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## The Quintessential Victims of War

In July of 1946, the American branch of the Unitarian Service Committee (USC) created a colony for Spanish refugee children in France. By the end of that year, over a hundred children between the ages of five and twelve had passed through the villa La Garde in Saint Goin, nestled in the Pyrenees close to the Spanish border. Some, mostly orphans, became permanent residents at La Garde. All of the children's parents had fought against Franco during the brutal civil war in Spain (1936–1939) and since Franco won the war, returning to Spain would mean likely imprisonment or death for their militant parents. But social conditions in France were desperate at the end of the war. “After nearly a decade of suffering, civil strife and war . . . the new generation of the Spanish Community in France is in serious danger,” a 1945 USC report warned. “Modern psychology stresses the fateful and lasting effect of the impact of such events in the formative period of the human soul . . . The physical and psychic effects of the civil war period appear to be . . . aggravated by the camp environment, the misery of the overcrowded and promiscuous barracks, of panicky men and hysterical women . . . This early experience will not fade out from the memories of the children who never saw harmonious family life and the ‘sweet home’ of childhood.”<sup>1</sup>

Most of the children at La Garde had been displaced their entire lives. Many had lost their fathers. Jose Castro, nicknamed Pepito, was the son of a famous Republican lieutenant killed in battle against Franco. His mother did not earn enough as a seamstress to support her two children in France. Pepito was reportedly “as naughty as they come,” but educators at St. Goin noted that he “has such a disarming personality that he is in a fair way of being

spoiled by everyone he meets.” Antonio Sanchez, born in 1939, was one of ten children of a republican guerilla. Both of his parents had survived the Civil War, but neither could work, as they suffered from tuberculosis. Eduardo Friemel was born in an internment camp in France in 1940. His father, a republican soldier, was captured by the Nazis in France and deported to Auschwitz, where he was executed for facilitating the escape of fellow prisoners. Eduardo spent most of the war hiding in dugouts in the mountains. He slept in a bed for the first time in his life at the age of eight when he arrived at La Garde.<sup>2</sup>

The director of the St. Goin colony until 1948 was J. M. Alvarez. Alvarez was typical of Spanish exiles in his determination to instill both nationalist and Republican values in his wards. In 1947, he described a typical lesson in the colony—a dialogue with his pupils. The lesson began innocently enough, with the question, “What do you want to be when you grow up?” The children responded with typical choices for 8–12 year olds in the 1940s: Pepito wanted to be a Sergeant in the Canadian Mounted Police, Conchita hoped to become a movie star, Juanito dreamed of fixing cars, Nina planned to become a secretary, Alberto a lion hunter, Lorenzo an airplane pilot.

One by one, Alvarez berated his pupils for their flights of fantasy. “Let’s begin with Pepito. I thought that we all agreed about one thing that is perfectly clear: that our country, our beloved Spain, once so rich, has become a country of misery. We had agreed that we would help rebuild our Spain by working hard all together when conditions are such that we can return. But—here is Pepito who would turn his back on the memory of his father . . . He prefers to be a Canadian, it seems.” Pepito lowered his head in shame. Carlos interjected, “I think that over there in Canada they don’t need the services of Pepito, while in Spain there will be so much work for us all to do.” Luis came to his friend’s rescue, suggesting that Pepito should become a member of the Spanish Republican Police. Pepito, relieved, exclaimed, “That would be marvelous! I would go after the assassins of my father to deliver them to justice.” “Well said,” Alvarez praised him. “You had forgotten Spain. But it really isn’t your fault. It is the fault of Franco because Spanish children are forced to languish in exile.”

Alvarez was particularly hard on Ricardo, whose ambition was to become an “Avenger of the Far West, the celebrated masked cowboy.” “My dear Ricardo,” Alvarez lectured. “We are not living in a film world or dream world . . . Masked cowboys? That is fiction, pretty lies, and nothing more.” Ricardo burst into tears. Only one child got it right: Radames, who announced proudly, “I am

from Asturias. I am an orphan of the war in Spain, and I should like to be a miner as my father was, and my uncle. I think it is noble work to dig coal out of the bowels of the earth for all the factories and to warm the homes of the people.” “Radames, that’s spoken like a man,” Alvarez praised. “I want to shake hands with you in front of your schoolmates, because you have understood.”<sup>3</sup>

The pedagogy in the colony at St. Goin was not only intended to cultivate the nationalist and republican loyalties of Spanish refugee children. As the USC report makes clear, educators also intended to address the perceived psychological consequences of war and displacement. This focus on psychological rehabilitation represented a significant departure in twentieth-century relief work. In the late 1930s, at the height of the Spanish Civil War, Howard Kershner of the Quaker American Friends Service Committee had actually rejected offers of assistance from American psychologists. Kershner explained at the time that a child psychologist would not “have found much use for her talents” in Spanish refugee camps. “The problems we faced were elemental. Refugee children had been living on sand, in fields, abandoned buildings, in whatever shelter could be found for them. When the struggle is to get food, clothing, and warmth enough to keep life going, the immediate problem is not one for a psychological solution.”<sup>4</sup>

Only ten years later, humanitarian organizations had radically changed their outlook. Increasingly, they were as concerned about the psychological after-shocks of war as about refugees’ physical needs. As early as 1941, Lindsay Noble of the American Friends Service Committee became convinced that in spite of any potential material and educational advantages, keeping Spanish refugee children in France was a mistake. The dangers that concerned him were above all psychological in nature. Noble explicitly linked the confused national identities of refugee children with psychological dysfunction. “They grow up neither French nor Spanish, finding themselves in the sad situation of being nowhere, possessing no place of employment or home. In keeping them longer here in our colonies we are without a doubt doing more harm than good,” he concluded.<sup>5</sup> By 1944, Charles Joy, the director of the USC, was also deeply concerned about the psychological dimensions of relief. “The problem of neurotic and psychotic children is a serious one. France has not made in the field of psychiatry the progress she has made in other fields,” he maintained.<sup>6</sup>

This shift from providing bread and butter relief to psychological rehabilitation would have profound consequences—not only for Spanish refugee children, but also for the millions of families uprooted by the Second World War.

In order to understand this development, however, it is necessary to return to the moment when children were first cast into the international spotlight as the quintessential victims of war: the First World War and the Armenian Genocide and its aftermath. The humanitarian campaigns that followed World War I and developed between the two world wars were formative ventures for the architects of post-WWII humanitarian organizations who would draw both positive and negative lessons from their experiences. These interwar experiences set the stage for the development of more cultural, nationalist, and psychological solutions to wartime suffering after 1945.

As Europe's first total war, World War I had the distinction of being the first major conflict on European soil to target civilians. By the war's end, social conditions in Central and Eastern Europe were particularly catastrophic. The allies had imposed a naval blockade in 1914, choking food shipments to Germany and Austria-Hungary. The blockade continued after the armistice in 1918 in order to compel Germany to sign the Treaty of Versailles. Hunger, military defeat, and the collapse of the Wilhelmine, Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires were upheaval enough. But then a deadly flu epidemic ravaged Europe's population between 1918 and 1920, inflicting even more casualties than had the war. Vienna faced some of the most desperate conditions in Europe. Testifying to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Agriculture, predicted, "I do not see what prospect there is [for Austrians] short of migration or death."<sup>7</sup>

Shortly after the outbreak of the Great War, charitable and religious organizations responded to the crisis, gathering forces and sending out their own troops—social workers and nurses whose official mission was to ease the suffering of children. British Quaker Francesca M. Wilson embarked on her first relief mission in Europe in 1916. Wilson would go on to follow the trail of misery across Europe in the twentieth century, attending to refugees in Serbia and Austria after World War I, in Spain and France during the Spanish Civil War, and in Europe after World War II with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). But Wilson began her career in humanitarianism during the First World War in the tiny village of Samoens in the French Alps, where she presided over the care of eighty women and children in a hotel converted into a refugee camp. Wilson was initially disappointed to be marooned in a sleepy Alpine village. When she signed up for relief work she had imagined being "just behind the front line with bombs falling all around." But she dutifully applied her skills to the tasks at hand: "changing babies, lifting up toddlers, washing napkins, consoling screaming

children, separating scratchers and biters from their victims, making peace between angry mothers.”<sup>8</sup>

Most of the women and children in Wilson’s care had been evacuated from the overcrowded tenements of Paris. In Samoens they found a reprieve from food shortages and military violence. But Wilson saw the evacuation as an opportunity to civilize her charges as well as protect them from physical harm. She was optimistic that with proper attention, the psychological impact of the war would be minimal. “They forgot both the terror they had been through and their slum manners pretty rapidly, for children respond to civilized life almost as quickly as they do to barbarism,” she proclaimed.<sup>9</sup>

In Samoens, Wilson participated in an unprecedented humanitarian experiment, delivering relief to civilians uprooted by the Great War. International humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (founded in 1863), had offered assistance to victims of war since the mid-nineteenth century, but these earlier efforts had focused on soldiers and prisoners of war.<sup>10</sup> As the lines between battleground and home front radically blurred during World War I, an ever-greater number of civilians needed food, clothing, medical care, and shelter assistance.

