quintessential elements of what it means to be an American male. Did migrating west, encountering Mexican vaquero culture, and constructing the cowboy destroy American culture? Or did American culture change and in the process incorporate novelty? The answer is the statue standing at John Wayne Airport.

Latinos in the United States have also experienced culture change, incorporating new ideas and behaviors into their lives and identities. For example, generations of Mexicans lived in Texas before it became part of the United States. When thousands of Germans migrated into Texas in the 1800s, they had a profound and lasting effect on Tejanos (Texans of Mexican descent).¹³ German immigrants brought with them the accordion and their fondness for the polkas that they played during their parties. Local Tejanos heard the music and picked up the accordion, adapting it to fit their preferences. Soon Tejanos were playing a new style of music in Texas that came to be known as conjunto, Tex-Mex, Tejano, or norteño music.¹⁴ To many Americans, it was just "Mexican music," and yet this music was a real American invention, blending German polkas, Mexican ballads, and other song styles.¹⁵ The late Texas singer Selena Perez was one of the most nationally famous performers of this style. In the long run, Tejanos did not lose their culture because they incorporated aspects of German culture into their lives. Their culture changed and was enriched in many ways because of such exchanges.

The Latino Threat Narrative distracts us from understanding culture change. It casts Latinos, whites, and everyone else into immutable categories of race, ethnicity, and culture. But the borders of these categories are not fixed; they are permeable. They will not break or be destroyed as they are transformed. What will constitute "Latino" or "white" fifty or a hundred years from now is anyone's guess. Most likely, the changes that occur will be unanticipated, least of all by the Latino Threat Narrative, because the transformations that cultures undergo are difficult to predict.

In the short term, however, the Latino Threat Narrative creates divisiveness and, by representing Latinos as a threat, undermines the integration of Latinos into society. The Latino Threat Narrative obscures the strides Latinos are making and at the same time masks the obstacles many of them face as they struggle to get an education and gain a modicum of economic mobility. But even more,

it suggests they deserve the obstacles they face because the threats they allegedly pose render them undeserving and illegitimate members of the community. The Latino Threat Narrative rationalizes actions and public policies targeting Latinas and their children, making it problematic to gain access to prenatal care for Latina mothers, quality schools for Latino children, jobs that provide economic mobility, and a path to citizenship for unauthorized residents living and working in our society.

What is needed as Latinos integrate into U.S. society is a commitment to equal opportunity. This would signal society's recognition of, and pragmatic support for, Latino social and cultural citizenship. Access to schools, medical care, and good jobs is essential for economic and social mobility. Making a commitment to improving opportunities for Latinos requires that we, as a society, move beyond the Latino Threat Narrative. Latinos would not be the only beneficiaries of such a dramatic shift. By moving beyond the Latino Threat Narrative, non-Latinos would be better able to recognize shared ambitions, to appreciate novelty provided by cultural differences, and to be less afraid of change.

What type of policy recommendations does this analysis suggest? Latinos already engage in practices of social citizenship, and they exhibit a sense of belonging that underscores their cultural citizenship. But more is needed to break down the barriers to social integration and economic mobility that Latinos routinely encounter. Here are concrete policies that we, as a society, could pursue to alleviate the damage caused by the Latino Threat Narrative and to ensure a rapid integration of Latino immigrants and their children:

- Active and persistent neutralization of the Latino Threat Narrative by members of the media, government, and academia.
- A comprehensive approach to labor market needs and immigration policy. This would reduce the tendency to blame Latino immigrants as "the problem" when they come to the United States to satisfy its labor needs.
- Elimination of the "illegal alien" as a social type. "Illegal alien" is a concept that represents a thoroughly immoral relationship between those who labor and those who benefit from that labor. If the economy needs more workers than we produce through births, then let those workers and their families live under the protection of law. Recognize their economic and social contributions to the general welfare.

- Provision of a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants leading productive and law-abiding lives. The 1.5 generation in particular should be provided legal residence, recognizing that they have grown up and attended school in the United States and most likely will continue to live in the United States. This is the best way to guarantee their rapid integration into society.
- Investment in 1.5- and second-generation Latinos by guaranteeing access to quality education and health care. This is an investment that would benefit all of society in terms of economic productivity, physical and mental well-being, and cultural creativity.
- Improvement of the second-chance opportunities for the 1.5- and second-generation Latinos who did not receive an adequate education or whose schooling was cut short. Provide greater support for community colleges and job training programs that allow for a modicum of mobility for those who have experienced major social obstacles. This includes minor brushes with the law. Those desiring to rehabilitate their lives deserve education, not incarceration.

