

RELIGIOUS REFUGEES
IN THE EARLY MODERN
WORLD

An Alternative History of the Reformation



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INTRODUCTION

ONE OF THE HARSHTEST REALITIES OF THE MODERN WORLD IS the plight of refugees. War, brutal dictators, and inter-communal tensions regularly send tens of thousands fleeing for their lives over the nearest border. Race, ethnicity, and religious identity often provide the overt reasons for exile and expulsion. Some refugees settle in camps, hoping to return, while others keep moving from country to country in search of a new life. Families are torn apart, and those who choose not to flee risk being killed by armies, guerillas, or neighbours. The twentieth century saw millions killed, millions flee as refugees, and millions more forced to migrate when war destroyed their homelands. In 2014 the United Nations High Commission on Refugees estimated that the current global total of displaced peoples had risen beyond 50 million. Has it always been this way? When did refugees first become a common phenomenon, and why?

On the Move

European states began using exile and expulsion as deliberate tools of policy about six hundred years ago, in the period known as the late Middle Ages or Renaissance. This was when the religious refugee in particular became a mass phenomenon. Medieval traditions regarding purity, contagion, and purgation took a sharper definition in the fifteenth century. Political and economic realities deeply shaped the many cultural forces and historical events that then spurred institutional religious reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Towns, cities, and states had long been concerned with asserting their religious character and spiritual purity. As power began flowing towards monarchs and central governments, French king Henry IV's goal of "one faith, one law, one King" took hold across the continent. Those who fell outside this unity were not just alien, but also

impure and possibly contagious. Any society that took its responsibilities to God seriously might have to purge itself in order to purify its population and so maintain its own health.

The sharp language of purification and purgation came out of medicine, but was adopted by religious reform movements. The drive to purge and purify reshaped Europe and the globe throughout the early modern period. This book will argue that because purgation was so central a part of religious reform, we should include the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492 as one of the critical events marking the start of 'the Reformation' – no less significant than Martin Luther's posting of the Ninety-Five Theses in 1517 or English king Henry VIII's divorce controversy of the 1520s and '30s. Iberian Jews were given the choice to be baptised as Christians or to leave the land that they had lived in for over a thousand years. Iberian Muslims, who had lived in Spain for seven hundred years, were given the same ultimatum in 1502. These were not the first or last threats – Jews had faced similar demands in 1391, and Muslims would face them again in 1609–14. Yet the 1492 decree of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella was the most ambitious in its national scope, numerical scale, and religious focus. To its proponents, it was an exercise in community building and a pious act. It was also the wave of the future. It set membership in the national community on the foundations of religious truth and individual will, rather than on accidents of birth. Within decades, Dutch Anabaptists, Italian Calvinists, English Catholics, and Bohemian Hussites would all be offered the same choice: join or leave.

Mass expulsions did not come overnight. Throughout the course of the fifteenth century, an accelerating wave of expulsions across Europe forced hundreds of thousands of people out of their homes for reasons of religion: 20,000 Jews were expelled from towns across Germany and France throughout the century, before Spain's unlucky 80,000 were given three weeks to leave in 1492. A decade later, the 200,000 who remained of Granada's half-million Muslim population were given the choice of baptism or exile. Anabaptists began fleeing from west and central to Eastern Europe in the 1520s and 1530s; *spirituali* fled Italy from the 1540s; Protestant Marian exiles abandoned England in the 1550s and Catholics left under Elizabeth I. Larger and larger groups were on the move: 10,000 Catholics fled the Netherlands when Calvinists seized power in the 1570s and early 1580s, and then 150,000 Protestants fled from Flanders when Spanish troops retook the region later in that decade. In the 1570s and 1580s, 80,000 *moriscos* were moved from Granada and Valencia into Castile.

The scale of expulsions only increased through the seventeenth century as nations gained a firmer shape and identity, and as governments gained greater

policing power: 300,000 Muslims fled from Iberia in 1609–14, 150,000 Huguenots from France after 1685, and 20,000 Protestants from the bishopric of Salzburg in 1731–32 in the last large religiously motivated expulsion in premodern Europe. Outside Europe, the British forcibly relocated more than 11,000 French Catholic settlers from Acadie from 1755. They hoped it would be the final solution for a determined guerrilla movement that was resisting absorption into the British Empire. It would be the last time a European colonial power forcibly resettled European settlers for reasons of religion or nationality. Of course, all colonial powers would continue exploiting and indeed inventing religious, tribal, and racial distinctions in their efforts to divide and conquer the various peoples and territories in their American, African, and Asian empires.

Not all exiles were driven out by formal proclamations, and not all migrants fled for their lives. The early modern period also saw 'voluntary' migrations of religious groups with effects that would resonate through later centuries. Some were engineered by governments to secure political control of contested areas, as when English governments moved Protestants into northern Ireland in what were known as the 'Ulster plantations'. In other cases, whole communities relocated overseas, either to have a chance to exercise their own restrictive notions of religious purity or at least to escape interference and persecution from neighbours and officials. The same European governments that persecuted them at home sometimes supported their move to overseas colonies. French Protestants initially moved freely to Brazil and New France with the eager support of Parisian officials who were finding it difficult to persuade other Frenchmen to occupy the newly claimed lands. Yet these same officials soon began to fear that these settlers might become a fifth column of resistance to the crown and so prohibited Protestants from moving to these colonies or publicly worshipping there. Portuguese Jews settled Recife in Brazil and then, when uprooted by the Inquisition, established plantations in Suriname. So many Spanish Jews who had formally converted to Catholicism moved to Mexico in the sixteenth century – more than half of all Spanish settlers by some estimates – that the Inquisition felt compelled to follow them by 1571.

Of course, not all migrants wore their religious convictions so prominently on their sleeves, or even much in their hearts. Many moved to pursue trade or avoid prison, to follow or flee family, or simply to find opportunities not available at home. They could still get caught up in the rhetoric of exile and expulsion. Perhaps the most self-conscious *religious* exiles were the English Puritans, who seized on the name of 'pilgrims' and on the biblical model of the Israelites fleeing Egypt when they left England from the

1620s-40s in search of a Promised Land in America. Their exile experience led them to see themselves as a Chosen People who were to be a Light on a Hill. That same conviction, without the Puritan creed, informed many of the English Catholics who later followed them to Maryland and Rhode Island. The strong sense of being an exceptional nation with a divine destiny, first framed by religious exiles in the seventeenth century, has since become a fundamental part of American identity, embraced by Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Christians as a secularized civic religion.