The growing numbers and needs of refugees during World War I created a context for new forms of international action. War and migration had long divided families, but the First World War and its aftermath marked the birth of the modern refugee as a special legal category of migrant. In the nineteenth century, European government authorities typically did not distinguish between political or religious refugees and other migrants who crossed frontiers in search of employment or marriage. State borders largely remained open—at least to Europeans. Between 1823 and 1905, England did not expel a single refugee. In the United States, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was one of the first major laws to restrict immigration on explicitly xenophobic and racial grounds. But U.S. immigration authorities deported only a few hundred aliens a year between 1892 and 1907. Children were among these nineteenth-century migrants, but they were not typically targeted as specific objects of humanitarian or state intervention.<sup>11</sup>

All that changed during and after the First World War, which ushered in new practices of state control of migration and citizenship. At the same time millions of civilians were fleeing occupying armies during World War I, xenophobia reached new heights. Passports and visas were introduced across Europe and in the United States as an emergency security measure, but soon became a permanent requirement for crossing state borders. The 1917 Russian

Revolution and civil war, which culminated in the creation of the Soviet Union, generated widespread fears of a Bolshevik revolution across Europe. Immigrants from Eastern Europe, in particular, were viewed as portents of anarchy and social revolution. In 1917, the United States passed restrictive immigration legislation, requiring a literacy test for admission.<sup>12</sup> In France, beginning in April of 1917, all foreigners over the age of fifteen were required to carry identification cards.<sup>13</sup> All told, between 1914 and 1918, approximately 400,000 civilians found themselves behind barbed wire in Europe, mostly for the “crime” of being foreign.<sup>14</sup>

The refugee crisis intensified after the war’s end. Approximately 9.5 million people in Europe were classified as refugees in 1926. Most were victims of the principle of national self-determination. Overnight, the collapse of the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires had transformed citizens of the former multinational Empires into “minorities” in aggressively nationalizing states. Some 850,000 German-speakers left Western Poland for Prussia, 180,000 German-speaking Alsatians were forcibly expelled and relocated to Germany, and 120,000 Germans left the Soviet Union for Germany after the war. Another 860,000 political refugees from the Russian revolution and the Bolshevik regime emigrated throughout Europe in 1922.<sup>15</sup>

The crisis unleashed by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire inspired particularly radical solutions, uprooting millions of people from their homes. The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 had already displaced several hundred thousand Muslims from the Balkans to the Ottoman Empire. In 1915, under cover of war, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), known popularly as the “Young Turks,” began a secret campaign to eliminate the Armenian minority in the Ottoman Empire. Those Armenians who managed to escape the Genocide fled largely to the Russian Caucasus and to the Syrian and Lebanese regions of the Ottoman Empire. After the war, Armenia briefly became an independent Republic, but in 1920, Turkey and the USSR invaded the fragile state, and the Allies retreated from their initial commitment to protect its sovereignty. What remained of Armenia was transformed into a Soviet Socialist Republic in November of 1920. Armenians fled once again, forming a diaspora of approximately 205,800 refugees in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Europe. In Europe’s first experiment with forced population exchanges, meanwhile, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne mandated that 1,350,000 Greeks in Turkey be “peacefully” swapped for 430,000 Turks in Greece.<sup>16</sup>

The League of Nations’ High Commission for Refugees, under the leadership of diplomat and arctic explorer Fridtjof Nansen, was established in 1921

as the first coordinated international effort to assist the unprecedented number of refugees. The Commission's original mandate to provide assistance to Russian refugees was extended to Armenians in 1923 and then later to Assyrian and Turkish refugees. The Nansen system provided stateless refugees with documents, so-called "Nansen passports," now critical to the establishment of a legal identity and the right to cross national frontiers. The "refugee" was born in international law.<sup>17</sup>

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The First World War and the Armenian Genocide not only generated millions of refugees, it also inspired the first international effort to "reclaim" and rehabilitate children uprooted by wartime displacement and ethnic cleansing. Children were "lost" during the Armenian Genocide in many ways. Thousands simply starved and died along the routes of deportation. Other children were repeatedly raped, forced into servitude, sold into concubinage or marriage, or abducted. When caravans of Armenians stopped to rest in Turkish towns, groups of local Kurds and Turks often appeared to take the Armenian children away, sometimes by force. Albert, an Armenian survivor, recalled that his caravan was assembled in a field in one town. The town crier yelled, "whoever wants a woman or child, come and get them. . . . A man came and grabbed me. My mother began to cry and cry and would not let go of me. He slapped her and yanked me away." He was nine or ten years old at the time. He was taken to a Turkish family and put to work guarding sheep. Another survivor recalled that when her caravan stopped to rest, a Turkish man approached her grandmother and asked to take her away. The man said that all the Armenian children were going to die. He would give her a chance to survive. Her grandmother relented. The next day the man came to take her. "When he came, I remember my grandmother sitting like a dead person, crying and crying. The man took me and another Armenian girl away. He gave me to . . . a young woman who did not have a child." She lived with her foster mother for three years, forgot Armenian, and "became a Turk."<sup>18</sup>

Between 1921 and 1927, the League of Nations sponsored a mission to rescue the thousands of Armenian children alleged to be have been Islamized in Turkish families and institutions during the Genocide. The League's Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East set a number of significant precedents. It took up the recovery of Armenia's lost children only as an urgent priority of the Armenian community, but also as an international (and "universal") humanitarian cause.<sup>19</sup>

The plight of Armenian children was first raised in the League of Nations General Assembly in 1920. There were several legal justifications for intervention. Article 23 of the League of Nations Covenant invested the League with the authority to supervise “the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children.” In addition, article 142 of the Treaty of Sèvres, signed between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire on August 10, 1920, nullified conversions to Islam that had taken place during the war. The clause obliged the Turkish government to help search for and release individuals who had disappeared, were interned, or held in captivity.<sup>20</sup>

In February of 1921, the League Council established a Commission of Inquiry with Regard to the Deportation of Women and Children. The Commission consisted of three members, all experienced in relief work in the Ottoman Empire: Emma D. Cushman, an American affiliated with the Near East Relief Agency, Dr. W. A. Kennedy, a British doctor working with refugees near Constantinople, and Karen Jeppe, a Danish citizen with a missionary background stationed in Aleppo, Syria.

In its first report to the League in September 1921, the Commission estimated that 90,819 Armenian orphans had already been reclaimed from Turkish families and institutions, mostly through the efforts of private Armenian groups, Near East Relief, and the British High Commission. But another 73,000 women and children reportedly remained in captivity. Armenian authorities maintained that at least six thousand children were still being “detained in Muslim surroundings” in Constantinople alone, and that another 67,000 were hidden in Turkish families and orphanages in Anatolia.<sup>21</sup>

Officially, the Commission was supposed to remain politically, nationally, and religiously impartial. But its work clearly reflected the concerns of Western feminist organizations and Christian missionaries. Continuing a long tradition, Commission members interpreted the denationalization of Armenian women and children by Turkish or Islamic “barbarians” as an assault on Christian “civilization.” In a report submitted to the League of Nations Second Assembly on September 21, 1922, Kennedy held the entire Turkish nation responsible for the abduction of “innumerable women, mostly young,” who had been “rudely torn from their hearths and homes, compelled to perform the most degrading tasks” and “shut up in harems, into which it is almost impossible to penetrate.” He elaborated, “Children torn from the Christian faith are often forced by ill treatment to disown even the little they remember of their past life. Their birth certificates are forged, and their true names are thus replaced by Turkish names . . . It is almost impossible to get at them, as an entire people is an

accomplice to this crime.”<sup>22</sup> In a May 1922 report from Aleppo, Karen Jeppe likewise alleged that as Armenians fled or were deported during the 1915 Genocide, “the Muslims stole the women and children or bought them at a low price.” Most of these children, she insisted, now “live in bondage, at the mercy of their masters, without any rights or protection, exposed to indignities and abuses of every kind.”<sup>23</sup>

It is striking that these initial reports barely mention the circumstances of war, deportation, and genocide under which children changed hands. Instead, the kidnapping of Christian children is framed as an almost standard Turkish or Muslim practice. Many of the Armenian children and women who were reclaimed by the Commission had of course been violently abducted and suffered exploitation or abuse. But some were well integrated into Muslim families and treated well. Other children entered Muslim families through less nefarious channels. As they fled persecution, some Armenian parents sought to save their children by hiding them with Turkish families or institutions—just as Jewish families would attempt to hide their children among Christians several decades later. In other cases, Turkish charitable institutions gathered up abandoned Armenian children along the routes of deportation. A number of Armenian children had formed close bonds to their Turkish foster parents and had to be removed from them by force. A boy who had been adopted by a young Turkish couple recalled, “I was very happy there . . . The French announced that they would pay money to any family who has news of live Armenians. They came and found me too and wanted to take me away. You should have seen how this poor lady [his adoptive mother] cried and did not want to part from me. So I told her not to worry, I would run away and return.”<sup>24</sup>

It is not coincidental that children and grown women were lumped together in the League’s rescue effort. Both women and children were seen as a form of national property to be “reclaimed” after the war. Both were considered particularly vulnerable to abduction and abuse. And both were considered incapable of making rational decisions about their futures. At least half of the Armenian women who had allegedly been abducted or sold into slavery subsequently married Turkish men and had children with them, Jeppe reported. Whether or not these marriages were consensual, many of these women, she acknowledged, “are now so well accustomed to living in this milieu that they no longer desire to return to their former homes.”<sup>25</sup>