It is time to put the Latino Threat Narrative to rest. It is counterproductive and divisive and creates self-fulfilling prophecies. It is an inaccurate depiction of the everyday lives of Latino immigrants and Latinos in general. Citizenship in all its manifestations is hard enough to construct, and it deserves honest, productive, clear-eyed representations of all members of society, as well as public policies that reduce obstacles to integration and social and economic mobility. Perhaps it is naive to say it all begins with attitudes; an inclusive society is one in which a sense of belonging blooms freely and unhindered, fostered by widespread recognition that we are all in this thing called society together. Pitting one group against another to maintain privileges may have short-term benefits for some, but it creates long-term problems for all of *us*.

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NOTES

Introduction

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4. Arizona's HB 2281 is available at www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/hb2281s.pdf.
5. *Washington Independent*, October 18, 2010, <http://washingtonindependent.com/100958/angle-defends-her-anti-illegal-immigration-ads>; Price, "Republican Senate Nominee Uses Picture of Mexicans—in Mexico—to Scare Us about Illegal Immigrants."
6. Wyatt, "Cain Proposes Electrified Border Fence."
7. Chavez, "Immigration Reform and Nativism"; Faegin, "Old Poison in New Bottles"; Higham, *Strangers in the Land*; Perea, *Immigrants Out!*
8. I consider this book, as well as most of my publications and public speeches, as the work of an anthropological cultural critic. Handler defines such critics as anthropologists "who expend at least some of their professional effort in dissecting the commonsense presuppositions of their own world and in disseminating the results of that work to as wide an audience of other citizens as they can reach." Handler, *Critics against Culture*, 4.
9. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 15–16.
10. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
11. Habermas, *Structural Transformation*; Lee and LiPuma, "Cultures of Circulation," 193–94.
12. For a discussion of immigrants represented as outside the imagined community of the nation, see Chavez, "Outside the Imagined Community."
13. Kellner, *Media Spectacles*.

14. On the media and immigration, see Bailey, "Mexico in the U.S. Media"; Coutin and Chock, "Your Friend, the Illegal"; Fernandez and Pedroza, "Border Patrol"; Keogan, "Sense of Place"; Santa Ana, *Brown Tide Rising*; Santa Ana, "Like an Animal"; Santa Ana, Moran, and Sanchez, "Awash under a Brown Tide"; Simon and Alexander, *Ambivalent Welcome*; White and White, *Immigrants and the Media*.

15. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, <http://www.m-w.com>, s.v. "spectacle."

16. Debord, *Society of the Spectacle*, 14.

17. For examples of the ways in which the media frame events, see Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements"; Ensink and Sauer, "Social-Functional and Cognitive Approaches"; German, "Role of the Media in Political Socialization"; and Coutin and Chock, "Your Friend, the Illegal."

18. As Ella Shohat has observed, "In a transnational world typified by the global circulation of images and sounds, goods and peoples, media spectatorship impacts complexly on national identity, communal belonging, and political affiliations." Shohat, "Post-Third-Worldist Culture."

19. For a discussion of the theory of virtualism, see Carrier and Miller, *Virtualism*.

20. Debord, *Society of the Spectacle*, 13.

21. Media spectacles become a technique of governmentality by contributing to the development of systems of knowledge to control the conduct of populations.

22. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*.

23. See table 1 of the Pew Hispanic Center report *Foreign Born at Mid-Decade*, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/other/foreignborn/Table-1.pdf>.

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29. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Public Law 104-193, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 110 (1996), is available at <http://wdr.doleta.gov/readroom/legislation/pdf/104-193.pdf>.

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31. HR 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, is available at <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

32. Curtius, "House Moving to Tighten Immigration."

33. Debates over immigration policies lend themselves to political grandstanding and political symbolism; see Kitty Calavita, "New Politics of Immigration."

34. *Los Angeles Times*, "Immigration's Endless Summer."