In light of these dynamics, the Reformation stands out as the first period in European and possibly global history when the religious refugee became a mass phenomenon. Europe was certainly no stranger to exile, crusade, and heresy hunting. The origins of what has been called its 'persecuting society' lay further back in time. Yet never before had so many people of so many different faiths – hundreds of thousands certainly and perhaps millions – been forcibly relocated by the demands of religious purity. Some, like Iberia's Jews or France's Huguenots, were being pushed out of a nation that was self-consciously purifying itself. Others, like Munster's apocalyptic Anabaptists and Massachusetts Bay's Puritans were being pulled to a Promised Land where they could form their own pure communities. In most cases, push and pull were just two sides of the coin in the new currency of religious community. For many refugee communities, exile was internalized to the point where it became a key element in how its members defined themselves. They embraced it, and even continued doing to themselves what others had done to them. Being exiled sometimes made refugees less rather than more tolerant of others. Persecution and martyrdom pushed some Radical Anabaptists to isolated agricultural communities in central and eastern Europe where they disciplined their own erring or dissident members with the choice of compliance or exile. Refugee status sharpened Calvinists' conviction that they were the Chosen People of God living like latter-day children of Israel exiled from slavery in Egypt. In a series of promised lands from Geneva and Emden to New England and South Africa, the pain of exile became for Calvinists a badge of courage, a mark of election, and a form of discipline. Across the globe, returned refugees or transplanted exiles became some of the most hard-line advocates of religious intolerance and purification.

Exile did not always mean relocation over the nearest border. It could also mean forced removal to some secure or enclosed place within the city or territory. An accelerating cascade of expulsions across Europe through the fifteenth century propelled increasing numbers of Jews into Italy, where by mid-century some preachers began sounding alarm bells about a rising

'Jewish contagion'. Civic governments, trying to calm these fears without risking the loss of Jewish capital, built walls and gates around Jewish neighbourhoods and thus created the enclosed ghetto as a solution to protect the Christian community from this new 'contagion'. But who did those hastily-erected walls and gates protect? Ironically, the ghettos consolidated Jewish community and reinforced the authority of rabbis and religious councils in the world that the Jews made within the walls. This certainly frustrated those Christian authorities that had built "conversion houses" just outside the ghetto gates in order to draw out Jews into Christendom. Despite these frustrations, enclosure in a walled and gated building or neighbourhood became a common cultural form that was almost like a kind of internal exile. And throughout the early modern period, Christian authorities trusted in enclosures to separate, protect, punish, or convert a wide range of groups. They built many kinds of enclosures for nuns, orphans, the poor, and other marginal people, although it was not always clear whether these marginal groups were being protected from their surrounding communities, or whether those communities were being protected from them.

Even as a mass phenomenon, religious exile had an individual face. It was the common experience of many of the key thinkers of the period, and many worked their experience as religious refugees into their thinking and writing: Isaac Abravanel, Juan Luis Vives, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Menno Simons, Reginald Pole, Lelio Socinio, Fernando Cardoso, Johan Comenius, Mary Ward, and many others. Some, like Michael Servetus and Giordano Bruno, moved back and forth across Europe and finished their migrations only when they were burned at the stake as heretics. Others like Elizabeth Dirks, Janneken Muntsdorp, and Margaret Polley went to the stake before they could hit the road, becoming a cautionary lesson for those who might be slow to flee.

Forced expulsion reshaped Europe's social geography through the early modern period by creating diasporic communities across and beyond the continent. At a time when few Europeans wanted to move to remote overseas colonies, refugees and religiously-driven migrants figured disproportionately as the source of settlers. In some colonies like Portuguese Goa or Angola, they would impose regimes as restrictive as the ones they had fled. In others like Brazil and parts of New England they would develop more open forms of co-existence and hybridity. Some European communities, like Emden and Geneva, became temporary shelters for thousands of transient refugees. Others like Amsterdam and Salonika developed into international entrepôts whose open social atmosphere attracted migrants of all kinds and revolutionized economic life. Many of these refugee communities lasted for



Map 1. Cities of Early Modern Europe & the Mediterranean. Produced by Colin Rose.

centuries, like those of the Mennonites in the Ukraine, the Al-Andalus Moriscos in Istanbul and Algiers, and the Jews in Salonika and Eastern Europe. Diasporic communities established by Jews around Europe and the Mediterranean remained intact until new waves of expulsion, ethnic cleansing, and Holocaust crashed over the twentieth century and swept them into Auschwitz and Bergen Belsen. The twentieth century's religion was a racialized nationalism, but its drive to purge various impure groups and purge the community remained as strong as ever.

Religious exile and forced migration were not limited to Christendom. Greek Orthodox believers fled the steady expansion of Ottoman Turks into the Byzantine Empire. The Ottoman policy of *sürgün*, or resettling, forced criminals, colonists, and immigrants around the Empire according to local need, and was sometimes applied collectively to distinct religious and ethnic groups like the Jews. Jews fleeing Spain or the Holy Roman Empire were steered towards a few specific centers like Istanbul, Salonika, Safed, Edirne, and Izmir. Those same cities received Jews who had been caught up in the Ottoman military advance into central Europe in the 1520s, when thousands fled from Buda and Belgrade. The Ottomans moved fewer peoples around

the Mamluk empire after conquering it in 1517, but their chief Islamic opponents in the Persian Safavid Empire also created religious refugees. As Persian Shi'ite clergy gained power from the late sixteenth century, they steadily increased pressure on Jewish communities and pushed for forced conversion campaigns which led many Jews to flee to Baghdad by the mid-seventeenth century.

Reformation Histories

What is 'Reformation'? Historians used to describe the period in terms of the search for a purer faith and simpler community in reaction to supposed abuses and corruption in the institutional Catholic Church. Histories of the Reformation were deeply shaped by the religious and national divisions the period created: Catholics and Protestants wrote very different accounts, but so too did French, English, or German historians. For centuries, most historians focused on the lives of particular religious reformers and the development of particular national church institutions. They lionized national heroes and demonized national enemies. From the nineteenth century, many asserted that the period's disputes triggered a series of developments that created the modern age. They found in the Reformation the birth of modern sensibilities about conscience, nation, and political liberty that were grouped together and described as 'modernity' – a cultural and intellectual development that many liberals praised and many conservatives condemned. Martin Luther's intellectual conflicts and refusal to bend to the pope were portrayed as assertions of individual freedom of conscience. Henry VIII's decision to break with Rome so he could break with his wife and secure his dynasty was a firm assertion of state power over the church. The Jesuit missions that accompanied Spanish and French colonists and framed a global Catholicism were confirmations of Catholicism's universality. The Calvinist framing of political responsibility confirmed representative government and the right to resist tyranny. There were few key values of modern Western society that historians could not trace back to the European Reformation, for better or worse.

