David Blackbourn, Germany in the World: A Global History, 1500-2000 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2023), pp. 272-96.

Carefully read the David Blackbourn text for the context you will need to successfully analyze and interpret the primary sources.

Colonies

Governments, worried about losing productive citizens, had often tried to restrict emigration. But they also saw the value of exporting potential unrest. This "safety-valve" view commanded widespread support in the nineteenth century, going back to the disastrous year of postwar famine and rural distress in 1817, when the diplomat and politician Hans von Gagern wrote that mass emigration was "without doubt desirable and hugely beneficial to internal order."[75] Later commentators agreed that, in light of German "overpopulation" (the term was routinely used), emigration should be encouraged to head off the threat of pauperism and social unrest.

But there was another side to the question. Paul Pfizer was already worrying in the early 1830s in his book *The Correspondence* about Germans being assimilated by their host societies and losing their "Germanness." Many contemporaries wrote in similar vein. Friedrich List was one of the most influential. He knew the United States well because he had lived there in the 1820s before returning to Europe. He had also seen at first hand as a Württemberg official in the crisis year 1817 how government indifference and incompetence drove people to leave. He loathed the consequences. "How does it help the German nation," asked List, "no matter how happy the emigrants to North America become, if their persons are lost to German nationality for all time?"[76] The same question was posed by the Frankfurt parliamentarians in 1848.[77] The "loss" of *Volkskraft*, or national energy, exercised many German minds in the era of mass emigration after the mid-century. The fact that Prussia and other states ceased to recognize the continued citizenship of emigrants who had lived abroad uninterruptedly for ten years heightened the concern. It was in response to fears about "lost"

Germans that the 1870 citizenship law of the North German Confederation, which became German law the following year, modified the ten-year rule. Germans abroad could now retain their citizenship if they reported to consular officials every ten years—not a very high bar, although it did require emigrants to be thinking about returning home, or at least keeping their options open.[78]

What to call those who departed Germany—"emigrants" or "Germans abroad," *Auswanderer* or *Auslandsdeutche*? The second term began to replace the first after midcentury. It conveyed the consoling message that those who had left were not really "lost" to the homeland, but remained a part of the imagined nation, spreading the values of German culture, hard work, and discipline around the globe.[79] The invention of "Germans abroad" as a label was how nationalists reassured themselves, like the Italian elites who referred in the same way to Italians abroad—the *Italiani al estero*.[80] The idea that a global Germany existed beyond the confines of Bismarck's nation-state was an article of faith for radical nationalists. An organization was founded in 1881 to support the German diaspora. It lobbied the Foreign Office successfully to subsidize German schools overseas. The tens of thousands of marks that went to German schools in Buenos Aires were among the millions of marks that flowed around the world by 1914 to fund German teachers, books, maps, and gymnastic equipment.[81]

Maps and vaulting horses no doubt served to tend the flame of German identity, but nationalists wanted stronger responses to the "loss" of Germandom abroad. The one they favored was the establishment of German settler colonies. For much of the nineteenth century, German colonial advocates looked to the United States as the most suitable place for them. In 1817, Hans von Gagern sent his cousin on a fact-finding mission to explore the feasibility of a German colony in the American west, but concluded regretfully that such a colony would be politically impossible to establish.[82] That did not deter other enthusiasts. The *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* pushed for the establishment of German colonies in North America as a matter of urgency. "Germany could spill her heart's blood for centuries if she does not found a new Germany on another continent," wrote the paper in 1843.[83] As German emigration soared in the 1840s, so did the number of newspaper articles linking emigration with colonization. Well-known America experts like Friedrich List and Robert von Mohl were among those who weighed in.

The writers differed on where exactly these German colonies should

be. Sometimes they pointed to the American midwest, sometimes to the southwest, sometimes to the far west. The democratic nationalist Franz Löher, hedging his bets, proposed that the German Confederation purchase land for German settlement from either Canada or Mexico.[84] The liberal nationalists Hermann Blumenau and Ernst Ludwig Brauns both pointed to the west as the ideal place for German settlers. Brauns made the case forcefully, even belligerently. Instead of allowing German nationality to seep away in scattered settlements, he wrote, a consolidated colony should be established west of the Mississippi. Germany was not San Marino, and Germans should not be treated as an "appendage" of the Yankees, a "helot" people. The German population should not "allow itself to be disparaged like a Negro from the African coast."[85] Let Germans purchase land from Mexico or from the "bold Comanchees and Apaches," establish a New Germany in the west, and proudly fly the German flag.[86]

There had, in fact, been an attempt to create a German colony in the southwest just a few years earlier. It was undertaken by the Mainzer Adelsverein, popularly known as the Texas Association, a company formed in 1842 by Rhineland aristocrats to establish a German colony in Texas through organized mass emigration. It eventually settled just seven thousand Germans in Texas, more than half of whom died. The enterprise was a fiasco. The company had clearly failed in its main objective by 1845 and went bankrupt in 1853.[87] But it is impossible, anyway, to imagine that a New Germany of the kind Blumenau and Brauns envisioned could have established itself in Texas or California. This was the era of American "manifest destiny" (the phrase was coined by newspaper editor John O'Sullivan in 1845). The United States annexed Texas in 1845, and fought a war with Mexico the following year to retain it. In the same campaign, Commodore John Sloat sailed into Monterey Bay and the American government secured military control of California.[88] In those same years Americans harbored dark suspicions about British designs on Oregon. There is no chance whatsoever that U.S. leaders would have tolerated a sovereign colony that flew the flag of the German Confederation.

The revolutionary year 1848 nonetheless brought renewed enthusiasm for German colonies in the United States. Politicians in Frankfurt argued that the creation of a new German nation-state would be the springboard. Unified Germany would have the leverage that individuals or small states lacked, and Washington would welcome this because it would strengthen the "natural friendship between us."[89] The enthusiasm for establishing German colonies in North America was most pronounced on the left, although it existed across the political spectrum. The revolution energized politics and gave the issue new life. Twenty-two new organizations concerned with emigration and colonization in America were founded in 1848–49. Dozens of plans, petitions, and memoranda on the subject poured into Frankfurt.[90]

It remained illusory, however, to believe that the Germans already in the United States or later arrivals who went as a part of directed settlement plans could become the raw material of German colonies—that it would be possible, somehow, to convert the qualities associated with German settlers into a form of sovereignty. These dreams were being pursued at the very moment when the lands singled out by the dreamers were, one by one, joining the Union as states—Texas in 1845, Iowa in 1846, Wisconsin in 1848, California in 1850. The radical democrat Wilhelm Schulz urged Germans to "make haste," but in fact it was already too late. By the 1850s colonial fantasies had been quietly laid to rest. There was still discussion of German settlers in America, in popular journals and specialist publications, but these now emphasized the German contribution to American westward expansion, a flattering self-image of the role the "German race" supposedly played in the opening up of American continental space by white settlers.

Many German colonial enthusiasts shifted their sights after midcentury from North America to South and Central America, where allegedly "soft" Hispanic inhabitants were expected to exert less pressure to assimilate.[91] The case for South America was already being made in the 1840s and the plans kept coming. Baron Alexander von Bülow founded the Berlin Colonization Association, which settled a hundred German families in Nicaragua in 1853. Despite many examples of misbegotten settlements in the recent past, the "mosquito coast" continued to exert its allure.[92] Karl Gaillard, a writer and music critic (he was an early Wagner enthusiast), was one voice in the chorus. He foresaw Germans spreading out from Nicaragua to Guatemala, and beyond. "Spanish America—that is our Canaan," he suggested grandly.[93] Gaillard also proposed a German colony in Brazil, the darling of many colonial advocates as a place where Germandom could flourish.

By the 1870s, there were few places in the world that had not been identified at one time or another as the ideal site for a German colony. Friedrich List, tireless in coming up with places where Germans might settle, had eyed Australia, New Zealand, and the South Sea islands. The Lower Danube Valley, Bermuda, Abyssinia, Borneo—all had their advocates.[94] In

1847, a pamphlet on Prussia's future as a naval, colonial, and world power identified Africa as "the key to the world," and proposed that the continent receive 10 to 20 million Prussians who would Germanize "100 million Blacks." The three great German empires (in Africa, Europe, and America) would then allow "German blood" to rule the world with "humanity, virtue and justice."[95] Thirty-two years later, in his widely read book *Does Germany Need Colonies?*, Friedrich Fabri, a former missionary and colonial advocate, was more sober in tone but no less confident about the "tasks" facing the German race and no less global in his ambitions. He identified two main kinds of colony, for settlement and trade, while noting briefly a third kind—penal colonies to which a variety of political "subversives" could be packed off in the age of anarchist plots. Fabri offered no suggestions on where Germany might find its version of Russian Siberia or France's Devil's Island. His ideas about where Germany should look to fulfill its other colonial "needs" had, by the late 1870s, become familiar. Fabri pointed to Asia Minor, Australia, and New Zealand, but above all South America as places to which organized German emigration should be directed. As for trade colonies, he saw opportunities everywhere, from the Samoan islands to Central Africa.[96]

It was a series of German territorial acquisitions in Africa, in the mid-1880s, that propelled Germany into the ranks of European imperial powers. Within the space of just two years there were German colonies in Southwest Africa, Togo, Cameroon, and East Africa. A second flurry of new colonies followed in the late 1890s, with the province of Kiaochow in northern China and its hinterland on the Shandong peninsula, then the Pacific territories of eastern New Guinea, Samoa, and some smaller island chains. By the end of the century, Germany presided over the fourth-largest European empire.[97] How do we explain this quite sudden move to acquire colonies, and what were the effects at home?

The causes were, to borrow a term from Sigmund Freud, "overdetermined"—that is, we have more reasons than we need to explain why Germany became a colonial power when it did.[98] One driving force was the pressure exerted by public opinion and lobby groups. Books like Fabri's, and Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden's *German Colonization*, represented a new, more aggressive advocacy.[99] They amplified the message coming from such organizations as the German Colonial Association and the Society for German Colonization. The writers and pressure groups voiced a number of concerns. One was the long-standing nationalist complaint that emigration

meant a loss of "national energy." The last and largest wave of emigration in the 1870s and '80s raised this anxiety to a new pitch and brought urgent appeals to preserve German culture through settlements.[100] The same years brought the "Great Depression," the global economic downturn that began in 1873 and triggered a move toward tariff protection and a new kind of imperialism. The so-called scramble for Africa was the classic expression of this. Businesses, colonial pressure groups, and other advocates argued that colonies offered the triple advantage of raw materials, markets, and a place where capital could be profitably invested. That was the case made by Fabri, who presented colonies as a solution to the problems of where to export people, goods, and capital. His landmark work offered "a comprehensive crisis therapy."[101]

These arguments for colonies were not just economic, and the noneconomic arguments were not just rationalizations of material interests. They were signs of the global imagination evident among members of the reading public by the 1880s. Germans had become familiar with reports about distant parts of the world. Some were produced by missionaries; others came from scientific travelers or explorers and were published in the major geographical journal of the day, *Petermann's Geographical Transactions*, but also in popular weeklies. Captain Karl Koldewey's second North Pole expedition of 1869–70 became a source of national pride when its crew, having wintered over in pack ice, arrived back in Bremen while the Franco-Prussian War was underway to find themselves toasted as having "gloriously demonstrated German nautical proficiency, German persistence and German striving for the enrichment of science."[102]

The cold, white Arctic was a place to plant a flag or name a sound. Africa, "hot" and "dark" in the German imagination, held a greater exotic, racially suffused fascination. Heinrich Barth, the geographer and explorer, had published his five-volume *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa in 1857–58*, but it was mainly scholars who were interested. Gerhard Rohlfs was a more popular public figure. A youthful volunteer with the nationalist Schleswig-Holstein campaign in 1848 and a former physician with the French Foreign Legion, he was more adventurer than scholar. Rohlfs crossed the Sahara Desert in the mid-1860s from Tripoli to the Gulf of Guinea.[103] He was just one of a string of German Africa explorers who enjoyed a heyday as celebrities in the 1860s and '70s. Gerhard Rohlfs, Georg Schweinfurth, Karl Mauch, Gustav Nachtigal, Eduard Mohr—the list is long. Their travels took in the west and east coasts and the interior,

although most ventured at some point into the Sahara. All fed a thirst for knowledge about Africa they had themselves helped to create.[104] They fostered a sense of European superiority and a belief that Germans had a civilizing mission—in Africa, and other parts of the world—by virtue of their supposedly greater energy and more developed culture.[105]

German colonial acquisition also had a tangled political background. The shift that occurred in the mid-1880s was partly a result of facts on the ground created by African adventurers like Carl Peters and Adolf Lüderitz. Peters, a clergyman's son who earned a doctorate in history, had spent time in Britain and saw himself as the German Cecil Rhodes. He founded the Society for German Colonization in 1884. At the end of that year Peters mounted an East African expedition in present-day Tanzania during which he signed a series of unscrupulously one-sided "treaties" with local chiefs granting him rights to commercial exploitation of the land.[106] Sixteen hundred miles away to the southwest, on the opposite coast of Africa, Adolf Lüderitz was up to the same tricks. Lüderitz came from a Bremen merchant family that dealt in tobacco. After working in the tobacco exchanges of the United States and trying his hand unsuccessfully as a rancher in Mexico, the twenty-five-year-old Lüderitz returned to Bremen bankrupt, but married into money and took over the family tobacco business when his father died. In 1882 he acquired a trading company on the Gold Coast, but that business failed. The following year he bought the Bay of Angra Pequena, in present-day Namibia, then conducted a series of dishonest negotiations with Africans chieftains that led to his owning a private empire of 225,000 square miles.