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36. The concept of citizenship is in a state of crisis, not just in the United States but worldwide. See Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" Castles and Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration*; Reed-Danahay and Brettell, *Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging*; Sadiq, *Paper Citizens*; Tsuda, *Local Citizenship*.

37. Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson, introduction to *Culture and Rights*; Roman, "Members and Outsiders"; Turner, "Contemporary Problems." As Carlos Véllez-Ibáñez has argued, in the United States "citizenship, nationality, and ethnic identity reflect the dominant ethnic group of Anglo-Saxon Americans." Véllez-Ibáñez, "Se me acabó la canción."

38. Karst, *Belonging to America*.

39. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*.

40. Luibheid, *Entry Denied*.

41. Gerstle, *American Crucible*; Molina, *Fit to Be Citizens?*; Stern, *Eugenic Nation*.

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44. Bosniak, "Universal Citizenship"; A. Gordon and Stack, "Citizenship beyond the State"; Hall and Held, "Citizens and Citizenship."

45. C. Gordon, "Governmental Rationality"; Rocco, "Transforming Citizenship."

46. J. Anderson, *Transnational Democracy*; Basch, Schiller, and Blanc, *Nations Unbound*; Bosniak, "Citizenship Denationalized"; Brettell, "Political Belonging and Cultural Belonging"; A. Castaneda, "Roads to Citizenship"; Fitzgerald, *Negotiating Extra-Territorial Citizenship*; Fox, "Unpacking Transnational Citizenship"; Inda, "Flexible World"; Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*; Schiller, "Transborder Citizenship"; Schiller and Fouron, *Georges Woke Up Laughing*.

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48. Bernal, "Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination," 164.

49. Ong, *Buddha Is Hiding*.

50. Flores and Benmayor, *Latino Cultural Citizenship*; Inda and Mirón, "Migrant Voices"; Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making"; Rosaldo, "Cultural Citizenship, Inequality, and Multiculturalism"; Stephen, "Cultural Citizenship and Labor Rights"; Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*; Torres, Mirón, and Inda, introduction to *Race, Identity, and Citizenship*.

51. Ortner, "On Key Symbols."

52. Aleinikoff, "Tightening Circle of Membership"; Hollinger, "How Wide the Circle?"

53. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, *Citizenship Policies*; Coutin, *Nations of Emigrants*; Yuval-Davis, "Multi-Layered Citizen."

54. For a discussion of the theory of virtualism, see Carrier and Miller, *Virtualism*.

55. Bosniak, "Citizenship Denationalized," 455.

56. Ibid., 456.

57. Ibid.

58. Bosniak, "Universal Citizenship"; Schuck, *Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens*. For a discussion of the upsurge in pro-regularization movements in immigrant communities across Europe, see Laubenthal, "Emergence of Pro-Regularization Movements." In the mid-1990s, illegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the former Yugoslavia occupied churches and initiated demonstrations in France, Spain, and Switzerland. The aim of these social movements was to protest the illegality of migrants and to push for means to legalize, or regularize, their status.

59. James Holston and Arjun Appadurai observe that legally resident noncitizens and citizens often possess essentially the same civil and socioeconomic rights. Holston and Appadurai, "Introduction," 4.

60. Bosniak, "Universal Citizenship."

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63. For examples of citizenship rights being viewed as diluted in the U.S. context, see Geyer, *Americans No More*; Huntington, *Who We Are*; and Maxwell and Jacobson, *Marketing Disease to Hispanics*. For an example of similar views in Spain as a result of immigration from North Africa and South America, see Suárez-Navaz, *Rebordering the Mediterranean*.

64. In January of 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that auto theft is a felony that warrants deporting a legal immigrant, a provision of the 1996 immigration law. Savage, "Justices Ease Deporting of Car Thieves."

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66. M. D. Gupta, *Unruly Immigrants*.

67. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Bosniak, "Citizenship Denationalized," 477; Coll, "No Estoy Perdida."

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70. Schiller, "Transborder Citizenship." See also Del Castillo, "Illegal Status and Social Citizenship."

71. Schiller, "Transborder Citizenship," 31.

72. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Bosniak, "Citizenship Denationalized," 479; Menjivar, "Liminal Legality"; Turner, "Contemporary Problems." As Caroline Brettell notes, such subjective sentiments of belonging have also been defined as "nationality." Brettell, "Political Belonging and Cultural Belonging," 97.

