

CHAPTER 1

NEGOTIATING EMPIRE

A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE RESPONSES TO HITTITE IMPERIALISM BY THE VASSAL STATE OF UGARIT AND THE KASKA OF PONTIC ANATOLIA

CLAUDIA GLATZ

EMPIRES ARE “ORGANIZED BOTH TO ADMINISTER AND EXPLOIT diversity, whether economic, political, religious, or ethnic” (Barfield 2001: 29). The Hittite Empire of Late Bronze Age Anatolia was no exception to this (see Figure 1.1). The many toponyms, names of political units, diverse languages spoken in disparate regions, and the ethnonyms mentioned in Late Bronze Age Anatolian textual sources all constitute the socio-political puzzle of Asia Minor and surrounding regions as the Hittites saw it. Late Bronze Age polities in Anatolia and northern Syria were diverse in size, social organization, cultural orientation, and influence in the international arena. They also showed varying degrees of willingness to accept Hittite imperialism. In the face of this diversity, Hittite strategies of expansion and integration have an air of contingency as well as of inflexibility and standardization.

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Figure 1.1. Map showing sites mentioned in the text

Actual or threatened military conquest and the completion of treaties are most commonly attested in textual sources. Resettlement of deportees and viceregal seats of administration in northern Syria were additional measures used to pacify rebellious regions, to overcome labor and settlement shortages, and to gain a firmer grip on regions of particular importance. The inherent fragility of this mode of imperialism is exemplified by the recurring cycles of rebellion, loss of territory, and subsequent retaliation detailed in the royal annals and historical preambles to vassal treaties (Klengel 1999; Beckman 1999). In light of this textual evidence, the Hittite great-kings and leading aristocracy appear by no means solely responsible for the decision-making that determined imperial prosperity or recession. By their own admission, they frequently had to react to local initiatives.

Outright hostile resistance and subtle political negotiation form part of a wide spectrum of behavioral possibilities available to societies entwined in various stages of imperial relationships from conquest and integration to periodic recession and final collapse. I propose here that sociopolitical and economic organization, the will and ability of subordinate groups to cooperate, in addition to imperial modes and intensity of domination, constitute crucial factors in determining the range of resistance strategies available to those incorporated into or otherwise affected by early empires.

The present chapter explores this proposition through an investigation of the strategies employed by the vassal kingdom of Ugarit and the Kaska tribes of northern Anatolia in the negotiation of their positions within the heterogeneous interplay of power-relations of the Hittite empire and beyond. The aim of this discussion is to contribute to our understanding of antagonistic behavioral strategies in imperial relationships in general and of the specific strategies of resistance and negotiation that may have influenced the development of the Hittite imperial system in particular.

The vassal state of Ugarit on the northern Levantine littoral and the Kaska highland tribes of north-central Anatolia occupy opposing ends on the spectrum of sociopolitical complexity that the Hittite empire strove to dominate. Nevertheless, the two regions both feature prominently in Hittite and other documentary sources. While this emphasis in the textual record reflects the heightened concern of the imperial administration, it also leads us to assume an overall greater significance of these two entities in shaping the idiosyncrasies of Hittite imperial development, relative to those not mentioned in texts. A general absence of material culture associated with the Hittite core area in the two regions in question, albeit for different reasons, contrasts with the emphasis in the written accounts.

DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND NEGOTIATION: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The textual records of Late Bronze Age central Anatolia, northern Syria, and adjacent regions present a rich source of information on the different types of inter- and intra-polity relations between the central Hittite polity and its various territories and dependencies. A consequence of this perceived richness has been that the Hittite empire, its political history, and its relationships of domination and resistance are essentially textually constructed. Presentations and interpretations of the textual data tend to have strong empirical and particularistic tendencies and, despite copious references to the ideological component in ancient historiography and diplomatic correspondence, often leave little leeway for critical assessments of royal propaganda. Conversely, archaeological evidence, which has the inherent ability to provide a socially more nuanced and balanced picture of imperial-local relationships (see, for example Alcock 1993: 5–6) has thus far featured rarely in the discourse on either Hittite strategies of integration or provincial responses to them. Equally unsurprising and rarer still have been considerations of resistance to Hittite imperialism (but see for example Gorny 1995; Glatz and Matthews 2005; Glatz 2009). In the case of the Hittite empire, but applicable more broadly

to early imperial networks, this is due to the politically one-sided and socially restrictive nature of the available written sources on the one hand and an urban and elite-centric archaeological tradition on the other. As a result, we know very little about the pasts of the conquered and subordinated of Late Bronze Age Anatolia and the wider Near East and their reactions to and attitudes towards imperial power and its representatives. However, behavioral strategies that amount to resistance will most certainly have formed part of the daily routines of subordinated groups. Examining resistance, therefore, is key in understanding imperial relationships and the experience of the conquered and colonized (Given 2004: 8). Instances of resistance, usually overt forms of defiance but also more subtle forms of negotiation, are among those aspects of imperial-local relationships that find resonance—in however general terms—in imperial correspondence and historical narratives and, occasionally, also the archaeological record.

Social power, and resistance to it, have come to be viewed in recent discourse as causally intertwined notions of fundamental importance for the maintenance and transformation of society: “[w]here there is power, there is resistance . . .” (Foucault 1998: 95; see also Miller et al. 1995). From this perspective, power is a capacity or resource rather than a property that may be restricted to those at the top of social hierarchies. It is a component in, and a consequence of, the totality of social interactions; all social actors through their interaction partake in relations of power. A second aspect of power, the notion of *power-over*, generally characterizes hierarchical relationships of domination in addition to the socially omnipresent *power-to* (Miller and Tilley 1984: 5–8). It encompasses the ability to impose one’s will upon others despite resistance (Weber 1964: 152) as well as the capacity to command obedience for a variety of reasons, not all of which are necessarily related to coercion. “. . .[E]very genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an *interest* (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience” (Weber 1978: 212; emphasis in the original).

Relations between early empires and their subordinated societies are, by definition, relations of domination that to a large degree are shaped by the intentions and interests of the imperial elite. The process of imperialism, however, is never entirely one-sided. Domination as a relationship involves a dialectic discourse in which the subordinated also have access to certain resources, material and/or nonmaterial, to counteract oppression (Miller and Tilley 1984: 7). Even if relations of domination involve a certain self-interest or, at least, an interest in self-preservation on the part of the weaker party

(Weber 1978: 212; Galtung 1980: 437), hierarchical power-relations are multifaceted and subordinates are unlikely to be either entirely submissive or entirely insubordinate (Scott 1990: 192). Domination, moreover, is rarely asymmetrical to the degree of total control. In particular, the ability of early states and empires to exert domination was severely curbed by technological factors such as transport and communications as well as by chronic demographic shortages, which influenced the degree of geographical continuity and discontinuity of effective control (Sinopoli 1994: 163; Smith 2003). Therefore, although domination—often in direct coercive form or its implication—underlies the vast majority of imperial relationships, dominance is, at least in theory, contestable; in fact, the expectation would be that it is constantly being contested. Post-colonial studies, moreover, have shown that agency on the part of subordinate individuals or groups, which includes resistance, is by no means only a reaction to the strategies and ideologies of the powerful (Given 2004: 10).