Bismarck agreed to make these territories German protectorates. That was what marked the beginning of Germany's formal empire. Rather like the sovereign entity established on Borneo by James Brooke, the self-styled Raja of Sarawak (the model for Rudyard Kipling's *The Man Who Would Be King*), Peters and Lüderitz carved out private states—"rogue empires." That was one of the things that recommended these territories to Bismarck, well-known as a colonial skeptic, especially after Peters threatened to cede his holdings to King Leopold of Belgium. German Foreign Office officials kept Bismarck carefully briefed on the Sarawak precedent. In theory, German East Africa and German Southwest Africa would not be a drain on public revenue even after Bismarck designated them formal protectorates (he avoided the word "colony"), and his decision to do so marked no major change of direction for the German chancellor. However, the decision to establish protectorates had the effect of sucking the state into greater colonial engagement (and eventually military engagement), in a pattern that was common to other European empires.[107]

Bismarck was also thinking about domestic politics. He saw the colonial issue as an opportunity to rally the parties of the center-right behind him with a Reichstag election coming up, and perhaps even to counteract the appeal of the Social Democrats to German workers by waving the national flag.[108] Both conservatives and liberals made this argument. Friedrich Fabri's book presented the conservative variant.[109] Liberal nationalists had their own version of "social imperialism," the idea that workers could be weaned from socialism if given reasons to identify more strongly with the nation. Not all German liberals took this view. There was always a stubbornly anticolonial strand among progressives. But in the 1880s, as in 1848, many liberals of different shades argued that in an increasingly competitive world a nation needed colonies, just as it needed a navy to protect them, and this outward projection of German power would have an educative effect at home on the lower classes.[110] There was one more powerful sentiment that helps to explain the widespread support for colonies. It was the belief that Germany, finally united, needed to make up for lost time. Call it a new assertiveness within the "belated nation," a desire to cut a figure in the world, often accompanied by sideways glances at Britain, which was both admired and envied. That was a view widely held in conservative and liberal circles, among business elites and the educated middle classes, although it encountered opposition from Social Democrats, Catholics, and some progressives.

Supporters advanced the same mix of economic arguments to justify the colonial acquisitions of the late 1890s, although the downturn in German emigration meant that settlement colonies received less emphasis, while a rapidly globalizing economy meant that naval bases and coaling stations received much more. Social imperialist arguments about the domestic usefulness of an aggressive foreign policy became even more central. They were made by ministers like Navy Secretary Alfred von Tirpitz, the admiral who was the architect of the German battle fleet and who saw great national tasks as "a strong palliative against educated and uneducated Social-democrats."[111] But they also came from liberal imperialists like the sociologist Max Weber, one of many "naval professors" who joined the Navy League, a mass-membership civic organization. The case for colonies based on prestige, or Germany's proper place in the world, had a sharper edge in

the 1890s, with Britain still serving as an admired but often resented point of reference.

The tone was set by Kaiser William II, who came to the throne in 1888 and voiced his desire for an assertive "world policy." One of his chosen instruments was the suave and self-confident Bernhard von Bülow, William's foreign minister from 1897 to 1900, then German chancellor until a great falling-out with the kaiser in 1909. Bülow's first speech as foreign minister contained two phrases that quickly found their way into the dictionaries of quotations. One was "place in the sun" ("we do not want to put anyone in our shadow, but we also demand our place in the sun"); the other was a sharply worded rejection of the idea that Germany was the contemplative "land of writers and thinkers." As Bülow put it, "The days when Germans granted one neighbor the earth, the other the sea, and reserved for themselves the sky, where pure doctrine reigns . . . those days are over."[112] It was while he was foreign minister that Germany acquired its second major tranche of colonies, the ones in China and the Pacific.

The German colonies lasted for just thirty years. The Dutch were in Java eleven times as long, the British in India six times as long. But during those thirty years Germans exercised every form of rule in the imperial repertoire—direct, indirect, "scientific" and developmental, paternalist, and brutally violent. This diversity was a result partly of the differences in size, environment, population, and function of the German colonies—whether they were seen as places where trade, plantations, or settlers had primacy. How power was exercised also depended on the nature of preexisting political structures, on the reactions of Indigenous peoples to colonial authority, and on what Germans learned or adapted from other colonial nations during an era when one-fourth of the globe fell under the control of western powers. As in other empires, authority was often exercised by men on the ground, mostly few in number—just four hundred German officers and administrators ruled German East Africa in 1900. There were nonetheless major shifts over time in the policy handed down from Berlin. In the earliest, experimental stage, informal authority was exercised by a few individuals, primarily merchants and adventurers, under the protectorate system of royal charters. The resulting mismanagement and crass abuses, requiring interventions from Berlin, led to a more centralized system after 1890 (and Bismarck's fall from power) under a new colonial department within the German Foreign Office. This second phase of colonial rule ended when German policies provoked resistance, above all

in East and Southwest Africa. It was answered by military violence, which reached genocidal proportions. The eventual result, after the colonial crisis ignited domestic political criticism, was a relatively less draconian exercise of colonial power after 1907 under Bernhard Dernburg, the liberal head of a newly created Colonial Office.[113]

German rule was most tolerant and paternalist in the Pacific: in New Guinea, which became a formal colony in 1898, after the German New Guinea Company failed, and in Samoa, acquired by international agreement the same year, following an equally inauspicious period of indirect rule by a German trading company. There was a reason for the tolerance, and it went beyond a desire to live down the earlier exploitation by German companies and planters. Going back to the time of the Forsters' and Chamisso's travels in the Pacific, Germans had read about the romantic "paradise" of the South Seas and the "noble savages" who lived there. That inveterate world traveler Friedrich Gerstäcker wrote in a similar vein during the 1860s. And at the end of the nineteenth century, as Germany took possession of its Pacific colonies, sentimental fascination with these (in jaded European eyes) simple, innocent peoples enjoyed new resurgence in an era when an affected distaste for materialism became fashionable once again.[114]

The governors who ruled after 1899 showed a notable sensitivity to local culture. Albert Hahl, the governor of New Guinea and a Bavarian lawyer by background, set out to limit the German planters' influence and supported native cultivation of the land. He used local officials to mediate between the German administration and the Indigenous population; traditional power structures were turned to German advantage rather than overturned. While governor, Hahl learned the Tolai language and maintained a relationship with a Tolai woman, with whom he had a child. In Samoa, Wilhelm Solf became governor in 1900. A philologist with a PhD in Sanskrit, Solf gave his children Samoan names, used Samoan terms and rituals when he met with local leaders, and happily performed the role of native king when it suited his purposes. These symbolic acts were a way of appropriating Samoan forms in order to exercise German authority noncoercively. There were no German military or police force in Samoa. But there was no doubting ultimate German authority. When it came to local culture, Solf permitted but regulated both long-standing customs and newer enthusiasms like cricket; he also challenged missionary zeal in protecting the local practice of *avaga*, a form of elopement. His chief justice, Erich Schultz, agreed to the imprisonment of Samoans who insulted local chiefs,

part of a larger German design of working through traditional power structures. Schultz, who succeeded Solf as governor in 1911, even had himself tattooed.[115]

Solf, Schulz, and Hahl all faced down the German planters, relatively few in number, to try to prevent the exploitation of Indigenous peoples. But all was not sweetness and light. A report of the Rhenish Mission from New Guinea in 1903, five years after the New Guinea Company had relinquished control, claimed that missionaries still had to act as "advocates of the natives against many an unscrupulous European." Their meditation had prevented "injustice and baseness," possibly "bloodbaths."[116] Even the successes of German governors in protecting the Indigenes of New Guinea and Samoa rested on dubious foundations, for one way they prevented the exploitation of "noble" native peoples of the Pacific was by importing cheap Chinese "coolie" labor to work the cotton, coffee, and cocoa plantations. Some thirty-five hundred Chinese and two hundred Malays worked in the two German colonies by 1914. Their treatment caused Chinese ambassadors in Berlin to submit a series of diplomatic protests.[117]

In China itself, German rule differed fundamentally from the pattern in the Pacific. Kiaochow became a German colony after the murder of two Catholic missionaries in 1897. The ninety-nine-year leasehold (like the one the British enjoyed in Hong Kong) was part of the settlement with the Qing court over the missionaries' death. But the murders were really a convenient pretext to take control of an area long identified as a potentially valuable naval base and coaling station. Ferdinand von Richthofen, a German geographer and traveler in China who had been passing on his local knowledge to Bismarck since the 1860s, described Kiaochow Bay in 1882 as "the biggest and best ocean harbor in all of northern China." Admiral von Tirpitz visited the site and called for its occupation; in 1896 William II instructed the Imperial Navy Office to draw up plans. The killing of the missionaries the following year then provided the opportunity for Germany to pounce.[118]

The province and its main town, Qingdao, were directly run by the Navy Office, which made it singular among German colonies. Kiaochow was intended to be a naval base and a foothold for trade interests; it was also supposed to be a "model" colony, a showcase for German culture and scientific know-how. Exactly what this meant in practice changed over time. It always included the ostentatious display of German technological prowess. New harbor facilities were built in Qingdao and a new town

laid out on the basis of a master plan. Rivers were regulated, railways constructed to link the port with the coal-rich interior, and specialists brought in to oversee the German-owned coal mines. German engineers were everywhere. In the early years of the colony, this hyperactivity by the "foreign devils" led to Chinese resistance by the Boxer rebels, which in turn was met by a brutal "pacification" campaign after the murder of a German envoy in 1900. The kaiser notoriously urged the departing soldiers to behave like "Huns," and the soldiers under the command of Alfred von Waldersee were guilty of massacres, violence that was loudly criticized by anticolonial opinion at home.

Most German administrators and residents of Qingdao showed racist contempt toward the Chinese. The colony was designed on a racially segregated basis as it grew in just fifteen years from a fishing village to a port and trading center with more than 55,000 inhabitants, mostly Chinese. Around 1904, however, the emphasis shifted and the "model" aspect of the colony acquired a different meaning. A combination of things—greater pushback by the Chinese state, the desire to accommodate Chinese business interests, the influence of more liberal Foreign Office factions—led to a change of course. Sinophile officials, translators, and missionaries went to Kiaochow and made their voices heard in the formulation of "native policy," drawing on a prior tradition of respect for Chinese culture that was now resurrected. The Seminar for Oriental Languages in Berlin fed sympathetic newcomers into the colony, and new institutions came into being. A German-Chinese college was established in 1909, the only university-level institution in the German colonies. Where once German residents had used whips on Chinese who failed to move off the sidewalk quickly enough, some Chinese were now permitted to play tennis at the Tsingtau Club. Whereas the earliest German architecture in Qingdao was designed to be authoritatively European, later buildings incorporated elements of the Chinese vernacular. None of this overturned the fundamentals of racial segregation, but it was a sign of cultural rapprochement and exchange, superimposed on the original system—an outcrop of what might be called benign Orientalism. Having shown northern China the mailed fist, Germany drew on the velvet glove.[119]

In Africa, the direction and severity of German rule varied greatly across the different colonies, but physical force was never far from the surface. The episodes of extreme violence against the African population occurred a generation after the Germans arrived, when military power was used to crush full-scale rebellions. Resistance was a response to policies

that undermined and in some cases destroyed the existing way of life. That process began with the drawing of arbitrary boundary lines on the map, which casually divided African peoples between German and other colonial powers. Even the "tribal" units they took as the defining feature of local peoples were to a significant degree a European construct, a projection onto Africans of the conquerors' own understanding of ethnicity and identity.[120] While German administrators made some use of local ceremonial forms (like the *shauri* in East Africa, a kind of negotiation procedure), local power holders were constantly undercut and sometimes deposed by district officers wielding huge authority on the ground. This was especially true during military expeditions into the interior, from the coastal regions where the German rulers felt most secure. What administrators and missionaries arrogantly presented as a "civilizing mission" also weakened Indigenous cultural practices, religious rites, gender relations, and inheritance customs. Most subversive of all were the economic arrangements Germans imposed on unwilling Africans. Everywhere, land was expropriated, sometimes to make large plantations growing cotton, cocoa, sisal, or other single-crop monocultures, as in Cameroon and East Africa, sometimes to provide farms for German settlers, as in Southwest Africa.

