

2

THE TWO FACES OF NATIONALISM: ETHNIC CLEANSING AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY

2.1 The rise of modern nationalism and the “long” First World War

The idea of the nation emerged in the early modern era and began to spread out as a mass movement beginning in the late eighteenth century.¹ In Western Europe the French Revolution provided the initial spark, while in Eastern Europe the impulse came from the partitions of Poland, which obliterated one of the oldest states and larger nations from the map of Europe. Initially the Jacobins, like the American revolutionaries of 1776, stood for a universal definition of the nation, primarily based on political values and convictions, and not on language or culture. Refugees accordingly were welcomed to France as long as they adhered to the values of the revolution. The second, republican Constitution of June 1793 established a right of asylum, basing it on a very simple principle: “It [the French Republic] serves as a place of refuge for all who, on account of liberty, are banished from their native country. These it refuses to deliver up to tyrants.”² Based on this paragraph (120) in the constitution, all persons who were politically persecuted could find refuge in France, the sanctuary of freedom and democracy.

This openness toward newcomers from other nations did not last. Owing to military intervention by the *ancien régime*, French nationalism became more exclusive. Reacting to the external threat posed during the Coalition Wars, the Jacobins mobilized the population and the army by promoting a kind of nationalism that was now linguistic and, in a rudimentary way, already ethnic. Bertrand Barère, a member of the Committee of Public Safety and thus of the government’s executive board, declared in 1794:

Federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hatred of the Republic speak German; [the] counter-revolution speaks Italian and fanaticism speaks Basque. . . . We must smash these instruments of harm and error. . . . [L]eaving citizens in ignorance of the national language . . .

is to betray the fatherland. . . . Among a free people language must be one and the same for everyone. . . .³

What stands out in this statement is the ideal of a linguistically and culturally homogenous nation. The growing xenophobia it represented had an immediate impact on the large number of political refugees from the Netherlands and Germany. In 1793, at Barère's instigation, the Committee on Public Safety promulgated a decree deporting all those refugees collectively under suspicion of supporting the counterrevolution.⁴

In the German states and Eastern Europe, from the very outset, nationalism had struck a sharper tone, setting what was foreign against what was native, foe against friend. This had to do with the Napoleonic Wars and the long era of foreign imperial rule. At the end of the Wars of Liberation, the famous Prussian reformer Freiherr vom Stein advocated a radical "purge" of the French from his Rhenish homeland:

Every people that wants to be genuinely national will not place trust in foreigners so as to mingle indifferently in civic community with them. . . . It is our duty toward the German fatherland to purge the Rhineland of everything that has made it un-German and keeps it in this condition.⁵

The formula "genuinely national" and the rejection of any kind of mingling testify to an ethnic definition of the nation that would become prevalent among all Central and East European national movements in the course of the nineteenth century.

Holm Sundhaussen has pointedly summarized modern nation-state formation in the Balkans as a pattern combining the French model of a centralized and unitary state with the German model of a nation based on ancestry. Much the same may be said of East Central Europe, even if that region always had exceptions and saw attempts at forming a more supra-ethnic kind of nation-state, as in the case of interwar Czechoslovakia or (more recently) Ukraine. Each of these models, the French and the German, involved the narrowest possible conception of a state and nation—in contrast to federalism and to politically defined nations made up of citizens, as in the case of the US. Combining the two European models made for a highly conflict-ridden mixture, since the areas of settlement for nations in Central and Eastern Europe overlapped and because, over time, almost every national movement demanded a state of its own.

This demand was not compatible with the presence of national minorities, something that became apparent in Central Europe right after the Franco-German War of 1870–71. When the German Empire annexed Alsace and Lorraine, its inhabitants faced two alternatives: they could either become citizens of the German Empire or opt for France, in which case they would then have to leave their homeland. The existence of national minorities was

not recognized. This was attributable, on the one hand, to the structures of modern administrative states, which invariably closed the distance between the state and individual citizens by means of compulsory education, the military draft, and an expanded bureaucracy, demanding unambiguous loyalty. On the other hand, the urge toward unambiguity was also a product of contemporary nationalism, which was growing in intensity.

Attitudes toward national minorities and relations among nations deteriorated even further under the impact of imperialism and Social Darwinism. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, relations among nations came to be interpreted as part of an eternal struggle for survival. According to the conventional biologicistic and increasingly racist thinking of the time, minorities were a foreign body in the fabric of one's own nation, inhibiting national development and posing a threat.

This was also when the term "race" came up in public discourse. It was not used not only in our present-day understanding of "race" as referring to skin color and descent, but as the stand-in also for an inflexible and unalterable conception of what constituted a "nation." When, for example, Western observers wrote about the Bulgarian, Greek, or Albanian "race," they implied that these were fundamentally different and potentially conflicting nations. The possible confusion between these two meanings of "race" is one of the reasons why I prefer not to utilize the term as one of the main analytical categories in this book. I am of course aware how omnipresent race is in US academic discourse, and I agree that it is important, especially in studies of societal integration. Nor should one deny the relevance of race or racism for modern nationalism.

The radical ethnic nationalism that came up in late-nineteenth-century Europe was reflected above all in the concept of "minority problems," a term whose meaning branded minorities as the cause of troubles, whereas in fact the major cause was a too narrow concept of the modern nation-state. The fact that an international order based on nation-states did not provide peace and stability became evident first in Southeastern Europe after 1878. The reason was not "ancient hatred" of others, sometimes stereotyped as a specifically Balkan trait. (In the 1990s, this unfortunate cliché caused the West to commit serious blunders in its dealings with the war in the former Yugoslavia.⁶) The problem, rather, was the incompatibility between the newly founded nation-states and their national minorities. This was a structural problem, one that would catch up with Europe in its entirety after the First World War and one that remains virulent to this day. All modern European nation-states pursued a strategy of assimilation, but that approach succeeded only in relatively rich countries with a very long tradition of statehood. When assimilation failed, the nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe resorted to more brutal measures, to the suppression of minorities, and ultimately (in some cases) to their violent removal.

Flight during the First World War

Radical nationalism and Social Darwinist thinking contributed fundamentally to the outbreak of the First World War. For a very long time, historians concentrated on the mostly static warfare on the Western Front, the terrible human loss of 9.5 million fallen soldiers, and the substantial physical destruction of the war. Because of these horrors, much less attention was paid to the roughly 13 million war refugees.⁷ The fact that more than four fifths of them were uprooted in Eastern Europe was also a factor. Research by Peter Gatrell, Włodzimierz Borodziej, and Maciej Górny has corrected the Occidentalism of the older historiography and increased awareness of the enormous numbers of refugees and their plight.⁸ There were so many of them in Eastern Europe because fronts there so often shifted, and because combat was at least as ruthless as in the West. The country most affected by far was the Russian Empire, where about six million people were forced to flee in the course of the war.⁹ Russia was followed by France with 1.8 million refugees, Austria-Hungary with 1.5 million, the German Empire with 850,000, Belgium with 650,000, Italy with 500,000, the Ottoman Empire with at least 400,000, Greece with about 400,000, and Serbia with at least 250,000 people.¹⁰ Around one quarter of these refugees were able to return to their homes during or toward the end of the war. This was another factor contributing to the quick disappearance of the war refugees from public consciousness.

Nevertheless, the many facets of flight—impoverishment, hardship, hunger, unemployment—brought immediacy to the plight of European refugees, not only for those directly affected, but also for the societies that took them in. In the years following 1914, the notion of the refugee became established as an object of public discourse and a screen onto which other concerns were projected. Because of the pervasive hardships brought about by the war, refugees were rarely welcome. Solidarity was practiced mostly toward members of one's own nation. Who counted as belonging to a nation was decided more than before by ethnic factors, a way of thinking that would later contribute to the outbreak of new conflicts and wars. There were, however, a few examples of international assistance. The 650,000 Belgians who fled before the German army, which had illegally occupied their neutral country, were readily admitted into France, England, and the Netherlands. This had to do with human compassion, and above all with the consideration that solidarity with the Belgians would demonstrate the moral superiority of the receiving countries over Germany.

The internationalism propagated by Socialists and Communists was prevalent among the first victims of the world war, which brought into being throughout Europe a new, radicalized nationalism. Beginning in the final third of the nineteenth century, war and nationalism were commonly twinned. There was never one without the other, and they mutually reinforced each other. But



Among the First World War's numerous refugees was the future psychologist and writer **Manès Sperber** (1906–1985). After the Second World War he became famous above all for his settling of accounts with Communism and his autobiographically tinged trilogy, *Like a Tear in the Ocean*. There are few twentieth-century writers who depicted the fate of refugees as movingly and in a manner so true to life as did Sperber. His family came from the small Galician town of Zabłotów, which was located along a heavily contested section of the front in the

First World War. The Sperbers fled four times from the Russian army under perilous circumstances before they finally packed their suitcases on the fifth try and moved to Vienna. There the family found accommodations in a small, bug-ridden apartment in Leopoldstadt, the Jewish and refugee district, where they quickly became impoverished. Hunger was as much a part of everyday life as freezing during the winter; the parents and their three sons tried desperately to keep their heads above water with piecework, specifically by rolling cigarettes for a living. In the first volume of his memoirs, Sperber offers this succinct summary of his difficult youth: "... between 1916 and 1918, sinking from level to level, I was to find out in endless detail, that every fall can trigger a further, deeper fall, and that the abyss has no bottom."¹¹ Only belatedly could he begin school at the local gymnasium, where he remained an outsider and was tormented by an antisemitic teacher. He was unable to finish school, in part because of a case of tuberculosis that only healed after many years and a long stay in a sanatorium. The Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), a Jewish-American NGO that pioneered aid for refugees worldwide, paid for his convalescence.