73. Nagel and Staeheli argue that because of transnationalism some can claim citizenship in a country without "being part of" or "belonging to" that country. Nagel and Staeheli, "Citizenship, Identity, and Transnational Migration." See also Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging."

74. Coutin, *Legalizing Moves*.

75. Chavez, "Power of the Imagined Community." For an example of the effect of positive sentiments on immigrant behavior, see Hook, Brown, and Bean, who found that immigrants were significantly more likely to become U.S. citizens in states where people have generally positive attitudes about immigrants. Hook, Brown, and Bean, "For Love or Money?"

76. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*; J. Mohanty, "Status of the Subject in Foucault."

77. Flores and Benmayor, "Constructing Cultural Citizenship," 15.

78. Rosaldo and Flores, "Identity, Conflict, and Evolving Latino Communities," 57.

79. Rosaldo, "Cultural Citizenship, Inequality, and Multiculturalism."

80. It is on this point that Aihwa Ong criticizes Renato Rosaldo's conceptualization of cultural citizenship. Rather than assuming that the assertion of cultural citizenship by a particular social group is sufficient for that group to acquire that subject status, Ong maintains that cultural citizenship is a dialectical process, in that it is asserted as well as being a status subject to construction by the nation-state. See Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making."

81. Ibid., 738.

82. Foucault, "Governmentality."

83. Inda, *Targeting Immigrants*.

84. For a discussion of the media, political citizenship, and consumer subjectivity among Mexican Americans, see Mayer, *Producing Dreams, Consuming Youth*.

85. Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making," 738. As Michael Samers has observed, "if undocumented immigration is produced by stricter regulations, then the state is not so much *controlling* it, the popular press not so much *reporting* it, as they are both *creating* it." Samers, "Invisible Capitalism," 576.

86. Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making," 738.

87. Bandhauer, "Global Trend in Racism"; Brettell, "Wrestling with 9/11."

88. Adams, *Greasers and Gringos*; De Leon, *They Called Them Greasers*.

89. For a discussion of the power of myths in contemporary life, see Barthes, *Mythologies*; Hall, *Representation*; and Kertzer, *Politics and Symbols*.

90. Kellner, *Media Spectacles*.
91. Foucault, "Birth of Biopolitics."
92. For an interdisciplinary examination of the Jessica Santillan case, see Wailoo, Livingston, and Guarnaccia, *Death Retold*.
93. Stepputat, "Marching for Progress." The idea of "performing citizenship" is influenced by Judith Butler's work on gender as an ongoing performance, constantly improvised, rather than an essential identity that is fixed and immutable. Butler, *Bodies That Matter*.
94. Taylor, *Archive and the Repertoire*.
95. For an example of how race is performed among Andean women, see Weismantel, *Cholas and Pishtacos*.