If our search for origins – itself very controversial – now takes us beyond a theologian's intellectual breakthrough in a German university town and back further to a religious community's forced removal from Iberia, we are acknowledging that the Reformation was not just a movement for intellectual and religious change. It was also Europe's first grand project in social purification. Of course, these two phenomena are still intimately related. We cannot ignore how the period redefined theological doctrines, created new hybrid

Purgation

Expelling the Other: Jews and Muslims

In 1549, Dr. Ludovico Fioravanti was asked to help a Spanish woman who had suffered a stomach ailment for three years. He prescribed his own remedy, a form of mercury oxide he had brewed up and called *Precipitato*. Within hours 'she had vomited an enormous quantity of putrid matter, and among the things she vomited up was a huge clump, as big as a hand, and it was alive! . . . the whole city talked about it and because of it I became very famous.' Fioravanti and his fans knew that the most thorough way to purge threats from any body was by expulsion. A doctor's care of the body might involve amputating a limb or purging bad humours by drawing blood or stimulating vomiting, urination, or bowel movements. So too, it could take radical action to purge the *Corpus Christianum* of what made it sick. This extreme action would become more familiar and more common over time. Europeans would start by expelling those who were religiously alien – the Jews and Muslims – but as they became familiar with the tactic they would move progressively towards expelling other Christians who differed from them over points of doctrine. Alongside forced expulsions were the many who fled on their own, either a step ahead of authorities, or once they had survived a bruising examination or trial. But like Fioravanti's cure or blood-letting, severe purgations could seriously weaken the very bodies they meant to save.


The first Europeans to experience mass expulsion were the Jews. The English crown staged the earliest expulsion of an entire Jewish community in 1290, and in the centuries following this was a form of purgation which governments across Europe adopted. Jews were usually offered the option of converting to Christianity as a way of avoiding expulsion. Yet converts were never entirely accepted, and in many cases suspicions and persecution only increased. Moreover, many expulsions were fundamentally economic or political, targeting Jews as moneylenders. This was certainly the case in England, where King Edward I initially protected the Jews in order to borrow from and tax them, before abandoning and expelling them for political advantage.

In the aftermath of the Black Death of 1346–53, suspicion that Jews had spread the plague or were poisoning city wells triggered local expulsions from parts of France, the Holy Roman Empire, and Hungary. The pattern accelerated through the next century, as individual cities and territories expelled their Jewish communities in two major waves. The first wave

from the 1420s to the 1550s saw Jews expelled from many jurisdictions in the Holy Roman Empire: from cities like Vienna (1421), Cologne (1424), Zurich (1436), and Augsburg (1438), and from territories like Bavaria (1442 and 1450) and Moravia (1454). In many of these cities, Jews were forced to abandon homes in the area bounded by the city walls, but were allowed to settle in suburban or rural communities and then continue entering the city by day to work and trade. The bounded sacred space of the city could be a workplace but not a home, since Jews carried out many of their religious rituals in their homes, and a resident community would soon demand a synagogue. In a similar way, most of these cities had long prohibited Jews from being buried within the city walls, but allowed cemeteries just outside them.

Some Jews accepted these restrictions, while others moved across the Alps to Italy where city governments interested in economic development recruited Jewish moneylenders with contracts (*condotta*) granting special privileges, like freedom from the requirement to wear an identifying sign, permission to bring communities of co-religionists with them, and even citizenship. Other Italian communities accepted the transalpine Jewish refugees, but required them to lend money to Christians at fixed lower rates, segregated them in separate areas, and required traditional coloured fabric badges or newer signs, like earrings, that would associate Jews with immorality, luxury, and vanity. These were the terms under which Jews entered Ancona (1427), Padua (1430), Perugia (1432), Florence and Siena (1439), and Assisi (1452). With regulations like these, German and Italian authorities showed that their drive to purify the *Corpus Christianum* by expelling non-Christians did not overcome their desire to keep Jews close by for economic purposes.

The second wave of expulsions occurred from the 1480s to the 1550s, and affected Jews over a far larger area. Some were expelled from the very Italian cities that had only recently recruited them, including Perugia (1485), Parma (1488), Milan (1489), and Florence (1494). In many of these, Observant preachers like Bernardino da Siena, Bernardino da Feltre, and Giacomo della Marca stirred up public opposition with harshly anti-Semitic sermons that claimed that Jewish money lending was feeding wasteful spending on luxuries and driving Christians into debt. Cities and territories of the Holy Roman Empire continued expulsions through this period, including Geneva (1490), Mecklenburg (1492), Halle (1493), Salzburg (1498), Nuremburg (1517), Regensburg (1519), Strasbourg (1520), and many others. Many of these were towns which would adopt Protestant church reforms within a few years or decades, and expel Catholic clergy and liturgies in a second stage of



17. Jews Chased Out of Frankfurt (1614). Art Resource, NY.

religious purgation. Hundreds of Jews expelled in this period moved to Prague, centre of Hussite reform and home to one of Europe's largest communities of Jews. The doubling of Prague's Jewish community in the early sixteenth century would trigger periodic reactions and temporary expulsions (1542, 1557, 1561). This pattern repeated in Frankfurt, where rioting mobs chased Jews from the city in 1614 [Fig 17].

Yet the most dramatic and thorough expulsions in this second wave of the late fifteenth century were from Spain and Portugal, home until then to some of the largest and oldest communities of Jews in all of Europe. Violent riots in 1391 and 1415 had led many to convert and some to flee, and placed all Jews under suspicion regardless of their professed religion. 'Old Christians' suspected that the conversions of 'New Christians' were not genuine, but merely a strategy to gain access to the privileges that came with membership in the *Corpus Christianum*. They mocked the New Christians as '*conversos*' or '*marranos*' (pigs), and launched the Inquisition in 1478 specifically to hunt and prosecute false converts. Many Old Christians suspected that Spain's still considerable Jewish community secretly supported *conversos* in the faith of their ancestors, and so pressured for the removal of those who remained. Jews were expelled from Andalusia in 1483. The influential Observant friar, inquisitor, and cardinal, Ximenes de Cisneros, argued for the complete purification of Spain, and three months after conquering the last Moorish

kingdom of Granada in 1492, Ferdinand and Isabella issued a decree ordering all Jews who refused to convert and be baptised to leave their kingdoms within four months. Possibly 35,000–40,000 went into exile, most of them leaving for the Ottoman Empire or Italy, while some passed over to Portugal, hoping perhaps that the order might be rescinded. Instead, the Portuguese followed with their own expulsion decree in 1497, and many thousands, reaching one tenth of the population may have left. Navarre then banned its Jews in 1498, completing the purgation of the Iberian peninsula.


The Iberian expulsions were unprecedented in scope and scale. No state had ever expelled this many of its people; by contrast, England's expulsion in 1290 had forced out 2000 Jews. There was no tacit toleration of the kind that had German cities forcing Jews to move outside the walls and settle in nearby suburbs and towns. The Iberian expulsions were national projects, undertaken for ideological reasons and against the economic self-interest of the states forcing the Jews to leave. Ottoman Sultan Beyazid II could hardly believe that Spain would deliberately savage its own economy, and gladly welcomed the refugees into his own territories. There would be more to follow as Spanish authorities extended the expulsion decrees to their territories on the Italian peninsula, including Sicily (1493), the Kingdom of Naples (1542), and Milan (1597).