The experience of being uprooted shaped Sperber's political career. After a brief flirtation with Zionism and an active membership in the socialist Zionist youth group Hashomer Hatzair, he turned to Communism, hoping to find an intellectual home and friends within the movement.¹² After the Palace of Justice in Vienna was burned in 1927 (following clashes between Social Democratic defenders of the Republic and a right-wing anti-democratic veterans' group, which Sperber astutely recognized as an omen signaling the end of the Austrian Republic), he left Vienna and moved to Berlin. There he lived by lecturing and giving presentations on individual psychology, which was emerging as an important field at just that time. Sperber had received his training from Alfred Adler, one of the founders of this field. But he spent most of his

time as an activist for the German Communist Party (KPD) and the Comintern. In 1931 Sperber traveled to the Soviet Union, where he found a poor and brutalized society instead of the workers' and peasants' paradise he expected. His experiences in Moscow led to a first estrangement from Communism and led Sperber to regard the KPD's fight against the Social Democrats as a failed strategy that contributed to the rise of Hitler. In March 1933 SA men tracked him down to a safe house where he was hiding and arrested him. Thanks to an intervention by the Polish embassy (Sperber was a Polish citizen), he was released from jail after five and a half weeks.¹³ After a short stay in Prague he traveled on to Vienna, where he no longer felt at home, then moved for a time to Zagreb, where he quickly learned Serbo-Croatian and once again was able to earn a sporadic living by lecturing. From there he made his way to Paris, where he spent most of the 1930s.

Thanks to his work for exile newspapers and (with increasing frequency) for French publishing houses, Sperber managed to make ends meet, though he lived very modestly. One visitor once noted that his accommodations, a dark and confining hotel room in the Quartier Latin, were furnished with a table, a radio, and a hotplate.¹⁴ Owing to his facility for languages and his charismatic personality, Sperber made connections with the Parisian intellectual scene and befriended André Malraux, who would, a few years later, save his life. In spite of this successful professional integration, Sperber remained critical of his environment: "The radical indifference of Parisians and their decided disinclination to be drawn into the life of foreigners or let such persons into their lives guarantees every individual a personal freedom that is hardly known elsewhere. This freedom benefited the exiles, but it also allowed the poorest and the loneliest among them to perish, 'to drown on the cobblestones out in the open, in the presence of many people, without a single passer-by as much as turning around.'" ¹⁵

After the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Sperber renounced Communism, and in December 1939 he volunteered for the French army. Conceivably he was hoping to obtain French citizenship by serving in the Foreign Legion; his parents and two brothers escaped at the last minute to England. Following demobilization Sperber hid out for almost two years in the south of France, where his wife, a Latvian Jew, bore him a son in June 1942. Three months later, following a warning from his friend André Malraux, he entrusted himself to a smuggler who was supposed to smuggle him across the mountains into Switzerland. But the smuggler abandoned the refugee toward evening at a fork in the trail. Disoriented from exhaustion, Sperber fell asleep on the side of the trail, and at day-break he found his way into Switzerland. After his arrival he was interned in a prison-like camp, while his wife and small son, who managed to escape two weeks later, lived in another camp for over a year.¹⁶ Sperber became ill from a

(cont.)

duodenal ulcer and was taken in by a pastor's family in Zurich. In 1944 the family, finally reunited, was able to move into a small house. One year later the war was over, and the Sperbers moved back to Paris.

Although the eternal refugee was now finally able to settle permanently, he never got over the loss of so many friends who died during the Second World War. His writings—such as his fictional trilogy and his three-part autobiography, less well-known but equally well worth reading—have an eloquence and vividness that recall Stefan Zweig. Understandably, both books are permeated by a profound melancholy. After the first volume of the trilogy came out, Albert Camus wrote to Sperber: "It is one of the books of this time: beautiful, dark, and necessary. I have liked above all what some of the greatest books of this time actually lack: compassion and a certain trembling of humanity, which it seems to me I would be able to recognize from hell."¹⁷

there are other reasons why we should treat the war refugees of the twentieth century within the broader context of nationalistically motivated flight as defined by international law and the statutes of the UNHCR. Refugees from both world wars and the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were victims, above all, of massive and nationalistically motivated violence. Hence, they deserve the same kind of protection and the same prospects for permanent integration as any other group of refugees.

This insight, moreover, makes it easier to understand why refugee flows did not cease with the official end of the two world wars, but actually increased. Although the weapons were officially silent as of November 1918 or May 1945, the victors of the wars thereafter attempted to broaden their territorial gains and to change population structures in their favor. Mass flight was thus no longer a result or symptom of war; it was turning into an aim of war. This first became apparent during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, when national minorities were chased out of disputed regions in order to justify subsequent territorial claims. Waves of refugees also had military side-effects: they upset resupply lines to the front, sowed chaos, undermined the moral of the enemy, and distracted the adversary from military priorities. In the 1940 Blitzkrieg against France, the Wehrmacht deliberately used refugees to achieve these purposes. Toward the end of the "long" First World War—"long" because military actions did not stop in 1918—more than a dozen nations were affected by numerous follow-up conflicts. In Eastern Europe between 1919 and 1923 there were probably even more refugees than there had been earlier, during the grueling war years.¹⁸

One of the largest groups, alongside the Russian Civil War refugees and Greeks from Asia Minor, were again East European Jews fleeing from a

myriad of pogroms that caused thousands of deaths. There was also a massive post-imperial flight by members of imperial nations leaving newly founded nation-states and lost territories. The losers of the First World War in Central Europe—the German Empire, Hungary, which had been reduced to a third of its former territory, and Austria, which shrank even more—had to cope with an influx of about two million people in total.¹⁹ The Ottoman Empire was less affected, because so many Turks and Muslims had already been driven out of Southeastern Europe after 1876 and after 1912, but the Ottomans nevertheless took in around 350,000 Muslims from Greece who had been removed under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. Bulgaria, another loser in the war, had to cope with an influx of more than 200,000 people.

We know little about the integration of these post-imperial refugees; if they had relatives and contacts in their host countries, this was obviously an advantage. Compensation was only a promise received on paper (this was provided for in the Treaties of Neuilly and Lausanne, for example, which is why they fit so well into a world order of liberal nation-states); most of them had lost their property and were impoverished, but never received any compensation. The refugee communities were therefore soon rife with nationalism and its variants of revisionism and revanchism.

The images of massive suffering and dying cited in the introduction to this book mobilized international NGOs like the Carnegie Foundation, which had already documented war crimes in the Balkan Wars. Jewish aid organizations, like the Berlin-based Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden (Relief Organization of German Jews), the aforementioned JDC, and the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society in New York sent food and financial aid and tried to facilitate immigration. The International and the American Red Cross, and British and American Quakers maintained numerous refugee camps. Tens of thousands of people would have died without that support, which stands as a first fine hour for international humanitarianism.

*The protection and diminution of minorities
after the Paris Peace Treaties*

The international community reacted by attempting to use international law as a way of stopping minorities from being subjected to discrimination and persecution. According to estimates by Carole Fink, up to twenty-five million members of minority groups lived in the eastern half of Europe.²⁰ Hence there was an irrefutable need for measures to protect them, which the victorious powers undertook to so do under the influence of the aforementioned NGOs and made into law in all of the Parisian Peace Treaties, from St. Germain to Sèvres. Fink calls this the “little Versailles” next to the “big Versailles” (the peace treaties between the former adversaries of the war).

Minority protection in the interwar period had a bad press even at the time, and to this day it hardly enjoys a good reputation. The safeguards for minorities were indeed only second-rank in terms of international law. Their legal force could not be evoked without difficulty, and in the final analysis they did little to improve everyday life for Europe's many minorities. We can nevertheless view efforts toward minority protection as an attempt at preventing more nationalist-inspired mass flight—and in this respect it functioned passably well. A majority of national minorities remained in the areas where they had settled; this was true for Germans and Ukrainians in Poland, for Hungarians in Romania, and for numerous other population groups.

A fundamental design flaw in "little Versailles" was that the Western nation-states ruled out minority protection within their own borders, clinging to the ideal of a homogenous nation-state. Moreover, minorities subjected to discrimination could only initiate proceedings against treaty violations if they first succeeded in securing assistance from League of Nation members. They were dependent on external support, and as a rule it was the neighboring nation-state that all too willingly put itself in the limelight, as Germany did when it came to the German-speaking population in Poland.²¹

Other minorities, like the Jews, the Armenians, and the Ukrainians, had no nation-state of their own to advocate for their interests or serve as a refuge (although the Ukrainian Soviet Republic did attract a number of Ukrainian intellectuals from Poland in the 1920s). They fell between the cracks of the nation-state order. In concrete terms, this affected such groups as the approximately 20,000 Galician Jews who had fled to Vienna during World War I and stayed there until the end of the war, among other reasons because of the pogroms in their homeland. In 1920 the government of the Republic of Austria refused to grant Jewish refugees the right of residence and citizenship using ethno-nationalist arguments. At first the Interior Ministry pointed to the Jews' foreign language and then, since most of them spoke German only too well, to their "race" in order to justify deporting them to Poland.