Three-quarters of their land was confiscated from the Herero and Nama peoples in Southwest Africa, and much of their livestock with it. Governor Theodor Leutwein said in 1894, "The entire future of the colony lies in the gradual transfer of land from the hands of the work-shy natives to the Europeans."[121] Land and livestock seizures, taxation policies, and education designed to inculcate European "work-discipline"—all were intended to turn seminomadic African cattle herders into a pliant labor force living on reservations. An outbreak of rinderpest, a cattle disease, in 1897 ravaged the Hereros' remaining cattle and heightened the distress. The backlash came in the form of attacks on German settlers, a revolt led by Samuel Maherero, who had earlier cooperated with Governor Leutwein in order to slow the pace of land seizures. The uprising of the Herero began in 1904 and lasted for three years. It was eventually crushed by military force under the command of General Lothar von Trotha, a veteran of earlier pacification campaigns in East Africa and China. Trotha, who was appointed governor in place of the more conciliatory Leutwein, was frank about his policy. Africans were "all alike insofar as they only yield to violence. My policy was, and is, to exercise this violence with blatant terrorism and even cruelty." He promised to finish off the rebels with "rivers of blood."[122]

Trotha was as good as his word. After his forces failed to achieve total victory over the Herero at the Battle of Waterberg, which "enraged" Trotha, he followed a policy of "annihilation." German troops shot men, women, and children, then pursued the remaining Herero into the Omaheke Desert, a western extension of the Kalahari, where they were trapped and denied access to water. Those who tried to escape were shot. Other Herero were imprisoned in concentration camps with grossly inadequate food supplies. The Nama also rose in 1904, conducting a guerrilla war that was met with equal brutality. They too were imprisoned in poorly provisioned camps, including the notorious Shark Island. As many as 65,000 out of 80,000 Herero lost their lives as a result of these genocidal campaigns, and around half of the 20,000 Nama did.[123]

The death toll from the nearly contemporary Maji-Maji risings in German East Africa was even higher. The revolt was caused by similar anger about administrative high-handedness, interference with local cultural practices, and a new economic regime that meant land seizures and plantations on which Africans were reduced to forced labor. It was the last of these that triggered revolt in 1905. The uprising was fueled, like the Boxer Rebellion in China, by millenarian religious sentiment, and was crushed with equal ferocity. Captured rebels were summarily executed, often fifty or one hundred at a time, on the grounds that they did not deserve the treatment afforded in warfare among "civilized" Europeans. As many as 80,000 Africans lost their lives in the fighting, another 200,000 in the famine that followed.[124]

It was in East Africa and in Southwest Africa (the "colonial grotesque")[125] that the breech-loading gun and machine gun were wielded most conspicuously by German troops as "tools of empire."[126] But in Cameroon, too, there were punitive although less deadly campaigns to snuff out resistance to land seizures and forced labor on the new cocoa and cotton plantations. The governor there was a career diplomat, Jesko von Puttkamer. He was a friend of the British diplomat and Irish nationalist Roger Casement, who played a large part in exposing colonial abuses in the Belgian Congo. But Puttkamer proved to be an autocrat, a governor who promoted military expeditions into the interior and tolerated widespread violence against Africans on the plantations, a policy condemned by missionaries. Critics eventually forced his early retirement, although he was brought down over minor peccadilloes, not his autocratic ways.[127] Even in the so-called model colony of Togo, a coastal trading post where merchants and missionaries

together prevented large-scale land seizures for plantations, military campaigns were conducted into the interior. During the "Tove war" of 1895, collective reprisals were undertaken against insurgent villages, farms and houses were torched, and prisoners of war were used to perform forced labor. Local crafts were vindictively destroyed, like the pottery industry, mainly in the hands of women, whose artifacts were smashed into shards that still littered the roadside years later.[128] Even in Togo then, the state deployed violence, even if intermittently. There, as in every German colony in Africa, ostentatious public executions and the display of bodies were intended as reminders of the power that the colonial authority held in reserve. Everywhere, too, Africans experienced the "soft" violence of residential segregation and curfews, as well as routine beatings on plantations and in private households.

Overt violence had a place in the German colonies, especially in Africa, that it did not have at home. Racism and cultural contempt made colonial subjects into dehumanized objects, while Berlin was willing to give wide discretion to the men on the spot and not ask too many questions unless a missionary or member of the Reichstag made a case of abuse too public to ignore (and the missionaries often kept quiet, because this gave them a hold over the colonial administration that increased their own freedom of action).[129] Violence was also the other side of the coin of weak everyday control: the "islands of rule" in East Africa, the uncertain state power in Southwest Africa outside the designated "police zone." In other words, German rule never achieved the kind of reach or established the level of legitimacy that it did within the borders of the 1871 nation-state.[130] That alone hardly set Germany apart from other European powers, all of whom sanctioned or tolerated high levels of violence against their colonial subjects, and for similar reasons. If there was something that made Germany distinctive, it was the size of the gap between the socially and bureaucratically disciplined society at home and the violent practices that marked German rule in Africa. Compulsory school attendance enforced in some German cities by gendarmes, the factory whistle and time clock, the presence of uniformed government officials in every walk of life, the workhouse—these exerted their own kind of disciplinary power. They made public executions and violent whippings, quotidian events in Cameroon and Southwest Africa, unheard of in Württemberg or Saxony.

Conscription was another of those disciplining agencies within metropolitan Germany. There *were* high levels of violence in the army, including the whipping of conscripts. Social Democrat Karl Liebknecht exposed these in his 1907 polemic against militarism.[131] But Liebknecht also noted that the German army intervened less to break up strikes than in most European countries. He might have added that the same reserve was generally true of the army's relations with minority communities on Germany's borderlands. The most notorious instance of the German army's domestic misbehavior was in the Alsatian town of Zabern in 1913, when insults by a junior officer directed against the local population led to protests, which in turn led to wholesale arrests. Twenty-six people were locked up in a coal cellar overnight; martial law was briefly declared. Zabern became a cause célèbre, the subject of a full-scale parliamentary debate about militarism. But no one died or was seriously injured.[132] By comparison with what happened in Southwest or East Africa, the scandal seems almost laughable, just as the actions of prewar antisemitic students who let mice loose in Jewish-owned department stores seem merely obnoxious in light of what was to follow thirty years later.

That prompts a big question. The colonies were sites of violence. Were they also breeding grounds of genocidal violence? Anyone who wants to argue for a line that runs from German atrocities in Southwest Africa to Nazi crimes in eastern Europe ("from Windhoek to Auschwitz") can point to continuities of people and ideas, there is no doubt about that.[133] But the lines of continuity are complicated. It is as plausible to argue that the Germans applied in Africa the lessons of their brutal responses to French franc-tireurs during the war of 1870–71 as it is to pin the "barbarism" of German military culture after 1914 on earlier colonial episodes.[134] The violence of the German colonial experience may loom larger in hindsight than it did to contemporaries. It is instructive to look at this through the eyes of Major Charles Edward Callwell, a pioneering British writer on colonial counterinsurgency. His book *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, published in 1896, was concerned with irregular, guerrilla conflicts in European empires—the French, Dutch, Belgian, Portuguese, and Italian as well as the British. Callwell has a few comments, too, on the United States and Japan. On Germany, however, there is nothing. Only in the third edition, in 1906, does Germany enter the picture, and then only barely.[135]

Were the German colonies "laboratories of modernity" in a larger sense—places where it was possible to try out things that could not be tried out at home?[136] In some ways, they were. Consider agriculture. In East Africa the German state established a two-million-mark agricultural research station,

the Amani Institute. New crops like cotton, sisal, cocoa, and tobacco were introduced on a major scale, especially in Africa. In one case, Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute in Alabama was invited to send an expedition to Togo, in the hope that a cotton economy like that of the American south could be established in West Africa, a striking episode of three-way transfer.[137] Many of these experiments failed, as has often happened when monocultures are established. The German colonizers ignored the virtues of African interplanting, a practice well adapted to the local climate that conserved the soil but looked messy and asymmetrical to European eyes.[138] There were also sustained German efforts at town planning not only in Qingdao but in Douala, in Cameroon, in both cases based on the ruthless appropriation of land, the destruction of existing street plans, and the objective of creating racially segregated communities.[139] Hong Kong may have had some impact on the master plan for Qingdao. In the end, though, German urban planning in the colonies did not rival the scale of French efforts in Morocco, Indochina, and Madagascar, or similar projects in British India.[140]

Often, policies that look as if they owed their existence to the greater opportunities (read: lack of resistance) in a colonial setting turn out to be no bolder than policies enacted at home. Were the blueprints for Qingdao or Douala really any more daring than James Hobrecht's 1860s strategic plan for the development of Berlin, with its fifty-year time frame?[141] To take another example, German colonial authorities assumed major powers in policing the movement of Indigenous people, but it is not obvious that these efforts went beyond the increasingly strict controls imposed within Germany itself, especially on non-German groups such as Poles, Sinti, and Roma. Even the relative ease with which it was possible to deport Europeans from the German colonies has to be set against the history of deportation of Europeans—Alsatians, Poles, Danes, and German Jesuits—from metropolitan Germany.[142] Nor did these policing and deportation practices at home have colonial dress rehearsals, for they mostly came before, not after. The same is true in the realm of medicine. The inoculation of soldiers against typhoid may have been tried out first in Southwest Africa; however, compulsory immunization against smallpox had already been introduced in Germany in 1874, just three years after unification.

Germans nonetheless flaunted their technological accomplishments in the colonies. These went by the name "progress," a domestic keyword of liberal nationalists in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, now transferred to a global stage. That is what made colonies a liberal project as much

as a conservative one, especially after 1907, when the "civilizing mission" took a progressive turn. One aspect of this was the huge railway-building program undertaken during the later years of German colonialism, especially in Africa. Rail lines were strategic battering rams into the interior, and a means of transporting German products in and raw materials and precious metals out. They were also demonstrative, a form of braggadocio. The Germans were, of course, watching other colonial powers (above all the British), and there was some gnashing of teeth over what the British had achieved in matters of infrastructure. The Aswan Low Dam in Egypt was widely envied.

Germans took pride in their tropical medicine, immunology, and veterinary science. The colonies provided a showcase for all of them, but many instances of "success" had a dark side. German scientists developed a vaccination against rinderpest, but the vaccine was used to preserve European rather than African cattle stocks. The differential rate at which the two herds died made a critical difference in destroying the basis of the Herero' existence in Southwest Africa. Colonial medicine was shot through with eugenicist assumptions based on racial thinking. Hans Ziemann, who headed the medical administration in Cameroon, made a study of malaria



Africans laboring on the East African railroad. A photograph from December 1909.

and came to the conclusion that the incidence of the disease in the African population justified strict residential racial segregation in Douala on hygienic grounds.[143] It is tempting to project this forward to the racist eugenics of the Nazi regime. But German conduct in this sphere differed little before 1914 from what other colonial powers were doing. Colonies gave a boost to European institutes of hygiene and tropical medicine. In Germany, as elsewhere, the effect of colonies was felt in many disciplines—medicine, zoology, anthropology. The self-conscious application of science was probably more pronounced in the German colonies. Even those with no liking for the Germans acknowledged this grudgingly.