Spain's purgative actions fell even more heavily on the Muslims. Perhaps half a million lived in the Moorish Kingdom of Granada before it fell in 1492. As many as 100,000 of these died or were enslaved in the military campaign, while 200,000 fled to North Africa. This left another 200,000, most of them gathered in a few enclaves. The mountainous territory of Alpujarras east of the city of Granada remained largely Islamic, and a 1492 treaty allowed Muslims to preserve their mosques, religious institutions, language, laws and customs. The first archbishop of Granada was a moderate, Hernando de Talavera (1428–1507), who promoted the official policy of segregating Christians and Muslims in separate quarters of the city without forcing conversion on the latter. This changed when Ximenes de Cisneros arrived in 1499. He promoted mass conversions and publicly burned 5,000 Arabic religious texts, triggering a rebellion in the Alpujarras which gave Ferdinand and Isabella the pretext to suspend the 1492 treaty. In 1502, Moors in Andalusia and Valencia were given the choice of baptism or exile, and after 1526 this was extended to Catalonia and Aragon as well. Spain's sorry history with the Jewish *conversos* now repeated itself with the Moorish converts, called *moriscos*; many also lived a double life, and soon also came under scrutiny of the Inquisition.

Morisco adherence to Christianity was often rudimentary, and the community preserved its identity through traditional forms of dress and diet, and through *aljamiado*, a form of Spanish written in Arabic characters. This only heightened Old Christian fears of contagion from 'false' and Islamicizing converts. In 1567, King Philip II passed an edict banning the use of Arabic script, and suppressing all Islamic traditions in religion, dress, and customs. This triggered a second rebellion in the Alpujarras (1568–70), during which the Ottomans and North African Berbers offered some military support to their embattled co-religionists. It was all the Spanish needed to justify a horrific response. Don John of Austria led a brutal suppression, slaughtering the entire population of the town of Galera east of Granada and forcing 80,000 Granadan *moriscos* north into Castile. At the same time, Old Christians from northern Spain were settled in Granada.

Complete expulsion of the *moriscos* was first proposed in 1582 in Philip II's council of state as the final solution to the problem of false Catholics in the Iberian *Corpus Christianum*. Many nobles initially opposed it, fearing the loss of farmers and skilled labourers from areas like Valencia where large regions were populated almost entirely by *moriscos*. They were promised *morisco* lands in compensation for the loss of people. At the same time, Archbishop of Valencia Juan de Ribera (1542–1611) who had initially opposed expulsion, gradually came to agree that it was the only way to completely purify and restore the land. Support for expulsion slowly grew. Between 1609 and 1614, King Philip III (r. 1598–1621) issued a series of edicts of expulsion which resulted in the departure of more than 90 percent of Spain's remaining *moriscos*, by then numbering roughly 300,000. The Kingdom of Valencia alone lost a third of its population, and nearly half of its villages were deserted by 1638 [Fig 18].

Since Spain and Portugal were Europe's first truly global empires, these 'national' expulsions extended far beyond Iberia. As we saw above, Jewish *conversos* migrated in relatively large numbers to Spain's territories in the Americas, and may have constituted the largest single group of Spanish citizens there. Yet they were followed there by the Inquisition, which targeted *conversos* in particular and burned a number of them in dramatic *autos da fe*. When the Portuguese landed in Goa, they found a mixed population of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Thomist Christians who traced their roots to the apostle Thomas and who used Syriac language and rituals. The Portuguese convinced the Hindu ruler of Goa to force the Jews into a ghetto, and then began systematically attacking Goa's Muslim community, burning mosques and destroying other buildings as an effort to exterminate what they saw as 'Moorish'. The Portuguese missions also targeted the large



18. Vicente Carducho, *Expulsion of the Moors from Valencia* (1627). Art Resource NY.

Hindu community with almost predictable results – 70 percent of inquisitorial activity was among Hindu converts. Yet while the Hindu community was larger, and arguably posed a greater potential threat to Portuguese Christians, the Portuguese rhetoric against Hindus never reached the level or intensity of that against Muslims and Jews.

Expulsions of Jews and Muslims from England, from cities and territories across the Holy Roman Empire, France, and Italy, and from the kingdoms in Iberia all had local triggers and particular characteristics. Different economic and political tensions shaped each one, yet they all shared a common legitimizing discourse framed in religious language. Jews and Muslims were the enemies of God and contagious aliens within the *Corpus Christianum*, and the only way to purify that Body of Christ was to expel them entirely. Some authorities were content to move them just outside the walls, while others pushed them completely offshore. Those who converted to Christianity could avoid expulsion, but in most cases remained under suspicion. This was certainly the case in Iberia, where *conversos* and *moriscos* came under increased suspicion and attack as duplicitous enemies of the faith. Jews encountered the same suspicion in Italy, in part because *conversos* headed to towns like Ancona, Livorno, Ferrara, and Venice and re-connected with

Jewish merchant communities there. Some converts attempted to blend in and reclaim their Jewish faith. Catholics considered this heresy, and in 1555 Pope Paul IV had twenty-five of these 'lapsed' *conversos* who had returned to Judaism burned in Ancona.

Forced conversions did not exactly create eager Christians, and frequent policy reversals only added to the confusion. The group known as Portuguese Jews experienced this clearly over many generations. Portugal replaced its 1497 expulsion decree with a mass campaign of forced baptisms the following year. Yet the 'New Christians' continued to live, marry, and socialize together, observed the Sabbath, Jewish festivals, and dietary laws, and remained essentially Jewish; some saw their merging of Judaism and Christianity as a fulfilment of both and superior to practicing just one or the other. King Manuel I prohibited marriages between New Christians, and until 1532 prohibited them from leaving the country. Portuguese authorities treated the *conversos* as a distinct and suspect group until the mid-eighteenth century, levying special taxes on them, dealing with them through separate community representatives, and singling them out as the primary concern of its Inquisition in 1536. This may have been because some of these *conversos* were doubly 'alien' having arrived in Portugal only after the expulsions from Spain in 1492. Under these circumstances, many had little commitment to either Catholicism or Portugal, and little incentive to develop one. When some returned to Spain in the seventeenth century, suspicions of them were so high that the Spanish Inquisition returned to hunting 'Judaizers', with Portuguese *conversos* as the most suspect group. They were certainly among the first refugees to return to the Jewish religion once they immigrated to countries that allowed it. King Francis I of France gave special protection and extensive autonomy to *converso* 'merchants of the Portuguese nation' who had fled to coastal and border towns in southwest France; some continued practicing Catholicism, some returned to Judaism, and some landed in between. As long as they were discrete in following Judaism or integrating Jewish rituals into their Christian practice, the authorities left them alone. This arrangement carried on to the early eighteenth century. When 'Portuguese' merchants showed up in English plays, Dutch towns, or German roads they were almost always Jewish *conversos*. Authorities might also deliberately turn a blind eye to what religion they practiced in private. Yet those same authorities still upheld the bans on public Jewish worship until the seventeenth century. When Amsterdam magistrates finally allowed the Sephardic community to open its first public synagogue in 1639, it was known as the Portuguese Synagogue.

Expelling the Self: Christian Migrations

Expulsion, exile, and migration became more complicated when Christendom fractured into a host of different confessional groups from the early sixteenth century: Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans, Catholics, Anabaptists, and a host of others with no name or fixed catechism challenged the religious unity that was critical to the ideology of the *Corpus Christianum*. The recent experience of secular and ecclesiastical authorities with Jewish 'contagion' shaped authorities' evolving responses to these new groups of Christian 'deviants'. Some religious dissidents were expelled, while the threat of prison or execution forced many more to flee.