What behavioral forms might we expect this resistance to take? What are the aims and motivations that lie behind resistance? Must it always have the ultimate goal of structural change and take the form of more or less violent rebellion? Or does it include less overt practices of negotiation and subversion such as occasional disobedience and delay in situations where real social transformation seems impossible and may even be undesirable? Foucault has proposed the existence of a whole array of forms of resistance, which occasionally present themselves as radical ruptures but more often take less drastic guises. There may be “resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial” (Foucault 1998: 96). Neither imperial nor subordinate societies are monolithic wholes, acting in perfect unison. Therefore, each imperial relationship will be characterized by more than one form of resistance. The spectrum ranges from unconscious everyday behaviors that ultimately amount to defiance, to conscious but covert acts of insubordination and open rebellion. Based on research among sedentary Malaysian peasant groups, Scott (1990: 17) has argued that, for reasons of security and self-preservation, subordinates in the vast majority of systems of domination resort to covert resistance such as poaching, pilfering, or tax evasion, whose goal is not normally the transformation or overthrow of the social system, though this may be the ultimate result. Actors, particularly those in the past, were perhaps conscious of their circumstances in life but might have known no alternatives with which existing social orders might be replaced. The main

practical reasons for resistance are the desire and necessity to reduce excessive extraction of labor or taxation as well as humiliation. In this model, overt resistance is interlinked with covert forms of antagonistic behavior and is often a development from it, as the constant testing of power-relations may escalate due to particularly severe oppression and the increasing desperation of the population. Scott (1990: 79, 192, 216–17) also proposes a causal connection between the severity of oppression and the likelihood of overt resistance, which is seen as the last resort in circumstances devoid of all other possibilities of dissent. Outright rebellion, from this perspective, is usually the result of a gross overestimation by the subordinates of their power and has historically proven to be, more often than not and in the last instance, an unsuccessful form of resistance.

While the ultimate success of any form of resistance, certainly from the comfortable perspective of the academic observer, may well be the overthrow of the oppressive system or the maintenance of a position beyond its effective control, notions of success or failure ought to be assessed within the historical circumstances of particular relationships of domination and in consideration of the overall situation of the subordinate group. These include the social context of imperial–local interaction; the strategies employed and the overall balances of power in terms of the political, economic, and military capabilities as well as the social coherence of each party through time; the apparent pervasiveness of ideological co-optation; and the interests and benefits for each party to engage or disengage in imperial relations.

Historical circumstances and coincidences represent potentially crucial variables in the developmental trajectories of these complex but inherently fragile sociopolitical entities. Most empires share a common life-cycle of imperial formation through conquest and “diplomatic” expansion via integration, cyclical gain and loss of territory, and final collapse (see Doyle 1986; Sinopoli 1994; Alcock et al. 2001). During these phases, balances of power may shift between imperial center and local power-bases, providing possibilities for successful rebellion at one time and making negotiation and occasional subversion more profitable at others. While open rebellions may be dealt with with relative ease during times of imperial stability, in times of general crisis, small-scale disobedience such as a delay of tribute payments may develop into or contribute to potentially fatal economic difficulties.

The following analysis, thus, takes an inclusive approach to the notion of resistance, recognizing that a variety of antagonistic behaviors will have characterized and constituted Hittite imperial relationships in different regional, social and political contexts as well as through time.

THE HITTITE EMPIRE: A SHORT HISTORY

The Hittite empire consisted of a series of directly controlled provinces, protectorates, and vassal kingdoms draped around the cultural and political core region of the Land of Hatti and its capital city, Boğazköy-Hattusa, on the north-central Anatolian plateau (see Figure 1.2). At the height of imperial expansion, during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE, Hittite control appears to have stretched from what is today's Turkish Aegean coast in the west to the Euphrates in the east, and to the north Syrian coast and parts of Cyprus in the south. Only to the north did effective control not extend much further than perhaps one hundred kilometers beyond the capital city.

Hittite state formation around 1650 BCE was rapidly followed by a first wave of wide-ranging but short-lived expansionism. The campaigns of Hattusili I and his son, Mursili I, during the early part of the Old Hittite Kingdom led the Hittite army into northern Syria on what, at least from the textual sources, appears to have been primarily an adventurous quest for glory and booty (Gurney 1979). Both certainly were gained from the sack of Babylon by Mursili I in 1595 BCE (or 1531 BCE, depending on chronology). These early conquests, however, were left unconsolidated and the murder of Mursili I upon his return to Hattusa initiated a long internal power struggle that lasted for over a century. The consequence of this internal weakness was the severe contraction of Hittite-controlled territory. It is most probably during this phase of the Middle Hittite Kingdom that the Hittites first encountered the Kaska tribes in northern Anatolia, even though nostalgic retrospection places their first appearance much further into the past (Klinger 2002: 446–47; von Schuler 1965: 22–29).

The legendary invasion of the Land of Hatti by rival forces from all cardinal points during the reign of Tudhaliya II/III marks a decisive low point in Hittite historical memory. However, already during the reign of this same king and under the military leadership of his successor, Suppiluliuma I, Hatti's Anatolian territories were gradually reclaimed. The ascent to the throne of Suppiluliuma I is conventionally viewed as the onset of the Hittite imperial phase proper (Gurney 1979). For the first time, organized attempts were made to consolidate military conquests at some distance to the Hittite heartland and their offshoots in the form of “voluntary” submissions. These include the installation of viceregal seats in Aleppo and Karchemish, dynastic marriages, and the conclusions of numerous vassal treaties (Bryce 1998: 175–205). One such treaty (CTH¹ 46, RS 17.340, RS 17.369A: Nougayrol 1956: 48–52; Beckman 1999: 34–36) was concluded between Suppiluliuma I and Niqmaddu II of Ugarit. Suppiluliuma had attempted to woo this small but

Figure 1.2. Synchronisms and events during the second half of the Late Bronze Age

B.C.	Hatti	Ugarit	Egypt	Events
1400	Arnuwanda I	Ammistamru I	Tuthmosis IV	Ugarit – Hatti vassal treaty
1390				
1380				
1370	Tudhaliya II/III		Amenophis III	
1360				
1350	Suppiluliuma I	Niqmaddu II	Akhenaten	
1340			Tutankhamun	
1330			Aye	
1320				
	Arnuwanda II			
1310	Mursili II	Ar-Halba	Horemhab	
1300		Niqmepa		
1290			Ramses I	
	Seti I			
1280				
	Muwatalli II			
1270	Uhri-Tesub (Mursili III)			
1260	Hattusili III	Ammistamru II	Ramses II	
1250				
1240				
1230	Tudhaliya IV	Ibiranu		
1220		Niqmaddu III (?)		
1210	Arnuwanda III	Ammurapi	Merenptah	
			Seti II	
1200	Suppiluliuma II		Siptah	
			Tewosret	
1190			Setnakht	
1180				
1170			Ramses III	

wealthy kingdom early during his first Syrian campaign (CTH 45, RS 17.132: Nougayrol 1956: 35–40; Beckman 1999: 125–26) but the previous Ugaritic king, Ammistamru, had affirmed his allegiance to Egypt in an Amarna letter (EA 45: Moran 1992: 117–18) and his successor only submitted to Hittite rule after Ugarit required its protection around 1335 BCE.

Suppiluliuma's expansion into northern Syria and the eventual destruction of the rival power of Mitanni underscored Hatti's position as a peer in the "club of great powers," then consisting of Egypt, Babylon, and an emerging Assyria (Liverani 2001; Bryce 2003). His successor, Mursili II, further consolidated the Hittite power base in Anatolia with the defeat and subsequent division of Hatti's main Anatolian rival, Arzawa. Later Hittite kings appear to have been primarily preoccupied with the defense and consolidation of what Suppiluliuma I and Mursili II had established. This effort involved the famous military clash with Egypt at the battle of Qadesh and an increasing number of skirmishes with a growing Assyria toward the close of the Late Bronze Age. A number of Anatolian and internal dynastic struggles, as well as natural disasters, further weakened Hittite grip on its subordinate territories in this final phase (Bryce 1998; Klengel 1999). The reasons behind the precise sequence of events and processes leading up to the final collapse of the Hittite empire and other important polities around the eastern Mediterranean in the early twelfth century BCE are still the subject of intense debate (see, for instance Gorny 1989; Zaccagnini 1990; Drews 1993; Seeher 2001; Matthews 2002; Bachhuber and Roberts 2009). Even though these questions do not form the main focus of this chapter, the nature of Hatti's relationships with subordinated and neighboring societies and the varying degrees of antagonism these involved, certainly played their parts in its ultimate demise.