If one interprets minority protection following the First World War in the context of the nation-state order created at the time, it becomes easier to understand why these safeguards went hand in hand almost everywhere with a deliberate reduction in the numbers of national minorities. The first Paris Peace Treaty, which linked both principles in a seemingly paradoxical manner, was the Treaty of Neuilly. It dealt with Bulgaria and imposed tough sanctions on this world war loser, comparable to the provisions imposed on Germany. In addition to paying sizable reparations, Bulgaria had to accept painful territorial losses; the Bulgarian part of Thrace was lost, and thus access to the Aegean. Although this allowed Greece to annex a region with a substantial Bulgarian minority, that minority's protection remained very limited. In the midst of all its many regulations about minority rights, the Treaty of Neuilly contains a collection of paragraphs about the "reciprocal and voluntary emi-

gration of persons belonging to racial minorities.”²² In these passages the great powers and the two former military adversaries that were parties to this arrangement specified that Bulgarians should emigrate out of northern Greece and, in return, Greeks out of Bulgaria. The principle of voluntariness still applied, so that in the following two years only a few hundred families volunteered for emigration to “their” nation-state.

With the arrival of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor, whom Athens deliberately settled in the north of the country in order to form an ethnic bulwark there against Bulgaria, the local dynamics changed. The refugees clashed with the native population over their land and their houses, and a spiral of violence was quickly set in motion. The League of Nations dispatched an investigative commission, which in 1924 decided that emigration should in the future be obligatory for minorities.²³ That of course had an impact on local practice; emigration turned more and more into forcible expulsion. Overall, 103,000 Bulgarians had to leave Greece, and 53,000 Bulgarian Greeks moved in the opposite direction toward Greece. Today these figures might seem small but, especially for Bulgaria, this influx on top of all the refugees it took in from the Ottoman Empire, Romania, and Serbia, amounted to a burden that was almost impossible to manage. In the mid-1920s, Bulgarian authorities put the number of refugees at about 200,000, most of whom lived in abject misery and were only partly integrated.²⁴

Although one can certainly categorize these refugees as victims of nationalist persecution, they created a breeding ground for an even more radical nationalism. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) launched suicidal terror attacks similar to those of the later Islamist group Al-Qaida. In 1934, in what was the organization’s most spectacular assassination, a Bulgarian terrorist shot to death King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French foreign minister in Marseille. The IMRO recruited numerous adherents and activists, above all from the ranks of embittered refugees from Serbia and Greece.²⁵

The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which dealt primarily with the Ottoman Empire, contained regulations similar to those in the Treaty of Neuilly. Minorities were supposed to be “exchanged” along a new Greco-Turkish borderline in western Asia Minor. The exchange never took place, however, because one part of the Turkish elite rejected this humiliating and colonialist agreement. Since Greece also marched into Asia Minor, Kemal Pasha, later known as Atatürk, formed a new Turkish army that in 1921 achieved a decisive victory west of Ankara at the Sakarya River. The Greek troops and the Greeks from Asia Minor were then driven into the sea, and by the end of 1922 some 600,000 to 700,000 refugees were already en route to Greece.

In 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne certified this mass flight as a matter of international law and expanded the population shifts to include all of Asia Minor and Greece. It was determined that all Christians had to leave the territory of



MAP 2. Flight and population shifts between Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria after the Treaties of Neuilly (1919) and Lausanne (1923)

Turkey, with the exception of Istanbul and Western Thrace (which belonged to Greece according to the provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly), and all Muslims (or, as they were viewed at the time, Turks) had to leave Greece. This “exchange of minorities” was obligatory and comprehensive and led to massive population removals. In addition to the roughly 700,000 refugees of 1922, there were an additional 500,000 Greeks from Anatolia, Eastern Thrace, and the Black Sea coast, along with 350,000 Turks and other Northern Greek Muslims. Contemporaries commenting on the Treaty of Lausanne would often cite the cruelty of “the Turks,” a theme widely disseminated in the nineteenth century owing to that era’s numerous wars, uprisings, and acts of retaliation, and only confirmed by the genocide perpetrated on the Armenians.

The proposed contrast between a civilized Europe and a violence-prone Orient (or Balkans) does not stand up to closer scrutiny. After 1918 there were also massive expulsions of minorities in Central Europe; characteristically, these happened after the armistice. The expulsions initially affected around 150,000 Alsatians and Lorrainers whom France, after marching back into the



These accusations against Turkey had already begun at the Conference of Lausanne and were seriously pushed by the chief negotiator, British foreign minister **Lord George Curzon** (1859–1925). He is frequently quoted as stating that the comprehensive removal of minorities without exception—something the treaty prettified as an “exchange of minorities”—was “a thoroughly bad and vicious solution, for which the world will pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come.”²⁶ Although he was right about that, the minutes of the negotiations clearly show that the

British chair of the conference, who had already put his stamp on the Treaty of Neuilly, had himself added the “exchange of minorities” to the agenda. It was Curzon who insisted that there could be no exceptions to this population exchange and that it was obligatory. The conference chair also set aside any moral objections since, like Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner for Refugees for the League of Nations, he was convinced that it was entirely possible to transplant millions of people quickly and integrate them into jobs at their new places of residence. This technocratic way of thinking shows that the flight from nationalism was not based solely on hatred, violence, and wars, but also on rational thinking and a ruthless kind of social engineering characteristic of European ultra-modernity.

Curzon developed his model of a territorial partition followed by population shifts when he was an Indian viceroy at the beginning of the twentieth century. The occasion was provided by the persistent conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in colonial India. In 1905, following the governing principle of “divide and conquer,” Curzon initiated the division of Bengal (which was basically made up of today’s Bangladesh and the Indian federal state of West Bengal) into two regions—one Hindu-dominated and the other preponderantly Muslim. Owing to protests on both sides, this partition was rescinded in 1911, yet in 1949 the border between an independent India and (East) Pakistan largely followed the line laid down by Curzon. The next “Curzon Line” that looked as if it could have been drawn on a map with a ruler was sketched in 1920 in Galicia, as part of an effort by the British foreign minister to mediate in the Polish-Soviet War. With some local deviations that line continued to serve as the new border between Poland and the Soviet Ukraine after September 1944. To be sure, one cannot make Curzon, who died in 1925, morally liable for the massive flight and expulsions that took place in India and Galicia during the second half of the 1940s. (In India there were about twelve million refugees, in Galicia more than a million.) But the populations shifts he recommended did go back to the principle of territorial partition that, apart from India, was also applied in the upper Adriatic region around Trieste as well as in the UN partition plan for Palestine.

region, defined as Germans. In 1918–19 the French Commissions de Triage (literally “Selection Commissions”) divided the population in Alsace and Lorraine into four categories: descendants of French citizens, citizens who were products of mixed marriages with at least one parent of verifiable French ancestry, citizens from third states, and Alsatians classified as Germans. About one third of the Alsatians belonging to the fourth category were deported, while the others had to put up with serious disadvantages, for example when it came to exchanging their reichsmarks for the new currency of the franc.

The expulsion of 1919–20 undertaken by the French did not, however, solve the minority problem, since numerous Alsatians were not satisfied with the new government and its policy of linguistic assimilation. They founded an autonomy movement that was suppressed by Paris with police action, censorship and deportations. In turn, Alsatian refugees in the German Reich formed an influential lobby that agitated incessantly against France, supported the separatist wing of the Alsatian autonomy movement, and during the 1930s spread National Socialist ideas. After the Second World War this lobby was neutralized in the context of the Cold War; now, however, there were new lobbies of expellees within the context of the Cold War, agitating above all against Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The handling of the German minority in Alsace and Lorraine established a precedent for Central Europe. The Geneva Convention on Upper Silesia negotiated in 1922 between Germany and Poland was based on the model of a two-sided emigration (again, comparable to the Treaties of Neuilly and Sèvres). This region, the most important industrial district in East Central Europe, was partitioned, and minorities on both sides of the newly drawn border obtained a “right of choice,” meaning an opportunity to emigrate to their external nation-state. Whether one can legitimately speak of a “right” here is another question. Ultimately, this was a choice between two evils. Overall, at least 170,000 Silesians opted for Germany or Poland and emigrated.²⁷ An unknown number had already fled from the violence and unrest (the so-called Silesian uprisings) that preceded the plebiscite in which they were asked to choose their postwar home.

Germany managed to cope reasonably well with the absorption of about one million post-imperial refugees and re-migrants, while much the same challenge overwhelmed the Southeastern European states. As mentioned earlier, up to 70,000 Greeks died from illness and conditions of scarcity on their way and *after* their arrival. In Bulgaria international NGOs did not have a very strong presence, so little is known about the refugees there. The regions along the coast and the major river valleys were, however, malaria-infested and not well suited to taking in more than two hundred thousand people.

While the suffering of the refugees was soon forgotten, politicians all over Europe praised the Treaty of Lausanne as a model for settling conflicts between hostile nations. From 1937 to 1947 the catchword “Lausanne” served

as a reference point for almost a dozen international treaties in which massive population shifts were negotiated and regulated. A closer look at the Turkish-Greek relationship shows that conflicts were by no means successfully “solved” along Lausanne lines. In 1955 about 125,000 Greeks left Istanbul after the pogrom-like riots of the so-called Septembrianá (the Treaty of Lausanne applied a special regulation to the old capital of the Ottoman Empire and of Greek Orthodoxy). After the military putsch of 1974, the ethnically mixed island of Cyprus was partitioned, so that 210,000 people had to flee (on Cyprus, see Chapter 2.4 below).