Many also saw the colonies as a potential source of German "renewal," a place where virtuous settlers could live out the ideals of Germandom. That had been an important part of Friedrich Fabri's case for colonies. It was very much the view of a younger figure from the same milieu, Ernst Fabarius, a military chaplain in Koblenz and secretary of the Rhineland branch of the Protestant Africa Association. In 1899 Fabarius founded a German colonial school at Witzenhausen in the Werra Valley. The school trained young men as farmer-settlers and "cultural pioneers."[144] The Women's League of the German Colonial Society* also founded a colonial school for women to train would-be female colonists in maternity care, cooking, darning, and the other skills of the loyal helpmeet on the frontier. The numbers of those who passed through these schools was small, but the modest numbers were in line with the dimensions of German settlements. Southwest Africa, the only true settler colony, never had more than 14,000 German residents. That was the same number of people who moved to Greater Berlin every four months—every four months for forty years.

Settler colonialism enjoyed the mystique it did partly because it embodied the white family, as opposed to the racially mixed marriages—or other sexual liaisons—between German men and Indigenous women that were common, especially in the early years of German colonial rule. These raised the specter of white men "going native" or indulging in behavior that undermined Europeans' supposed racial superiority. In 1905 marriage between German men and African women was forbidden by administrative decree in Southwest Africa and made retroactive, so that already existing marriages were annulled.[145] The same prohibition was later extended to

* The German Colonial Society was formed in 1887 via the merger of the German Colonial Association and the Society for German Colonization.

East Africa and Samoa. Similar concerns prompted Governor Leutwein's 1898 proposal to pay the passage of single German women to Southwest Africa—sending "suitable female breeding material from the Reich," as the feminist Gertrud Bülow von Dennewitz contemptuously called it.[146] But many German women, in the colonies and at home, supported these policies. Grete Ziemann, who went to Cameroon to keep house for her brother Hans, the medical officer, left no doubt where she stood: "In my opinion, race pride—naturally only in the best and noblest sense—cannot be exercised strictly enough. *If Germany wants to conquer Africa, in no circumstances may a mixed race arise.*"[147] Even a feminist like Minna Cauer saw a case for encouraging women to go to the colonies because (in the classic argument of contemporary feminism) they would "civilize" the "uncivilized" conduct to which men were always prey.[148]

When the Women's League of the German Colonial Society placed an advertisement inviting women to apply for assistance in traveling to the colonies, it was surprised by the large response. In addition to the "undemanding, simple girls" who were most easily placed, there were educated women—housekeepers, Kindergarten teachers, companions—who wanted the opportunity to fashion a more independent life for themselves than they enjoyed in Germany. They were rejected by Margarete Schnitzler, one of those vetting the applications, because there was no demand for such women in the colonies. These educated young women she turned down with regret. Other applicants wanted to get away from their husbands, "had gotten into distressing situations, usually because the father had died," or "just wanted to get out a bit" or "had lust for adventure of all kinds written plainly all over their face."[149] Schnitzler turned these women down straight away, with no regrets.

Yes, at the same time, many men in the German colonies conducted themselves in ways that not only mocked the idea of a "civilizing mission" but exceeded what was acceptable under the double standards that governed male and female behavior. What could get you into trouble with the government, even deported? Indigence, for one—failing as a settler and taking to drink (not necessarily in that order), becoming a disreputable hanger-on. That was letting down the white race. So were homosexual acts, especially if performed with African men.[150] Then there were crimes that went beyond the tacitly accepted everyday violence, including sexual violence. German missionaries in Southwest Africa complained repeatedly about the rape of African women. Some took to calling the *Schutztruppe*

("protective force") the *Schmutztruppe* ("dirty troops").[151] But this had little effect and it required something out of the ordinary to create a scandal. A man named Heinrich Odelwald was jailed, then deported from Southwest Africa in 1912, for raping an African child.[152] The misuse of alcohol featured in many cases that became scandals. A settler called Kurt Berner was recommended for deportation from Southwest Africa after he shot one of his African workers in an alcohol-fueled rage.[153] An incident involving alcohol and sexual assault occurs in one of the African novels written by Frieda von Bülow, a distant cousin of Gertrud and herself a feminist as well as a radical nationalist who sought personal freedom in East Africa in the late 1880s, where she founded and ran German nursing facilities. In *Tropic Rage*, the heroine's brother and his friends drunkenly break into African homes and attempt to rape the women.[154] It is worth noting that while in East Africa Bülow had an unhappy love affair with the colonial adventurer Carl Peters, who was forced to leave the colony after shooting two Africans, his concubine and her purported lover.[155] Franz Giesebrecht, a left-leaning cultural critic, wrote a study of Peters in 1897 in which he called him, sarcastically, a "German colonial hero." It is a psychological portrait of a monster, but Giesebrecht suggests that the monstrosity—the "colonial abominations"—were somehow released by Africa: "Out there, in the wild land . . . culture and civilization went to the devil." That was where the evil, previously hidden, emerged and triumphed—"the beast inside the human."[156] It was as if Giesebrecht could imagine the horror being released only in an African setting. Here was a *Heart of Darkness* script several years before Joseph Conrad's famous book.

The colonies assumed an outsized importance in the German imagination. One aspect of that, not to be overlooked, is the criticism that some Germans leveled against the brutality of colonial exploitation. This reached a high point in 1906–07, while two wars were being fought in Africa, and was triggered by criticism of the colonial administration in the Reichstag by members of the Catholic Center Party who had been briefed by missionaries. The Social Democrats, long-standing critics of colonialism, added harsh strictures of their own. The upshot was a parliamentary election in 1907 called by Chancellor Bülow, the so-called Hottentot elections, designed to isolate Catholic and Social Democratic critics. The policy worked, although what followed was a reform-minded new colonial regime under Bernhard Dernburg. The lineup of parties that backed Bülow in the election—Conservatives, right-wing National Liberals, and Progressives—

indicates the broad support for the colonial project. But its greatest support came from branches of the Veterans' Association and the radical right: the Colonial Society, Pan-German League, and Navy League. They were the organizations that produced wall charts and maps for schools and doctors' waiting rooms, and sponsored lectures and slide shows where famous figures like Gerhard Rohlfs and other "experts" held forth on Germany's colonial mission. These drew packed crowds, as many as seven hundred for an evening lecture even in a midsized town like Osnabrück. That was where, in February 1913, the "Africa adventurer" Albert Spring spoke about East Africa. Before the Germans arrived, he explained, it had been in "an almost completely primeval state. The Negroes squatted idly into front of their filthy huts." Then came the transformation: "Now there are clean villages in which the electricity shines at night. The steam-powered steed traverses the fruitful land. Well-clothed Negroes and Negresses go to the station, just as we do in provincial places, to wait for the train."[157] This was the disdainful racism of the "civilizing mission."

Was it likely that a German would encounter Africans in Germany? Possible, certainly, although not likely. Africans from the German colonies did travel to Germany, mainly from Togo, Cameroon, and East Africa. Some were the children of social elites, whose families wanted them to have a German education. Others went as translators and language instructors, as the personal servants of colonial officials, or as part of training programs run by one of the German missions. A few were sailors, or apprentices learning a trade their German instructors expected them to practice when they returned to Africa. They were, in other words, a very disparate group of individuals. Those who came from Cameroon included both Christians and Muslims and speakers of four different languages.[158] The experiences of Africans in Germany varied as well. Two children from elite families in Cameroon, placed in a Protestant school in the small Württemberg town of Aalen, were greeted by a brass band when they arrived and were apparently very popular. But unwanted curiosity or abuse were more frequent.[159] What Africans in Germany had in common was that they expected (and were expected) to return, which explains the high turnover in Germany's Black African population. Several thousand probably passed through in the three decades before 1914, but the population at any given time numbered less than a thousand.[160] That was around 1 in 70,000 of the overall population on the eve of war.

Germans were more likely to encounter representations of Africans,

generally caricatured and demeaning. The slides that accompanied talks like Albert Spring's in Osnabrück were part of a society suffused with exotic images from the colonies. Mass-circulation illustrated newspapers jostled alongside posters, placards, and advertisements. Navigating the growing big cities of the kaiser's Germany meant learning to read these visual cues, while those who wanted to advertise a show or a product tried to catch the attention of hurrying city dwellers with spectacular images.[161] Many advertisements played up the exotic. Stylized, often grotesquely caricatured images of Black people appeared in ads selling a wide range of products: chocolate, ready-made cake mix, margarine, cigars and cigarettes, alcohol ("Herero Liquor"), bicycle tires, sodium bicarbonate, soap, toothpaste, metal polish, and boot and shoe polish. Products that claimed to clean things and images that showed cleaning in some form were especially prominent, like the white soap being applied to a child's Black face in a Mohr's soap advertisement.[162] Similar images adorned trading cards and posters advertising wax museums, exhibitions, and shows.

Some of the shows featured live exhibits of colonial peoples and others from around the world deemed to be "exotic" or "primitive." These were the notorious "people shows," in which non-Europeans from the tropics to the Arctic Circle—Africans, Inuit, Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, Singhalese—were placed on display for European audiences.[163] These exhibits began as carnival sideshows several decades before Germany acquired colonies, but they soared in popularity and became more mainstream in the 1880s. That was when prominent scholars gave the shows their seal of approval as scientific, and therefore edifying. The scientists studied those being displayed, vouched for their "authenticity," and provided a cover for the impresarios. This amounted to a kind of "commercial ethnography," the joining together of moneymaking entertainment with scholarship.[164] More than a hundred large-scale people shows and countless minor ones toured German and other European cities in the thirty years before the war. For Carl Hagenbeck, the best-known German organizer, the people shows grew naturally out of his previous business, which was importing wild animals for zoos.[165] Zoological gardens were among the respectable, middle-class places where people shows were mounted.

A variant was the minutely choreographed "native village," complete with huts, tools, and animals, which became a standard part of major exhibitions. The Berlin Trade Exhibition of 1896 boasted such a display. So, the following year, did the Saxon and Thuringian Trade Exhibition in Leipzig,

which included forty-seven Africans expressly brought over for the purpose and handpicked to represent "inner-African tribes" unfamiliar to Europeans. The veneer of seriousness and public edification that was always a part of these staged displays was undercut in this instance by the trade fair newspaper, which shamelessly played up the element of spectacle by suggesting that members of the Wadoe tribe practiced cannibalism and might have been responsible for eating three German sailors who had gone missing in 1888.[166] Ethnographic displays also took place at large popular festivals, such as the Oktoberfest in Munich. Bavarian Prince Regent Luitpold visited the Samoa Show there in 1910.[167]

The original "sideshow" form of display meanwhile enjoyed new life in the wax museums, or Panoptiken, that sprang up in German cities in the late nineteenth century with Madame Tussaud's in London as their model. Castan's Panoptikum in Berlin was the first, in 1871, with four provincial branches opening later. Rivals and imitators followed in St. Pauli, neighboring Hamburg, and Frankfurt. Carl Gabriel, a circus director's son who was already mounting shows every year at the Oktoberfest, then opened his International Panoptikum in Munich.[168] These businesses usually had a theater attached to the wax museum, which is where the people shows were held. All emphasized the exotic and sensational.

Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich were big cities. But images and accounts of a wider, "exotic" world also made their way into smaller towns. In 1905, an "African village" was on display in Oldenburg, in the north German fens.[169] Weimar, the small but famous town whose residents during its late-nineteenth-century silver age included musicians (Franz Liszt, Richard Strauss), art connoisseurs (Count Harry Kessler), and a mad philosopher (Friedrich Nietzsche), was also a hotbed of colonialism, thanks in no small part to Grand Duke Carl Alexander. He funded Carl Peters lavishly, maintained a close personal relationship with Adolf Lüderitz, and gave land to Gerhard Rohlfs, who built a villa in the town. Weimar's newspaper carried extensive material on Africa and the local chapter of the Colonial Society was very active. The local regiment also participated in the Boxer Rebellion and the Herero war, another link to the colonies.[170] There were many conduits through which that wider world reached into provincial life. Street names and commemorative plaques were an everyday reminder of the colonial. So were those colorful advertisements, and the "colonial goods" shops that sold the commodities they advertised. Illustrated magazines carried colonial stories. Germans could buy cheap editions of colonial adven-

ture stories or the "*Farmersfrau*" style of memoir pioneered by Frieda von Bülow.[171] Nor should we forget the literature, games, and toys produced for children and young people. Just as the model train set domesticated that great symbol of nineteenth-century progress, so board games like Die Kolonisten and models like the miniature African village domesticated the distant colonial world. They allowed children to "play empire."[172]

These influences were pervasive.[173] But did they necessarily encourage people to identify with the German colonial empire? Some obviously did—a local regiment that had fought there, street names honoring German "colonial heroes," wall maps of the German empire, colonial literature set in Southwest Africa. But the elements of the "exotic" were often quite unrelated to German overseas possessions. The African village in Oldenburg called itself a "Somali village." Any claims it might have had to authenticity concerned a part of Africa divided between Britain and Italy. That was no accident. The Herero displayed at the Berlin Exhibition of 1896 were the last Africans from the German empire to be part of any people show or display. The missionaries in Southwest Africa had objected at the time.[174] Four years later the German government caught up with them. Chancellor Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst and the Colonial Council (a group that advised the Colonial Office) banned the export of native peoples from the German colonies for display in Europe, on the grounds that these moneymaking ventures possessed no educational value and had adverse effects on the health of the individuals concerned and on colonial relations.[175]

The often spuriously labeled peoples who appeared in later shows came from all over the world. They were Nubians, Burmese, Zulus, and North American "wild Indians" and "Eskimos." Advertisements, board games, and popular literature also included a much wider range of peoples than were to be found in the German colonies. The racist sentiment that was fed by these cruel displays and grotesque caricatures belonged to a wider racialized European imagination.

World Economy

CONTEMPORARIES KNEW THAT THE WORLD WAS GROWING smaller. They were also aware how economic exchanges were helping to drive that process and create a "world horizon" (in the words of the theologian Ernst Troeltsch).[176] A truly global economy took shape toward the

end of the nineteenth century, marked by the extraordinary multiplication of trade links and tied together by the rapid growth in shipping, undersea cables, and the activity of merchants and bankers whose frame of reference was international. Almost nowhere on earth remained untouched by the ability of a dynamic capitalist system to commandeer new resources and open new markets. That is why the period before 1914 is now widely regarded as the first age of globalization, its interconnections and linkages unequaled until the closing years of the twentieth century.[177]

German observers were especially quick to spot the trend. The economist Adolph Wagner was already writing in 1879 that "current conditions have allowed commerce to unite the national economies into a single globe-spanning world economic organism."[178] The term *Weltwirtschaft*—world economy—was widely used from the 1880s, decades before it became familiar in English.[179] One reason is that, since the time of Friedrich List earlier in the century, economics was typically viewed in Germany through a national lens. German economists therefore saw the globalizing trend as just the latest stage of a development from domestic, to urban, to national, to global economy. More than that, however, Germany's increasingly active role in global trade became a contentious issue in domestic politics. The economic strength of the new nation was a source of widespread pride, especially when—in some areas, at least—it began to overtake Britain, which was at once model and rival. But Germany's expanding role in the global economy followed from the fact that it had, in the jargon of the time, made the transition from "agrarian" to "industrial" state. That shift encountered resistance from conservative intellectuals, and from those—a minority by the 1890s, but a large one—who lived in the countryside and small towns, felt left behind, and saw world trade as a threat, not an opportunity. Germany's place in the global economy often caused antagonism to flare up between town and country, industry and agriculture, when political battle was joined over trade treaties, tariffs, and seemingly innocent matters like veterinary border controls.

That Germany had become an economic leader on the world stage is beyond question. A few statistics will show how intimately the German economy was enmeshed in the global movement of commodities. The value of German imports increased from 2.8 to 10.8 billion marks between 1880 and 1913. Exports followed a similar trajectory, rising from 2.9 billion to 10.1 billion marks over the same period. In both cases, the curve rose most steeply in the last prewar decade. Germany was the world's most dynamic

144 British Ambassador Lord Loftus in Berlin to Foreign Secretary Clarendon, Apr. 17, 1869, in Veit Valentin, ed., *Bismarcks Reichsgründung im Urteil englischer Diplomaten* (Amsterdam, 1937), 542–43.
145 On the history of the phrase, see Stephanie Malia Hom, "On the Origins of Making Italy: Massimo D'Azeglio and 'Fatta l'Italia, bisogna fare gli Italiani,'" *Italian Culture* 31, no. 1 (2013): 1–16.
146 Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, *Purging the Empire* (New York, 2015), 143–76.
147 John J. Kulczycki, *School Strikes in Prussian Poland, 1901–1907* (Boulder, Colo., 1981).
148 George C. Windell, *The Catholics and German Unity, 1866–71* (Minneapolis, 1954); Hugo Lacher, "Das Jahr 1866," *Neue Politische Literatur* 14 (1969): 83–99, 214–31.
149 Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser, eds., *Culture Wars* (New York, 2003). On Germany, see David Blackbourn, "Progress and Piety," *History Workshop Journal* 26 (1988): 57–78; Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict* (Princeton, N.J., 1995); Michael Gross, *The War Against Catholicism* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2004).
150 Blackbourn, "Progress and Piety," and David Blackbourn, *Marpingen* (New York, 1994), describe many violent incidents.
151 Julius Bachem, *Erinnerungen eines alten Publizisten und Politikers* (Cologne, 1913), 133.
152 On "composite monarchies" and the nonunitary state, see Dieter Langewiesche, "Monarchy—Global," *JMEH* 15, no. 2 (2017): 299–300.
153 Abigail Green, *Fatherlands* (New York, 2001).
154 The memoirs of the religious conservative and former Wartburg festival participant Friedrich Krummacher refer to the area around Anhalt (where he once had a parish) as a "second fatherland," alongside his original fatherland on the Lower Rhine, but he also describes Germany as his fatherland: Krummacher, *Selbstbiographie*, 35.
155 Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990).
156 Siegfried Weichlein, *Nation und Region* (Düsseldorf, 2004); Jean-Michel Johnston, *Networks of Modernity* (New York, 2021), 199–241.
157 Vanessa Ogle, *The Global Transformation of Time: 1870–1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 2015), 1–2, 32–54; Oliver Zimmer, "One Clock Fits All?," *CEH* 53, no. 1 (2020): 48–70.
158 Svenja Goltermann, *Körper der Nation* (Göttingen, 1998); Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right* (New Haven, 1980); Roger Chickering, *"We Men Who Feel Most German"* (Boston, 1984).

CHAPTER EIGHT: ON THE MOVE

1 Aristide Zolberg, "The Exit Revolution," in *Citizenship and Those Who Leave*, ed. Nancy Green and François Weil (Urbana, Ill., 2007), 33–60.
2 Klaus J. Bade, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland?* (Berlin, 1983), 18; Mack Walker, *Germany and the Emigration, 1816–1885* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964); Peter Marschalck, *Deutsche Überseewanderung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1973).
3 Edith M. Burlage, *The Life of a Priest in Two Worlds* (Manitowoc County, Wisc., 1973).
4 *Utopia—Revisiting a German State in America*, ed. Traveling Summer Republic and City Archives of Giessen (Bremen, 2013).
5 Mischa Honeck, *We Are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants and American Abolitionists After 1848* (Athens, Ga., 2011).
6 The classic account of emigration from Württemberg is Friedrich List, *Die Ackerverfassung, die Zwergwirtschaft und die Auswanderung* (Stuttgart, 1842). See also Wolfgang von Hippel, *Auswanderung aus Südwestdeutschland* (Stuttgart, 1984).
7 Klaus J. Bade, *Migration in European History* (Malden, Mass., 2003), 46–47.
8 Panikos Panayi, *German Immigrants in Britain During the 19th Century, 1815–1914* (London, 1995); Panikos Panayi, "Sausages, Waiters and Bakers," in *Migration and Transfer from Germany to Britain, 1660–1914*, ed. Stefan Manz et al. (Malden, Mass., 2009), 147–59; Horst Rössler, "Germans from Hanover in the British Sugar Industry," in Manz et al., eds., *Migration and Transfer from Germany to Britain*, 49–63.
9 Gregory Anderson, *Victorian Clerks* (Manchester, Eng., 1976), 60–64.
10 Günter Moltmann, "German-American Return Migration in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *CEH* 13, no. 4 (1980): 378–92; Karen Schniedewind, *Begrenzter Aufenthalt im Land der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten* (Stuttgart, 1994).
11 Tanja Fittkau, *In die neue Welt—Von Bremerhaven nach Amerika* (Stuttgart, 2010), 39–43.
12 C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Malden, Mass., 2004), 451–87, referring to the years 1890–1914.
13 Rudolf Reimer, *Süd-Australien* (Berlin, 1851), 31.
14 David Schubert, *Kavel's People* (Highgate, Aust., 1997).
15 Reimer, *Süd-Australien*, 25; Jürgen Tampke, *The Germans in Australia* (New York, 2006), 25–32.
16 Reimer, *Süd-Australien*, 9; James Jupp, ed., *The Australian People* (Cambridge, 2001), 363.
17 Tampke, *Germans in Australia*, 17.
18 Michael Bollen, "The Hospital That Never Was," in *Germans*, ed. Peter Monteath (Kent Town, Aust., 2011), 104.
19 Renata Vollmer, *Auswanderungspolitik und soziale Frage im 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt/Main, 1995).
20 Josef Vondra, *German Speaking Settlers in Australia* (Melbourne, 1981), 31–32.
21 Tampke, *Germans in Australia*, 75–89.
22 Bollen, "The Hospital That Never Was," 111.
23 Pauline Payne, "Richard Schomburgk," in Monteath, ed., *Germans*, 126–43; Janice Lally and Peter Monteath, "'Essentially South Australian': The Artist Alexander Schramm," in ibid., 147–48; Tampke, *Germans in Australia*, 90–91.
24 Tampke, *Germans in Australia*, 72, 85, 106.
25 Brigitte Bönisch-Brednich, *Keeping a Low Profile* (Wellington, N.Z., 2002), 15–16.
26 Udo Sautter, "Deutsche in Kanada," in *Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland*, ed. Klaus J. Bade (Munich, 1992), 189.
27 Bollen, "The Hospital That Never Was," 114.
28 Michael Clyne, *Perspectives on Language Contact* (Melbourne, 1972); Janet M. Fuller, "Language and Identity in the German Diaspora," in *German Diasporic Experiences*, ed. Mathias Schulze et al. (Waterloo, Ont., 2008), 3–33.
29 Jürgen Tampke, ed., *Wunderbar Country* (Marrickville, Aust., 1982), 21–27, 56–65, 90–99.
30 These statistics are based on Hermann Kellenbenz and Jürgen Schneider, "La Emigración Alemana a América Latina desde 1821 hasta 1930," *JbLA* 13 (1976): 386–403.
31 Walter Ludwig, "Ein deutscher Kaufmann in Südamerika, 1905–1911," *JbLA* 27 (1990): 337–73.
32 Jürgen Buchenau, *Tools of Progress: A German Merchant Family in Mexico City, 1865–Present* (Albuquerque, 2004); Jürgen Buchenau, "The Life Cycle of a Trade Diaspora," *JbLA* 39 (2002): 275–97; Joachim Kühn, "Das Deutschtum in Mexico um 1850," *JbLA* 2 (1965): 335–72.
33 Ronald C. Newton, *German Buenos Aires, 1900–1933* (Austin, 1977); Anne Saint Saveur-Henn, "Die deutsche Migration nach Argentinien (1870–1945)," in *Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Argentinien*, ed. Peter Birle (Frankfurt/Main, 2010), 21–53; Isabelle Rispler, "Negotiating 'German-ness' Within the Transatlantic Space," *Revue Interdisciplinaire de Travaux sur les Amériques* 6 (2013), http://www.revue-rita.com/notes-de-recherche6/isabelle-rispler.html.
34 David Brandon Dennis, "Seduction on the Waterfront," *GH* 29, no. 2 (2011): 175–201.
35 Ibid., 198.
36 Sandra Carreras et al., eds., *Die deutschen Sozialisten und die Anfänge der argentinischen Arbeiterbewegung* (Buenos Aires, 2008).
37 Alfred Hasbrouck, "The Conquest of the Desert," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 15, no. 2 (1935): 195–228, is a triumphalist account. President Sarmiento's *Facundo* (1845) has "civilization" (associated with northern Europeans) and "barbarism" in its subtitle. On Volga German settlements in Argentina, see https://vgi.fairfield.edu/immigration/ar.
38 Percy Ernst Schramm, *Neun Generationen* (Göttingen, 1963), 2:202–3, 221–22.
39 Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (New York, 2010), 282–333.
40 Ibid., 284; Richard Graham, "Free African Brazilians and the State in Slavery Times,"

in *Racial Politics in Contemporary Brazil*, ed. Michael Hanchard (Durham, N.C., 1999), 48–49.