In general, however, members of the League Commission were hard-pressed to acknowledge that either Armenian women or children might have formed genuine ties to the Turkish community or to Islam. Kennedy reported

that many children vehemently insisted that they were Turks, in spite of evidence to the contrary. He explained "their persistence in the statement that they were Moslems" as a product of terror. "They had been threatened in many ways, and the older girls often state that, in such a case, they would be sent to houses of ill-fame." Other children, he reported, "openly state that they received or were promised gifts of various kinds to induce them to feel happy and remain Moslem. Some admit that they were happy and well treated. Some have actually for various reasons escaped to their Moslem homes . . . This is to be explained by the fact that they went from comfortable Turkish homes to Armenian institutions where no luxury exists or is possible."<sup>26</sup>

In a letter to the Secretary General of the League, Emma Cushman maintained that many Armenian children had been brainwashed by the Turks. She denounced the "unique and very clever manner in which the Turks contrive to conceal the identity of these children. They try to bring about not so much a change of name and locality, but rather a complete change of mind in the children. These children, for a period of time extending from one week to three months, will deny strenuously that they are Christians. Some, indeed, will go so far as to revile the Christians as infidels, and declare that they are loyal Moslems." Cushman, too, was reluctant to acknowledge the potential for genuine ties between Armenian children and their adoptive families. She insisted that most of the girls had been bribed to deny their origins "by gifts of clothing, personal adornments, such as beads, cheap jewelry, etc.," whereas the boys had generally been compelled to submit by force. Many children, she conceded, ran away to their Turkish families after being reclaimed by Armenian or British authorities. But she insisted that these runaways suffered from a "distorted mentality," and blamed "surreptitious visits or communication from the Turkish family, who either brought or sent some tidbits of food or a present of some kind."<sup>27</sup>

On September 23, 1921, in response to the first set of reports from the Commission of Enquiry, the League of Nations Assembly ordered the appointment of a League Commissioner for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East. The League Commissioner was officially charged with the reclamation of trafficked women and children. The League also resolved to open a "Neutral House" for rescued women and children. Kennedy was appointed Commissioner, and he established a headquarters and League of Nations Neutral House in Constantinople with Cushman. Karen Jeppe led a branch of the League Commission and a second League home in Aleppo, Syria, a major area of settlement for Armenian refugees.<sup>28</sup>

In the Neutral House and in affiliated schools in Aleppo, Jeppe's branch aimed explicitly to renationalize, re-Christianize, and "re-civilize" lost Armenians. Jeppe reported in August 1924, "It is hard to believe your eyes when you compare the people in rags, dirty and of a savage bearing who arrive here, with the more or less civilized people who leave us a few months later. At first, our protégés often tend to try to run away if life here doesn't completely suit them; but soon 'the Armenian' within begins to reappear. Before they leave us, they are completely returned to their nationality."<sup>29</sup> Orphanages for Armenian children established by the Near East Relief and other private charities were also run in a nationalist spirit. The children were reeducated in the Armenian language and Christian religion, and learned Armenian nationalist songs and folk dances. Some survivors recalled that they were punished by their teachers or even beaten if they were caught speaking Turkish.<sup>30</sup>

Not surprisingly, the League's rescue campaign provoked an outcry from Ottoman and Muslim elites. Many saw the effort as an affront to the patriarchal privileges of Muslim men. One prominent Turkish feminist, Halide Edip Adivar, even insisted that Muslim children were the true victims of denationalization in the League's homes. In 1928, she alleged that "children brought to the [Neutral House] were left in the care of the Armenian women, and these Armenian women either through persuasion or threats or hypnotism, forced the children to learn by heart the name of an Armenian woman for their mother and an Armenian man for their father."<sup>31</sup>

The League's Commission operated for five years before falling victim to the reigning principle of national sovereignty in interwar Europe. The Treaty of Lausanne guaranteed Turkey's national sovereignty, hindering further action in Constantinople. In Syria, French mandatory authorities began to demand the termination of Jeppe's oeuvre in 1925, insisting that all humanitarian efforts in the mandate should be subject to the supreme authority of the French High Commissioner. At the very least, they wanted Jeppe to be replaced by a French citizen.<sup>32</sup> Robert de Caix, the French delegate to the League's Mandate Commission in Geneva, explained that "the work of liberating women and children who have entered into Muslim families voluntarily or by force can cause serious problems if one does not proceed discreetly and amicably . . . Therein lies the danger for public order for which the Mandatory Power alone is responsible and which it alone has sacrificed to maintain." French authorities were particularly incensed by Jeppe's ambition to establish agricultural colonies for Armenian refugees in Syria. De Caix considered Armenian refugees "difficult people," and implied that the French government did not want

them to become a permanent presence on Syrian soil. A year later, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Aristide Briand agreed that Jeppe's Commission "risks creating a lot of difficulties with the indigenous population, without responding to any real necessity." The French were, however, prevented from unilaterally terminating the Aleppo mission because of "the favor which this pro-Armenian charity enjoys with feminist and evangelical associations, who exercise a considerable influence in the milieu of the Secretariat of the League of Nations and in certain important delegations to the Assembly."<sup>33</sup>

The Commission finally ended its work in Constantinople in 1926 and in Aleppo in 1927. In her final report, Jeppe estimated that the Aleppo branch had successfully "reclaimed" 1,600 Armenians, 1,400 of whom had passed through the League's Neutral Home. Including those assisted by the Constantinople Commission, a total of some four thousand children and four thousand adults received aid from the League's Commission.<sup>34</sup> These were relatively modest figures compared to the number of children alleged to remain in Turkish hands—a numerical disparity that would surface again when the United Nations canvassed for lost East European and Jewish children after the Second World War. Jeppe explained this disparity with reference to the Commission's humanitarian ethic and restraint. The Commission had only mobilized to reclaim women and children who themselves wished to escape from the Turkish milieu, she insisted. "We were determined not to disturb friendly relations or to disturb family life in cases in which the women or children expatriated were treated well and considered members of the family . . . We only assisted those who could not resign themselves to their fate and who felt profoundly unhappy. . . . This is the reason the number of our protégés is relatively small. If we had been less scrupulous we would have been able to obtain, numerically, very different results."<sup>35</sup>

She estimated that only 6 percent of the Commission's wards ultimately chose to rejoin their Muslim families rather than the Armenian community. And while the goal of renationalizing and re-Christianizing Armenian women and children was never far from sight, Jeppe also insisted that the Commission's foremost goal had always been to reconstruct families torn apart by war. She thus celebrated the successful reunification of Armenian families as a triumph of the League's humanitarian principles, attesting, "I cannot describe the scenes which we have witnessed, when brothers and sisters are reunited by chance, or when fathers and mothers embrace a child that they believed they would never see again."<sup>36</sup>

The similarities between the League's mission to recover Armenian children and efforts to recover East European and Jewish children after World

War II are striking. They suggest the extent to which the loss and recovery of children were central to twentieth century experiences of war, genocide, and reconstruction more broadly. Whether it was Armenian children who became Turks, Czech children who became German, or Jewish children who became Christian, the transfer of children to a “foreign” nation or religion came to represent not only a humanitarian offense against individuals, but also a war-time assault against entire nations. After both World Wars, the recovery of lost children was tightly linked to national regeneration by communities decimated by genocide, war, and displacement.

These lost children were both victims and beneficiaries of the drive to create nationally homogenous states in Europe. In the first half of the twentieth century, European governments saw population as the highest measure of national power and prestige, the key to expanding economic and military might. The perceived ability of children to learn new languages, religions, and identities saved many of their lives during both the Armenian Genocide and the Second World War. But this ability to assimilate was a double-edged sword. In a world of warring nationalist movements and population politics, it also transformed children into a form of plunder, to be captured and remodeled by nations looking to expand their ranks.

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In Central Europe as well, new humanitarian organizations found new terrain for action during and after World War I, setting a number of precedents for post-World War II relief work. Among the millions displaced by World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg Empires were thousands of children evacuated from the path of occupying armies and starvation. These evacuations were small in scale in comparison to the massive civilian evacuations of the Second World War. But they represented a formative experience for child welfare experts who would later mobilize around displaced children during and after World War II. In 1918, Anna Freud led a group of Austro-Hungarian refugee children from depleted Vienna to the more fertile Hungarian countryside. (Twenty years later she would go on to author the most influential study of evacuated children during the Second World War). The Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Interior had organized the evacuation of nine hundred children from Vienna to Hungary in 1918, “in consideration of the fact that the uninterrupted, long-term stay of refugee children in Vienna . . . will negatively influence their development and health.”<sup>37</sup> After the war, as Austria sunk into famine, the number of evacuees multiplied.