If the Greeks of Asia Minor had had a stronger voice in the Western media and politics, perhaps this assessment of Lausanne would have turned out differently. Even years after arriving in their host countries, the refugees were still being ostracized, attacked, and chased out of the very fields they were meant to be cultivating. In 1924, in the Macedonian prefecture of Serres, there was even a small-scale pogrom. Twelve houses and a refugee settlement were destroyed, and fifty people were hospitalized. One Greek politician thereupon suggested identifying the refugees with yellow armbands.²⁸ The professional and day-to-day integration of Greeks from Asia Minor proceeded only slowly; as late as the 1970s and 1980s, certain villages and city neighborhoods were still clearly recognizable as former refugee settlements.

This intolerable situation ultimately came to an end because many refugees traveled on from Greece to other countries, including the US, Australia, France, and countries beyond the Mediterranean. One may speak here of a secondary flight—comparable to what has been happening to the Syrians who came to Germany in 2015 from Turkey or Lebanon. In Egypt during the 1920s the Greek community grew to about 50,000. The story of this diaspora ended a generation later when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser banished most Europeans, including the Greeks, following the Suez crisis of 1956.

This cross-generational and multi-stage flight was, as in the case of many groups of refugees, also economically motivated. The Egyptian and Australian Greeks—and the very concept of “diaspora,” after all, comes from the Greek—show that dire situations such as that of the 1920s could be solved, among other ways, by the affected parties seizing the initiative and settling in third countries on their own.

Flight migration in stages was also a common experience for refugees from the Russian Civil War. Initially they fled mostly to neighboring states (more about this in Chapter Three). But Poland, Lithuania, and parts of Romania, were unable to feed, house, or even permanently take in such numbers. Moreover, Russia’s despotic rule over Poland had ended a few years earlier, and the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 reactivated anti-Russian feelings. Since Poland’s right-wing parties put Jews and Communists into the same pigeon-hole, antisemitism increased as well. Eventually, at the start of 1923, the Polish government issued a decree requiring all refugees who did not have Polish

citizenship to leave the country.²⁹ Many Russians, especially Russian Jews, tried to get to the Free City of Danzig, where there had been a shipping link to New York City since 1919. Until 1924 more than 120,000 people emigrated from Danzig to the US, 83,000 of them Jewish.

The Russian Jews who had found refuge in Romania at the beginning of the 1920s (depending on which estimate one uses, this was between 40,000 and 100,000 people) also attempted to get through to the West.³⁰ And in this case again, territorial conflicts (including the dispute over Bessarabia) and negative experiences with Russian supremacy played a role. Romanian animosity toward Russian domination admittedly went back further than more recent ill feelings in Poland (the Russian protectorate over Romania had ended with the Crimean War), yet the strongest imperial power in Southeastern Europe was still unpopular.

Oppressive poverty and terrible living conditions in Poland, Romania, Hungary, Austria, and other eastern central and southeastern countries increased migration pressures on Germany. Berlin was on the route to North Sea harbors where, prior to 1914, most East European migrants had boarded ships for overseas destinations. On top of that, the German capital was itself a magnet for Jewish and East European migrants, and there were still the remnants of a rudimentary welfare state in Germany so that, in spite of the hyperinflation and all its social costs, living conditions were somewhat better than in Poland or Romania.

When the refugees from Russia arrived by the hundreds of thousands, however, they soon began to sense that they were unwanted.³¹ As a rule, government officials refused to grant them labor or residency permits, which excluded them from social welfare services. This forced the new arrivals into the shadow economy and into accepting very low paid jobs, which landed them in competition with the native lower classes. In November 1923, growing social tensions in the Scheunenviertel, the neighborhood in Berlin that was a mecca for Jews from Eastern Europe, erupted into a pogrom. Unlike pogroms in numerous Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, and Romanian cities, in Berlin the police got the violence under control, and there were no fatalities. Yet the looting and violence on the streets worked like a push factor, impelling forward migration to other countries. According to official French statistics, 72,000 Russians went to France, especially to Paris. Traces of other places where migrants eventually landed largely disappeared on the way overseas and en route to other European countries. About 100,000 Russian refugees remained in Germany, most of whom then had to pack their suitcases one more time after the National Socialists seized power.

The US, however, was largely closed to refugees after 1924. The Immigration Act enacted that year effectively sealed off, for more than two decades, what had until then been the most important destination admitting East European Jews. The quota rule issued earlier, in 1921, was already directed against

immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. In Danzig there was often a backlog of Jewish refugees; several thousand people were at times housed under miserable conditions in provisional camps and tents.³² They did, however, receive support from the aforementioned Jewish aid organizations, which also helped defuse acute distress in places like Bucharest, Berlin, or Vienna.

Yet Jewish NGOs could not prevent government discrimination in most of the Eastern European states or prevent the United States from passing the Immigration Act. As a rule, Jews integrated fairly quickly, even changing their names in many cases and, in a number of instances, amassing fortunes. (The very term “Melting Pot” was in fact the invention of a Jewish writer with East European roots.) In the end, though, positive experiences with integration often counted for little. Eagerness to integrate could not blunt the sharp edge of American isolationism, the matrix of immigration policy in the interwar era. Workers feared competition from immigrants and wage dumping, and antisemitism was also on the rise on the Western side of the Atlantic.

A fundamental problem faced by Polish and Romanian Jews was that, unlike Russian Civil War refugees, they were not viewed as victims of violence and persecution on the international stage. To be sure, most East European Jews emigrated in order to improve their living situation, yet very many of them had also experienced antisemitism and violence or even witnessed pogroms. When the US nearly dropped out of contention as a destination, they increasingly turned to Argentina, Brazil, or Canada. But those countries were also closing their borders as the world economic crisis took hold. Clearly, the international process of redirecting migrants from one country to another, which had functioned in a rudimentary way thanks to the Nansen passports, was no longer in force.

NOTES

Chapter 2. The two faces of nationalism: Ethnic cleansing and national solidarity

1. On the origins of modern nationalism, see, inter alia, Miroslav Hroch, *Das Europa der Nationen: Die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
2. An English translation of the Constitution of 1793 (which was in effect only for a brief period) may be found online at <http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1793-french-republic-constitution-of-1793> (accessed 24 July 2018). The translation comes from the appendix to Francis Lieber, *On Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, 3rd rev. ed., Theodore D. Woolsey, ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1883).
3. Translation (slightly modified here) by R. Anthony Lodge, *French: From Dialect to Standard* (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), 214. The original formulation can be found in Louis-Jean Calvet, *Les langues véhiculaires* (Paris: P.U.F., 1981).
4. On Barère and the decree, cf. Delphine Diaz, *Un asile pour tous les peuples? Exilés et réfugiés étrangers en France au cours du premier XIXe siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2014), 78.
5. The quotes are from a letter by Stein to the governor of Berg, Privy Councilor Justus Gruner; see Freiherr vom Stein, *Briefe und amtliche Schriften*, vol. 5: *Stein in Westfalen, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Verfassungsfragen (Januar 1819-Mai 1826)*, Erich Botzenhart, ed., newly issued by Walter Hubatsch (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964), 1–3.
6. On this, see again Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)—a book that is just as relevant today as when it was first published twenty years ago.
7. See for this number and a good first overview, Peter Gatrell, “Refugees,” in *1914–1918 Online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War* (8 October 2014), accessible online at <http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/refugees> (as of April 2017).
8. A German translation of the monumental work by these two Polish colleagues has already appeared (Włodzimierz Borodziej and Maciej Górny, *Der vergessene Weltkrieg: Europas Osten 1912–1923*, 2 vols. [Darmstadt: WBG, 2018]); an English translation is in the making.
9. The Soviet demographer Yevgeniy Volkov calculated as many as 7.4 million Russian refugees, but recent Russian research is more cautious in its estimates; see, inter alia, Irina

- Belova, *Vynuždennyye migranty: Bežency i Voennoplennyye Pervoj mirovoj voiny v Rossii. 1914–1925 gg.* (Moscow, AIRO-XXI: 2014), 10–13. So probably Gatrell is just right. See on the wartime deportations of Germans and Jews, Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.)
10. These figures are based on Gatrell, “Refugees,” and additional data from Julie Thorpe, “Displacing Empire: Refugee Welfare, National Activism and State Legitimacy in Austria-Hungary in the First World War,” in Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdee, eds., *Refugees and the End of Empire. Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 102–126. The figures on the Ottoman Empire are divided up into 250,000 Armenians who found their way to Russian Armenia and about 150,000 Greeks, many of them recruits. There were unfortunately no reliable data that could be obtained about the flight from Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire.
 11. Sperber’s autobiography, on which this portrait is largely based, spans three separate books that should long ago have been published in a single volume. The individual citations are Manès Sperber, *Die Wasserträger Gottes: All das Vergangene . . .* (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1974) [vol. 1]; Manès Sperber, *Die vergebliche Warnung: All das Vergangene . . .* (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1975) [vol. 2]; Manès Sperber, *Bis man mir Scherben auf die Augen legt: All das Vergangene . . .* (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1977) [vol. 3]. The quote here about the miserable conditions in Vienna is taken from page 168 of vol. 1, English translation by Joachim Neugroschel from Sperber, *God’s Water Carriers* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987) [vol. 1], 104. The other volumes in English translation are: *The Unheeded Warning, 1918–1933*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991) [vol. 2] and *Until My Eyes Are Closed with Shards*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1994) [vol. 3]. There is a long list of studies in literary criticism dealing with Sperber’s works. For this sketch I have relied above all on the outstanding literary biography by Mirjana Stančić, *Manès Sperber: Leben und Werk* (Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld Verlag, 2003); see, in addition, Anne-Marie Corbin, *Manès Sperber: Un combat contre la tyrannie (1934–1960)* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1996).
 12. On his adolescent years in Vienna, see Stančić, *Manès Sperber*, 72–87.
 13. On the arrest and the conditions of detention, cf. *ibid.*, 224–231.
 14. Cf. *ibid.*, 354.
 15. Sperber, *Bis man mir Scherben auf die Augen legt*, 105 (English edition: Sperber, *Until My Eyes Are Closed with Shards*, 70).
 16. Sperber wrote about his internment in the camp in his autobiography: “The people interned in such camps had no rights whatever, but they were strictly forbidden even to complain, as if a complaint were an act of mutiny. Those who planned and operated the camps in this fashion were acting in the spirit of Adolf Hitler.” (From Sperber, *Bis man mir Scherben auf die Augen legt*, 298—English translation by Harry Zohn from *Until My Eyes Are Closed with Shards*, 208). For his positive experiences in the parsonage, by contrast, see his account a few pages later (301–302 of the original German memoir, and p. 211 in the English translation).
 17. Quoted by Stančić, *Manès Sperber*, 407. Translation here, from the French, in Jennifer Aileen Orth-Veillon, “Ignazio Silone, Albert Camus, and Manès Sperber: Writing between Stalinism and Fascism” (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University 2011), 203, endnote 6 ([original French wording on page 10]); the dissertation may be downloaded at https://legacy-etd.library.emory.edu/file/view/pid/emory:94m8j/etd/emory:94m7d/orth-veillon_dissertation.pdf (accessed 25 July 2018).
 18. Oltmer assumes that there were almost ten million; this estimate is also plausible; cf. Jochen Oltmer, “Flucht, Vertreibung und Asyl im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” *IMIS Beiträge* 20 (2002), 113.
 19. On these numbers, cf. *ibid.* and Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side*, 67.

20. Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 236–264.
21. A German minority that included all of Poland and the different German-speaking groups there, and that also self-identified as German in an ethno-nationalist sense, actually arose only as a result of nation-state formation; on this, see Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). On analogous processes of nation-building among other national minorities, see Ther, *The Dark Side*, 26.
22. The Treaty of Neuilly is reprinted in, among other books, Harold William Vazeille Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. 5: *Economic Reconstruction and Protection of Minorities*, reprint (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 305–358; on paragraph 56, see 317.
23. On this commission, see Ther, *The Dark Side*, 73. On the disturbances that preceded it, see Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, *Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Rural Settlement of Refugees 1922–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); this book is also the most important study of the problems encountered by Greeks from Asia Minor in their efforts to integrate.
24. On this, cf. the counts based on government documents in Žečo Čankov, *Naselenieto na Bulgariia* (Sofia: Knigoizdvo Kazanluška dolina, 1935), 220. (I thank Dimitar Dimitrov from the International Institute for Peace in Vienna for referring me to this and additional literature on Bulgaria.)
25. On the IMRO, see Stefan Troebst, *Zwischen Arktis, Adria und Armenien: Das östliche Europa und seine Ränder* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2017), 123–132 and 137–144.
26. The quotation in full has Curzon saying that “he deeply regretted that the solution now being worked out should be the compulsory exchange of populations—a thoroughly bad and vicious solution, for which the world will pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come”—quoted according to the minutes of the proceedings from the Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922–1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1923), 212.
27. Cf. Wanatowicz, Maria, *Historia społeczno-polityczna Górnej Śląska i Śląska Cieszyńskiego w latach 1918/1945* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 1994), 147.
28. On this, see Kontogiorgi, *Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia*, 174–175, 182, and 187.
29. Grzegorz Berendt, *Żydzi na terenie Wolnego Miasta Gdańska w latach, 1920–1945 (Działalność kulturalna, polityczna i socjalna)* (Gdańsk: Gdańskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1997), 56–57. Between 1926 and 1928, however, citizenship was assigned to 600,000 Jews who had immigrated from Russia following the First World War; on this, see Włodzimierz Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2010), 165.
30. The figures on Romania vary widely. While contemporary observers like John Hope Simpson put the number at around 40,000 Russian Jews, the Romanian historian Vadim Guzun has calculated, on the basis of his archival studies, a number between 60,000 and 100,000; see Vadim Guzun, *Indezirabilii: aspecte mediatice, umanitare și de securitate privind emigrația din Uniunea Sovietică în România interbelică* (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Argonaut, 2013), 30–32. Lower figures are provided by the Russian historian Miroslav Jovanovich, *Russkaya emigraciya na Balkanach, 1920–1940* (Moscow: Russkii put, 2005).
31. See Tobias Brinkmann, “Ort des Übergangs—Berlin als Schnittstelle der jüdischen Migration aus Osteuropa nach 1918,” in Verena Dohrn and Gertrud Pickhan, eds., *Transit*

- und Transformation: Osteuropäisch-jüdische Migranten in Berlin, 1918–1939* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 25–44.
32. See Berendt, *Żydzi na terenie*, 60.
 33. See Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 57–84.
 34. See Sperber, *Bis man mir Scherben auf die Augen legt*, 106 (English translation by Harry Zohn in Sperber, *Until My Eyes Are Closed with Shards*, 71).
 35. All the figures about flight from Nazi Germany come from Claudena Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 48–54. This book, well over twenty years old, is among the most important foundations for the book presented here.
 36. On this, see *ibid.*, 197–200.
 37. On this, see *ibid.*, 201.
 38. On this, see *ibid.*, 206.
 39. The commission was named after its chair, the Earl William Peel, an elder statesman who had served as a minister in the cabinets of various British governments.
 40. Writing in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the distinguished historian of Russia Jörg Baberowski (of all people) made an early contribution to criminalizing refugees by speaking of “illegal migrants”; see *id.*, “Europa ist gar keine Wertegemeinschaft,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (14 September 2015), accessible online at <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/joerg-baberowski-ueber-ungesteuerte-einwanderung-13800909.html> (accessed April 2017). Further details on the policies of European and non-European states toward refugees from Germany may be found in Claus-Dieter Krohn, et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933–1945* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998), 129–468. For an overview, see also Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe*, 216.
 41. The history of immigration to Canada and of the rejection of refugees in the 1930s is well documented on the website “Canada—A Country by Consent,” <http://www.canadahistoryproject.ca/1930s/1930s-07-intolerance.html> (accessed April 2017).
 42. The wanderings of the *St. Louis* are well documented on the webpage of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, <https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005267> (accessed April 2017).
 43. Cf. Sarah A. Ogilvie and Scott Miller, *Refuge Denied: The St. Louis Passengers and the Holocaust* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). On the Dublons, see *ibid.*, 102–104.
 44. There is also a German-language publication about the *St. Louis*, with an appendix reprinting the complete diary of Erich Dublon; cf. Georg Reinfelder, *MS ‘St. Louis’: Die Irrfahrt nach Kuba. Frühjahr 1939* (Teetz: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2002), 125f., 218–234. The diary conveys an almost casual and optimistic atmosphere among the passengers on their way to the US and their subsequent anxiety when the ship was turned back.
 45. By June 2017, the manifesto (or the Twitter account under this name) had already attracted more than 70,000 followers: https://twitter.com/stl_manifest?lang=de.
 46. On the “Refugee Children Movement,” see Wolfgang Benz, Claudia Curio, and Andrea Hammel, eds., *Die Kindertransporte 1938/39: Rettung und Integration* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003).
 47. On these numbers, see Wolfgang Benz, “Die jüdische Emigration,” in Krohn et al., eds., *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration, 1933–1945*, 6, 9, and 11.
 48. Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees,” *Menorah Journal* 31, no. 1 (January 1943), 70. The text is available online at http://www.documenta14.de/de/south/35_we_refugees (accessed April 2017). The full article is also reprinted in Arendt, *The Jew as Pariah*, ed. Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove, 1978), 55–66. (In the original text, Arendt writes about “a new kind of human beings” [sic].)

49. See *Menorah Journal*, *ibid.*, 74.
50. *Ibid.*, 69, 73, 77.
51. On the Second Vienna Arbitration, the Treaty of Craiova, and concrete details of their implementation, see Ther, *The Dark Side*, 106–109.
52. See Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 201. In addition, there were 70,000 refugees from Luxemburg and 50,000 from the Netherlands.
53. See *ibid.*, 297. Gatrell puts the number at 40 million civilians forced to flee as a result of the Second World War; cf. Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 89.
54. On this, see the foundational work by Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 738.
55. The best book on the Polish-Ukrainian “war within the war” remains Grzegorz Motyka’s *Tak było w Bieszczadach: Walki polsko-ukraińskie, 1943–1948* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen), 1999.
56. On the expulsions from Nazi-occupied territories, cf. Ther, *The Dark Side*, 95–104.
57. There is now a secondary literature on this subject, which for a long time had hardly been researched because it was overshadowed by crimes of the German occupation that were even more gruesome; on the expulsion from Poland and the Warthegau, see Maria Rutowska, *Wysiedlenia ludności polskiej z Kraju Warty do Generalnego Gubernatorstwa, 1939–1941* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 2003). There is also a very detailed and impressive diary from the Zamość district: Zygmunt Klukowski, *Zamojszczyzna*, vol. 1: 1918–1943 (Warsaw, Karta, 2008); in that book, see 126–127, 177–179, and 197.
58. Quotation from Winston S. Churchill, *His Complete Speeches, 1897–1963*, vol. 7: 1943–1949, Robert Rhodes James (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), 7069.
59. On this, see Rüdiger Overmans, “Personelle Verluste der deutschen Bevölkerung durch Flucht und Vertreibung,” *Dzieje Najnowsze* 26/2 (1994), 60.
60. Estimates vary in the literature. According to Stedingk, it was 1.83 million refugees, of whom a good half were not German speakers. According to Helczmanowski, the number was 1.43 million, of whom about 800,000 were not German-speaking. See Yvonne von Stedingk, *Die Organisation des Flüchtlingswesens in Österreich seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Treatises on Refugee Problems* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1970), 27.
61. Exceptions were made only for refugees who had close family members in Austria. In the end, therefore, about 350,000 refugees, most of them from areas near the Czech-Austrian border in southern Moravia and Bohemia, were able to remain in Austria. For more information about Austrian refugee politics, there is a good collection of articles in *Mitteilungen des oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs* 19 (2000), which shows the situation of the refugees in postwar Upper Austria and conveys the official stance of Austrian historiography. For a more critical approach and a detailed survey about the situation in Lower Austria in 1945/46, see Niklas Perzi, “Aufnahme und Abschub. Die Sudetendeutschen in Niederösterreich 1945/46,” *Jahrbuch für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich*, NF 82 (2016), 135–233.
62. On the Jewish DPs, see (inter alia) Michael Brenner, *After the Holocaust: Rebuilding Jewish Lives in Postwar Germany*, trans. Barbara Harshav (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 7–41, as well as the contemporary witness accounts from the DP camps on pages 77–99. The maximum number of Jewish DPs reached 182,000 in the summer of 1947, but before that there had been several hundred thousand refugees who had already fled onward to third countries or been taken in there. See on the DPs also Angelika Königseder and Juliane Wetzels, *Lebensmut im Wartesaal: Die jüdischen DPs (Displaced Persons) im Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1994).
63. See Ruth Klüger, *Still Alive: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered* (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2001), 138. The entire flight is treated on