As we look at the accelerating purgations that drew tighter religious boundaries across the European map, we have to be careful about definitions, time, and scope. Those on the move might be exiles, religious refugees, or simply migrants caught up in broader movements. They might move temporarily during some crisis and return home in a few months or a year. They might move permanently to a place that suited and supported their religious identity. They might hit the road as individuals, moving from place to place across Europe in search of some degree of religious freedom, or they might migrate in large and organized groups. These distinctions are important, yet also a bit abstract. They do not change the fundamental reality that in this period religious exile and religious refugees gradually expanded to become a mass phenomenon as much for Christians as for Jews and Muslims.

Expulsions of Jews had expanded in two waves through the fifteenth century, and expulsions of Muslims came in two waves at the beginning of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; in both cases the second was larger than the first. Expulsions of Christians expanded in three waves from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries and also steadily grew in size. Beginning on a relatively small scale with some hundreds at a time fleeing in the 1520s-50s, these waves steadily expanded to affect a few thousand refugees and migrants at a time from the 1550s to the 1590s, and then hit their largest size when many thousands and even hundreds of thousands of exiles fled from the 1600s to 1750. Politics and war pushed each wave higher. Monarchs appointed themselves the defenders of particular religious creeds and confessions which were in turn identified with the character and mission of the nation itself. For at least three centuries, rulers and their officials claimed that God had appointed them to defend a national and religious creed against enemies both in and outside the

Corpus Christianum, and that this divine mission both legitimized their own rule and set a standard that their subjects had to obey.

Belief and Exile: 1520s-1550s

It began almost immediately. In traditional accounts of the Reformation, the German friar Martin Luther is seen as the catalyst to broader reform due to his expanding challenge to key Catholic doctrines in a series of wildly popular publications from 1517 to 1520. By 1521, he had fallen under a Holy Roman imperial ban for refusing to retract his views, and with his life in danger he spent almost a year as a refugee hiding in a remote castle under an assumed identity. Many individuals would similarly go into individual exile and travel around Europe seeking refuge in the years following Luther's actions. The earliest groups of refugees were those known as Radicals, Sacramentarians, or Anabaptists. In the 1520s-1540s, they pushed beyond the views of the most widely recognized reformers such as Luther and Huldrych Zwingli (1484-1531) on points having to do with scripture, with the main sacraments of baptism and communion, and with membership in the church. Two of these were Thomas Muntzer (1489-1525) and one of Luther's early allies, Andreas Karlstadt (1486-1541). When they attempted in the early 1520s to move more quickly and radically in reform than Luther wanted, they were dismissed from their positions and expelled. At roughly the same time, the diffuse groups of radical reformers in Switzerland were also forced to flee in order to avoid execution. Throughout the 1530s, many moved to Poland and Transylvania. In the period 1547-51 when Charles V was busy restoring Catholic worship across the Holy Roman Empire, Moravia (between modern-day Poland and Austria) became the destination of choice for south German, Swiss, and Austrian radical reformers. More than 1,600 settled in the town of Nikolsburg alone, though most moved out to isolated rural settlements where they could practice their faith complete with the community of goods.

German radicals were active in the Peasant's Revolt of 1524-1525, while Dutch radicals in the 1530s aimed to seize town governments in Amsterdam and Leeuwarden. Fuelled by apocalyptic rhetoric about Christ's imminent return, 2,000 of them headed to the north German town of Munster in 1534 with the vision of building a pure community. They expelled those who resisted them, but were themselves besieged, betrayed, and executed in a military campaign in 1535. Munster soon became a symbol of the radicals' revolutionary determination to overturn the existing order and usher in a new and purified Kingdom of God. They continued to be targeted as the black sheep of the broader Protestant

movement, in large part because their ideas about the purity of the church led them to firmly reject traditional views of the *Corpus Christianum* as a comprehensive merging of church and state.

As the troops of the Holy Roman Empire were besieging Munster, the threat of soldiers at the door had individuals fleeing England and France. In the 1530s, Reginald Pole escaped to Italy to avoid Henry VIII's religious settlement, while John Calvin fled Francis I's crackdown on reformers by heading to a series of towns just over the Rhine River. Both worked hard from exile to shape religious affairs in their homelands. Henry's shifting and very personal policy ensured that he would have opponents across the spectrum, from the very Catholic Pole to the Bible-translating follower of John Wycliffe, Miles Coverdale, and a host in between. Some fled to Strasbourg and Wittenberg, and others to Rome. Pole was involved in a series of plots to unseat the king, and eventually returned to England as archbishop of Canterbury in Queen Mary's failed Catholic restoration of 1553-1558. Calvin followed many individual French exiles to Strasbourg and Basel and by 1541 had settled permanently in Geneva, helping turn it into a shelter that took in refugees and sent out books and missionaries. Italian Protestants began making their way to Switzerland from the 1540s, following some high-profile Italian refugees from the newly established Roman Inquisition like Bernardino Ochino, head of the observant Capuchin group within the Franciscan Order, and Peter Martyr Vermigli, an Augustinian canon from Florence. Both would soon move far beyond Switzerland and its reformers, and end their lives as refugees suspected of heresy by Protestants and Catholics alike. Other Italian refugees who followed the same path included Lelio Sozzino and his nephew Fausto, who would travel between Geneva, Rome, Basel, and Lyon before heading to Transylvania and Poland and shedding more and more standards of orthodox doctrine, above all the idea of the Trinity and Christ's divinity. The Sozzini are considered founders of Unitarianism. Many of the most radical reformers were moving continually in their thinking, and this put them continually on the road avoiding prosecution and seeking shelter.

German refugees arrived in Geneva in the late 1540s, and about 800 English refugees from the Catholic restoration of Queen Mary Tudor arrived throughout the 1550s. These so-called Marian exiles were never formally expelled from England, but simply fled for their lives. Refugee communities more than doubled the population of mid-sixteenth-century Geneva, but few stayed more than a few years, preferring either to return home like the English and Germans, or to move to larger cities in the Holy Roman Empire. There were similar short-lived communities of exiles dotting borders across

Europe, including Emden in northern Germany and the Rhine cities of Cologne, Strasbourg, and Basel. In this early stage of the Reform movement, exile and flight were common but involved relatively small numbers of people who fled for relatively short periods of time. Almost all aimed to return home to shape religious reform there, and those who did often returned with sharper views and a reduced appetite for compromise.