In 1920 more than 100,000 Austrian children traveled as far as Switzerland, Denmark, Holland, and Germany on holidays from hunger that lasted between eight weeks and a full year.<sup>38</sup>

In February 1920, an International Congress of Children's Aid Organizations in Geneva brought together delegates from all the major relief agencies in Europe and government representatives to discuss the progress of evacuation programs. There was little controversy at the Congress about the separation of children from their parents. In fact, representatives of the Austrian Ministry for Social Welfare praised the "moral and material benefits" of sending children abroad. A member of the Danish Committee for the Aid of Viennese Children even saw hungry Austrian children as potential ambassadors. Austrian children scattered across Europe were contributing to the development of "international understanding" in the aftermath of war, he proclaimed.<sup>39</sup>

Some evacuated children never returned home. Hermine Santrouschitz, an 11-year-old Viennese girl from a working-class family, was evacuated to Leiden in the Netherlands in December 1920. Her Dutch foster family gave her the nickname Miep and provided her with ample food and affection. She first returned to Vienna five years later and discovered that she no longer felt at home there. "I did not want to hurt my natural family's feelings, and I was still young and needed their consent. But I wanted desperately to return to the Netherlands. My sensibilities were Dutch, the quality of my feelings also Dutch." Miep Gies returned to the Netherlands and moved to Amsterdam with her foster family. Eventually she became a secretary of Otto Frank, Anne Frank's father, and was one of the Frank family's protectors during the Second World War.<sup>40</sup>

The occupation of Northern France and Belgium by German forces prompted equally ambitious schemes to protect children's safety and health. In the summer of 1918, during the Hindenburg offensive, the French government evacuated 75,000 Parisian children as the German army threatened to seize the capital. These children were typically taken in by peasant families in regions such as the Yonne and Nièvre, where the French *Assistance Publique* relied on long-established networks of foster parents, but they were sometimes sent as far away as Holland.<sup>41</sup> Far from worrying about the emotional effects of separating children from their parents, some French commentators speculated that the evacuees were better off in their new families, removed from their impoverished urban origins. A writer for the magazine *Débats* in 1919 even lamented the fate of children who "will have to leave behind a veritable family in the Netherlands" to return to their own parents. "Who knows,"

asked the magazine, "if their happiest days will not have been their days spent in Holland?"<sup>42</sup>

The central mission of international humanitarian organizations during and after the First World War was to protect European children from violence, starvation, and infant mortality. These threats did not diminish with the armistice. To this end, in May of 1919, Eglantyne Jebb founded the Save the Children Fund (SCF) in London. Jebb was moved by the plight of starving children in Central Europe during World War I. She protested the British Naval blockade in Central Europe in Trafalgar Square in London, distributing photographs of skeletal children with the caption, "Our Blockade has Caused This." A year after its founding, the SCF blossomed into an international organization, and the International Save the Children Union (SCIU) was born, headquartered in Geneva. Jebb drafted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1923, the first international children's Bill of Rights, which was ratified by the League of Nations in 1924.<sup>43</sup>

On the other side of the Atlantic, Herbert Hoover's American Relief Administration emerged as the most important American effort to combat hunger in Europe. In October 1914, Hoover had organized the Commission for Relief in Belgium. The CRB distributed several billion dollars in relief aid to hungry children in German-occupied Belgium and Northern France during the First World War. After the war, Hoover turned his attention to Central and Eastern Europe, establishing the Child Feeding Program of the American Relief Administration (ARA). Officially, the ARA declared itself "impartially aloof from all politics, military, racial, or other controversial questions." In practice, its anti-Communism was never far from the surface. "Revolutions and political upheavals were of frequent occurrence and more than half of Europe, including Germany, tottered on the brink of anarchism, against which the only effective weapon was food," explained a 1922 ARA report.<sup>44</sup>

The success of the ARA and the SCF rested on creative fundraising strategies that fostered imagined affinities between American donors and Central European children. In one American suburb, the village green was transformed into a mock graveyard planted with two thousand white crosses, "each representing the grave of a child in Central Europe whose life might be saved by the immediate action of the residents of the village." A representative of the Hoover Commission stood by. Each time he received a ten-dollar bill, he lifted one cross out of the ground and replaced it with an American flag. Within a single week, the field of crosses had become a field of flags.<sup>45</sup>

The ARA penetrated the tiniest villages of Central and Eastern Europe through a network of local committees and soup kitchens. In March of 1919,

at least 400,000 children in Austria received a daily meal courtesy of the ARA; along with 1,500,000 children in Poland; 600,000 children in Czechoslovakia; 400,000 children in Serbia; 500,000 children in Romania; and 200,000 children in Russian Armenia.<sup>46</sup>

The food crisis had begun during the war itself in Austria. Like the other Great Powers, Austria had anticipated a short war, and government officials made no plans to provision the population in a drawn-out conflict. By 1918, official rations allocated to the typical consumer in Vienna had plunged to 830 calories a day.<sup>47</sup> The situation did not improve when the war ended. Francesca Wilson, who left the French Alps to combat starvation in Vienna's working-class neighborhoods, described Vienna as "a city of the dead" in the summer of 1919.<sup>48</sup> The death rate among children aged 5 to 19 was up 50 percent from its pre-war level. The ARA estimated that 96.2 percent of Viennese children were undernourished in 1919.<sup>49</sup>

While theoretically focused solely on feeding starving children, the ARA embraced a pedagogical mission from the outset. Its representatives sought to deliver "American" values of self-help, efficiency, and cross-class solidarity along with surplus wheat and corn.<sup>50</sup> In a speech in October 1920, Hoover insisted, "it was essential that the problem of child life be made the responsibility of each community and that American charity should not become a pauperizing influence."<sup>51</sup> The psychological consequences of starvation were not a central concern of the ARA, however. Rather, Hoover believed that his soup kitchens could heal the festering wounds of class division in Europe and thereby prevent the Russian revolution from spreading west. "A princess stirring broth in a soup kitchen is the best argument for democracy that could possibly be found . . . It was through this kind of service that we were able to stave off anarchy," he explained to the *Saturday Evening Post*.<sup>52</sup>

American Relief Administration workers developed a distinctive method of delivering calories to needy children, intended to embody the values of efficiency and self-government. But in spite of the organization's emphasis on self-help, the agency was not particularly concerned about family solidarity. In fact, ARA policies were shaped by a profound mistrust of parents. Hoover assumed that if food were distributed to parents, the parents would simply eat it rather than share it with their children. So the organization mandated that children's plates must be cleaned on the spot in ARA cafeterias, under strict supervision. Clemens Pirquet of the University of Vienna, who devised this feeding program, explained, "One of the principles was that the children had to eat everything that was given them, and to the last crumb. Before leaving the place they are all inspected so that nothing is left in their dishes and

that they do not take any bread or cake home, because the possibility would be that they would take it to their parents and other people." Disciplining picky eaters was essential for a society threatened by famine, in Pirquet's view. Force-feeding "means an education in eating, and such education is a very important thing for a poverty-stricken country, in whose interest it is that their inhabitants become accustomed to any kind of food available."<sup>53</sup>

Francesca Wilson was highly critical of ARA's methods, particularly their potential to undermine the family. "The policy of the Americans was to see the food down the children's throats . . . Hoover wanted to be certain that only children were fed, because he said that they had not, like their parents, been his enemies." The problem with this approach, she reasoned, was that "if mothers starve, there is no one to look after the children."<sup>54</sup> But throughout Europe, relief work centered on children, represented as the quintessential victims of the war. "The concern of the Save the Children Fund is solely with the children, the most innocent and deserving sufferers from the mistakes of mankind," declared Mrs. Philip Snowden of the British SCF in 1919.<sup>55</sup> Parents made less-compelling objects of sympathy—regardless of their politics.

In theory, the ARA intended to efficiently deliver rice and cocoa to Central European children. But the seeds of a more cultural approach were planted within this calorie-driven vision of relief. Along with American values and anti-Communism, ARA workers brought unspoken prejudices to Eastern and Central Europe, depicting the region and its people as inherently backward, violent, and corrupt—in imagined opposition to American modernity and efficiency.<sup>56</sup> These prejudices undercut their stated goals of facilitating self-help. ARA workers ultimately concluded that East Europeans did not have the capacity for self-government, that their backward culture, rather than war or material shortages, was the true source of hunger in Eastern Europe.

Encounters between relief workers and locals sometimes left humanitarian activists questioning whether East Europeans were even human. One SCF field worker reported that in the Sub-Carpathian Rus in Czechoslovakia in 1920, "The squalor is almost beyond belief. Six or seven people—if one can call them people—in one stuffy room, and a half-dozen hens or rabbits besides . . . Idiots and cretins abound."<sup>57</sup> At the same time that ARA workers claimed to promote class and national reconciliation, they scapegoated Jews, in particular, in order to explain their own failures. During another visit to the Sub-Carpathian Rus, ARA worker N. Leach blamed the limited success of ARA programs on Jewish sabotage. "With a ninety percent total illiteracy for Ruthenia and almost a hundred percent among the peasant class, the Jews

find little difficulty in controlling the situation . . . One never sees a Jew doing hard manual labor," Leach reported.<sup>58</sup>

Perceived corruption also undermined the ARA's philosophy of self-help. The Chief of the Polish Mission, W. P. Fuller, lamented in 1920, "Unfortunately it is a fact that abuse is running rife and that an astonishing number of people in this country look upon our foodstuffs as something from which to derive personal benefit."<sup>59</sup> Lina Fuller, W. P. Fuller's wife, wrote a letter to her husband in January 1920 despairing of rampant corruption in the village of Parysów in Poland. She described her surroundings as a remote town of some five thousand souls, two-thirds Jewish, "all houses of mud and straw, and such poverty and dirt as you have never seen." Upon arrival, she reported, her car was greeted by "some 3,000 shrieking, howling wild humans who ran after the car wherever it went, like so many dogs. Picture the old Jew in that god-awful garment of rags, with flowing beard, barefooted in the snow and mud, running . . . falling down, and the crowd surging right over him . . . they were all crazed." After surveying the scene, Fuller interviewed the local priest, who informed her that "all the members of the committee were thieves, their fathers and grandfathers before them had been thieves; that they had stolen most of the food and had carted it away at night to the next town where they had sold it . . . that there were no honest men in the town (the three most honest had died of typhus the week before)." She concluded her visit with an inspection of the ARA soup kitchen, which turned out to be the apartment of the president of the local committee. Most of the food intended for distribution was stored under his bed. Outraged, Fuller stormed out and lectured the villagers, "telling them that they had failed to run their own show, and that now I was going to run it."<sup>60</sup> Her report reflects an emerging conviction among relief workers that the ARA's doctrine of self-government was ill suited to the "backward" conditions of Eastern Europe.