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2. Rosaldo, "Cultural Citizenship, Inequality, and Multiculturalism."
3. Chavez, *Covering Immigration*.
4. Buck-Morss, *Thinking Past Terror*; Bush, *National Security Strategy*; Chishty et al., "America's Challenge"; Hardt and Negri, *Empire*.
5. Cole, *Enemy Aliens*; Johnson and Trujillo, "Immigration Reform"; Maher, "Who Has a Right to Rights?"; Volpp, "Citizen and the Terrorist."
6. Huntington, "Hispanic Challenge," 30.
7. Ibid., 42, 32.
8. Huntington, "Special Case of Mexican Immigration," 22.
9. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*; Hall, introduction to *Representation*.
10. Hall, introduction to *Representation*, 6.
11. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 4.
12. Ibid., 71.
13. For a discussion of U.S. differentiations between "color race" (e.g., the "brown race") and race as groups of people, even what are termed nationalities today (e.g., the "Italian race," the "Mexican race," the "Nordic race"), see Guglielmo, *White on Arrival*.
14. Ibid., 6.
15. For a discussion of racialization, see Torres, Mirón, and Inda, introduction to *Race, Identity, and Citizenship*.
16. Small, "Contours of Racialization."
17. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 7.
18. Stern, "Buildings, Boundaries, and Blood," 75.
19. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 8.
20. Ibid., 89.
21. For a discussion of the public's ambivalent position in relation to undocumented immigrants as criminals and to enforcement, see also Schuck, "Law and the Study of Migration," 197–200.
22. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*.
23. Geyer, *Americans No More*; Tancred, *In Mortal Danger*. See also Peter Schuck's views on a "devaluation" of citizenship. Schuck, *Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens*.
24. De Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality.'"
25. Inda, *Targeting Immigrants*.
26. Coutin, "Being En Route."
27. For a discussion of the "immigrant invasion" in the Spanish context, see Suárez-Navaz, *Rebordering the Mediterranean*.
28. *U.S. News and World Report*, "How Millions Sneak into U.S."
29. Research by Jeffrey Passel and his associates showed that the INS estimates were too high. See Passel and Woodrow, "Change in the Undocumented Alien Population."
30. Chavez, *Covering Immigration*.
31. Handler, *Nationalism*.
32. Chavez, "Culture Change and Cultural Reproduction."
33. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*.
34. Buchanan, "What Will America Be in 2050?"
35. Ibid.
36. Brimelow, *Alien Nation*, 218–19.
37. Ibid., 219.
38. Geyer, *Americans No More*, 304–5.
39. Ibid., 305.
40. Kennedy, "Can We Still Afford to Be a Nation of Immigrants?"
41. Ibid., 68.
42. Massey and Pren, "Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy," 6. Massey and Pren's analysis builds upon Chavez's findings in *Covering Immigration*.
43. Passel, *Unauthorized Migrants*; Robinson, *ESCAP II*.
44. Grieco, "Foreign Born from Mexico."
45. Will, "We Have Been Here Before."
46. Cleeland, "AFL-CIO Calls for Amnesty."
47. Scheer, "Surprise!"
48. J. F. Smith and Chen, "Bush to Weigh Residency."
49. Tancred, *In Mortal Danger*.
50. Krikorian, "Dealing with Illegal Immigrants."
51. DeSipio and Masuoka, "Opportunities Lost?"
52. Arellano, "Fear of a Brown Planet."

53. See Arizona's HB 2281 at www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/hb2281s.pdf.
54. *Los Angeles Times*, "Lesson for Arizona."
55. Serrano and Castellanos, "Federal Officials Sue Arizona Lawman."
56. Puwar, *Space Invaders*. On the politics of Latina fertility, see also Chavez, "Immigration Reform and Nativism."
57. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. See also Chavez, *Covering Immigration*, 45.
58. Ong, *Buddha Is Hiding*.
59. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
60. LiPuma, "Cultures of Circulation."
61. *Ibid.*, 8.
62. Carrier and Miller, *Virtualism*.
63. Carrier, introduction to Carrier and Miller, *Virtualism*, 2.
64. D. Miller, "Conclusion," 200.

Chapter 2

1. The three people upon whom the cases in this chapter are based were interviewed by the author (Rocío) and Roberto Gonzales (Juan and Carlos), at the time a graduate student in sociology at the University of California, Irvine.
2. Chavez, *Shadowed Lives*; Chavez, "Settlers and Sojourners."
3. The Orange County Survey was conducted in 2006 under the auspices of the Center for Research on Latinos in a Global Society (CRLGS), University of California, Irvine. Interviewing Service of America conducted the telephone survey between January 4 and 31, 2006, using trained interviewers in both English and Spanish. The survey used random-digit dialing on a sample from a database that includes all U.S. directory-published household numbers, both listed and unlisted, combined with a sample that had identified Hispanic markers. Both listed and unlisted numbers were included, avoiding potential bias as a result of exclusion of households with unlisted numbers (see Survey Sampling Inc., *Statistical Analysis of Sample*). The cooperation rate was 70 percent. Interviews were in the interviewee's language of choice. Eligible participants were English- or Spanish-speaking men and women, 18 years of age or older, who were not institutionalized and who identified themselves as white (Anglo, Caucasian, non-Hispanic white) or Latino (Hispanic or more specific ethnic identifiers such as Mexican, Mexican American, Salvadoran, etc.).
4. See U.S. Census Bureau, *State and County Quickfacts*.
5. The Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) project was supported by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation. Co-principal investigators were Rubén G. Rumbaut, Frank D. Bean, Susan K. Brown, Leo R. Chavez, Louis DeSipio, Jennifer Lee, and Min Zhou. Conducted in 2004, the