Politics and Exile: 1550s-1600

The numbers of religious migrants grew after the 1550s-1560s as religious identity became more closely tied to political disputes. The Religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555 allowed rulers in the Holy Roman Empire to determine whether their city or territory would be Catholic or Lutheran, but with no provision for either Calvinism or Radicalism. Elizabeth I came to the English throne in 1558 determined to govern a church that would not be subject to the Roman pope, and ruled until 1603. Simmering religious tensions in France broke out into a civil war by 1562, which consumed the country even after formal peace was declared in 1594. The Netherlands moved steadily towards rupture from the Spanish crown in a revolt that began in politics but steadily took on a religious character. In 1579, a group of southern provinces and territories confirmed their loyalty to Catholicism and Spain in the Union of Arras spurring the seven northern provinces to respond with a Protestant Union of Utrecht, which virtually declared their independence from Spain. The conclusion of the Council of Trent in 1563 settled doctrinal directions for the Catholic Church and opened a period of intense missionary and diplomatic activity, which would turn it into what was arguably the first global institution.

After the rapid and chaotic changes of the 1520s-1550s, no one could have predicted that these events in the mid-century would each in their own way set directions that would harden by 1600. In the 1550s, the religious character of each of these states, and indeed of many religious movements, was in flux. By 1600, each was firmly on the way to having a particular religious confession as a central part of its political order and national identity, with a ruling family taking personal responsibility for upholding this distinct and increasingly exclusive character. Each church or religious movement had firmer and more exclusive statements of doctrine, often written by those who had spent some time in exile. They also devised efficient means of promoting and policing these, and closer ties to political authorities. As a result of all these changes, exile was less a matter of individual conscience, and increasingly one of political reality. It also expanded in scale and impact: the numbers increased dramatically, and it was no longer sure that refugees would ever

be able to return. In this second period, religious exile for European Christians came to look increasingly like what it had become for Iberian Jews and Muslims: permanent expulsion.

The largest movements came in the Netherlands. In 1566, rioters entered churches and destroyed religious icons like statutes, paintings, and stained glass windows. The so-called iconoclastic fury so terrified local Catholic magistrates that hundreds of them fled over the border into France and Germany. They received a chilly reception in most places, since their flight had essentially opened the way for Protestants to take control of government. The Spanish Crown responded by sending the duke of Alba to subdue the Netherlands in 1567, and his armies succeeded initially in restoring both order and the magistrates. Yet Alba's harshness, and his determination to restore not just Spanish political rule but also Spanish Catholic culture, gave an ever-stronger religious character to what had begun as a purely political and cultural dispute. His opponents claimed that Alba would bring the Spanish Inquisition into the Netherlands to recast the Dutch *Corpus Christianum* in an Iberian mold. Opposition grew from the 1570s. Over the following eighty years an escalating series of military campaigns alternating with treaties and alliances saw the seven northern provinces sever their allegiance to the Spanish king and Catholicism, while the six southern provinces affirmed both. In 1572, the Spanish brutally sacked Antwerp, the largest and wealthiest city in the southern Netherlands and a Protestant stronghold. When they seized it again in 1585, 150,000 refugees fled north in fear to cities controlled by Protestant councils; a smaller number of Catholics fled south. By 1579, the southern provinces had been restored to Spanish control, and within a few years the nine United Provinces to the north had consolidated their anti-Spanish and Protestant alliance. An interim settlement in 1609 and final resolution in 1648 confirmed the religio-political division into two nations, with the Spanish Netherlands having a Catholic state church, and the Dutch Republic a Protestant state church.

France's civil Wars of Religion (1562–98) saw a similar steady escalation of the stakes, although its Protestant population was never as numerous. Later called 'Huguenots', a name of uncertain origin and meaning, French Protestants were concentrated in the south where the Cathar and Waldensian heresies had originated. They included artisans, professionals, and nobles; this was the same demographic that had been drawn to the Cathars in earlier centuries. Through the course of France's sixteenth-century civil wars, the ruling family of the Valois aimed to ally with either the Catholic Guises or Huguenot Navarre family, and after three decades of brutal military campaigns, frustrated alliances, and assassinations, Henry of



19. Francois Dubois, *Massacre of St. Bartholomew Day*. Scala/White Images/Art Resource.

Navarre ended up as the military victor by 1592. His pathway there had included an ill-fated 1572 marriage alliance with the king's sister Margaret of Valois, which was meant to confirm the steady ascent of the Huguenots in city governments across France. Many leading Protestants came to Paris to celebrate the wedding, but the now-ambivalent Valois and the Catholic Guises used the occasion to plot a series of assassinations which triggered massacres of Huguenots in major cities across the country [Fig 19]. The Huguenot duc de Sully thought that 70,000 had died in what has become known as the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, but there are no accurate statistics, and most estimates now range from 10,000 up to 30,000. Bells rang in celebration across Catholic Europe, and Pope Gregory XIII declared it a great victory. It certainly fed the fears of Protestants across Europe that Catholic authorities were bent on their utter destruction. St. Bartholomew's Day became one of the most resonant symbols of religious division across Europe, with Catholics considering it a sign of God's favor, and Protestants a sign of Catholic treachery and violence. Henry of Navarre did eventually take the French throne as King Henry IV, but he could not take the country without converting to Catholicism. He aimed for a religious settlement resembling what Elizabeth I was working towards in England: one faith, one monarch, one law. His adoption of Catholicism in 1594 could have triggered a mass Huguenot exodus. In order to prevent this Henry IV passed the Edict of Nantes in 1598, which protected the Protestants' community by granting them about one

hundred fortified towns and specific rights to public worship and legal protection.

In England, Elizabeth I came to the throne in 1558 aiming to calm political and religious divisions by restoring her father's Church of England as an institution that preserved many Catholic rituals without submitting to the Catholic pope. She faced challenges from both sides. Vocal and motivated men who had been among the 800 Marian Exiles filled Parliament and key church positions, and many wanted to apply to England the more reformed theology and independent church government that they had just experienced in Geneva, Basel, or Strasbourg. They staged serious political campaigns in 1563, 1572, and 1587 to pass the necessary Parliamentary legislation, and it took all Elizabeth's skills at persuasion, threat, and delay to hold them at bay. Large parts of the country remained firmly but discreetly Catholic. This included significant parts of the North and West, particularly in rural areas, and some key noble families. When Elizabeth's cousin, Mary Queen of Scots, came to England as a refugee after being deposed by Scottish nobles, she became an active focus for plots to restore Catholic rule in both England and Scotland. Elizabeth would finally order her execution in 1587.

Despite Elizabeth's aim for a middle way, England was seen across Europe as fundamentally in the Protestant camp, and Elizabeth's religious policies fed a steady exodus of Catholic families to the continent, where they settled in Douai, Paris, Rome, Rouen, Madrid, and Valladolid. Noble families sometimes sent their young men to Catholic schools and sheltered those who returned to England as covert missionaries. Young women also fled. Twenty-two English convents were founded on the continent from 1598, and approximately 4000 young English women would join them over the next two centuries, the majority of them in the 1610s and 1620s. Most came from families already in continental exile, and most lived in poverty. Catholic refugees supported a series of plots, diplomatic efforts, and military campaigns aimed at returning England to Catholicism. This included efforts to assassinate Elizabeth I and her successor James I; support for Spanish invasions in 1588, 1596, and 1597; and an effort by to blow up Parliament in 1605. Each failed effort increased active prosecution of Catholics in England, and fed a religious nationalism that associated Catholicism with treason and that framed England as a distinctly and exclusively Protestant nation.