In Serbia, an ARA relief worker drew equally pessimistic conclusions. "The children are in a deplorable condition but as far as I can learn they always have been in bad shape . . . as soon as we withdraw the conditions will become the same as they were before the war. It seems a hopeless task as far as any permanent good is concerned."<sup>61</sup> And in Košice in Czechoslovakia, an ARA employee declared that the time had come to close the mission in 1920. The children there were still hungry, he conceded. But "I do not think they would look healthy after years of soup kitchens . . . There is doubtless in every town a considerable number of *poor* children, but their relief should surely not be undertaken by a foreign mission. We have had apparently little success in

helping local committees to a more far-sighted view of the people's welfare."<sup>62</sup> W. P. Fuller ultimately concluded his mission in Poland with the concession that "the doctrine of independent control by the Polish has been a dire failure."<sup>63</sup>

These perceptions of failure shaped the development of later aid programs for refugees. The problems facing the new democracies of Eastern Europe, relief workers concluded, could not be solved with soup kitchens. Central and East European culture and psychology—judged through an anti-Semitic and orientalist lens—were the more fundamental obstacles to development. It was a lesson they carried to Europe after the Second World War, when humanitarian organizations devoted their efforts more explicitly to transforming refugees' psychological and cultural outlooks, rather than simply distributing goods. But by then, they would also have a new scientific language with which to express their concerns about refugees' "mentalities," grounded in the disciplines of child psychology and psychoanalysis.

At the same time that the First World War transformed Europe's starving children into objects of humanitarian intervention, new restrictions on immigration in Western Europe and the United States brought the plight of migrant families to the attention of international organizations. The restrictions on citizenship and mobility introduced during World War I had not been lifted after the war, for several reasons. In light of famine conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, West European and American officials feared that swarms of starving Europeans would rush toward their borders. And in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, they also worried that refugees from the East would bring revolutionary ideas with them. In addition, as citizenship rights expanded in Europe's interwar republics—to include more generous welfare benefits and suffrage for women, for example, governments introduced new measures to prevent foreigners on their shores from accessing those rights. In the United States, the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 introduced the infamous quota system, designed to choke immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.<sup>64</sup> Only France, with its low birthrate and its shortage of agricultural and industrial labor, continued to welcome immigration in interwar Europe, until the Great Depression provoked a bitter reaction against foreigners there as well.<sup>65</sup>

These new restrictions on immigration created problems for families divided across national borders. The International Migration Service (IMS), which changed its name to the International Social Service (ISS) in 1946, was the first major international organization to focus exclusively on the problems fac-

ing families that had been “scattered in pieces all over the face of the globe” due to labor migration, persecution, or war.<sup>66</sup> Through counseling families toward promoting family solidarity, the IMS also contributed to a gradual shift from material to psychological forms of relief among international organizations.

The IMS developed from the activism of Anglo-Saxon Protestant women at the turn of the century. In 1914, women in the YWCA organized an international conference to discuss the pressing social issues faced by immigrant women and children. In 1920, the YWCA undertook a study of major ports and cities of emigration and immigration in Europe and the United States. The study foregrounded the need for an international organization to tackle the problems faced by transnational families. These women founded the IMS in 1922 with headquarters in London and Geneva. An American branch was established that same year, and a French office opened under the name *Service Sociale d'Aide aux Émigrants* (SSAÉ) in 1924.

Migration was on the rise between the wars, and by the eve of the Second World War, the agency employed 150 field officers in branches in France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the United States, and Germany (until 1937).<sup>67</sup> In a publication celebrating its 25th anniversary, the IMS/ISS reflected, “Normal movement of population, displacement due to war, political, or religious oppression, international marriages, all of these create a need for people and agencies to work together across borders and frontiers to prevent the discouragement and suffering which contribute to the breakdown in family unity, waste of individual potentialities, and international ill-will.”<sup>68</sup>

It was no coincidence that an international organization was born to attend to the “human problems” faced by migrant families at the same moment that many states closed their borders. In the 1920s and 30s, immigrants faced ever more complex legal barriers as they attempted to acquire citizenship, work, marry, divorce, and have children. These restrictions generally meant longer separations of husbands, wives, and children. The agency was particularly concerned with the moral and social risks that faced divided families. These concerns were also a legacy of the First World War. While the evacuation of children from war zones had not stirred much alarm in Europe, the extended absence of mobilized fathers generated a wave of anxiety about juvenile delinquency and adultery, a perceived consequence of a lack of male authority in the home.<sup>69</sup>

International Migration Service leaders hoped to bridge the gap between a labor market that propelled workers across state borders and a system of social protection based on principles of national citizenship and local responsibility.

In a 1931 speech to the National Council of Social Work, George Warren, director of the American Branch of the IMS, lamented that “the family, as it were, walks into a void because the country of departure and the country of destination immediately disclaim all responsibility for the social care of those forced to travel from one to the other.”<sup>70</sup> In some countries, such as France, migrant social rights were protected through bilateral treaties. A 1920 treaty entitled Polish workers to the same status as French citizens with regard to pensions, workman’s compensation, unemployment insurance, and family allocations, for example. Similar treaties protected the rights of Belgian and Italian workers in France. But in the United States, immigrants were generally left to the mercy of local and state authorities.<sup>71</sup>

While Warren promoted reform to bring the welfare state in line with the trans-Atlantic labor market, IMS workers adopted a more individualistic approach, using old-fashioned moral persuasion in their campaign to solidify family ties. An early IMS study, authored by Kenneth Rich and Mary Brant, examined the cases of the Immigrant Protective League in Chicago and outlined strategies for reunifying families. “There is an inexorable recurrence of the same obstacles in case after case, driving husbands and wives apart, and bringing family ruin,” they lamented. The social worker’s goal was to keep families intact through counseling. “The moderately simple problem which occurs at the beginning of a family break may be solved by various forms of persuasion.”<sup>72</sup> The most common problem “type” identified by IMS social workers was the “Deserting Husband,” who abandoned his wife and children in Europe. In general, Rich and Brant warned, “The man who has been away from his family for a number of years has become so accustomed to drifting about that he has forgotten the advantages of a home. He must be called in frequently and reminded of the goal toward which he is working, or his enthusiasm wanes and the family becomes permanently separated.”<sup>73</sup>

While American social workers worried about deserting husbands, IMS representatives in Poland were equally concerned about the morality of women and children left in Europe without male supervision. Between 1918 and 1930, some 630,000 Poles left the European continent, while another 500,000 immigrated to other countries in Europe.<sup>74</sup> Adam Nagorski of the Polish Bureau of the IMS lamented to George Warren in February 1939, “The emigration country has to deal with a wife who is apt to lead an immoral life being abandoned by her husband and left behind without means.”<sup>75</sup> Joan Kussak, Director of the IMS’s Polish Branch in 1926, agreed that many Polish wives were “not worthy of our attention.” But she also noted that the

Polish Branch was inundated with requests to trace husbands who left for America—never to be heard from again.<sup>76</sup>

Only when persuasion failed did the IMS consider legal action. There were cases, the agency lamented, in which men deserted their families in Europe, and “all the powers of persuasion, appeal, shame, and urging cannot arouse a spark of interest or cooperation.” Caseworkers were not above exploiting their clients’ fear of deportation in such cases. One social worker noted that “most of these men are . . . afraid of American institutions, and particularly of the power of American Women to enforce justice.” When confronted with a deserting husband, she called him into her office and reminded him that “according to the laws of the United States, he is obliged to support his wife and children, that his consul will not uphold him as a lawbreaker . . . This is usually sufficient to gain his willingness to cooperate.”<sup>77</sup>

In the wake of the Depression, the Spanish Civil War, and the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, the scope of IMS casework in Europe and America expanded. The organization shifted seamlessly from counseling delinquent husbands to aiding political refugees. The American caseload of the IMS more than doubled in the 1930s, from 1,734 families in 1927 to 3,590 families in 1939. “Practically all of the case situations reflected increasingly desperate need precipitated by the war in Europe,” the IMS reported.<sup>78</sup> In 1939, the IMS coordinated a program to evacuate British children to the United States, and in 1940 it assisted efforts to resettle 100,000 German and East European Jews in the Dominican Republic. The IMS further expanded its authority after the Second World War, when it received a mandate to deliver casework services to refugees in Europe under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. Today the ISS continues to operate in nineteen countries worldwide, working largely in the field of international adoption.

Like the League of Nations and the American Relief Administration, the IMS contributed to the emergence of the divided family as an object of international intervention. IMS experts also accelerated a transition from material to psychological humanitarianism, delivering counseling rather than material assistance to migrant families. But the methods should not be confused with the goals of relief. Even as IMS workers used counseling and persuasion to encourage family solidarity, they were not typically concerned about the psychological well-being of individual children. Rather, IMS social workers aimed to reunify families because they feared that women and children would be left impoverished and demoralized without male support. These international social workers were pioneers in their efforts to “untangle the snarls in human

lives that result from migration.”<sup>79</sup> But the agency conceived of these snarls in social, economic, and moral terms. It would take the upheavals of the Second World War for social workers and child welfare experts to re-imagine displacement as a threat to children’s mental health as well as to Europe’s social and political stability.