study targeted the young-adult children of immigrants from large immigrant groups in the five-county metropolitan Los Angeles area (from Ventura County in the north to San Bernardino County in the south) and used a random telephone survey to gather information from 4,780 persons ages 20 to 40 who had at least one immigrant parent. The study was designed to be a random probability sample of persons whose parents' national origin was Mexican, Chinese (from both the mainland and Taiwan), Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, or Central Americans (Salvadoran or Guatemalan) residing in households with telephones in the greater Los Angeles area. Because of the centrality of the Mexican-origin group to the immigrant experience in Los Angeles, we oversampled the Mexican population. The sample included individuals other than these national groups who are not considered here, including U.S. whites, African Americans, other Latin Americans, other Asians, and Middle Easterners.

6. Of the 805 Latinos surveyed, 6 were missing values on this question. The percentages cited in the discussion here are based on the total of 799 who answered the question.

7. Rumbaut, "Origins and Destinies."
8. $\chi^2 = 8.349$; $p < .01$.
9. For a discussion of similar gains by the new second-generation children of immigrants more generally, see Bean and Stevens, *America's Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity*.
10. $\chi^2 = 29.819$; $p < .001$.
11. $\chi^2 = 16.444$; $p < .01$.
12. Portes and Bach, *Latin Journey*.
13. Brown, "Delayed Spatial Assimilation."
14. There were thirteen interviews with missing information on citizenship status, making the total of respondents to this question 794.
15. Of the 396 Anglos surveyed, one had a missing value on this variable.
16. Bean et al., "Chasing the American Dream"; Bean et al., "Pathways to Legal Status." These works are based on data collected by the IIMMLA project.
17. $\chi^2 = 435.134$; $p < .001$.
18. The IIMMLA project surveyed Mexican immigrants ($N = 125$), 1.5/second-generation Mexican Americans ($N = 844$), and third-plus-generation Mexican Americans ($N = 400$) in the greater Los Angeles area, from Ventura County to San Bernardino County.
19. Hakimzadeh and Cohn, "English Usage among Hispanics in the United States."
20. $\chi^2 = 378.705$; $p < .001$.
21. $\chi^2 = 212.835$; $p < .001$.
22. $\chi^2 = 253.765$; $p < .001$.

20. For a list of DREAM Act-related sites, see <http://www.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&source=embed&oe=UTF8&mmsa=0&msid=104184449682652234459.000467fe552f4b837d305>.
21. Posters seen at the 2008 mock graduation ceremony in Washington, D.C.: <http://www.globalvisas.com/blog/dream-act-protest-enacts-graduation-ceremony.html>.
22. Vargas, "Shadow Americans," 34.
23. Text of speech available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address>.
24. Medrano, "Obama as Border Cop."
25. Preston, "Deportations Go On."
26. Preston, "Federal Policy Resulting in Wave of Deportations Draws Protests."
27. Goffard, Esquivel, and Watanabe. "U.S. Will Review Cases."
28. Preston, "Deportations Go On."
29. Parsons, Bennett, and Tanfani, "Obama Opens New Door."
30. Gabriel, "Florida's Crucial Hispanic Voters Remain Wary of Romney."
31. Oliphant, "Mitt Romney Would Veto DREAM Act."
32. Liptak, "Romney Defends DREAM Act Stance."
33. The quote is available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bHRzeaYYCM>.
34. Passel and Cohn, *Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*.
35. <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment14/>.
36. *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, "Profile of a Lost Generation." For a summary of the history of the term "anchor baby," see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anchor_baby.
37. Chavez, *Shadowed Lives*, 179.
38. Malkin, "What Makes an American?"
39. Malkin, "No More Drive-by Citizenship."
40. For Lou Dobbs's comments and a discussion of anchor babies and the efforts to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment and birthright citizenship, see *Lou Dobbs Tonight*, April 15, 2006, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6x1t8ej-Tk>.
41. Barr, "Graham Eyes 'Birthright Citizenship'"; Conant, "Next Front on Immigration."
42. Santa Ana, "Like an Animal I Was Treated."
43. Berk et al., "Health Care Use among Undocumented Latino Immigrants."
44. Hochschild and Mollenkopf, *Bringing Outsiders In*.
45. Rawle, *View of the Constitution of the United States of America*. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural-born_citizen.
46. Justia.com, "US Supreme Court: United States v. Wong Kim Ark."
47. Ibid. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wong_Kim_Ark.