41 See Karl [Carlos] von Koseritz, "Jakobine Maurer, die deutsche 'Christusin' in Brasilien," *Die Gartenlaube* (1874), part 1 in no. 40, 643–45, and part 2 in no. 43, 696–98.

42 Dirk Hoerder, "The German-Language Diasporas," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transcultural Studies* 11, no. 1 (2002): 26.

43 Günter Moltmann, ed., *Deutsche Amerikaauswanderung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1976), 201.

44 Albert Bernhardt Faust, *The German Element in the United States*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1909).

45 Audrey L. Olson, *St. Louis Germans, 1850–1920* (Lawrence, Kans., 1970); James Bergquist, "German Communities in American Cities," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 4 (1981): 9–30; Guido Dobbert, *The Disintegration of an Immigrant Community* (New York, 1980); Stanley Nadel, *Little Germany* (Urbana, Ill., 1990); Russell A. Kazal, *Becoming Old Stock* (Princeton, N.J., 2004); Monika Kugemann, *Between Cultures* (Hamburg, 2009).

46 Barbara Lorenzkowski, *Sounds of Ethnicity: Listening to German North America, 1850–1914* (Winnipeg, Man., 2010), 81.

47 John Gurda, *The Making of Milwaukee* (Milwaukee, 1999), 170.

48 H. Glenn Penny, "Atlantic Transfers," *GH* 26, no. 4 (2008): 566, drawing on Katja Wüstenbecker, *Deutsch-Amerikaner im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart, 2007).

49 John Koegel, *Music in German Immigrant Theater* (Rochester, N.Y., 2009), 485–86n21.

50 Kathleen N. Conzen, "Ethnicity as Festive Culture," in *The Invention of Ethnicity*, ed. Werner Sollors (New York, 1989), 53.

51 See Kathleen N. Conzen, "German-Americans and the Invention of Ethnicity," in *America and the Germans*, ed. Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, vol. 1, *Immigration, Language, Ethnicity* (Philadelphia, 1985), 131–47; Kathleen N. Conzen, *Immigrant Milwaukee, 1836–1860* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976).

52 See the German Historical Institute's five-volume project *Immigrant Entrepreneurship: German-American Business Biographies, 1720 to the Present*, available online at https://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org/about/.

53 Uwe Spiekermann, "Claus Spreckels, Robber Baron and Sugar King," in ibid., vol. 2, *The Emergence of an Industrial Nation, 1840–1893*, ed. William J. Hausman, http://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org/entry.php?rec=5.

54 Tobias Brinkmann, "Jews, Germans, or Americans?," in *The Heimat Abroad*, ed. Krista O'Donnell et al. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005), 111–40; Cornelia Wilhelm, *Deutsche Juden in Amerika* (Stuttgart, 2007).

55 Hoerder, "The German-Language Diasporas," 24; Nadel, *Little Germany*; Hartmut Keil, *German Workers in Chicago* (Urbana, Ill., 1988); Hartmut Keil, ed., *German Workers' Culture in the United States 1850 to 1920* (Washington, D.C., 1988); Christiane Harzig, "The Role of German Women in the German-American Working-Class Movement in Late Nineteenth-Century New York," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 8 (1989): 87–107; Gurda, *The Making of Milwaukee*, 204–11.

56 Anke Ortlepp, *"Auf denn, Ihr Schwestern!"* (Stuttgart, 2004), 221–22.

57 Paul Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy* (Princeton, N.J., 1984); Bruce C. Nelson, *Beyond the Martyrs* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1988). Timothy Messer-Kruse, *The Haymarket Conspiracy* (Urbana, Ill., 2012), argues that the brother-in-law of one defendant threw the bomb.

58 Gurda, *The Making of Milwaukee*, 189.

59 Thanks to Eric Kurlander for bringing the origins of the Louisville Slugger to my attention.

60 "The Katzenjammer Kids," in *The Encyclopedia of American Comics*, ed. Ron Goulart (New York, 1990), 212–13.

61 Ortlepp, *"Auf denn, Ihr Schwestern!"*

62 Christiane Harzig, "Lebensformen im Einwanderungsprozess," in Bade, ed., *Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland*, 166.

63 Peter Connolly-Smith, *Translating America* (Washington, D.C., 2004).

64 Lorenzkowski, *Sounds of Ethnicity*, 83.

65 Glenn Gilbert, ed., *The German Language in America: A Symposium* (Austin, 1971).

66 John Nau, *The German People of New Orleans, 1850–1900* (Leiden, 1958).

67 Karen Schniedewind, "Fremde in der alten Welt," in Bade, ed., *Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland*, 181–82.

68 Ibid., 183.

69 Walter D. Kampfhoefner et al., eds., *News from the Land of Freedom* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991).

70 In 1857 the German publisher and bookseller Wilhelm Engelmann listed two hundred handbooks, travel guides, and advice books under the heading "Writings on Emigration": Heinrich Krohn, *Und warum habt ihr denn Deutschland verlassen?* (Bergisch Gladbach, 1992), 128–29.

71 Friedrich Gerstäcker, *Nach Amerika!* (Jena, 1855).

72 Jeffrey Sammons, *Ideology, Nemesis, Fantasy* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998); A. J. Prahl, "Gerstäcker und die Probleme seiner Zeit" (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1933).

73 L[udwik] P[owidaj], "Polacy i Indianie," *Dzennik Literacki*, part 1 in no. 53 (Dec. 9, 1864), and part 2 in no. 56 (Dec. 30, 1864). Thanks to Patrice Dabrowski for bringing these articles to my attention and translating passages. See also David Blackbourn, *The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany* (New York, 2006), 303–4.

74 Harry Liebersohn, *Aristocratic Encounters* (New York, 1998); H. Glenn Penny, *Kindred by Choice* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2013).

75 Christine Hansen, "Die deutsche Auswanderung im 19. Jahrhundert—Ein Mittel zur Lösung sozialer und sozialpolitischer Probleme?," in Moltmann, ed., *Deutsche Amerikaauswanderung*, 22, citing Hans von Gagern, *Über die Auswanderung der Deutschen.*

76 Harald Focke, "Friedrich List und die südwestdeutsche Amerikaauswanderung 1817–1846," in Moltmann, ed., *Deutsche Amerikaauswanderung*, 80.

77 Hans Fenske, "Imperialistische Tendenzen in Deutschland vor 1866," *Historisches Jahrbuch* (1978): 346.

78 Howard Sargent, "Diasporic Citizens," in O'Donnell et al., eds., *The Heimat Abroad*, 22–23; Eli Nathans, *The Politics of Citizenship in Germany* (New York, 2004); Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschliessen* (Göttingen, 2001).

79 Bradley D. Naranch, "Inventing the *Auslandsdeutsche*," in *Germany's Colonial Pasts*, ed. Eric Ames et al. (Lincoln, Neb., 2005), 21–40.

80 Donna Gabaccia, "Juggling Jargons: 'Italians Everywhere,' Diaspora or Transnationalism?," *Traverse: Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 12, no. 1 (2005): 56.

81 Gerhard Weidenfeller, *VDA—Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland* (Berne, 1976); H. Glenn Penny, "Material Connections," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 59, no. 3 (2017): 519–49; Stefan Manz, *Constructing a German Diaspora* (New York, 2014), 227–60.

82 Fenske, "Imperialistische Tendenzen," 345; Jens-Uwe Guettel, *German Expansionism, Imperial Liberalism, and the United States, 1776–1945* (New York, 2012), 57–58.

83 Frank Lorenz Müller, "Imperialist Ambitions in *Vormärz* and Revolutionary Germany," *GH* 17, no. 3 (1999): 351 (I have slightly altered the wording for stylistic reasons).

84 Franz Löher, *Geschichte und Zustände der Deutschen in Amerika* (Cincinnati, 1848); P. Wittmann, "Löher, Franz von," *ADB* 52 (1906): 56–62.

85 Ernst Ludwig Brauns, *Neudeutschland in Westamerika* (Lemgo, 1847), 75.

86 Ibid., 77–78.

87 Fenske, "Imperialistische Tendenzen," 370–71; H. Winkel, "Der Texasverein," *VSWG* 55 (1968): 348–72; Walter Struve, *Germans and Texans* (Austin, 1996), 46–50.

88 Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985); Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts* (New Haven, 2008).

89 Guettel, *German Expansionism*, 72–73; Müller, "Imperialist Ambitions," 365; Matthew Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany* (New York, 2008), 41.

90 Müller, "Imperialist Ambitions," 357–66.

91 Examples in Fenske, "Imperialistische Tendenzen," 347.

92 Gavin Henderson, "German Colonial Projects on the Mosquito Coast, 1844–1848," *EHR* 59 (1944): 257–71; Thomas Schoonover, "Germany in Central America, 1820s to 1929," *JbLA* 25 (1988): 39–41; Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism*, 61–65.

93 Karl Gaillard, *Wie und Wohin?* (Berlin, 1849), 35.
94 Focke, "Friedrich List und die südwestdeutsche Amerikaauswanderung," 82; Müller, "Imperialist Ambitions," 355; Fenske, "Imperialistische Tendenzen," 348.
95 H. von der Oelsnitz, *Denkschrift über die Erhebung Preussens zu einer See-, Kolonial- und Weltmacht ersten Ranges* (Berlin, 1847), 9, 13, 19, 33–34.
96 Friedrich Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?* (Gotha, 1879).
97 Sebastian Conrad, *German Colonialism* (New York, 2012), 21.
98 Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* [1900], vol. 4 of *The Penguin Freud Library*, ed. Angela Richards (Harmondsworth, Eng., 1991), 388–89, 415–19.
99 Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden, *Deutsche Kolonisation* (Hamburg, 1881).
100 Ernst von Weber, *Die Erweiterung unseres deutschen Wirthschaftsgebiets und die Grundlegung zu überseeischen deutschen Staaten* (Leipzig, 1879), 1.
101 Klaus J. Bade, *Friedrich Fabri und der Imperialismus in der Bismarckzeit* (Erlangen, 1975), 157.
102 Eugen von Enzberg, *Heroen der Nordpolarforschung* (Leipzig, 1905), 128–75 (quotation at 175); Reinhard A. Krause, *Die Gründungsphase deutscher Polarforschung, 1865–1875* (Bremerhaven, 1992).
103 Horst Gnettner, *Der Bremer Afrikaforscher Gerhard Rohlfs* (Bremen, 2005).
104 Felix Lampe, *Grosse Geographen* (Leipzig, 1915), 245–51; Cornelia Essner, *Deutsche Afrikareisende im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1985); Ursula von den Driesch, "Schweinfurth, Georg August," in *NDB* 24 (2010): 50–51; Wolfgang Saida, ed., *150 Jahre Karl Mauch, Afrikaforscher, 1837–1987* (Kernen, 1987); Claus Priesner, "Nachtigal, Gustav," in *NDB* 18 (1997): 682–84; Wilhelm Obers Focke, "Mohr, Eduard," in *ADB* 22 (1885): 66–67.
105 Examples in Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?*, 30, 39–40.
106 Arne Perras, *Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 1856–1918* (New York, 2004).
107 Steven Press, *Rogue Empires* (Cambridge, Mass., 2017), 131–65.
108 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* (Cologne, 1969); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Bismarck's Imperialism, 1862–1890," *PP* 48 (1970): 119–55; Martin Werner, *Deutschlands Griff nach Übersee* (Hamburg, 2014).
109 Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?*, 87–89.
110 Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism*; Geoff Eley, "Social Imperialism," *Social History* 1, no. 3 (1976): 265–90.
111 Alfred von Tirpitz, *My Memoirs* (New York, 1919), 1:80–81.
112 Rüdiger vom Bruch and Björn Hofmeister, eds., *Kaiserreich und Erster Weltkrieg, 1871–1918* (Stuttgart, 2000), 268–70.
113 Horst Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien* (Paderborn, 1985), 241–45; Klaus J. Bade, "Die deutsche Kolonialexpansion in Afrika," in *Afrika im Geschichtsunterricht europäischer Länder*, ed. W. Fürnrohr (Munich, 1982), 7–47.
114 George Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting* (Chicago, 2007), 243–315.
115 Ibid., 317–58; Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, "Embodying Empire: European Tattooing and German Colonial Power," *PP* 234 (2017): 101–35.
116 Klaus J. Bade, "Culture, Cash, and Christianity," *Pacific Studies* 10, no. 3 (1987): 65–66.
117 Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation*, 258–67.
118 Steinmetz, *Devil's Handwriting*, 15–16, 434–36. On Richthofen, see ibid., 405–14, and Shellen Xiao Wu, *Empires of Coal* (Stanford, Calif., 2015), 33–65.
119 Steinmetz, *Devil's Handwriting*, 436–507; Klaus Mühlhahn, *Herrschaft und Widerstand in der "Musterkolonie" Kiautchou* (Munich, 2000).
120 Andreas Eckert, *Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt/Main, 2006), 65–66.
121 Steinmetz, *Devil's Handwriting*, 185.
122 Ibid., 180.
123 Ibid., 6–12, 135–239; Helmut Bley, *Southwest Africa Under German Rule* (Evanston, Ill., 1971); Jon M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Herero* (Berkeley, Calif., 1981); Nils Ole Oermann, *Mission, Church and State Relations in South West Africa Under German Rule (1884–1915)* (Stuttgart, 1999); Jürgen Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner* (Münster, 2001); Jakob Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen* (Göttingen, 2010); Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005), 5–92; Susanna Kuss, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence* (Cambridge, Mass., 2017).