BETWEEN DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE: THE VASSAL KINGDOM OF UGARIT

Access to and control over northern Syria were of vital importance and seemingly one of the motivations behind the expansion of the Hittite empire, whose core region on the central Anatolian plateau was a long way away from the nodes of Late Bronze Age international commerce that guaranteed the supply of metals and luxuries. Strong support for this proposition comes from an observation by Korošek (1960: 72; see also Bryce 1998: 51) that only Syrian vassal treaties, in contrast to those of western Anatolia, contained clauses for the payment of tribute. The most important of the Hittite vassal states along the northern Levantine littoral was the kingdom of Ugarit. Though incorporated into the Hittite empire under comparatively favorable conditions, an

exceptionally high tribute burden was imposed on Ugarit by Suppiluliuma I. The payments included annual deliveries of a principle tribute of altogether ca. 560 shekels (ca. 6.2 kg)² of gold in addition to gold bowls, large numbers of garments, and purple-dyed wool for the royal court. In comparison, Ugarit's neighbor Amurru had to pay 300 shekels (ca. 3.6 kg) (Bryce 1998: 51; Nougayrol 1956: 40–44; Beckman 1999: 166–68).

In addition to having favorable maritime connections with Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean, Ugarit was situated along the coastal highway linking Egypt with Anatolia and was able to access interior overland routes to the Euphrates and beyond. Throughout the Late Bronze Age, it also lay at the intersection of the limits of power of several imperial polities. This combination of factors allowed Ugarit to function as the preeminent commercial intermediary regionally and to negotiate its position within and between these empires in the most advantageous way (Lattimore 1979: 38–39; Kohl 1987: 16; Galtung 1980: 474). Only in military terms does Ugarit appear to have been passive and helpless. Military incapacity due to its small geographical dimensions (ca. 2,000 sq km; Yon 1997: 19) was seemingly the reason why the kingdom required the protection of a larger power in the context of Syria's petty kings' struggles for local supremacy.

Ugaritic elites were perhaps left with little choice as to their allegiance to the Hittite throne; but they also benefited from their incorporation into the Hittite empire. In return for their eventual pro-Hittite stance, Ugarit was awarded an increase in territory and Hittite overlordship ensured reasonably peaceful conditions for the undisrupted conduct of trade and exchange (Bryce 1998: 179). The advantage on the Hittite side naturally lay in rich tribute payments and the potential for engagement in commercial ventures through Anatolian merchants from coastal cities such as Ura in Cilicia (Klengel 1979: 78). Apparent harmony of interest of this kind, whatever the "real" benefits and disadvantages, is a defining feature of imperialism according to Galtung's structural theory, whereby dominance bases itself on a "bridgehead which the center of the Center nation establishes in the center of the Periphery nation, for the joint benefit of both" (Galtung 1980: 437–38). The types of resistance or negotiation adopted by Ugarit, however, also resemble those of a polity that is located at the center of a political system with multiple cores, and the multifaceted opportunities such a situation affords (Kohl 1987: 16, 20–21). Yet, strategies of this kind are not expected to effect fundamental changes in dominance relations, but may nonetheless lead to the modification of the structures of interaction (Galtung 1980: 474). The definition of some aspects of Ugarit's behavior as resistance to Hittite imperial rule is thus a matter of

degree, as the observable patterns rank at the lower, less overtly aggressive, end of the spectrum. As will be illustrated here, evasion, insubordination, and negotiation existed throughout Ugarit's relationship with the Hittite empire, and to ignore both textual and material culture evidence for it would be to dismiss an important aspect of vassal-overlord relationships, namely that of the self-perception and ideological representation of the subordinate partner.³

Textual Sources

The prohibition of independent foreign relations for Hittite vassal rulers detailed in most vassal treaties (Beckman 1999: 3) is a characteristic trait of imperial strategies of integration: to limit horizontal contact and funnel communication toward the political center in the spirit of *divide et impera* (Galtung 1980: 451; Sinopoli 2001: 198). Well aware of Ugarit's connections to other great powers, the Hittite great king Mursili II sought to curb such activities in his vassal treaty with Niqmepa of Ugarit:

... if [you Niqmepa, . . . , do not seek the prosperity afforded by Hatti] and the protection of Mursili, Great King, [King of Hatti, but rather seek the prosperity afforded by] another land—by Hanigalbat, [or by Egypt]—if [you seek] the protection of [another] Great King, [you will transgress the oath]. (CTH 66: Beckman 1999: 67–68)

As a commercial center, however, Ugarit by definition flourished through its international connections. Evidence for high-level external contact is typically found in the early stages of Hittite rule as well as in the final decades of gradually declining Hittite power. Prior to the incorporation of Ugarit into the Hittite empire, Ugarit's king, Ammistamru, wrote to Amenophis III of Egypt as what appears as a subordinate ally in EA 45 (Moran 1992: 117–18). In EA 48 (Moran 1992: 120), a queen of Ugarit sent a gift to her Egyptian counterpart, in what was surely an attempt to reaffirm the good relations between Egypt and Ugarit. EA 49 (Moran 1992: 120–21) is the request of Niqmaddu of Ugarit to probably Amenophis IV for a physician and two attendants from Kush (Klengel 1969: 344; Lackenbacher 1995: 78).

That Ugarit's loyalty to Hatti was not entirely consolidated, in particular during the early stages of their relationship, is also implied by several measures taken by the Hittite court in response to an uprising of Syrian principalities early during the reign of Mursili II (Klengel 1992: 134). Ugarit, though not actively rebellious, appears to have stayed passive and unresponsive to Hittite orders to engage in a military offensive (RS 17.334; Nougayrol 1956: 54–55; Beckman 1999: 126–27). Likely consequences included the deposing of Niqmaddu's successor, Arhalba; the installation of the latter's brother,

Niqmepa, on the throne; and a reduction of Ugarit's territory by about one-third (RS 17.380 and RS 17.382; Nougayrol 1956: 80–83; Beckman 1999: 173–75). In addition, a new and more severe vassal treaty was imposed (RS 17.338 *et duplicata*; Nougayrol 1956: 85–101; Beckman 1999: 64–69).

Relations between Ammistamru II and his overlords at Hattusa and Karchemish appear to have been comparatively free of conflict (Klengel 1992: 144); at least, this is what the preserved documents seem to imply. The relevant international correspondence concerns mainly internal Syrian matters such as dynastic marriages and divorces, and the old question of the size of Ugarit's territory.