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The Spanish Civil War has often been called a dress rehearsal for the Second World War. It was a grim practice exercise not only for combatants, military planners, and European governments, but also for children. Tens of thousands of Spanish Republican children were separated from their parents and dispersed to foreign lands between 1936 and 1939, forming a diaspora in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Mexico. When compared with the relatively short evacuations of the First World War, moreover, Spanish refugee children were typically exiled for years—if not permanently.

The conflicts surrounding displaced Spanish children echoed the League of Nations’ movement to “reclaim” Armenian lost children, and prefigured the debates that would erupt after the Second World War about the denationalization of children in the Nazi empire. As in the Armenian case, child-savers were not only concerned about the material welfare of refugee children, but also about their national, political, and religious loyalties. More than ever, international organizations linked their work in soup kitchens and children’s homes to the highest realms of international politics. In a speech to the directors of Quaker-run colonies for refugee children in France in 1942, Mr. Burritt Hiatt lectured, “You can no longer imagine that when you are in a school or an isolated children’s colony that you have no relationship to the international situation.”<sup>80</sup>

When people speak of the Spanish Civil War as a global conflict, they typically invoke the arms, money, and soldiers that crossed state borders—guns shipped from the Soviet Union to Republican guerillas, money and troops that flowed from Mussolini’s Italy and Nazi Germany into Franco’s hands, or volunteers in the International Brigade who enlisted in the struggle against fascism. But the movement of children across national borders also transformed the Spanish civil war into a European conflagration, creating transnational alliances and even kinship relations among Communists, social Catholics, Basque nationalists, Republicans, and fascist militants in far-flung lands.

Even as the plight of Spanish refugee children became a matter of international politics, however, contemporary observers still did not generally perceive

children's suffering in psychological terms. They saw the separation of children from their parents as a political and national threat, not as a form of psychic trauma. Humanitarian workers thus continued to concentrate on providing calories, clothing, and medical care to refugee children. In the tradition of League of Nations' campaign to "reclaim" Armenian children from Turkish homes, they also continued to worry about sustaining children's national loyalties in exile.

The Spanish Civil War began in 1936, and the refugee crisis followed closely on the heels of Franco's conquests. Nationalist troops conquered the city of Guernica in April 1937, took the Basque capital Bilbao in June, and surged into Santander in August. As Franco's forces conquered growing swaths of Republican territory, Republican soldiers and their families fled to the shrinking zones under Republican control. By 1938, some two million Republican refugees were crowded in Catalonia. With the crushing Republican defeat in March of 1939, the crisis intensified. Close to 500,000 people pressed against the French border. They waited in bitter conditions, exposed to the cold, without adequate food or supplies. Finally French border guards relented, and the refugees rushed into France.<sup>81</sup> The French Interior Ministry estimated that 514,337 Spanish Republicans had found refuge on French soil by 1940, including 76,162 women and 78,629 children.<sup>82</sup>

Plans to evacuate Spanish children to France took shape not long after the Spanish Civil War began. In France, the Comité d'Accueil aux Enfants d'Espagne (CAEE) was formed in November of 1936 in cooperation with the Spanish Republican Ministry of Health and Social Assistance. The CAEE was an organ of the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), which included all of France's major trade unions and was primarily controlled by Communists. The CAEE quickly recruited five thousand French families to open their homes to Spanish refugee children. This outpouring of support coexisted with sharp internal divisions over French involvement in Spain's civil war. Léon Blum, the Prime Minister of France's Popular Front government, which brought together France's left-wing Communist (PCF), Socialist (SFIO), and Radical parties in an alliance against the French Right, originally pledged to support the Republican army in its struggle against Franco. But under pressure from the French Right and British leaders, Blum signed a non-intervention agreement only three weeks after the war began. French supporters of Spain's Republican forces saw hosting Spanish refugee children as one of the few means by which they could demonstrate their solidarity with the Republican cause.<sup>83</sup>

The first group of 450 CAEE-sponsored evacuees departed for France on March 20, 1937. A year later, the CAEE reported that close to 9,000 Spanish children were in the organization's care, some 4,000 in collective colonies, and another 5,000 in private foster homes.<sup>84</sup> After the war, Franco's government estimated that a total of 34,037 children had been evacuated abroad during the Spanish Civil War—17,489 to France, 5,130 to Belgium, 3,291 to the Soviet Union, 4,435 to the United Kingdom, 807 to Switzerland, 430 to Mexico, 335 to French West Africa, and 120 to Denmark.<sup>85</sup> But these numbers are all vague estimates, because children moved constantly in and out of colonies and foster placements, and across the Pyrenees and back.<sup>86</sup> Between 7,000 and 11,000 unaccompanied Spanish children probably resided in French colonies and foster homes between October 1937 and January 1939.<sup>87</sup>

A veritable alphabet soup of overlapping and competing humanitarian organizations took charge of these children. In addition to the CGT, the American Friends Service Committee hosted 600 Spanish children in 16 colonies in France by 1941.<sup>88</sup> The Spanish Republican Ministry of Education also sponsored a own network of colonies and schools for evacuated children. Catholics and Basque nationalists, meanwhile, were often loath to send their children into the hands of "godless" Socialists and Communists, so they launched their own competing evacuation schemes. The Basque nationalist Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) established colonies in France's Basque territories with the intent of guaranteeing the Basque loyalties of its charges. And the Comité National Catholique de Secours aux Réfugiés d'Espagne (CNC), established in 1937, created colonies in France with the support of the Vatican and French Catholics, pledging to sustain Spanish children's Catholic faith in exile.<sup>89</sup> Humanitarian workers would later denounce this overlapping, politicized tangle of humanitarian efforts as the antithesis of the rationalized, apolitical organization that they pledged to construct after World War II.

Spanish refugee children were highly vulnerable to the shifting tides of French immigration policies. In the 1920s the French government and employers had thrown open the gates to immigrant workers, as long as they fueled a growing economy and compensated for the low French birthrate. In 1931, France boasted the largest immigrant population in Europe, an estimated three million people. All that changed with the onset of the Great Depression. Initially, French officials continued to express sympathy for victims of Nazism, who were permitted to cross the border from Germany in the spring of 1933 without documentation. As the economic crisis deepened, however, and the persecution of Jews in Germany intensified, sympathy for refugees dissolved. In 1934–1935, the expulsion of illegal immigrants began in earnest.

Blum's Popular Front government, which came to power in the spring of 1936, initially brought some relief to refugees and immigrants in France. There was no formal change in immigration policy, but the pace of expulsions slowed. Since the Popular Front came to power just as Republican refugees began to pour across the Pyrenees, many Spanish refugees initially received a warm welcome, especially in traditionally red regions of southern France. During the Second Popular Front government of Camille Chautemps, however (June 1937–January 1938), the French economy sank further into the Depression, public funds to support Spanish refugees were exhausted, and some 150,000 refugees (especially Basques from the northern zones of Spain) were deported. When the Popular Front collapsed in 1938, official attitudes toward refugees hardened further. Claiming that France was “saturated,” Édouard Daladier's center-right government began efforts to repatriate and intern unwanted refugees. The arrival of close to 350,000 Spanish refugees in early 1939 inflamed passions on the right. The right-wing and Catholic press denounced Republican asylum seekers as “terrorist hordes” and accused them of fomenting anarchism.

The French government had been unprepared for the influx of Spanish refugees, and conditions in refugee camps were appalling. Refugees were poorly sheltered from the elements, undernourished, and subject to harsh discipline by French authorities.<sup>90</sup> Daladier's government was not inclined to improve conditions. The French government was paying some 200 million francs a month to support refugees, and hoped to secure an agreement with Franco to guarantee Spain's neutrality in the (increasingly likely) event of a French war with Germany. Though repatriation was technically “voluntary,” by the end of 1939 close to 200,000 Republican refugees had returned to Spain, under considerable pressure.

In spite of these conditions, children placed in foster homes by the CAEE retained mostly warm memories of their experiences in France. “My adoptive family was Communist, extraordinary people, unfailingly kind to me,” recalled one former evacuee. Another *niña* remembered enjoying luxuries beyond her wildest imagination. “They bought me beautiful clothes, and for the first time in my life, I was taken to a beauty parlor,” she recalled. “They treated me like their own daughter, maybe even a little better.”<sup>91</sup>

The children evacuated by the PNV and the Catholic Church were sometimes less warmly received, particularly those who landed in the French-Basque provinces in the summer of 1937. Local Catholics suspected the refugees of harboring anti-Catholic loyalties. One former refugee child recalled that “all the French in the little towns were hostile: they called us ‘Little Basque Pigs,’ ‘Scum of Spain,’ ‘Red-Separatists,’ or simply ‘Refugees’ in such a tone I would

cringe and want to hide.” Another remembered being ostracized at church. “We even had to sit in a separate section at Mass in the village, and take Communion after everyone else, as though we children would somehow contaminate the good French families.” In regions unsympathetic to the Republican cause, Spanish children encountered hostility from local officials as well. “The mayor was pro-Franco and despised us. He always complained of the amount of water our little colony used, saying the pigs they raised deserved it more than we did,” recalled one former refugee.<sup>92</sup>

Spanish children in the USSR also recalled their early experiences in exile in mostly positive terms. These testimonies, collected in Spain forty years later, reflect the difficult transitions experienced by Spanish refugees who repatriated to Spain from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Following the Second World War, during which Spanish children shared many of the ordeals of their Soviet compatriots, the early years of exile in the 1930s may have acquired a rosy glow. But even in the late 1970s, many children recalled their experiences in Soviet institutions with a surprising dose of nostalgia.