124 Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 145–47; Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 157–75. On colonial policies and famine in German East Africa, see Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts* (London, 2001), 204.
125 Steinmetz, *Devil's Handwriting*, 6.
126 Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire* (New York, 1981), 102.
127 Woodruff Smith, *The German Colonial Empire* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978), 75–90.
128 Arthur J. Knoll, *Togo Under Imperial Germany, 1884–1914* (Stanford, Calif., 1970); Peter Sebald, *Togo, 1884–1914: Eine Geschichte der deutschen "Musterkolonie"* (Berlin, 1988); Dennis Laumann, "A Historiography of German Togoland, or the Rise and Fall of a 'Model Colony,'" *History in Africa* 30 (2003): 195–211; Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa* (Princeton, N.J., 2011), 112–38; Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 66–74.
129 Oermann, *Mission, Church and State Relations*, 83.
130 Michael Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika* (Frankfurt/Main, 2005); Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen*.
131 Karl Liebknecht, *Militarismus und Antimilitarismus* (Leipzig, 1907).
132 David Schoenbaum, *Zabern* (Boston, 1982).
133 Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz?* (Berlin, 2011); Jürgen Zimmerer, "Colonial Genocide and the Holocaust," in *Genocide and Settler Society*, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York, 2004), 49–76.
134 That is the argument of Hull, *Absolute Destruction*.
135 Dieter Langewiesche, "Das Jahrhundert Europas," *HZ* 296 (2013): 30–31, citing Charles Edward Callwell, *Small Wars* (London, 1886).
136 See Dirk van Laak, "Kolonien als 'Laboratorien der Moderne'?," in *Das Kaiserreich transnational*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen, 2004), 257–79; Conrad, *German Colonialism*, 142–49.
137 Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*.
138 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, 1998), 21–22, 269–82, 294; John McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun* (New York, 2000), 218–24; Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*, 120–21.
139 Andreas Eckert, *Grundbesitz, Landkonflikte und kolonialer Wandel* (Stuttgart, 1999); Wilhelm Matzat, *Die Tsingtauer Landordnung des Chinesenkommissars Wilhelm Schrameier* (Bonn, 1985), 2–33; Klaus Mühlhahn, *Herrschaft und Widerstand in der "Musterkolonie" Kiautschou* (Munich, 2000).
140 Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago, 1991); Robert G. Irving, *Indian Summer* (London, 1981).
141 van Laak, "Kolonien als 'Laboratorien der Moderne'?," 263.
142 Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, *Purging the Empire* (New York, 2015).
143 Florian Hoffmann, *Okkupation und Militärverwaltung in Kamerun* (Göttingen, 2007), pt. 2, 248–52; Pascal Grosse, *Kolonialismus, Eugenik und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1850–1918* (Frankfurt/Main, 2000).
144 Jake W. Spidle, "Colonial Studies in Imperial Germany," *History of Education Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (1973): 237–41; Marianne Harries, "Fabarius, Ernst Albert," in *NDB* 4 (1959): 717–18.
145 On the complexities of racial line-drawing, see Robbie Aitken, *Exclusion and Inclusion* (New York, 2007).
146 Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham, N.C., 2001), 134.
147 Ibid., 155.
148 Ibid., 134.
149 Ibid., 164–65.
150 Daniel J. Walther, "Racializing Sex," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 17, no. 1 (2008): 11–24; Fitzpatrick, *Purging the Empire*, 229–30, 251–52.
151 Oermann, *Mission, Church and State Relations*, 69.
152 Fitzpatrick, *Purging the Empire*, 252.
153 Ibid.
154 Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire*, 54–78, 134.

155 Frieda von Bülow's fictionalized account is *Im Lande der Verheissung: Ein deutscher Kolonial-Roman* (Dresden, 1899).
156 van Laak, "Kolonien als 'Laboratorien der Moderne'?," 267; Birthe Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten* (Cologne, 2003), 29 and *n*77.
157 Thorsten Heese, "Das koloniale Osnabrück," in *Kolonialismus hierzulande: Eine Spurensuche*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden and Joachim Zeller (Erfurt, 2007), 41.
158 Robbie Aitken and Eve Rosenhaft, *Black Germany* (New York, 2013), 9.
159 Ibid., 31, 33.
160 Ibid., 2.
161 Peter Fritzsche, *Reading Berlin 1900* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996).
162 David Ciarlo, *Advertising Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011). Frank Trentmann, *Empire of Things* (New York, 2016), 172–73, reminds us that Black people appeared in just 3 percent of coffee advertisements.
163 Sierra Bruckner, "Spectacles of (Human) Nature," in *Worldly Provincialism*, ed. Matt Bunzl and H. Glenn Penny (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2003), 127–55; Alexander Honold, "Ausstellung des Fremden—Menschen- und Völkerschau um 1900," in Conrad and Osterhammel, eds., *Kaiserreich transnational*, 170–90; Anne Dreesbach, *Gezähmte Wilde* (Frankfurt/Main, 2005); Cordula Grewe, ed., *Die Schau des Fremden* (Stuttgart, 2006).
164 The phrase "commercial ethnography" comes from Bruckner, "Spectacles of (Human) Nature." See also Andrew Zimmerman, *Anthropology and Antihumanism* (Chicago, 2002), 16–20; Ciarlo, *Advertising Empire*, 81–84.
165 Hilke Thoda-Arora, *Für fünfzig Pfennig um die Welt* (Frankfurt/Main, 1989); Nigel Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts* (Baltimore, 2002), 44–142.
166 Jochen Lingelbach, "War da was? Spuren des Kolonialismus in Leipzig," in van der Heyden and Zeller, eds., *Kolonialismus hierzulande*, 53–55.
167 Anne Dreesbach and Michael Kamp, "Kolonialismus in München," in van der Heyden and Zeller, eds., *Kolonialismus hierzulande*, 72–73.
168 "Als auf der Wiesen noch fremde Völker zur Schau gestellt wurden," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Sept. 27, 2018.
169 Mamoun Fansa, ed., *Das Somali-Dorf in Oldenburg 1905* (Oldenburg, 2005).
170 Alf Rössner, "Das koloniale Weimar," in van der Heyden and Zeller, eds., *Kolonialismus hierzulande*, 27–33.
171 Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire;* John Philip Short, *Magic Lantern Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2012).
172 Jeff Bowersox, *Raising Germans in the Age of Empire* (New York, 2013), 32, 42; Bryan Ganaway, *Toys, Consumption, and Middle-Class Childhood in Imperial Germany, 1871–1918* (Frankfurt/Main, 2009).
173 Jan Rüger and others in "Forum: The German Colonial Imagination," *GH* 26, no. 2 (2008): 251–71, question how pervasive the "culture of colonialism" was.
174 Oermann, *Mission, Church and State Relations*, 80.
175 Anne Dreesbach, "Colonial Exhibitions, 'Völkerschauen' and the Display of the 'Other,'" *EGO: European History Online*, March 5, 2012, paragraph 24, http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/backgrounds/european-encounters/anne-dreesbach-colonial-exhibitions-voelkerschauen-and-the-display-of-the-other?set_language=http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/backgrounds/european-encounters/anne-dreesbach-colonial-exhibitions-voelkerschauen-and-the-display-of-the-other; Dressbach, *Gezähmte Wilde.*
176 Langewiesche, "Das Jahrhundert Europas," 32–33, citing Ernst Troeltsch, "Das Neunzehnte Jahrhundert" (1913).
177 Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "When Did Globalisation Begin?," *European Review of Economic History* 6 (2002): 23–50; Cornelius Torp, "Weltwirtschaft vor dem Weltkrieg," *HZ* 279 (2004): 561–609; Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson, *Globalization* (Princeton, N.J., 2005), 81–89.
178 Quinn Slobodian, "How to See the World Economy," *JGH* 20 (2015): 317, citing Adolph Wagner, *Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie* (Leipzig, 1894).
179 Ibid., 308; Mark Hewitson, *Germany and the Modern World, 1880–1914* (New York, 2018), 215, 219.

180 David Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1998), 330; Alan Milward and S. B. Saul, *The Economic Development of Continental Europe, 1780–1870* (London, 1973), 473.
181 Blackbourn, *Long Nineteenth Century*, 313.
182 Maiken Umbach, "Made in Germany," in *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, ed. Étienne François and Hagen Schulze (Munich, 2001), 2:405–18; Walter E. Minchinton, "E. E. Williams: 'Made in Germany' and After," *VSWG* 62, no. 2 (1975): 229–42.
183 Toni Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly, *The German Economy During the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 2004), 153–56.
184 Steven Press, *Blood and Diamonds* (Cambridge, Mass., 2021).
185 Andrew Zimmerman, "Race and World Politics," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History*, ed. Helmut Walser Smith (New York, 2011), 362.
186 Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton* (New York, 2015), 357, citing the economist Karl Helfferich.
187 Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, 239; Conrad, *German Colonialism*, 97.
188 Adolph Wagner, *Agrar- und Industriestaat* (Jena, 1902), 192.
189 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, 62.
190 Cornelius Torp, *Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung* (Göttingen, 2005), 79.
191 Martin Kitchen, *The Political Economy of Germany, 1815–1914* (London, 1978), 193.
192 Blackbourn, *Long Nineteenth Century*, 335–36.
193 Werner Abelshauser, David Gilgen, and Andreas Leutsch, "Kultur, Wirtschaft, Kulturen der Weltwirtschaft," in *Kulturen der Weltwirtschaft*, ed. Werner Abelshauser et al. (Göttingen, 2012), 9–28.
194 James J. Sheehan, *The Career of Lujo Brentano* (Chicago, 1966).
195 Heinrich Dietzel, *Das neunzehnte Jahrhundert und das Programm des Liberalismus* (Bonn, 1900), 14.
196 Kenneth D. Barkin, *The Controversy over German Industrialization, 1890–1902* (Chicago, 1970).
197 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York, 1944), 202.
198 The historian is Helmut Böhme. See Blackbourn, *Long Nineteenth Century*, 315–17.
199 Karl Hardach, *Die Bedeutung wirtschaftlicher Faktoren bei der Einführung der Eisen- und Getreidezölle in Deutschland 1879* (Berlin, 1967).
200 Geoff Eley, "*Sammlungspolitik*, Social Imperialism and the Navy Law of 1898," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 1 (1974): 29–63; Cornelius Torp, "The Coalition of 'Rye and Iron' Under the Pressure of Globalization," *CEH* 43, no. 3 (2010): 401–27.
201 David Blackbourn, *Populists and Patricians* (Boston, 1987), 122–26.
202 Ibid., 230.
203 James C. Hunt, "Peasants, Grain Tariffs, and Meat Quotas," *CEH* 7, no. 4 (1974): 311–31.
204 Ulrich Teichmann, *Die Politik der Agrarpreisstützung* (Cologne, 1955), 463–74; David Blackbourn, *Class, Religion and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany* (New Haven, 1980), 49–50.
205 Brett Fairbairn, *Democracy in the Undemocratic State* (Toronto, 1997).
206 Trentmann, *Empire of Things*, 159.
207 Uwe Spiekermann, "Dangerous Meat?," *BGHI* 46 (2010): 99–100, citing *New-York Tribune*, Mar. 21, 1883.
208 Teichmann, *Politik der Agrarpreisstützung*, 569–604; Hunt, "Peasants, Grain Tariffs, and Meat Quotas," 313–16; Cornelia Knab, "Infectious Rats and Dangerous Cows," *ConEH* 20, no. 3 (2011): 281–306.
209 Blackbourn, *Long Nineteenth Century*, 315.
210 Adolf Wermuth, *Ein Beamtenleben* (Berlin, 1922), 48–50.
211 James T. Cariton and Jonathan B. Geller, "Ecological Roulette," *Science* 261 (July 1993), 78–82.
212 Johannes Baptist Kissling, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes im Deutschen Reiche* (Freiburg i. B., 1916), 3:58, citing a writer in *Im Neuen Reich.*
213 Sarah Jansen, "*Schädlinge*" (Frankfurt/Main, 2003).
214 Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation*, 239, citing a 1906 issue of *Deutsche Volkszeitung.*
215 Bade, *Migration in European History*, 157–64; Hermann Schäfer, "Italienische 'Gastar-