In Eastern Europe, the union of Poland and Lithuania in 1569 created a vast Commonwealth which, though ostensibly Catholic, included diverse ethnic settlements of German Lutherans, Swiss, Dutch, and Italian Radicals

and anti-Trinitarians, Moravian Brethren, Tartar Muslims, Ashkenazi Jews, and Ukrainian Orthodox. These all lived under the protection of nobles who were significantly more powerful than the king. While increasing numbers of nobles had turned to Protestantism by mid-century, they welcomed religious refugees primarily as a valuable source of settlers and skilled artisans. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth preserved noble freedom of religion and other privileges, yet tensions over religious identity were common, and local outbreaks of violence not unknown, particularly against Radicals and Calvinists. Protestantism had never made serious inroads among the broad mass of the population, and from the 1570s the many religious minorities began fracturing. By the 1580s, Polish Protestantism was clearly in decline. The Jesuits had come to Poland in 1564, quickly establishing colleges and working with some nobles and the king to promote re-Catholicization. King Sigismund III (ruled 1587-1632), who had been raised a Catholic, began appointing only Catholics to high office, and this led many nobles to convert. By 1600, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth still had many hundreds of congregations representing all varieties of Protestantism, and while there were no large-scale expulsions, the community steadily declined over the following centuries.

The map of religious confessions at the end of the sixteenth century shows an incredible variety of religious groups co-existing in large communities across Europe. There were still significant numbers of Muslims in Spain; Protestants and Hussites in Eastern Europe and France; Catholics in England, Holland, and Switzerland; Radicals in Moravia; Unitarians in Poland and Transylvania; and Jews in cities across Europe. All boundaries were blurred. Individual exile and the migrations of groups of religious refugees created a patchwork of religious communities which managed, on the whole, to preserve a practical co-existence. Within a century, the map would change radically as growing concerns about religious identity and national security would trigger Europe's bloodiest wars around dynasty, borders, and religion. With a few notable exceptions, Europe's governments and people would become remarkably less tolerant of religious diversity in the seventeenth century, and the boundaries of religion and nation would converge and become more firm and fixed.

Nation and Exile: 1600-1750s

By the turn of the seventeenth century, religious confession was becoming a fundamental feature of national identity in the states that were forming across Europe. This combination would feed a series of brutal wars over the next half century that would generate hundreds of thousands of refugees. These

wars set the stage for an even longer and more deliberate series of religiously defined expulsions in the third wave that carried on to the 1730s and beyond. The drive to purge fed on itself and consumed all of Europe. From the 1590s through to the 1750s, religious leaders mounted determined missions to enforce uniform beliefs in particular regions. European governments would for the first time stage systematic 'religious cleansings' that were as wide ranging and brutal as the 'ethnic cleansings' of the twentieth century. This deliberate collaboration of church and state elites politicized and nationalized religion as never before. It introduced institutional and legal forms of segregation and intolerance that shaped attitudes and actions into the twentieth century.

The expulsions of the Moors and *Moriscos* from Spain in 1609–1614 was the first example of the period's ambitious campaigns of ethnic-religious cleansing. Many small- and large-scale purgations of Catholics and Protestants across the rest of Europe followed as the unfinished business of the Reformation. They were legitimized by discourses of purgation long after politics, security, and economy had replaced religion as the main driver of state policy, and indeed long after many elite men and women had moderated their active faith. Many of those in positions of authority believed on purely practical grounds that religious diversity weakened a nation. As the public square expanded through newspapers, coffee houses, pamphlets, rituals, and festivals, and as public opinion needed to be manipulated rather than ignored, the propaganda around religion and nationality intensified. The traditions being invented and the communities being imagined saw ethnic and religious diversity as a political problem, and not a social good.

French, English, German, and Scandinavian monarchs worked hard to eliminate diversity within their borders while working equally hard to promote it in the territories of their enemies – chiefly the Holy Roman and Spanish Empires. The Thirty Years War of 1618–48 shaped this entire period with rapidly shifting public and secret alliances between all faith groups that made a mockery of the religious causes which first triggered the disputes. A century later, the concerns motivating expulsions were more overtly strategic, but the legitimizations remained the same.

Some of the largest expulsions in this period arose out of explicit state actions which followed long periods of more subtle pressure: Spain's expulsion of Muslims in 1609–14 and France's revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 follow this pattern. Others were the collateral damage or legacy of war, and the Thirty Years War of 1618–48 and England's Civil War (1642–51) are prime examples of this. Given that there were

so many, and that they were driven by national concerns, we will divide them politically rather than consider all expulsions in a single chronological narrative.

Holy Roman Empire The 1555 Religious Peace of Augsburg established the principle that it would be the rulers rather than the people who determined whether a territory would follow Catholic or Lutheran worship. These were the only two options for the over two hundred states within the empire, and the growth of Calvinism among German elites soon complicated matters. Cities with an imperial charter granting them self government, like Augsburg, Nuremberg, or Strasbourg, could allow public worship in both confessions under terms determined locally. This 'religious peace' bore little or no relation to what local populations believed, and it reinforced the power of their rulers significantly since they effectively determined the form of Christianity practiced locally. It also meant that dynastic changes in even the smallest of territories could trigger anxieties and intense negotiations across Europe. The death of a duke or king could easily start a war. Some of the bloodiest wars and harshest expulsions of the period came as part of the Thirty Years War, which was sparked by a change of monarchs in Bohemia, before sucking in virtually every European nation and devastating much of Central Europe. What began as a dispute between Protestants and Catholics in the Holy Roman Empire would develop into a much broader struggle about the balance of power between all the leading nations on the continent.

Minor violations of the Augsburg religious peace agreement accumulated through the later sixteenth century and started becoming major issues. Since Calvinism was not recognized in the Augsburg treaty, it was not clear whether a ruler who embraced Calvinism could impose this on his territory. When the Catholic archbishop of Cologne converted to Calvinism in 1583 it triggered a war because he was one of the seven electors of the Holy Roman Emperor. Since the three secular electors of the Palatinate, Saxony, and Brandenburg had already abandoned the Catholic faith, his fourth vote could potentially turn the entire empire over to the Protestant cause. Catholic rulers were particularly vigilant at protecting their religion. When the Lutheran majority in the imperial free city of Donauwörth blocked a Catholic religious procession in 1606, the Catholic duke Maximilian of Bavaria paid a rather violent visit to restore Catholic privileges.