King Ibiranu of Ugarit was the recipient of an Assyrian letter (RS 34.165; Lackenbacher 1991: 90–100), possibly sent *en masse* to Hittite subject kings, informing him of an Assyrian victory over Tudhaliya IV at Nihiriya in Upper Mesopotamia (Klengel 1999: 281). It is quite possible that the letter alludes to a potential alliance with Assyria (Lackenbacher 1991: 100). The last king of Ugarit, Ammurapi, again stood in more or less regular contact with Egypt. RS 88.2158, for instance, represents a reply letter by the chancellery of Pharaoh Merenptah (Lackenbacher 1995: 78–83; idem 2001) concerning a request from Ugarit for an artisan to make a stone sculpture of the pharaoh. The image was to be placed in the temple of Baal opposite the statue of the god, which may have been donated by Egypt in the first place (Lackenbacher 2001: n. 13). Although the pharaoh's sculptors were apparently busy finishing works to the glory of his majesty at home, Merenptah, in a clear gesture of diplomatic good will, sent a number of gifts including cloth and precious raw materials to Ugarit. The fragmented RS 86.2230 (Arnaud 2001: 278–79) preserves the opening passage of a letter from Beya, chief of the pharaonic bodyguards, to Ammurapi of Ugarit. Since 1994, a number of other Egyptian letters, whose details are still largely unpublished, have come to light at Ugarit, which will further illuminate the nature of Ugaritic–Egyptian relations (Lackenbacher 2001: n. 15; idem 2004: 104). Several more letters also detail the relations of Ugarit with Egyptian vassal states such as Sidon and Tyre at the close of the Late Bronze Age (Arnaud 2001).

In addition to breaches of vassal duties, a number of documentary sources appear to indicate that whenever geopolitical circumstances allowed, Ugarit reverted to strategies of political negotiation very similar to those attested in the Amarna correspondence of the fourteenth century BCE (Liverani 1983, 2001; Cohen and Westbrook 2000). Ugarit's correspondence with its Hittite overlord differed from the Amarna letters in that the latter regularly responded and was involved in local commercial, judicial, and dynastic

matters. Nonetheless, Ugarit deployed similar tactics of negotiation, disobedience, and delay to those of Egyptian vassals and international diplomacy more generally. Chronologically, these are documented from the very beginning of Ugarit's relationship with Hatti but are most evident in the last decades of the Late Bronze Age, when Ugarit's kings were "subjects little attentive to a weakening empire" (translation of Lackenbacher 2001: 247). One might even conclude that the last king of Ugarit, Ammurapi, "did not consider himself as a vassal of the Hittite king, but as an ally capable of saying 'no'" (translation of Lebrun 1995: 85; see also Astour 1981: 22–23). In this way, Ugarit's passivity and inaction in military matters and the delay of vital supplies may well have contributed in a significant manner to the events and processes that ultimately resulted in the collapse of the Hittite polity.

An early instance of military inaction, during the Syrian rebellion, has already been mentioned and it is perhaps in this context that Tudhaliya IV may have adapted to Ugarit's general disinclination toward military action and granted Ammistamru II a reprieve from military duties for a campaign against Assyria in exchange for an enormous amount of gold (50 minas, ca. 24 kg!) (RS 17.59; Nougayrol 1956: 150–51). In another instance, the son and successor of Ammistamru II, Ibiranu, was urged by the king of Karchemish to send forth his soldiers and chariots—in a matter of life and death—and was told that he should not wait for the Hittite envoy to ascertain the number of troops and chariots placed under Ugarit's command by the central palace (RS 17.289; Nougayrol 1956: 192). In RS 20.237, Karchemish also urges Ugarit to comply with Hittite demands, as Ibiranu appears to have tried to delay the fulfillment of his overlord's request in a previous correspondence with the question as to *how many* chariots His Majesty would desire exactly:

Thus (speaks) the king [:] to the king of Ugarit he says: Greetings! Concerning the chariots which you have asked me about: "How may [chariot]s?" the Sun (simply) sai[d ?:] "Send [them]!" . . . will you [de]liver [what you had pr]omised? Before the [Su]n come! (translated from the French edition of Nougayrol 1968: 102–3)

King Ibiranu is also being reprimanded by a Hittite high official for having failed to comply with other aspects of his vassal duties, in this case, the prescribed annual visit to the imperial capital, gifts to the king and his officials, and the regular exchange of messengers:

Why have you not come before His Majesty since you have assumed the kingship of the land of Ugarit? And why have you not sent your messengers? Now His Majesty is very angry about this matter. Now send your messengers quickly

before His Majesty, and send the king's presents together with my presents. (CTH 110/RS 17.247; Beckman 1999: 127; Nougayrol 1956: 191)

Altogether, the arbitrary behavior of Ibiranu seems to have irritated the Hittite administration enough to send a prince from Karchemish to reside at Ugarit. His arrival is previewed in RS 17.423 (Nougayrol 1956: 193) and Ibiranu is urged to treat him according to his rank.

The last king of Ugarit, Ammurapi, grew even bolder and perhaps also desperate as Hittite power decreased and news began to spread across the eastern Mediterranean of hostile peoples, who lived on boats (RS 34.129; Malbran-Labat 1991: 38–39). At a time of apparent famine in Anatolia, a Hittite court official urges the king of Ugarit to load 2,000 measures of grain from Mukis on one large boat and to send it to the port city of Ura in Cilicia. He also repeatedly points out Ugarit's liberation from some of its duties by the great king and reprimands the vassal state for not fully executing the demands of his overlord:

The King relieved you from “service”, but whe[n he] sealed and gave you (these) letters, was there not one among them: “That which will be asked of him, he will hear (it) and do (it)” Yet, that which is asked of you, why do you not do it? Following that which the King, y[our]]Master s[ays], comply fully! He relieved you, on your part, the King, your Master; that which he requests d[o (it)]. At present: the Uraeans l[ack everything ? and] the Sun they asked for supplies. The Sun assigned them 2,000 (measures of) grain coming from Mukiš. You, on your part, provide them with (only ?) one big ship and crew and they shall take this grain to their country! It will take them one or two journeys, but, you, do not deprive them of a boat . . . (RS 20.212, lines 5–26; translated from the French edition of Nougayrol 1968: 105)

The very fragmented letter RS 20.141B has been suggested as a possible reply from Ammurapi (Nougayrol 1968: 107). The hypothesis would be that Ammurapi, without overtly refusing the command of the great king, appears to remind him of the impossibility of loading all the grain on even his biggest ship and that he would more likely need thirty. Another delay tactic of the same king is documented in RS 20.255A (Nougayrol 1968: 100–2; Lebrun 1995: 86), in which a Hittite court official urges the Ugaritic king to supply the goods that had been demanded of him previously.

In what appears to be the most outright gesture of resistance and disrespect, Ammurapi seems to have dislodged his Hittite wife, a daughter of the great king, prior to the settlement of his divorce (RS 17.226, RS 17.355, and RS 20.216; Nougayrol 1956: 208–20; idem 1968: 108–10; Beckman 1999: 180–84). This is not a gesture one would expect from a vassal to his overlord.

Another anecdote, although unfortunately undated, further illustrates the tactics of evasion of the Ugaritic court vis-à-vis its overlord. In RS 17.383, Takuhli(nu), a servant of the king of Ugarit, possibly Ammistamru II (Klengel 1992: 144), urges his master to resolve rapidly the affair of the promised but undelivered lapis lazuli to Hattusa, as the Hittite great king was becoming increasingly displeased (lines 13–20; 28–29):

The heart of the King is severely upset and it is against me that the King turned (in these terms): “Does this man not mock me? He picked up from the ground a kamma stone and he made me wear it (with these words:) Here that I made you wear lapis-lazuli.” . . . But now, find lapis-lazuli no matter where and have it be brought to the King. (translated from the French edition of Nougayrol 1956: 221–23)

The second letter (RS 17.422), apparently sent from Hattusa to Ugarit by Takuhli(nu), urges the Ugaritic king even more intensely to bring the requested lapis to the increasingly annoyed Hittite great king. Again, the Ugaritic king had attempted to delay the delivery with the excuse that he had looked for lapis lazuli but had been unable to find any (line 16):

On the subject of the lapis-lazuli about which you wrote to the King: “I searched for lapis-lazuli and I could not find any.” The heart of the king with regard to my Master is very badly disposed. (translated from the French edition of Nougayrol 1956: 223–125)

Despite these examples of disobedience and delay, there can be little doubt about Ugarit’s political domination by the Hittite empire from ca. 1340 BCE until the end of the Late Bronze Age, which brought destruction and abandonment to the trading city and to its overlords. Each individual act of insubordination on the part of Ugarit was neither able to nor likely to have been truly intended to change its position in the pecking order of political power in the Late Bronze Age international system. In the majority of textual sources, whose details would exceed the scope of this chapter, Ugarit maintains the appearance of a mostly compliant and cooperating subordinate. Such public maintenance of the hegemonic ideology of domination by the subordinate party may be expected in the context of covert resistance, where the expression of dissent is mostly reserved for spaces removed from the direct access of the dominant group (Scott 1990; see also Miller 1995: 76). The occasional glimpses of insubordination in the high-level diplomatic correspondence of Ugarit may thus be hinting at a more deeply rooted diversion from the official imperial ideology of obedience and co-optation.