- pages 135–149. The quote about the “jumble of requirements and quotas” for her American entry visa is on p. 158. The German original of the book was published as Ruth Klüger, *Weiter leben: eine Jugend* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1992).
64. Klüger, *Still Alive*, 145.
 65. On this, see a conversation between Stalin and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, in Tatiana V. Volokitina et al., eds., *Vostočnaja Evropa v dokumentach rossijskich archivov, 1944–1953 gg.*, vol. 1: 1944–1948 gg. (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii chronograf, 1997), 582. On the conflict surrounding Transylvania, see Holly Case, *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). Former soldiers in the Hungarian army were, however, exempted from this repatriation.
 66. On the sequence of events in this repatriation, see Philipp Ther, *Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene: Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen, 1945–1956* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), as well as the extensive documentation of sources in Stanislaw Ciesielski, ed., *Umsiedlung der Polen aus den ehemaligen polnischen Ostgebieten nach Polen in den Jahren 1944–1947* (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2006).
 67. On the “exodus” of the Italians from Istria and Dalmatia, see Marina Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale, 1866–2006* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), as well as the regional study by Piero Purini, *Metamorfosi etniche: I cambiamenti di popolazione a Trieste, Gorizia, Fiume e in Istria: 1914–1975* (Udine: Kappa Vu, 2010).
 68. I dedicated a chapter to the “British Track of Ethnic Cleansing” in my previous book. See Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation States*, 247–249.
 69. For a good overview, see Silvia Salvatici, “Between National and International Mandates: Displaced Persons and Refugees in Postwar Italy,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 49 (2014), 514–536. This special issue of the JCH is devoted to “Refugees and the Nation-State in Europe, 1919–59.”
 70. On the Italians in Libya, see the comprehensive study by Angelo Del Boca, *Gli italiani in Libia*, 2 vols. (Milan: Mondadori, 1993/94).
 71. For more details on Saxony, see my earlier book: Ther, *Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene*, 116–135. On Hamburg, see Evelyn Glensk, Rita Bake, and Oliver von Wrochem, eds., *Die Flüchtlinge kommen: Ankunft und Aufnahme in Hamburg nach Kriegsende* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 1998).
 72. See Michael Schwartz, *Vertriebene und ‘Umsiedlerpolitik’: Integrationskonflikte in den deutschen Nachkriegs-Gesellschaften und die Assimilationsstrategien in der SBZ/DDR, 1945 bis 1961* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004).
 73. Several years later the subject received more extensive book-length treatment by the same author in Paul Lüttinger, *Integration der Vertriebenen: Eine empirische Analyse* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1989).
 74. See Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Berlin: Siedler, 2008).
 75. See Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland: Ihre Eingliederung und ihr Einfluss auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik und Geistesleben*, 3 vols. (Kiel: Ferdinand Hirt, 1959).
 76. The latter, however, applies only to men; women expellees did not work as frequently as natives, which was attributable to more traditional values and above all to the availability of jobs; on unemployment and employment among expellees, see *ibid.*, 111 and 136.
 77. On the border closing, see Brunhilde Scheuringer, “Die Situation der sudetendeutschen Flüchtlinge in Oberösterreich seit 1945,” *Mitteilungen des Oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs*, vol. 19 (Linz: Oberösterreichisches Landesarchiv, 2000), 145–146. On the discussion concerning the Gablonzers, some of whom ended up in Upper Austria during their flight, see Gertrude Enderle-Burcel and Rudolf Jeřábek, eds., *Protokolle des Ministerrates der Zweiten Republik: Kabinett Leopold Figl I: 20. Dezember 1945 bis 8.*

- November 1949*, vol. 1: 20. *Dezember 1945 bis 9. April 1946* (Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2004), 82. I thank Pauli Aro for this reference.
78. On the “refugee industries,” see two relevant essays in Lemberg and Edding, *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland*, vol. 2, 166–374, esp. 334.
 79. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, 105. On the convergence and dissolution of old milieus, see also the essay by Alfred Karasek-Langer in the same volume (especially 682–683). It is not entirely a coincidence that the essay’s title “Nationhood in a State of Flux” (the word is *Volkstum* in the original German—“Volkstum im Umbruch”—and it imparts an ethno-national connotation to “nationhood”) sounds like something out of German history before 1945. Karasek-Langer was a specialist on German settlement enclaves in Eastern Europe, as an SS Obersturmführer (first lieutenant in the Nazi paramilitary force that included the Gestapo) he was responsible for the resettlement of the Volhynian and Bessarabian Germans during the war, and later for the plundering of Soviet universities and art collections.
 80. This statement about the Polish-German border is documented in a short biographical sketch of Steinbach that appears on the website of the public radio station RBB (Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg): http://www.deutscheundpolen.de/personen/person_jsp/key=erika_steinbach.html (accessed April 2017).
 81. Cf. Philipp Ther, “Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen,” in Detlef Brandes, Holm Sundhausen, and Stefan Troebst, eds., *Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 736–739.
 82. Cf. the letter of resignation on her website, <http://www.erika-steinbach.de/erklaerung.html> (accessed April 2017).
 83. There is an excellent English language book about the refugee politics of the postwar German governments and how this priority shaped their foreign policy. See Pertti Aho, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945–1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
 84. See “League of Nations: Mandates Palestine report of the Palestine Royal Commission, presented by the Secretary of State for the colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty (July 1937),” *Jewish Virtual Library*, accessible online at <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/peel1.html> (accessed April 2017).
 85. The additional sequence of events for this flight (through September 1948) and the distribution of refugees are recorded with considerable detail in a report to the UN Security Council; see United Nations, *Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine (16 September 1948)*, accessible online at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/703168/files/A_648-EN.pdf (accessed April 2019).
 86. Cited by Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 49. Pappé’s thesis of ethnic cleansing planned well in advance, however, is controversial. In his own study, Benny Morris stresses the military components and the short-term nature of the planning; see Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). By contrast, the historian Nur Masalha, who teaches in England (and is of Palestinian descent), advocates a longue-durée thesis; see his *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of ‘Transfer’ in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992). He emphasizes a broader pattern of European thinking about the Balkans and the Near East that was evidently shaped by Orientalism and colonialism. And, indeed, as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, British, French, German, and Swiss sociologists and ethnologists were proposing extensive population shifts for this part of the world; on these intellectual architects of ethnic cleansing, see Ther, *The Dark Side*, 33.
 87. See, too, the fundamental critique offered by Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
 88. Quoted from an original document in Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, 166.