beiter' im deutschen Kaiserreich, 1890–1914," *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* 27 (1982): 192–214.

216 Otto Uhlig, *Die Schwabenkinder aus Tirol und Vorarlberg* (Stuttgart, 1978). In 2021 Johnathon Speed completed a dissertation at Vanderbilt University on the Swabian children.

217 Blackbourn, *Conquest of Nature*, 237.

218 Jack Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers* (New York, 1987). Just 75,000 of the 2 million remained in Germany.

219 Richard W. Tims, *Germanizing Prussian Poland* (New York, 1966); William W. Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews* (Chicago, 1980).

220 Max Weber, "The Nation State and Economic Policy," in *Weber: Political Writings*, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge, 1994), 1–28.

221 Roger Chickering, *"We Men Who Feel Most German"* (Boston, 1984), 104.

222 Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation*, 250–51, drawing on Sibylle Küttner, *Farbige Seeleute* (Erfurt, 2000).

CHAPTER NINE: GLOBAL TRAFFIC AND THE CLAIMS OF GERMAN CULTURE

1 Mark Hewitson, *Germany and the Modern World, 1880–1914* (New York, 2018), 228; Joachim Radkau, "Technik im Temporausch der Jahrhundertwende," in *Moderne Zeiten*, ed. Michael Salewski and Ilona Stölken-Fitschen (Stuttgart, 1994), 61–76.

2 Hans-Otto Kleinmann, "Der atlantische Raum als Problem des europäischen Staatensystems," *JbLA* 38 (2001): 22.

3 Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, "The Philosophical World Journey in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Mechanics of Internationalism*, ed. Martin Geyer and Johannes Paulmann (New York, 2001), 405–33.

4 Regina Höfer, ed., *Die Indienreise von Erzherzog Franz-Ferdinand von Österreich-Este* (Vienna, 2010).

5 Horace Rumbold, *Recollections of a Diplomatist* (London, 1902), 2:228. See also David Blackbourn, "'Taking the Waters,'" in Geyer and Paulmann, eds., *Mechanics of Internationalism*, 435–57.

6 Bonnie Anderson, *Joyous Greetings: The First International Women's Movement, 1830–1860* (New York, 2000), 99, 159.

7 Susan Zimmermann, "Frauenbewegungen, Transfer und Trans-Nationalität," in *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im. 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hartmut Kaelble et al. (Frankfurt/Main, 2002), 263–302.

8 Leila J. Rupp, "Constructing Internationalism," *AHR* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1571–1600; Jean H. Quataert, "'Being Heard on Important Matters of International Life,'" in *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain*, ed. Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth (New York, 2008), 173–95.

9 Georges Haupt, *Socialism and the Great War* (New York, 1972).

10 Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and a World Without War* (Princeton, N.J., 1975).

11 Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, 2013), 11–44.

12 Michael D. Gordin, *Scientific Babel* (Chicago, 2015), 105–58; Markus Krajewski, "Organizing a Global Idiom," in *Information Beyond Borders*, ed. W. Boyd Rayward (New York, 2014), 97–108.

13 Chris Leonards and Nico Randeraad, "Transnational Experts in Social Reform, 1840–1880," *International Review of Social History* 55, no. 2 (2010): 220, citing Christopher Lasch.

14 Dirk Hoerder, "Local, Continental, Global Migration Contexts," in *Beyond the Nation? Immigrants' Local Lives in Transational Cultures*, ed. Alexander Freund (Toronto, 2012), 21–22.

15 May Seikaly, "Haifa at the Crossroads," in *Modernity and Culture*, ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C. A. Bayly (New York, 2002), 99–104.

16 Jeffrey Wasserstrom, *Global Shanghai, 1850–2010* (New York, 2008), 40.

17 Brian Letwin, "The Lost History of Germans in Saigon," *Saigoneer*, May 20, 2014.

18 Uwe Spiekermann, "Claus Spreckels," *Business and Economic History On-Line* 8 (2010): 19.

19 Jessie Gregory Lutz, *Opening China* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 2008); Albert Monshan Wu, *From Christ to Confucius* (New Haven, 2016), 19–20, 30, 44–46.

20 Wu, *From Christ to Confucius*, 62.

21 Ulrike Kirchberger, "'Fellow-Labourers in the Same Vineyard,'" in *Migration and Transfer from Germany to Britain, 1660–1914*, ed. Stefan Manz et al. (Malden, Mass., 2009), 81–92; Bill Edwards, "The Moravian Church in South Australia," in *Germans*, ed. Peter Monteath (Kent Town, Aust., 2011), 41–46.

22 Kirchberger, "'Fellow-Labourers in the Same Vineyard,'" 87–88.

23 Rebekka Habermas, "Mission im 19. Jahrhundert—Globale Netze des Religösen," *HZ* 287 (2008): 652–60.

24 Kirchberger, "'Fellow-Labourers in the Same Vineyard,'" 84.

25 Wu, *From Christ to Confucius*, 63–65.

26 Ibid., 44–45.

27 Habermas, "Mission im 19. Jahrhundert," 643–44.

28 Robbie Aitken and Eve Rosenhaft, *Black Germany* (New York, 2012), 44–53.

29 Johannes Paulmann, "Regionen und Welten," *HZ* 296 (2013): 687–93.

30 Wolbert Smidt, "'Schwarze Missionare' in Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts," in *AfrikanerInnen in Deutschland und Schwarze Deutsche*, ed. Marianne Bechhaus-Gerst and Reinhard Klein-Arendt (Münster, 2004), 46.

31 Ibid., 44.

32 Eduard Hüsgen, *Ludwig Windthorst* (Cologne, 1911), 296.

33 Renate Hücking and Ekkehard Launer, *Aus Menschen Neger machen* (Hamburg, 1986), 94–95, 102–3; Hans Debrunner, *Presence and Prestige* (Basel, 1979), 363–64.

34 Paul Göhre, *Drei Jahre Fabrikarbeiter und Handwerksbursche* (Leipzig, 1891).

35 Habermas, "Mission im 19. Jahrhundert," 654–56.

36 Thomas Hahn-Bruckart, *Friedrich von Schlümbach* (Göttingen, 2011).

37 Patrick Streiff, *Der Methodismus in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2003).

38 Christoph Ribbat, *Religiöse Erregung* (Frankfurt/Main, 1996), 35–73, 120–31.

39 Shellen Xiao Wu, *Empires of Coal* (Stanford, Calif., 2015), 38–65; Paulmann, "Regionen und Welten," 684–87; Ulrike Kirchberger, "Deutsche Naturwissenschaftler im britischen Empire," *HZ* 271 (2000): 621–60.

40 H. Glenn Penny, "Latin American Connections: Recent Work on German Interactions with Latin America," *CEH* 46, no. 2 (2013): 373–74.

41 R. A. Swan, "Neumayer, Georg Balthasar von (1826–1909)," in *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, vol. 5 (Melbourne, 1974).

42 Darrell Lewis, *Where Is Dr. Leichhardt: The Greatest Mystery in Australian History* (Clayton, Aust., 2013).

43 Leichhardt to Friedrich August Schmalfuss, Oct. 21, 1847, and Feb. 22, 1848, both in "Ludwig Leichhardt: A German Explorer's Letters Home," www.environmentandsociety.org.

44 Wu, *Empires of Coal*, 38–46.

45 Cornelia Essner, *Deutsche Afrikareisende im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1985).

46 Moritz von Brescius et al., eds., *Über den Himalya* (Vienna, 2015); Moritz von Brescius, *German Science in the Age of Empire* (New York, 2019).

47 Joachim Radkau, *Nature and Power* (New York, 2008), 174.

48 Indra Munshi Saldanha, "Colonialism and Professionalism," *Environment and History* 2, no. 2 (1996): 195–219; Ravi Rajan, "Imperial Environmentalism or Environmental Imperialism?," in *Nature and the Orient*, ed. Richard Grove et al. (New York, 1998), 324–71; Ulrike Kirchberger, "German Scientists in the Indian Forest Service," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 29, no. 2 (2001): 1–26; Gregory Barton, *Empire Forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism* (New York, 2002).

49 Henry Gerhold, *A Century of Forest Resources Education at Penn State* (University Park, Pa., 2007), 15–17.

50 David Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1998), 194; James Hodkin-



GERMANY IN THE WORLD

A GLOBAL HISTORY 1500–2000

DAVID BLACKBOURN

Liveright Publishing Corporation

A Division of W. W. Norton & Company
Celebrating a Century of Independent Publishing

Copyright © 2023 by David Blackbourn

All rights reserved
Printed in the United States
First Edition

For information about permission to reproduce selections from this book, write to Permissions, Liveright Publishing Corporation, a division of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110

For information about special discounts for bulk purchases, please contact W. W. Norton Special Sales at specialsales@wwnorton.com or 800-233-4830

Manufacturing by Lakeside Book Company
Book design by Barbara M. Bachman
Production manager: Anna Oler

ISBN 978-1-63149-183-2

Liveright Publishing Corporation, 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110
www.wwnorton.com

W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., 15 Carlisle Street, London W1D 3BS

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

For Celia

CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS xi

INTRODUCTION xiii

PART ONE

GERMANS IN A CHANGING WORLD

CHAPTER 1 NEW WORLDS 3

CHAPTER 2 COMBUSTIONS 50

CHAPTER 3 EMPIRES 94

PART TWO

GERMANY AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN, 1780–1820

CHAPTER 4 REVOLUTIONS 137

CHAPTER 5 KNOWLEDGE 165

CHAPTER 6 WORLD LITERATURE 190

PART THREE

GERMANS AND THE GERMAN NATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

CHAPTER 7 A NATION AMONG OTHERS 209

CHAPTER 8 ON THE MOVE 252

CHAPTER 9 GLOBAL TRAFFIC AND THE CLAIMS OF GERMAN CULTURE 310

PART FOUR
THE "GERMAN CENTURY" CONFOUNDED

CHAPTER 10 WAR, REPUBLIC, THIRD REICH: GERMANY, 1914–1939 367

CHAPTER 11 THE PIVOTAL DECADE: GERMANY AND GLOBAL HISTORY, 1939–1949 464

CHAPTER 12 THE GERMAN QUESTION ANSWERED 551

EPILOGUE 646

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 661
NOTES 663
ILLUSTRATION CREDITS 737
INDEX 739

LIST OF MAPS

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE IN 1500
5

THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION OF 1815
214

UNIFIED GERMANY, 1871
243

GERMAN-OCCUPIED EUROPE IN 1941–42
472

THE OCCUPATION ZONES IN POSTWAR GERMANY
538