Archaeological evidence represents an obvious alternative and complementary path of investigation when most textual sources may be expected to present and reinforce the dominant or official versions of history (Miller 1995: 76). Local cultural identities and ideologies find expression in and undergo renegotiation as a result of the production of material culture (see, for instance, Ross 2005). An investigation of Ugarit's Late Bronze Age cultural traditions, thus, should allow us to gain insights into how at least Ugarit's elite perceived of and chose to portray itself and its relationship with its imperial overlord.

Archaeological Evidence

Indirect imperial rule, which leaves the local political structure and leadership largely intact, may be expected to leave comparatively few archaeological traces, and indeed, with the exception of the clay tablets cited above containing letters and treaties, material culture evidence for Hittite imperial overlordship is conspicuously rare at Ugarit in terms of both imported artefacts and broader cultural connections.

Among the few possible finds of Anatolian origin at Ugarit are a golden hieroglyphic seal-ring of a free Anatolian woman found on the south acropolis (RS 24.145; Galliano and Calvet 2004: no. 76); a hieroglyphic biconvex seal from the harbor area (RS 2.[035]; Galliano and Calvet 2004: no. 77), as well as a much-debated chlorite seal of great king Mursili II from the royal palace (RS 14.202; Galliano and Calvet 2004: no. 74). Mistakes in the cuneiform, and particularly the hieroglyphic texts, have led to serious doubts about the authenticity of the seal and the possibility of a Hittite chancellery at Ugarit (Neu 1995: 124–25), which had been suggested by Schaeffer (1956: 87–93). If the seal is indeed an ancient counterfeit, one cannot but wonder what sort of documents the Ugaritic king might have used his overlord's seal for.

In addition to large numbers of imported Aegean and Cypriot pottery, and in stark contrast to the scarcity of Anatolian materials, Egyptian objects—including imports, local products and amalgamations of Syrian and Egyptian subject matter and styles—are a prominent feature of the archaeological record of fourteenth- and thirteenth-century BCE Ugarit. From these we can infer a level of direct participation in political relations between the Ugaritic elite and Egypt and a preference on the part of the former for Egyptianizing iconography and the ideological currency conferred by Egyptian symbolism. The finds from Ugarit also point to a socially widespread, long-term engagement and familiarity with Egyptian culture.

Egyptian imports suggestive of direct political contact include several statues with royal cartouches of Middle Kingdom date, which may have

reached Syria during the Hyksos period (Helck 1995: 89). Objects with royal Egyptian inscriptions from the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE include stone vessels from Tuthmosis III, Amenophis IV, Horemhab, and Ramses II, and a wedding scarab from Amenophis III. A stone vessel showing king Niqmaddu of Ugarit and his queen in Egyptian dress and iconographic tradition, with accompanying Egyptian hieroglyphic inscription, as well a stele dedicated to Mami, a high official of Merenptah, and a sword with Merenptah's cartouche were also found at Ugarit (Sparks 2003: 53–56; Helck 1995).

The inscribed stone vases in particular command attention, as Egyptian stone vessels were objects of high value around the eastern Mediterranean and specimens with royal Egyptian inscriptions are exceedingly rare (Sparks 2003: 40). Through their royal cartouches, as Sparks has argued, these vessels stand in direct association with the Egyptian administration. Their concentration on the Levantine littoral—in particular in the elite contexts of Ugarit and, to a lesser degree, of Byblos during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE—may be related, among other possible distributive mechanisms, to deliberate diplomatic gestures on the part of the Egyptian court. Conversely, uninscribed Egyptian vases are found in a range of other social contexts at Ugarit (Sparks 2003: 50–51). The chronological distribution of these objects appears to match the pattern outlined by the textual sources of more intensive Egyptian–Ugaritic relations during the Amarna period and coinciding with the *pax Hethitica* following the battle of Qadesh. However, to dismiss as insignificant (Helck 1995: 92) evidence for interaction between Egypt and Ugarit during a phase of strong Hittite control, such as the vessel inscribed by Horemhab, is to ascribe undue supremacy to the textual sources. It also mutes archaeological evidence where it is most instructive: in uncovering “unofficial” sociopolitical and/or cultural negotiations.

A logical extension of the above inquiries is an investigation of local Ugaritic material culture and the various sources for its stylistic and cultural inspirations. During the fourteenth and thirteenth century BCE, south Levantine elites under Egyptian hegemony preferentially used hybrid Egyptian–Levantine material culture in local discourses of prestige and power (Higginbotham 1996; 2000). By contrast, areas under direct Egyptian military and administrative control saw the wholesale introduction of Egyptian cultural assemblages in contexts directly associated with Egyptian rule.

We would therefore expect to find north-central Anatolian cultural influences in the form of locally produced Anatolian objects or the selective incorporation of Anatolian cultural traits into hybrid styles that might be associated with Hittite political influence, to concentrate—if at all—in palatial

and other elite contexts at Ugarit. An investigation of architecture and material culture from such contexts should allow us to reconstruct the Ugaritic elite's stylistic preferences and its cultural and ideological sources of power during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE.

Even at a superficial level of investigation, the vast majority of Ugaritic elite objects immediately betray their strong affiliation with Egyptian stylistic traditions, albeit in the depiction of local Syrian subject matters and with a series of interwoven local as well as Aegean and Mesopotamian influences. Due to the space constraints of this chapter, the following discussion will focus on a few selected aspects of Ugaritic material culture.

Two ivory plaques (RS 16.056 and RS 28.031; Schaeffer 1954: 52–59; Yon 1997: 146) (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4) from what was very likely an Egyptian-style bed (see, for example, Barnett 1982: 29) were found in the royal palace at Ugarit. These are among the iconographically most diverse and multifaceted objects from Late Bronze Age Ugarit (for a summary of Ugaritic iconography, see Cornelius 1999). The representations on each of the two panels consist of eight individual scenes that revolve around subject matters connected to the life of a high-status personality, probably the king. Framed by two sacred trees and a long panel depicting a hunting scene, the king's official roles are portrayed in RS 16.056, while RS 28.031 seems to be concerned with his private or family life. A strong Egyptian influence is remarkable in elements such as posture and hairstyle, yet the majority of depictions portray Syrian subject matters (see, for example, Ward 1969; Barnett 1982), with occasional incorporations of Mesopotamian, Aegean, and Anatolian attributes (Feldman 2002a). Barnett (1982: 29) identifies the representation of a bowman and a stag as a Hittite motif. Another Anatolian element may be found in the winged female Figure on panel RS 28.031: above her Egyptian hairstyle and Mesopotamian/Levantine divine horns, she carries what has been identified as an Anatolian rosette or sun-disc (Ward 1969: 225). This sign is found, for instance, on Anatolian glyptic and monumental iconography (see, for example, Börker-Klähn 1994: 138–45) as well as stamped on pottery in the form of the so-called *signe royal* (Seidl 1972: 65–70). The symbol, however, is chronologically not confined to the Hittite imperial phase in Anatolia and thus may have made it into the Ugaritic iconographic repertoire prior to the establishment of Hittite control.