89. For an overview, see Malka Hillel Shulewitz, ed., *The Forgotten Millions: The Modern Jewish Exodus from Arab Lands* (London: Bloomsbury, 2001). In addition, there are numerous detailed studies on the individual countries of origin that, for reasons of space, cannot be cited here.
90. See Yfaat Weiss, *A Confiscated Memory: Wadi Salib and Haifa's Lost Heritage*, Avner Greenberg, trans. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). On Tiberias, see the research of the Palestinian historian Mustafa Abbasi, "The War on the Mixed Cities: The Depopulation of Arab Tiberias and the Destruction of its Old, 'Sacred' City (1948–9)," *Holy Land Studies* 7/1 (2008), 45–80. The findings treated here are largely derived from a 2005–2008 research project of the German-Israeli-Foundation entitled "Out of Place: Ethnic Migration, Nation State Formation, and Property Regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Israel," in which the author was a participant, and which included conferences and research visits in Israel. On Jaffa, see Daniel Monterescu, *Jaffa Shared and Shattered: Contrived Coexistence in Israel/Palestine* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2015).
91. See again, by way of example, Lüttinger's study on the integration of German expellees.
92. The Israeli writer Amos Oz has captured this beautifully in his autobiographical novel *Eine Geschichte von Liebe und Finsternis* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2008); see, inter alia, 112–113. See also the American edition: *A Tale of Love and Darkness* (Orlando: Harcourt, 2004).
93. On this (from a postcolonial perspective that is pertinent here), see Yehouda Shenav, *The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
94. One poignant example is the story of Charlotte Knobloch, for many years the chair of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Her mother, who had initially converted to Judaism yet was regarded as "Aryan," divorced her Jewish father in 1936. The father managed, however, to keep the little girl hidden with acquaintances who passed her off as their own daughter; on this, see Philipp Gessler, "Eine hartnäckige Deutsche," *taz* (6 June 2006), accessible online at <http://www.taz.de/Archiv-Suche/1423039&s=&SuchRahmen=Print/> (accessed April 2017).
95. On these estimates, see Nadine Picaudou, "The Historiography of the 1948 Wars," *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence* (1 November 2008), accessible online at <http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/historiography-1948-wars> (accessed April 2017).
96. See Avi Shlaim, *The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine, 1921–1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). This version of partition, which prevented the Palestinians from getting their own state, was supported by Great Britain. In this way, London hoped to build up an ally in the Near East, which it succeeded in doing; on this, cf. *ibid.*, 111.
97. See Jalal Al Hussein and Riccardo Bocco, "The Status of the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East: The Right of Return and UNRWA in Perspective," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 28/2–3 (2010), 263, fn. 9. Jordanian policy toward the Palestinians is also treated extensively in Shaul Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank—The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949–1967* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).
98. See Abbas Shibli, "Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25/3 (1996), 38; on this, see also Khalil, "Socio-economic Rights."
99. This misleading metaphor is much used by Western media outlets to this day. A quick Internet search will yield a long list of hits.
100. On this, and on the problems of the Palestinians, see Dorothee Klaus, "Palästinenser im Libanon zwischen Ghetto und Integration," in Stefan Wild and Hartmut Schild, eds., *Akten des 27. Deutschen Orientalistentages (Bonn—28. September bis 2. Oktober 1998): Norm und Abweichung* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2001), 499–509; see also the study—suffused with a tone of Palestinian nation-building, nevertheless worth reading—by Rosemary

- Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon* (London: Zed Books, 1994).
101. Currently there is, unfortunately, only one foreign-language book (bound in a mauve cover) about Queen Rania, but its thirty-two pages do contain the most important biographical details: Mary Englar, *Queen Rania of Jordan* (Mankato: Capstone Press, 2009).
 102. See Asem Khalil, "Socioeconomic Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab countries," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 23/4 (2011), 701.
 103. Cf. Maya Sela, "Jordan's Queen Rania Rejects Offer to Publish Hebrew Edition of Her Children's Book," *Haaretz* (14 July 2010), accessible online at <http://www.haaretz.com/jordan-s-queen-rania-rejects-offer-to-publish-hebrew-edition-of-her-children-s-book-1.301791> (accessed April 2017). The queen, however, soon disputed that an offer had been made.
 104. Quoted in Kayleigh Lewis, "Jordan's Queen Rania Visits Child Refugees in Lesbos and Calls for 'Exceptional Response,'" *The Independent* (25 April 2016), accessible online at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-jordan-queen-rania-visits-refugees-lesbos-calls-for-exceptional-response-a7000596.html> (accessed April 2017).
 105. See Klaus, "Palästinenser im Libanon zwischen Ghetto und Integration," 505.
 106. Nevertheless, in 2010—a good sixty years after Palestinian refugees started arriving in Lebanon—access to the labor market was eased. Since then Palestinians can receive services in return for the contributions they pay into social insurance funds. They remain ineligible to vote, and access to public schools and universities remains restricted, as in Egypt; see Khalil, "Socioeconomic rights," 698–701.
 107. On the Gaza Strip and Egypt's policy toward the Palestinians, see Oroub El-Abed, *Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies/Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2009), 22.
 108. On this, see Howard Adelman and Elazar Barkan, *No Return, No Refuge: Rites and Rights in Minority Repatriation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). This astute analysis shows how much the perpetuation of refugee status and the "right of return" have shaped Palestinian national identity. The book would be even more persuasive if it had reviewed the state of research on the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, which is relativized and played down in some passages.
 109. On the relevant document, Resolution 194 (III) of the UN General Assembly from December 1948, see Adelman and Barkan, *No Return, No Refuge*, 190.
 110. Journalists' coverage of this problem at the time is discussed in detail by Matthew Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 122–163. According to Frank, Victor Gollancz, a British publisher from a Polish-Jewish family, played a key role in changing public opinion. Unfortunately, he failed to do so during wartime, although he did draw broad public attention to the mass murder of Jews in concentration camps as early as 1943.
 111. The official designations for these conventions are accessible on the website of the UN; see the original texts at <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html> and <http://www.un-documents.net/a3r260.htm> (both accessed April 2017). Due to lack of space, we are using abbreviated designations here.
 112. However, this irresponsibility is not restricted to Putin's Russia. It also exists in the US, e.g., when John Bolton, the (already former) US ambassador to the United Nations, stated in 2007 that there was no connection between the US invasion of Iraq and the later mass flight out of that country. See García, *The Refugee Challenge*, 145–146. The Obama administration thought differently: up to 2013, 85,000 refugees from Iraq had been allowed to enter the US.
 113. This section and the following remarks on the flight from Algeria are based on the foundational French literature that I reviewed for a 2012 lecture in Paris comparing refugees in Germany, France, and Poland; see, inter alia, Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie*

- coloniale (1830–1954)*, 2nd ed. (Paris: La Découverte, 2004); Marco Ferro, ed., *Le livre noir du colonialisme: XVIe–XXIe siècle: De l’extermination à la repentance* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2003); Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie (1954–1962)*, 4th ed. (Paris: La Découverte, 2004); Daniel Lefeuvre, “Les pieds-noirs,” in Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora, eds., *La guerre d’Algérie* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2004), 381–410; see also, in German, Christiane Kohser-Spohn and Frank Renken, eds., *Trauma Algerienkrieg: Zur Geschichte und Aufarbeitung eines tabuisierten Konflikts* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2006).
114. On this, see Gil Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy,” *International Migration Review* 35/1 (2001), 35 f. (This volume also contains a number of other essays about the UNHCR that are worth reading but cannot all be cited here for lack of space.) In conducting this literature search and research on the UNCHR, I was aided by Pauli Aro, now a doctoral candidate at the EUI in Florence, whom I wish to thank once more for his assistance.
 115. See *ibid.*, 36–38; Michael Barnett, “Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow,” *International Migration Review* 35/1 (2001), 255–259.
 116. On this critique, see Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics,” 46–53; Betts and Collier, *Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy*, 227–236. On the problem of the IDPs, see Young Hoon Song, “International Humanitarianism and Refugee Protection: Consequences of Labeling and politicization,” *Journal of International and Area Studies* 20/2 (2013), 1–19.
 117. See Eric Savarèse, *L’invention des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris: Séguier, 2002).
 118. There is a growing literature on the Harkis; for a first overview in English with further references, see Abderahmen Moumen, “Housing the Harkis: Long-term Segregation,” accessible at <https://www.metropolitiques.eu/IMG/pdf/MET-Moumen-en.pdf> (accessed December 2018).
 119. On the absorption and integration of the “repatriés,” see Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain: Politique d’intégration et parcours de rapatriés d’Algérie en métropole (1954–2005)* (Paris: Éditions de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2010), as well as an English-language summary of his book in Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, “The Post-colonial Repatriations of the French of Algeria in 1962: An Emblematic Case of a Public Integration Policy,” in Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen, eds., *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France: Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 95–114.
 120. On the reception of the “repatriés” (from their perspective as well), see Jean-Jacques Jordi, 1962: *L’arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris: Autrement, 1995), 27 and 49–50.
 121. The re-calculation and computation of purchasing power can be undertaken on the website of the French Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques: <https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2417794> (accessed April 2017); for research on this, I again thank Manuel Neubauer from the IOG. One consequence of the restitution payments for land and other property, however, was that the very unequal colonial social order was reproduced in France.
 122. Etemad estimates the number of postcolonial migrants through 1990 at a minimum of 1.75 to a maximum of 2.2 million people; see Bouda Etemad, “Europe and Migration after Decolonisation,” *Journal of European Economic History* 27/3 (1998), 465.
 123. See Dominique Schnapper, “L’échec du ‘modèle républicain’? Réflexion d’une sociologie,” *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 61/4 (2006), 759–776. In this article, moreover, Schnapper draws interesting comparisons with Great Britain and Germany. While political integration was much more successful in France (among other reasons because of its citizenship law), the economic situation of postcolonial immigrants and their descendants ranks worst there.
 124. On the pieds-noirs and their involvement in the Front National (which until today has its bastions in communities with a high proportion of Algerian French and their