Refugee children hosted by the Soviet Union during the Spanish Civil War occupied a privileged position in a society strained by scarcity. They were greeted as heroes, celebrated with parades, flowers, and caviar. Their children’s homes became showpieces for the Soviet regime, intended to advertise the magnificence of Soviet humanitarianism, internationalism, and culture to the world. In letters home, the children described banquets of white bread and chocolate, films, concerts, ballet lessons, and the loving attention of their teachers. The daughter of one worker from Bilbao recalled, “Our own parents only gave us slaps on the cheek and complaints, but the teachers there were so incredibly patient and helpful and loving to us.” Other former evacuees were grateful for the educational and cultural opportunities on offer. “We arrived in Russia more savage than civilized . . . The experience in Russia changed our lives. We became educated, thinking persons.” Women were often grateful for the career opportunities they enjoyed in the USSR.<sup>93</sup> Araceli Sánchez-Urquijo simply recalled her years in exile in the Soviet Union as “the happiest of her life.”<sup>94</sup>

Many things changed with the onset of the Second World War, and especially with the Hitler-Stalin pact, which made the ongoing presence of Spanish refugees on Soviet soil embarrassing for Stalin. Some Spanish teachers who accompanied the children were rumored to fall victim to the purges. Conditions took another turn for the worse with the onset of the war against Nazi Germany in 1941. Spanish children were integrated into Russian schools, since it was clear that they would not immediately (or ever) return to Spain. They

shared hardships endured by their Soviet peers, including evacuation, hunger, and German occupation. Many were transplanted from luxurious children's "palaces" to cold and shabby barracks. But even after 1941, Spanish refugee children enjoyed privileged treatment, receiving significantly higher bread rations than Soviet children.<sup>95</sup>

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Forces within Spain began to lobby for the repatriation of Spanish refugee children before the Civil War even ended. While Franco's emissaries insisted on the repatriation of Spanish refugee children in the name of parental and national rights, exiled Republicans were equally opposed to the children's return to a nationalist Spain. To complicate matters, many of the children's parents were missing, imprisoned, dead, or themselves in exile, courtesy of Franco.

Jean Herbette, the French ambassador to Spain, was among the most ardent advocates of repatriation. Herbette, who served as Ambassador to Spain between 1931 and 1937, was a complex figure. While he supported Spain's Republican, left-wing government in the early 1930s, he was ultimately recalled by the Popular Front for his manifest sympathies for Franco. He was particularly concerned about the contagion of Basque nationalism on French soil. "As the department knows, last week two British torpedo boats transported 450 children from Bilbao to Saint-Jean-de-Luz . . . It has come to my attention that the people who are accompanying these children unloaded a voluminous shipment of propaganda literature, a large part of which was printed in Basque, onto our soil at the same time. One must fear that this abuse of our hospitality will encourage Basque nationalism in our own country, to the detriment of our national unity," he wrote in a 1937 missive to the Quai d'Orsay. Herbette warned of the thin line between humanitarian aid and political agitation, insisting, "Every colony of Spanish children risks becoming a source of foreign propaganda and political agitation on our territory."<sup>96</sup>

His fears were well justified. The presence of Spanish refugee children in France became a focal point of ongoing domestic and international conflicts throughout the 1930s and 1940s. On March 20, 1937, a group of right-wing French women wrote to the editors of the Basque nationalist newspaper *Diario Vasco* to "express, in the name of all French women, our energetic opposition to the loathsome sequestration of children by the Spanish Reds, who have torn these children from their mothers and shipped them to Russia."<sup>97</sup> Proponents of repatriation were supported by the Vatican and by a right-wing international press campaign that claimed that exiled children had been kidnapped,

denationalized, and de-Christianized by Communist militants. France's relatively conservative diplomatic corps, meanwhile, locked horns with the Ministry of the Interior, which remained firmly in the hands of Socialist ministers throughout the Spanish Civil War. Some 10,000 Spanish children were directly in the hands of the CGT-controlled CAEE, which obstructed all attempts to repatriate them. The CAEE, in turn, received aid from a network of Socialist and Communist prefects in southern France, who hindered repatriation efforts.<sup>98</sup> The Spanish Civil War, and increasingly a civil war between the French Right and Left, was fought in microcosm over exiled Spanish children. As disputes over the children's education and repatriation transcended national frontiers, refugee children became a vehicle through which the Spanish Civil War escalated into a conflict that engaged much of Europe.

Bilbao, the capital of the autonomous Basque region established by the Spanish Republic in 1931, fell to Franco's forces on June 18, 1936. Two months later, Franco launched a crusade to repatriate all Basque children abroad. Monsignor Hildebrand Antoniutti, deployed by the Vatican to lobby French authorities for repatriation, assisted Franco's forces. In a meeting with French diplomats in August, Antoniutti insisted that a large number of the children had been trafficked to France and were being detained against their parents' will. He reported "mothers coming to say that they have had no news from their children and that they don't even know where they are." It was not a question of politics, Antoniutti insisted, but rather "of humanity" to return these children to their parents "without further delay." Herbetie agreed, "A return to the family is normal, while the separation of families is an aberration from the most legitimate of traditions."<sup>99</sup>

But in spite of these appeals to "humanity" and to family unity, conflicts over repatriation often pitted family members against one another. In another memo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated June 25, 1937, Herbetie noted that many children themselves refused repatriation, but dismissed this fact. "The refusal of the children should not supersede the formal desire expressed by their fathers or mothers to see them return to the midst of the family. Nor should we take account of disagreements between the parents, unless we possess authentic proof that the father is opposed to the children's return . . . Keeping Spanish children in France against their families' will can only be interpreted as an effort to convert them to ideas that are incompatible with those they will encounter in their familial milieu," he claimed.<sup>100</sup>

Some adolescent girls in exile, in particular, grew accustomed to the independence they enjoyed in France. They chafed against their relatives' insis-

tence that they return to the patriarchal strictures of family life. In November 1937, Victor Echave from Bilbao demanded the repatriation of his nieces, orphans residing in the French department of the Ain. The girls, aged 18 and 15, stubbornly refused, informing the prefect that they “will never agree to the demands of their relative, an uncle by marriage, whose authority over them they do not recognize.” The two young women were both employed, financially independent, and had an older sister in France. But the age of majority in France was 21.<sup>101</sup> Cecilia Vera Gandul, age 18, also resisted her family’s calls to duty. Cecilia lived with her uncle in France and worked as a seamstress. In a letter in December 1938, her sister in Spain exhorted her to return home, writing, “Cecilia . . . You must understand how much we need your help. If all of us acted like you did, leaving and abandoning our mother, what would she have done? If you think that you are going to earn your living by knitting you have lost your mind.” Cecilia also refused to heed the call of familial duty.<sup>102</sup>

Women and children were ultimately more vulnerable to forcible repatriation due to their legal status as dependents. Under the Vichy regime, French police sought more effective means of removing unwanted refugees from French soil. Increasingly, they deported women and children whose husbands or fathers resided in Spain. Mercédès Ferrer, age 13, lived with her mother in France in 1942 when French police officials in Gers tried to deport both mother and child on the grounds that “the head of the family is in Spain.” Even when the women concerned were employed, French authorities insisted that they risked becoming a burden to the state when separated from their husbands or fathers. The humanitarian trope of “family reunification” thereby became a means of reinforcing the patriarchal authority of husbands and fathers over their “dependent” wives and children, and of protecting the French state from financial obligations toward foreign women and children.<sup>103</sup>

In both Spain and France, the right-wing press supported the repatriation campaign, alleging that refugee children in France were being denationalized and neglected. In 1940, following the repatriation of more than 6,000 Spanish children from France to Spain, *L’Ideal* in Granada claimed that many returning children “don’t know how to speak Spanish and almost none of them know their parents.” The children arrived from France “in deplorable conditions . . . clothed in rags, infected with parasites, malnourished,” the paper reported. The French consul in Malaga refuted these claims, attesting, “I have received several visits from parents accompanied by their recently repatriated children . . . These children have not only testified to their gratitude and regret that they were

obliged to leave our territory, but have also complained of the miserable regime that they have encountered on Spanish territory." Many Spanish parents, he added, lamented having "given in to their feelings of affection, which had the consequence of putting their children in deplorable material conditions that are very inferior to those which they experienced in France."<sup>104</sup>

But records show that some Spanish parents were indeed frustrated in their efforts to reclaim their children. In September 1938, Angela Fernandez requested the department of the Isère to repatriate her 15-year-old daughter Josefa. Josefa had complained to her mother that she was obliged to do excessive farm labor and was receiving unwanted sexual attention from her foster brother. French consular officials quickly wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris requesting that the girl be repatriated, but noted with dismay that out of 55 requests for the repatriation of Spanish children from the department, only one had actually been satisfied.<sup>105</sup>