48. Lacey, "New Task Force."
49. Gallegly, "Gallegly Seeks to End Automatic Citizenship"; Lacey, "New Task Force."
50. Lowy, "GOP Congressman Seeks to Limit Citizenship Birthright."
51. Ibid. HR698, the Citizenship Reform Act of 2005, was dropped at the end of that legislative session and never became law; <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-698>. In its place is HR1940, the Birthright Citizenship Act of 2007, which was introduced by Representative Nathan Deal (R-Georgia) and would also amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to eliminate birthright citizenship; <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1940>.
52. Boyle, "Congressman Steve King Rolls Out Plan."
53. The text of HR140, the Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, is available at <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h112-140>.
54. Newser, "Arizona Bills Target Birthright Citizenship"; Preston, "State Lawmakers Outline Plans to End Birthright Citizenship."
55. Preston, "State Lawmakers Outline Plans to End Birthright Citizenship."
56. Fischer, "Who Is a Citizen?"
57. Bentley, "Sen. Russell Pearce to Introduce 14th Amendment Bill."
58. Schwartz, "Russell Pearce Loses Election."
59. *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 5th ed., s.v. "anchor baby."
60. <http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=anchor+baby>.
61. Lou Dobbs's statement on Fox News is available at <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/08/03/889930/-Even-Lou-Dobbs-believes-in-the-14th-amendment>.
62. Aujla, "Steve King Unveils Birthright Bill."
63. D. Roberts, "Who May Give Birth to Citizens?" 212.
64. *Rasmussen Reports*. "61% Oppose U.S. Citizenship for Children Born to Illegal Immigrants."
65. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 130.
66. Tormey, "'Everyone with Eyes Can See the Problem.'" See also Moran, "Immigrant Appearances"; and A. Smith, "Irish Citizenship Referendum."
67. Barnes, "Supreme Court Rejects Much of Arizona Immigration Law."

Epilogue

1. Myers, "California Futures"; Pitkin and Myers, "Generational Projections of the California Population."
2. For a discussion of regional and national identities, see Hayes-Bautista, *La Nueva California*.
3. Alba and Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream*.

4. Rumbaut, "Assimilation and Its Discontents"; M. M. Suarez-Orozco, "Everything You Wanted to Know."
5. Gutmann, "Ethnicity, Alcohol, and Acculturation"; Hayes-Bautista, *La Nueva California*; Hirsch et al., "Social Constructions of Sexuality"; Marchi and Guendelman, "Gender Differences"; Rumbaut, "Assimilation and Its Discontents."
6. Markides and Coreil, "Health of Hispanics"; Rumbaut, "New Californians"; Rumbaut and Weeks, "Children of Immigrants"; C. Suarez-Orozco and M. Suarez-Orozco, *Transformations*.
7. Bloemraad, *Becoming a Citizen*.
8. For example, the audience of the *Lou Dobbs Tonight* show on CNN increased 72 percent between 2003 and 2007, largely because of Dobbs's anti-immigrant, and particularly anti-Mexican, editorializing. He frequently asserted that a reconquest is occurring and that immigrants have U.S.-born children as anchor babies to help them acquire legal status. Perhaps his most outrageous assertion has been his patently false claim that immigrants are causing an epidemic of leprosy. Leonhardt, "Truth, Fiction, and Lou Dobbs"; Rutten, "Lou Dobbs."
9. Carlos Vélez-Ibáñez refers to a process of "cultural bumping" as people and cultures interact. Vélez-Ibáñez, *Border Visions*.
10. Fischer, *Emergent Forms of Life*.
11. Foner, "Introduction."
12. Graham, *El Rancho in South Texas*. See also Hayes-Bautista, *La Nueva California*, 178–79; McWilliams, *North from Mexico*.
13. Jordan, *German Seed in Texas Soil*.
14. San Miguel, *Tejano Proud*.
15. For more information on this style of music, see the excellent PBS documentary *Accordion Dreams*, produced and directed by Hector Galán and available from Galán Inc., Austin, Texas.

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