The stone stelae found in religious contexts throughout Ugarit's acropolis equally combine influences from around the eastern Mediterranean with local religious motifs. The finds-contexts of many stelae are difficult to reconstruct and different date-ranges have been proposed for them. The overriding




Figure 1.3. Ivory plaque (RS 16.056) (after Yon 1997, 146)




Figure 1.4. Ivory plaque (RS 28.031) (after Yon 1997, 146)

stylistic influence, however, is again Egyptian. The subject of the so-called Stele of “Anat” (RS 2.[038]), which may be a human rather than divine representation (Börker-Klähn 1982: 240), is portrayed in Egyptian dress, posture, and attributes (Yon 1991: fig. 6, no. 3) (see Figure 1.5). The proposed dates vary widely but Yon (1991: 299) suggested placing the stele in the tradition of the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE based on iconographic comparisons with Egypt. Similarly difficult to date is the representation of the *Baal au Foudre* on stele RS 4.427 (Yon 1991: fig. 6, no. 5) (see Figure 1.6), which has stylistic elements of the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE but could also be of earlier date (Yon 1991: 299). It too has strong Egyptian iconographic links, such as the posture of the victorious, smiting pharaoh (Liebowitz 1978:

29), while the headdress and horns are local Mesopotamian/Syrian (Frankfort 1996: 256), recalling the typical appearance of Resheph (Yon 1991: 297). The dagger on the god's waist has been likened to that of a Hittite deity at the Kings Gate at Boğazköy-Hattusa (Schaeffer, 1949: 124–25; Yon 1991: 296; Frankfort 1996: 256), but depending on the date of the stele, it may in fact pre-date the Anatolian example (Böker-Klähn 1982: 238–39).

Smaller-scale divine depictions in the round dating to the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE such as the seated El (RS 23.393: Yon 1997: 142–43, no. 14) and a bronze counterpart of the *Baal au Foudre* (RS. 23.294; Yon 1997: 142–43, no. 15) also show strong Egyptianizing influences (Yon et al. 1990: 4–5; Seeden 1980: 102–3). Several fragments of an alabaster vase (RS 15.239; Yon 1997: 168–69, no. 49) depicting King Niqmadu of Ugarit, who is identified by an Egyptian hieroglyphic inscription, and a woman in Egyptian dress and iconographic tradition, bear additional witness to Ugarit's desire to appropriate Egyptian symbolism and to align itself with Egyptian power.




Figure 1.5. Stele of “Anat” (RS 2.[038]) (after Yon 1991, fig. 6, no. 3)



Figure 1.6. “Baal au Foudre” (RS 4.427) (after Yon 1991, fig. 6, no. 5)

Feldman (2002b; 2006) has suggested a conscious ambiguity in the representation of the lady as what appears to be a high-status Egyptian bride, and the desired prestige this might have conferred onto the Ugaritic king among the right audience.

From an architectural point of view, few Anatolian influences may be identified in the monumental structures at Ugarit. They are essentially limited to the design of underground passages or posterns, which are a defining feature of central Anatolian defensive architecture. While Ugarit's fortification wall is pierced by just such an underground passage and its construction postdates those on the Anatolian plateau, it seemingly pre-dates Hittite political domination in the Levant (Naumann 1955: 122–25; Bittel 1976: 16, 59; Schaeffer 1939) (see Figures 1.7 and 1.8). Margueron (2004: 145) has recently attributed the Late Bronze Age modifications and transformations of the royal palace at Ugarit to the dominant role of the Hittite . However, he does not elaborate on these propositions in any reconstructable detail. In contrast, Naumann (1955: 354) views the evolution of palatial architecture in northern Syria as a process independent from that of Anatolia.

Ugaritic glyptic too largely preserves its independent local character, while other Syrian subjects of the Hittite empire such as Amurru, Emar, Karchemish, and Alalah develop a hybrid Syro-Anatolian glyptic style that involves the utilization of Luwian hieroglyphs (Neu 1995: 125; Beyer 2001).



Figure 1.7. Postern at Ugarit



Figure 1.8. Postern at Boğazköy-Hattusa

From this brief and selective overview, the virtual absence of clear Hittite imperial influences on the material culture of Ugarit corroborates Carla Sinopoli's (1994: 169) observation that the absence of standard "imperial indicators does not demonstrate that specific areas were outside an empire." However, the evident contrast between the strong Egyptian influence and the overall absence of Anatolian elements cannot only be explained by an apparent disinterest on the part of the imperial overlord to strive for cultural uniformity. The choice of incorporating cultural elements of a rival Late Bronze Age power over that of one's own political overlord is here suggested to represent an active process of cultural negotiation, as a deliberate, rather than accidental or subconscious, communication of cultural, ideological, and power-political messages.

Material culture and its polysemic nature permit the co-existence of a whole array of changeable meanings and interpretations for a given object (Miller 1995: 76; see also Feldman 2002a, 2006). While Ugaritic elite art and iconography may convey different messages to different viewers depending on their social status, cultural affiliation, and stylistic/iconographic literacy, there is little doubt that Ugarit clearly communicated its own political ambition, via the use of mostly Egyptian or Egyptianizing symbolism, to whomsoever cared to look. Complementary to Feldman's (2002a; 2006) interpretation of particularly the

ivory bed panels and the alabaster vase with Niqmadu's inscription, as part of an internal discourse to reinforce Ugaritic kingship through the use of symbols of power from strongly centralized foreign political entities, I would suggest that the choice of iconographic source and adaptation carries an additional international dimension and direction. Because of the long-standing cultural connections between Egypt and the Levant, it is important to consider whether the use of Egyptian stylistic elements and symbols of power had become part of the local canon of artistic expression in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE, and in this way perhaps remained unconscious or "politically neutral" in terms of the international political arena. The expertise with which Ugarit's artists transferred Egyptian royal symbolism into the Levantine ideological and environmental context, and the knowledge of contemporary Egyptian iconography and meaning this process required (Feldman 2002a: 16), seems to indicate a rather conscious decision *for* Egyptian and—by default—*against* other available and equally strong traditions of royal representation.

A recent redefinition of the otherwise cursory term "international style" (Feldman 2002a) may further help to underline this point. Feldman has identified a number of high-status objects at Ugarit, such as the famous golden bowl (RS 5.032; Yon 1997: 174, no. 56), whose iconography and stylistic canon cannot be linked to any particular cultural tradition in the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. These high-value portable objects, she argues, would have circulated as part of the international exchange of goods and correspondence between the elites of the great powers of the Late Bronze Age as a kind of material *lingua franca* that reinforced elite commonality across cultural boundaries. Thus, while Ugarit participated in the exchange of "international style," and in this way perhaps "politically correct," objects, its use of selective foreign symbolism with an especially strong reference to Egypt in many of its high-status luxuries seems to underline an element of deliberate choice. Whether the display of such Egyptianizing objects was in any way disturbing to Hittite officials and ultimately to the imperial overlord is, of course, questionable. Nonetheless, Ugarit's elite clearly and loudly projected its self-perception and aspirations within the international system through its material culture.