In another case in January 1938, Vinancio Pinedo-Saez addressed a heartfelt letter to the Prefect of Tarn requesting the repatriation of his children Jose Luis and Angel. "The children are my only reason for living in this world . . . I have no doubt that you . . . will do everything possible so that someday soon I will be able to embrace these beings who I love so much."<sup>106</sup> His pleas received little sympathy from the CAEE. Roux Zola replied, "Don't think that your letter scares us, because we will assume the necessary responsibilities toward your children as long as necessary, and our consciences are at ease."<sup>107</sup> It was not until February 20, 1939 that the Ministry of Interior finally ordered the Prefect of Bouches-du-Rhône to expedite the repatriation of Pinedo-Saez's children—a week before the French government officially recognized Franco's government.<sup>108</sup>

Thanks largely to the obstruction of the Ministry of the Interior and local Socialist prefects, only 95 Basque children were repatriated in 1937 and only 43 returned to Spain in 1938.<sup>109</sup> But in April 1939, after the Republican defeat, Henri-Philippe Pétain, the future head of state of France's collaborationist Vichy regime, was named French ambassador to Franco's Spain. And after the French defeat in the Second World War, the Vichy regime's Interior Minister Marcel Peyrouton agreed to Spanish demands to conduct a census of all Spanish orphans on French soil and to repatriate them "in the interest of France" and in recognition of Spain's "rights" to its children.<sup>110</sup>

Repatriations accelerated dramatically after 1939. The number of civilian refugees in France had dropped to 86,776 (including approximately 52,272 children) by April 1940. Over half of the unaccompanied Basque children re-

turned home. But the Franco regime remained dissatisfied.<sup>111</sup> Many exiled children did not return home willingly. In 1938, Franco's government formed an Extraordinary Delegation for the Repatriation of Minors. Beginning in 1941, this body fell under the jurisdiction of the *Servicio Exterior de Falange*, the Spanish Secret Service.<sup>112</sup> After France's defeat by the Nazis, the *Servicio Exterior* enjoyed free reign in all of France. When legal means failed, the Service did not hesitate "to resort to extraordinary measures through which, in one way or another, we almost always succeeded in capturing the minor."<sup>113</sup>

The Service developed creative tactics to reclaim Spanish children from France. In 1942, an organization called Social Services for Foreign Workers distributed coupons for clothing, toys, and food in order to gain access to the homes of exiled Spaniards—and then to seize Spanish children and repatriate them by force. When French foster families refused to relinquish their wards, Spanish agents dug up compromising information about their political backgrounds and then blackmailed them, threatening to report them to the police if they did not turn over the children. Other children were simply snatched off the street.<sup>114</sup> "It was a true hunt for red children. The only thing missing were shotguns and pellets," recalled Eduard Pons Prades, who had been evacuated to France with his brothers and mother.<sup>115</sup> Out of some 17,849 children exiled in France, 12,831 were repatriated by 1949, according to the statistics of the *Servicio Exterior*. By comparison, only 34 out of 5,291 children had returned from Russia.<sup>116</sup>

Once repatriated, refugee children were supposed to be reunited with their families, but this often proved impossible. Many evacuees had forgotten their names, or learned that their parents in Spain were now dead, imprisoned, or missing. A law passed in 1941 stipulated that children whose parents were missing were to be assigned new names. Their official documents and identity papers were altered to prevent their relatives from tracing them. The children were then placed in orphanages or in the homes of families friendly to the Franco regime for "reeducation."<sup>117</sup>

Maria and Florencia Calvo were among the Spanish children forcibly repatriated by the *Servicio Exterior*. Maria had been adopted by an American Quaker couple in France, while Florencia had been living with a French family. "The family treated me very well, looked after me wonderfully. A moment arrived when it was necessary to hide me . . . They changed my clothes every day so that no one would recognize me. Every day we went to school via a different route." But eventually Franco's agents captured both girls and repatriated them by force to Spain, where they were placed in orphanages. Their

mother had died when the girls were young, and their father was missing. Maria's last name was changed to Exposita in accordance with the 1941 law. A Spanish couple adopted her and pretended that she was their biological daughter. The sisters were first reunited twenty years later.<sup>118</sup>

Franco's supporters, however, did not monopolize the concern over denationalized Spanish children. Spanish Republicans also aspired to nurture Spanish loyalties in their wards so that these children would one day return to lead a victorious Republic. An initial agreement between the Spanish (Republican) Ministry of Education and the CAEE/CGT specified that Spanish refugee children would be placed with workers' families in France. The CAEE preferred family placement because it was the least expensive way to care for the evacuated children. But four months later, the Spanish Republican government demanded that refugee children be placed in collective colonies, where Spanish teachers would provide their instruction. In August 1937, the Spanish Republican government of Valencia issued a decree placing all children's colonies abroad under the authority of the Republican Ministry of Education. "The government has the firm desire that the children evacuated abroad . . . receive as much as possible an education from Spanish teachers," so that they would "conserve the values of the culture of their country, in particular the use of their language," the decree stipulated.<sup>119</sup>

Children hosted by the CAEE in France typically attended French public schools. But other French colonies, especially those for Basque children, were animated by an explicitly nationalist pedagogy. The largest colony for Basque children was La Citadelle at St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port, directed by Vicente Amezaga. At its peak, 800 people lived in the colony's cramped quarters. In spite of rustic conditions (the residents had to eat in shifts because there was not enough silverware) one former resident recalled a familial and fiercely nationalist environment: "We had a full program for our religious, cultural, and educational formation, in a totally Basque atmosphere. All our teachers were more than mere educators; they were like fathers and mothers to all of us."<sup>120</sup>

The conflicts that surrounded the young refugees of the Spanish Civil War prefigured the diplomatic wrangling around children during and after World War II. The international humanitarian workers, child welfare experts, and diplomats who took up the cause of refugee families during and after the Second World War would draw heavily on their experiences and perceptions of the war in Spain. Many organizations that mobilized on behalf of children during the Spanish Civil War, including the American Friends Service Committee and the Unitarian Service Committee, shifted their resources, infra-

structure, and expertise seamlessly from the children of Spain to the children displaced by the Nazi occupation of Europe.

Even as the plight of Spanish refugee children was intensely politicized, nonetheless, contemporary observers did not typically understand children's suffering in psychological terms. Humanitarian workers in interwar Europe, as during the First World War, concentrated on providing for the material needs of refugee children. And yet humanitarian activists during the Spanish Civil War simultaneously set the stage for a shift toward a more psychological approach to relief. Like the League of Nations' Commission to "reclaim" Armenian children, these activists were deeply concerned about the threatened national and religious loyalties of displaced children. Increasingly, moreover, they represented the denationalization of children not only as a threat to the future of the Spanish nation, but also as a menace to children's individual welfare.

Alfred Brauner, a French literary scholar and humanitarian worker, was one of the first experts to promote nationalism as a form of psychological rehabilitation for refugees. As a doctoral student, he worked with children in refugee camps in Spain during the Civil War. He documented intense national and Republican loyalties among children in these camps. Brauner praised this nationalism as a productive coping mechanism: "In spite of the privation and the bombardments, they possessed a healthy nationalism that could aid our pedagogical work," he reported.<sup>121</sup> Brauner ultimately became a prominent child welfare expert in France, where he continued to write about children's emotional responses to war. During and after the Second World War, other humanitarian activists would follow his lead. Preserving children's health and their national loyalties in exile remained a priority in Europe's displaced person's camps and orphanages after World War II. But as the "lost child" became the face of victimhood during World War II, a larger community of experts began to reimagine relief in more explicitly psychological terms. The Unitarian Service Committee's colony in St. Goin was only one of hundreds of children's castles, colonies, and homes that sprouted up across Europe after World War II, all devoted to assuaging the psychic as well as the physical scars of war.

This shift toward guarding children's national loyalties and psychological health would have profound and ambiguous consequences during and after World War II. On the surface, humanitarianism seemed to become more ambitious through the psychological turn, more attentive to the needs of the "whole child." But when humanitarian workers began to worry about the

psychological dangers of alienating Spanish children from their culture, they simultaneously took a more conservative approach to relief. As postwar humanitarian workers began to define their mission in both psychological and nationalist terms, insisting that children's well-being could only be served in their families and nations of origin, they suggested that the "trauma" of crossing frontiers of kinship, class, nation, or culture was so great that children were better off consigned to the milieu into which they were born. Such claims had long been made by nationalist politicians and movements, who feared the dangerous malleability of children's loyalties. But now humanitarian workers justified nationalist claims on children in a language of individual psychological well-being. If the worst threat to a child was familial separation or a confused national identity, "rescuing" children from poverty, abuse, war, or political persecution had become a risky venture indeed.

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50. On the alleged triumph of individual over collective rights in postwar West European politics and human rights activism, see Judt, *Postwar*, 564–565; Paul Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights* (Philadelphia, 1996); Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950,” *The Historical Journal* 47 (June 2004): 386–388; A. W. Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (Oxford, 2001), 157–220; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).
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52. See especially Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, 2009).
53. Judt, *Postwar*, 18.
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55. Doron, “In the Best Interest,” 22.
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12. John Torpey, “The Great War and the Creation of the Modern Passport System,” in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World* (Princeton, 2001), 256–270.
13. Jean Claude Farcy, *Les camps de concentration française de la première guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1995), 51–63.
14. Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis, 1996), 61; Bade, *Migration in European History*, 176.
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17. Skran, *Refugees in Interwar Europe*, 65–101.
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## Chapter 2. Saving the Children

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# The Lost Children

RECONSTRUCTING EUROPE'S FAMILIES  
AFTER WORLD WAR II

Tara Zahra

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