- descendants), see Emmanuelle Comtat, *Les pieds-noirs et la politique: quarante ans après le retour* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2009), 237–266.
125. A good overview is provided by Jean-Louis Miège and Colette Dubois, eds., *L'Europe retrouvée: Les migrations de la décolonisation* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), where the compulsive character of postcolonial remigration is emphasized (see the book's introduction [10]), as well as (in abbreviated form) Etemad, "Europe and Migration after Decolonisation."
 126. Cf. Guno Jones, *Tussen onderdanen, rijksgegoten en Nederlanders: Nederlandse politici over burgers uit Oost en West en Nederland, 1945–2005* (Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2007), 85–86, 369–370.
 127. Cf. Guy Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo, 1885–1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 208–209.
 128. On colonial remigration to Portugal, see Norrie MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire* (London: Longman, 1997).
 129. In France this context of flight from postcolonial wars entered into legislative language favoring the French from Algeria and other colonies. In that legislation the compulsive character of remigration was explicitly emphasized; cf. Scioldo-Zürcher, "The Postcolonial Repatriations of the French of Algeria in 1962," 97.
 130. See varying estimates in Colette Dubois and Jean-Louis Miège, "Introduction," in Jean-Louis Miège and Colette Dubois, eds., *L'Europe retrouvée: Les migrations de la décolonisation* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), 18. Etemad estimates the number of postcolonial refugees and remigrants at between 3.3 and 4 million people.
 131. On the history of Cyprus, see the comprehensive, four-volume series by Heinz A. Richter, above all *Geschichte der Insel Zypern*, vol. 4 (1 + 2): 1965–1977 (Mainz: Rutzen, 2009).
 132. On this, see United Nations Security Council, S/11789 (5 August 1975), "Interim Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 370 (1975)." The records are accessible online at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N75/151/45/PDF/N7515145.pdf?OpenElement> (September 2016 and April 2017; unfortunately, the link is not always reliable).
 133. On flight from Bulgaria, see Brandes, Sundhaussen, and Troebst, eds., *Lexikon der Vertreibungen*, 662–667.
 134. On the collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars, see Holm Sundhaussen, *Jugoslawien und seine Nachfolgestaaten 1943–2011: Eine ungewöhnliche Geschichte des Gewöhnlichen* (Vienna, Böhlau, 2012). Of course, there is also a lot of English literature on the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. See, inter alia, Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).
 135. These incidents are documented in the court records of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). On this, see the "Vukovar Hospital" trial in Den Haag at <http://www.icty.org/case/mrksic/4> (accessed April 2017).
 136. The best analysis of the conflict's military dimension is still Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Russian and European Analysis, *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: CIA, 2002).
 137. Everyday life in the Serbian ethnocracy is penetratingly analyzed by Armina Galijaš, *Eine bosnische Stadt im Zeichen des Krieges: Ethnopolitik und Alltag in Banja Luka (1990–1995)*, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011).
 138. On Austria, see Rainer Münz, Peter Zuser, and Josef Kytir, "Grenzüberschreitende Wanderungen und ausländische Wohnbevölkerung: Struktur und Entwicklung," in Heinz Fassmann and Irene Stacher, eds., *Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht: Demographische Entwicklungen—sozioökonomische Strukturen—rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen* (Vienna: Drava Verlag, 2003), 26–27. In the case of the Federal Republic of

- Germany, nobody at the time was circulating an account of the “refugee crisis” (as they do today) attributing Germany’s acceptance of displaced persons to guilt feelings about the country’s Nazi past.
139. Numerous reports are recorded in the Open Society Archive in Budapest and were already examined by the author in preparing earlier publications; see the collections deposited there: HU OSA, 304-0-2 (International Human Rights Law Institute, Interim and Supplementary Reports of the UN Special Rapporteur); see further HU OSA 304-0-6 (International Human Rights Law Institute, Materials on Ethnic Cleansing); HU OSA 304-0-4 (International Human Rights Law Institute, United Nations, International Red Cross Committee, International Court of Justice).
 140. The first case in which mass rapes were attested and punished by the ICTY concerned the Bosnian Serb commander Dragoljub Kunarac, who commanded a VRS unit that was made up overwhelmingly of volunteers and that maintained a house near the East Bosnian city of Foča in which numerous women were held captive and raped. The incidents there are documented in the court records of the ICTY. The files are accessible only at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/ind/en/kun-iii991108e.pdf> (accessed April 2017).
 141. Recent studies like Miriam Gebhardt’s book show that numerous rapes also took place as the US Army invaded; see Miriam Gebhardt, *Crimes Unspoken: The Rape of German Women at the End of the Second World War* (Cambridge: Polity, 2017). Gebhardt’s estimates of 190,000 rapes by GIs are, however, disputed.
 142. See Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 167–170.
 143. The legal foundation for the refugees’ absorption was the Bund-Länder-Aktion für bosnische Kriegsvertriebene (Federal-State Action for Bosnian War Expellees), which ceased operations in 1998. On repatriation and the option to stay, see the European comparison undertaken by Annegret Bendiek, *Der Konflikt im ehemaligen Jugoslawien und die Europäische Integration: Eine Analyse ausgewählter Politikfelder* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 79–85. On the percentage of Bosnians who remained in Austria, see Münz, Zuser, and Kytir, “Grenzüberschreitende Wanderungen und ausländische Wohnbevölkerung,” 26–27.
 144. On the guest workers, see Ulf Brunnbauer, “Labour Emigration from the Yugoslav Area from the Late 19th Century until the End of Socialism: Continuities and Changes,” in id., ed., *Transnational Societies: Transterritorial Politics: Migrations in the (Post-)Yugoslav Region, 19th–21st Century* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 17–50.
 145. See the study by Heinz Fassmann, Josef Kohlbacher, and Ursula Reeger, *Integration durch berufliche Mobilität? Eine empirische Analyse der beruflichen Mobilität ausländischer Arbeitskräfte in Wien* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001).
 146. On the data about occupational branches, see the chapter “Arbeit und Beruf” in the report issued by Statistik Austria/Kommission für Migrations- und Integrationsforschung [Austrian Statistics/Commission for Migration and Integration Research], *Migration & Integration: Zahlen. Daten. Indikatoren 2013* (Vienna: Statistik Austria, 2013). On the data about de-skilling, see Bettina Stadler and Beatrix Wiedenhofer-Galik, “Dequalifizierung von Migrantinnen und Migranten am österreichischen Arbeitsmarkt,” *Statistische Nachrichten* 5 (2011), 383–399, as well as Martina Stadlmayr, *Arbeitsmarktintegration und Dequalifizierung von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund* (Universität Linz: unpublished dissertation, 2012), an abbreviated version of which is accessible at http://www.ibe.co.at/fileadmin/AblageBox/TEAM/Stadlmayr/Kurzfassung_Diss_Stadlmayr.pdf (accessed April 2017).
 147. These were also the findings of the studies for the aforementioned research seminars at the University of Vienna, although these works were not, as a rule, published. Here I refer to a study by Karin Weißinger and Mersiha Zukorlic about the integration of Bosnian refugees into the Austrian labor market (prepared in the summer semester of 2014); the

- authors, in addition to evaluating social science studies of the subject, conducted oral history interviews.
148. Labor market integration was delayed in countries where refugees were not allowed to work right after their arrival. Hence, openness to refugees saves social expenditure and pays off economically. See for this conclusion the comparative study by Mikkil Barslund, Matthias Busse, Karolien Lenaerts, Lars Ludolph, and Vilde Renman, "Integration of Refugees: Lessons from Bosnians in Five EU Countries," *Intereconomics* 5 (2017), 257–263.
 149. Carolin Leutloff-Grandits, "Post-Dayton Ethnic Engineering in Croatia through the Lenses of Property Issues and Social Transformations," *Journal of Genocide Research* 18/4 (2016), 485–502.
 150. On the practice of deportation, see "Bosnien-Flüchtlinge: Vor die Hunde," *Der Spiegel* 15 (1997), 36–37, accessible at <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8693231.html> (accessed April 2017).
 151. Cf. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 167–170.
 152. On this, cf. Brandes, Sundhaussen, and Troebst, eds., *Lexikon der Vertreibungen*, 50–51, 58–59, 266–267.
 153. On the Kosovo conflict and its prehistory, see, inter alia, Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler, and Karl Kaser, *Kosovo/Kosova: Mythen, Daten, Fakten* (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 1999). UÇK stands for Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës.
 154. These historical analogies and arguments were already being made, to some extent, at the beginning of the war in Croatia and Bosnia. The French intellectual Alain Finkielkraut was especially active making arguments of this kind; see his book *Dispatches from the Balkan War and Other Writings* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999).
 155. On this, see the diverse (and, in part, questionable) case studies in Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne, *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
 156. On these incidents and the entire Western mission in Kosovo, see Helmut Kramer and Vedran Džihic, *Die Kosovo-Bilanz—Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft?*, 2nd ed., updated and corrected (Vienna: LIT, 2006). Next to KFOR, the EU mission EULEX, entrusted with setting up constitutional structures, was especially important.
 157. On this, see, inter alia, Shaun Walker, "The Ukrainians Starting a New Life—in Russia," *Guardian* (5 January 2016), accessible at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/ukrainian-russia-refugee-conflict> (accessed April 2017).

THE OUTSIDERS

Refugees in Europe since 1492

PHILIPP THER

TRANSLATED BY JEREMIAH RIEMER

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON AND OXFORD

English Translation Copyright © 2019 by Princeton University Press
Originally published as *Die Außenseiter: Flucht, Flüchtlinge und Integration im modernen Europa* © Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin 2017

Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work
should be sent to permissions@press.princeton.edu

Published by Princeton University Press
41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TR
press.princeton.edu

All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019936643

ISBN: 978-0-691-1-7952-0

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available

The translation of this work was funded by Geisteswissenschaften International—
Translation Funding for Work in the Humanities and Social Sciences from Germany,
a joint initiative of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, the German Federal Foreign Office,
the collecting society VG WORT and the Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels
(German Publishers & Booksellers Association).

Editorial: Eric Crahan and Pamela Weidman

Production Editorial: Ellen Foos

Text Design: Carmina Alvarez

Production: Merli Guerra

Publicity: James Snyder and Caroline Priday

Jacket and text illustrations: Pauline Altmann / Suhrkamp Verlag

Maps: Peter Palm

This book has been composed in Minion Pro

Printed on acid-free paper. ∞

Printed in the United States of America

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2