REJECTING EMPIRE: THE KASKA OF NORTHERN ANATOLIA

We now turn to another set of imperial relations that differs from the case of Ugarit in all possible respects. The zone of interaction between the Hittites and the Kaska peoples in northern Anatolia in many ways became the Hittite version of a "barbarian frontier" that commenced almost immediately beyond the northern gates of the capital city. This is at least the perspective provided

by the Hittite texts (Matthews 2000a; Glatz and Matthews 2005; Zimansky 2007). Unlike most imperial frontiers, which are established or encountered in the course of imperial expansion, this particular border appears to have been forced upon the Hittites and actively driven into formerly Hittite territory sometime during the Middle Hittite Period (fifteenth century BCE) by the Kaska (Klinger 2002 *contra* von Schuler 1965; Singer 2007). Important Hittite cult-centers and their temples are reported to have been destroyed and plundered in this process, and generations of successive Hittite kings fought for the return to Hittite control of these sacred towns. The overwhelming religious importance of the inner Black Sea region for the Hittite state cult is reflected in the relentless efforts to regain the lost territory and in the readiness of some Hittite rulers to strike deals with the Kaska in order to continue the appropriate worship of the gods of these towns (von Schuler 1965: 30).

In geographical terms, this contested region encompassed the mountainous zone of northern Anatolia stretching from around the Devrez Çay, and possibly further west, across the whole of the Turkish central Black Sea region and along the Yeşilirmak and Kelkit Çay in the east (von Schuler 1965: 61–62; Forlanini 1977; Yakar 1980, 1992; Yakar and Dinçol 1974; Matthews and Glatz 2009b).

Textual Sources

An unusual variety of textual classes from prayers (CTH 375) and oracles (CTH 137) to instructions for officials such as border guards (CTH 257, 260, and 261; Alp 1991), campaign reports (CTH 40, 61, and 81) and treaties (CTH 89 and 138–40), spanning several centuries, illustrate the great concern the Kaska problem caused the Hittite imperial leadership. From these texts, which represent the only Late Bronze Age documentary sources detailing this interaction, a series of strategies of imperial domination may be deduced (for complete summaries, see von Schuler 1965; Glatz and Matthews 2005). Most notable is the apparently static nature of the relationship. Throughout centuries of contact and antagonism, there appears to have been comparatively little development or transformation in the modes of interaction portrayed by the textual sources, which revolved essentially around the same patterns of attack and counterattack, interrupted by occasional, but ultimately futile, attempts at diplomacy and co-optation. The basic mode of engagement, at least from the point of view of the Hittite state, throughout the Late Bronze Age was military conflict and all other activities were structured around an ever-present undercurrent of violence.

Almost yearly campaigns were led by generations of Hittite great kings or their generals into Kaska territory, usually in retaliation for previous attacks on Hittite settlements and property. The recurring details of these encounters involve the often successful break-up of enemy forces and their escape into difficult mountain terrain, the destruction of frequently abandoned settlements, and the taking of prisoners and booty whenever Kaska did confront the Hittite army. Each king claims ultimate victory, yet the recurrence of these accounts betrays the tentative nature of any Hittite success. The vast majority of Hittite–Kaska interaction detailed in the official sources thus conforms most directly to the concept of overt resistance to domination in its most uncompromising form.

In order to consolidate territorial gains and to pacify contested regions, several Hittite kings reverted to the establishment of fortified settlements and garrison-outposts and their resettlement with Hittite and deportee populations (CTH 40, 61, and 89). A number of attempts at diplomatic regulation through treaties and oaths (CTH 81, 89, 138–40, and 375) were also drawn up by the Hittite administration in hopes of calming the situation in the north. The use of high-level diplomatic tools and “peaceful” modes of imperial domination, which are otherwise well adapted to drawing elites of local petty kingdoms into the realm of Hittite domination, in the Kaska context illustrate the basic inability of the Hittite leadership to devise strategies of defense, conquest, and incorporation for a people whose sociocultural organization lacked a central political force and was thus fundamentally different from that of the Hittite core-region and the vast majority of its other subordinates.

Beyond the sparse and often indirect references to Kaska culture, society, and mode of life in Hittite sources, little to nothing is known about them. From Hittite texts, a loose confederation of twelve tribes may be deduced. With the exception of a leader named Pihhuniya who, contrary to Kaska custom, “ruled in the manner of a king” during the time of Mursili II (Goetze 1933: 88–89; Bryce 1998: 215), the Kaska apparently did not tolerate individual rulership (von Schuler 1965: 70). The dispersed sociopolitical organization of the Kaska posed great problems for the Hittite army as the former engaged mainly in the typical hit-and-run tactics despised as barbarous in the royal ideology of the time (Liverani 2001: 108–15). The apparent rapidity and nonchalance with which the Kaska rebuilt their settlements after Hittite attacks and their ability to move whole towns or their inhabitants out of the way of the Hittite army (see, for example, von Schuler 1965: 75–76) may indicate a rather more mobile lifestyle than that assumed by the majority of Hittite-controlled populations.

However, as with all forms of human interaction, frontiers, when examined in greater detail, are not only demarcations of the limits of imperial ability to dominate. Unofficially, border zones are also areas of intensive cross-cultural and social interaction (Lightfoot and Martinez 1995). Hints of this kind of interaction can be found in Hittite documents seeking to regulate the conduct of interaction between befriended Kaska groups and Hittite individuals and communities. Kaska, even if they owed allegiance to the Hittite king, were not allowed into Hittite cities, and legal matters involving Kaska had to be resolved outside the city gates. Also mentioned are intermarriages between Hittites and Kaska (CTH 89; von Schuler 1965: 146–47). Beyond this apparently peaceful interaction on a local level, Kaska contingents are mentioned in Egyptian sources as Hittite allies in the battle of Qadesh (Liverani 2001: 81; Lichtheim 1976: 61); and Hattusili III appears particularly to have exploited the ambiguity between official Hittite perception and localized relations in his struggle for dynastic supremacy (von Schuler 1965: 56–60).

Archaeological Evidence

The Kaska have managed successfully to escape not only Hittite control but also the archaeologists' trowels and the relationship between these tribes and the Hittite empire can only be indirectly reconstructed from the archaeological record. In the absence of excavated Kaska settlements or identifiable material culture traits (for an attempt, see Glatz and Matthews 2005), archaeological investigations of Hittite–Kaska interaction face a unilateral bias similar to that of the textual accounts.

A hoard of metal objects from the Kastamonu region, which included bull rhyta and a bowl decorated with hunting scenes and a Luwian hieroglyphic inscription of the thirteenth century BCE (Emre and Çınaroğlu 1993; Gates 1997: 258; Gates 1996: 298–99; Bilgen 1999; Greaves and Helwing 2001: 498–99) may indeed have been looted from Hittite temples (Matthews 2000b: 1017) as described in the prayer of king Arnuwanda and queen Asmunikkal:

The temples which you, the gods, possessed in these countries, the Kaška sacked them. They smashed the images of you, the gods. They plundered silver and gold, rhyta and cups of silver and gold, and of copper, your implements of bronze and your garments. (CTH 375; Goetze in Pritchard 1955: 399–400)

Associated archaeological contexts would point toward a workshop area that included metal as well as ceramic manufacture (Bilgen 1999). A continuous occupation sequence from the later third to the first millennium BCE has been proposed for this site, however only late third-millennium and transitional early second-millennium BCE as well as Iron Age materials have

been commented on and illustrated in the preliminary reports (Çınaroğlu and Genç 2005). The lack of published later second-millennium BCE materials, unfortunately, inhibits the potential identification of Late Bronze Age material culture traits associated with Kaska and/or Hittite presence at the site.

A general problem of differentiation affects ceramic evidence on a wider scale as distinctive ethnic labels often do not fit well with the usage of particular material culture traits. “North-central Anatolian” pottery may denote the presence of Hittite populations in a political and/or cultural sense but does not exclude the possibility of Kaska populations also using and producing artefacts of north-central Anatolian-style (see Özşait 2003 for a theory of homogenization). However, at the current state of research a rather crude working hypothesis concerning the relation of pots and Hittites has to be made, albeit in corroboration with other strands of evidence.

Archaeological surveys and excavations attest to Middle Bronze Age settlements on or near the central Turkish Black Sea coast (see, for example, Işın 1998; Dönmez 2002) and to thriving contact with the central Anatolian cultural sphere (Müller-Karpe 2001). Sometime during, or shortly after, the sixteenth to fifteenth centuries BCE, however, recognizable permanent settlement appears to cease across the entire area (Dönmez 2002 *contra* Yakar and Dinçol 1974). Throughout the Late Bronze Age, Hittite textual sources also report the demographic depletion of this northern region. In attempts to stabilize the affected areas, several generations of great kings claim to have established fortified border towns and resettled deserted regions (von Schuler 1965).

Archaeological evidence of heightened Hittite settlement activity to the northwest of the Hittite core region comes from recent survey results. Project Paphlagonia (Matthews 2000a, b; Matthews et al. 1998; Matthews and Glatz 2009a) (see Figures 1.9 and 1.10) covered a sizeable and previously archaeologically largely unexplored region of northern Turkey, which formed part of the Hittite provinces of Pala and Tumanna (see, for example, Forlanini 1977; Matthews and Glatz 2009b). While the precise dating of north-central Anatolian-style pottery is problematic and currently under review even at the Hittite capital (see, for example, Schoop 2003, 2006), an apparent increase in Hittite activity in this area can be observed in the Late Bronze Age (Glatz et al. 2009). The majority of the twenty-one Late Bronze Age settlements in the region occupied sizeable multi-period mounds (see Figure 1.11). Many sites controlled strategic communication routes and had access to good agricultural land (Matthews 2000b: 1017), while the overall settlement pattern appears to indicate several lines of defense against a northern enemy.




Figure 1.9. Paphlagonia survey region



Figure 1.10. Project Paphlagonia survey: Late Bronze Age sites



Figure 1.11. View of Salman Höyük West

The almost complete absence of Late Bronze Age north-central Anatolian material culture beyond the line of sites in the Devrez River valley (except for the site of İnceboğaz) is echoed by the results of other surveys along the northern fringe of Anatolia. A general decline of settlements with recognizable Late Bronze Age material culture has been reported from the Kastamonu, Sinop, and Samsun regions and beyond the Kelkit and Yeşilirmak valleys (Marro et al. 1996, 1998; Kuzucuoğlu et al. 1997; Işın 1998; Yakar 1980, 2000; Yakar and Dinçol 1974; Dönmez 2002). Recent intensive survey along the north-west central Black Sea coast has yielded a single site with Late Bronze Age north-central Anatolian-style pottery (Glatz et al. 2011: 282-83). To the northeast, the retreat of settlements with recognizable Late Bronze Age material traits appears to have come to a halt in inner Samsun and Amasya provinces (Dönmez 2002). Settlement patterns and site-size distributions in these regions generally correspond to those found to the south of the main line of defense in Paphlagonia (Glatz 2007).

At present we are not in a position to pin down in material culture terms potential groups of people who may have forced the archaeologically visible retreat of Hittite settlement and the deliberate fortification of the area south of the Black Sea mountains. Mountainous terrain and the seemingly more mobile lifestyle of the Kaska tribes as well as the near absence of excavations

in these areas hampers the recognition of potential contemporary material traits to those we may associate with Hittite activities. Textual and archaeological evidence, however, allows a relatively convincing reconstruction of an enduring Kaska claim over an area that was integral geographically and, most importantly, ideologically of the Hittite core region, as well as the persistent resistance of the Kaska to any attempts to either exterminate or co-opt them into joining the Hittite realm. It is, therefore, highly likely that the Hittite inability to pacify northern Anatolia made the Kaska an important agent in the collapse of the empire at the end of the Late Bronze Age.

NEGOTIATION AND RESISTANCE TO THE HITTITE EMPIRE: SOME CONCLUSIONS

The local reactions to Hittite imperialism that I have just outlined are observed essentially through the macroscopic lens of the textual sources and only tentatively through the archaeological record. An archaeology of the Hittite empire, which accords primacy to archaeological research questions and aims to reconstruct a bottom-up perspective of the relationships of domination and their local effects, is very much in its infancy. With all attention turned to the military, political, and diplomatic aspects of empire recorded in the textual sources and the excavation of capitals and monumental edifices, few detailed archaeological studies have so far been conducted on the cultural, social, and economic impact of Hittite imperialism on its subject polities, their reactions, and the subsequent transformations of imperial relationships (Glatz 2009).

Nevertheless, important insights can be gained from this macro-scale of inquiry about the scope of local strategies of negotiation and resistance to imperial power. On the one hand, we observe the more or less subtle negotiation of Ugarit, attempting to escape its vassal duties through delay tactics and inaction. The self-confident behavior of Ugarit vis-à-vis the Hittite court may be reflected in the absence of material culture indicative of imperial presence or influence. The textually attested active aggression and subsequent resistance to Hittite attempts at military control or diplomatic pacification on the part of the Kaska tribes represent the other extreme of local reaction.

From these two examples of resistance and negotiation against and within the Hittite empire, it would appear that social and economic organization are crucial factors in determining the strategies available to those affected by early imperialism and the acceptability of the potentially violent consequences developing from them. Ugarit, as one vassal state of many in the empires of the Late Bronze Age Near East, was connected to the Hittite great king through a direct, personal alliance with its own king, the preservation of whose position

and that of his family depended on his ability to assert his power internally as well as on his overall compliance with the requirements of the imperial leadership. Ugarit's position as a trading city and, closely intertwined with its commercial success, the power of its king, depended heavily on the prevalence of peaceful conditions. In addition, military protection was at least theoretically afforded by the Hittite overlord, which was perhaps more than could be realistically expected of Egypt. Ugarit thus had an incentive for official obedience, albeit one defined by self-interest rather than ideological co-optation. Ugarit's self-perception and confident aspirations, hinted at in the textual records, becomes more pronounced in its elite's material culture, which makes a clear statement of affiliation with the Egyptian realm; it communicates an ideology rather different from that of a faithful vassal to Hittite overlordship.

No such elite interest appears to have hampered the near-total rejection of Hittite domination, up to and including repeated and contemptuous challenges to the imperial army, by the Kaska. The absence of ruling elites capable of internally controlling the disparate mountain tribes and an ever-shifting pattern of alliances among different groups as well as the strategic advantages of small-scale, acephalous societies such as high mobility, hindered the imposition of imperial control in all its forms and aspects. The Hittite army appears to have had a rather hard time even getting the Kaska to face them in combat, while the lack of leadership capable of internal domination voided any diplomatic overtures. The necessary coercion or its threat, undercurrent in most early imperial relationships, could not be imposed on a king or supreme chief as in the case of Ugarit. Although some Kaska groups could be pacified by means of military control and presumably incentives of a positive kind, others persistently opted out of such relations.

ABBREVIATIONS

CTH	<i>Catalogue des Textes Hittites</i> (Laroche 1971)
EA	El-Amarna tablet number
RS	Ras Shamra – Ugarit record number

NOTES

1. See Abbreviations.
2. Hittite weight ratios differed somewhat from their Mesopotamian and Levantine counterparts. One Hittite *mina* measured 40 rather than the more usual 60 shekels, while the weight of a Hittite shekel appears to have been ca. 12g (or 12.8g) (Van den Hout 1990: 525–27).
3. The following discussion does not represent a comprehensive summary of available historical and archaeological evidence relevant for this chapter. The presented data, furthermore, is not evenly distributed chronologically throughout the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE, thus, resulting in the overrepresentation of some phases over others.

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