War seemed inevitable. Protestant rulers in the Holy Roman Empire formed a protective Protestant Union (1608), and Catholics responded with the Catholic League (1609). The spark which blew everything apart

landed in the large eastern territory of Bohemia, where nobles and people still defended the separate religious settlement first launched by Jan Hus 200 years before. A series of Hapsburg rulers, who had at one and the same time worn crowns as kings of Bohemia and as emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, had tolerated this in order to keep the Bohemian crown on their head and the Bohemian nation in their empire. In 1617, Ferdinand II of Austria, trained by Jesuits and determined to restore Catholicism across the Empire, was elected king of Bohemia and moved immediately to limit Protestant worship. Bohemian nobles who had already feared what policies he might follow now challenged his right to rule. In the negotiations that followed, they threw Ferdinand's representatives out of the window of Prague Castle, and instead elected as their king the Calvinist Frederick V, ruler of the territory of the Palatinate along the Rhine River. Although only twenty-two years old, Frederick V was as close to being the leader of German Protestantism as one could hope to find. He was one of the seven imperial electors, the head of the Protestant Union, and son-in-law of King James I of England. His decision to accept the Bohemian crown in 1619 triggered the war that everyone had been dreading. It was guaranteed to be violent when Ferdinand II, the man he replaced, was elected Holy Roman Emperor only three days later. Unable to get support from other Protestant rulers, Frederick now forged an alliance with the Ottomans. Turkish troops would defend the Calvinist ruler of Hussite Bohemia from Catholic soldiers. Yet before this head-scratching paradox could play out, the Holy Roman emperor's armies invaded and soundly defeated the Bohemians in the 1620 Battle of White Mountain on the outskirts of Prague.

The new king and queen barely escaped from Prague. More than 80 percent of Bohemian nobles soon followed them into exile, forfeiting their lands in the process. Bohemia went from being an elective monarchy to a hereditary Hapsburg possession. In 1621, King-Emperor Ferdinand II ordered all Calvinists to convert or leave Bohemia in three days, and in 1622 he extended this decree to Lutherans. By some accounts, over one-third of a population of three million went into exile. Spanish troops later overran even Frederick V's hereditary territory of the Palatinate, and he too died in exile. Emperor Ferdinand II went on to carry out a prolonged campaign of forced reconversion to Catholicism in Austria and Hungary, assisted by the Jesuits. With both older and newly appointed nobles, they used the strategies of selective patronage or ostracism that French and English monarchs had employed so skilfully and successfully. With the common people they combined discipline and more effective local pastoral work, including greater attention to religious exercises, rituals, and shrines. The re-Catholicization

campaign would continue on to the eighteenth century and eventually turn Austria, which had a majority Protestant population in the late sixteenth century, into a strongly Catholic state. Hungary, by contrast, retained significant numbers of Calvinists and anti-Trinitarian radicals, due in part to the fact that the Ottomans favored Protestants in those parts of Hungary that they occupied.

The events in Bohemia may have triggered the Thirty Years War, but deeper political divisions fuelled its destructive path back and forth across Germany. Over the next three decades, troops and funds from Denmark, Sweden, France, Spain, England, the Netherlands, and the Ottoman Empire poured into the Holy Roman Empire, ranging widely and wreaking devastation everywhere. Catholics and Protestants fought on both sides. Alliances shifted frequently over questions of property and advantage – Ferdinand II passed an Edict of Restitution in 1629 restoring all Catholic properties seized by Protestants since 1555, but had to back down within a few years when major Protestant territories abandoned him. Yet the Thirty Years War pushed the process of re-Catholicization in the southern and eastern cities and territories of the Holy Roman Empire, both through the forced conversions of nobles, and by the forced removal of those Protestants of all classes who refused to convert. War, famine, and plague killed many, while untold numbers fled in advance of troops: 60 percent of the population of Wurttemberg disappeared, half that of Brandenburg, and a third of Bohemia. It is difficult to work out how many died and how many fled from any particular territory, but the population of the Holy Roman Empire fell by a quarter from 21 to 16 million, with the greatest collapses in the northeast and southwest where war was most intense. About two-thirds of the empire was seriously damaged socially and economically. Typhus, plague, and dysentery did their work in war-ravaged lands, but some rulers willingly depopulated particular regions in order to build what they thought would be a more coherent, unified, and loyal state.

England In the seventeenth century, England began using refugees and migrants in order to secure and develop new and troubled areas in Ireland and the Americas. In the course of that century's protracted Civil War, marked by the execution of one king and the exile of another, the monarchs were forced to accept Anglican Protestantism as a condition of rule.

Ireland was chief of the troubled areas secured by refugees and religious migrants. From the 1560s successive English governments had aimed to expand control by bringing English settlers into what were called

'plantations' that had been cleared of their Gaelic population. Settlements planted by force did not always grow, and some notable reversals included the southern province of Munster in the 1560s. The Catholic monarchs Mary and Philip had first authorized plantations in the 1550s, but from 1606 religion became a bigger factor in what had until then been a cultural fight between English settlers and the Gaelic/Celtic nobility, particularly in the northeastern province of Ulster, which the English had never controlled. In a determined push, about 125,000 settlers were shipped over to Ireland in the space of a few decades, with 80,000 sent to Ulster alone.

The native Irish rebelled in 1641. Perhaps 4–12,000 of the Protestant settlers were killed in Ulster, a figure quickly inflated to 100,000 by propagandists. Oliver Cromwell led a bloody reconquest from 1649 to 1653, and the war and punitive peace completely reshaped Ireland. Famine, plague, and war casualties killed as many as 600,000 out of a population of 1.4 million and a further 50,000 were deported. Catholic landowners and soldiers were dispossessed and fled as refugees. English, Scottish, and Welsh Protestants were settled in larger numbers, including thousands of soldiers who were given land in place of wages. Before the 1641 Rebellion, Irish Catholics had owned 60 percent of the land, but Cromwell's changes cut this to 8 percent. His controversial policies of ethnic-religious cleansing are seen by some as an early example of genocide, and the political and social ramifications reverberated for centuries.

Ireland was the closest, but not the only battlefield for England's ongoing religious civil wars. Through the sixteenth century, governments pressured Catholics into accepting the middle way settlement, but in the seventeenth they also turned against a wide range of Protestant groups who for one reason or another rejected the Church of England's privileged powers and hence were called Dissenters or Non-Conformists. Some aimed for a Genevan-style organization of religion, complete with more Calvinist doctrines and lay governance (Presbyterians); in Scotland, these signed a solemn 'Covenant' to resist Anglican forms of worship and church government. Others picked up parts of the older Radical reform tradition with its emphasis on adult baptism (Baptists), or developed new forms of Christianity which downplayed the role of clergy, abstract theology, and formal churches (Quakers). Many rejected what they considered to be continuing elements of Catholicism in the Church of England's organization, doctrine, or rituals, picking up on criticisms raised by Puritans ever since the 1560s. The English Civil War marked the high point of their influence, and particularly the period of the Commonwealth and Protectorate (1649–60) when the Church of England lost its bishops, its service book and creed, and above all its monopoly on

protestant worship. The fact that the various Protestant Dissenters shared common enemies in both Catholicism and Anglicanism did not generate much toleration between them, and they joined in repressive campaigns against each other. From the 1650s to the 1680s, early Quakers like George Fox, Margaret Fell, and William Penn were widely seen as threatening, treasonous, and anarchic. They rejected church buildings, marriage ceremonies, oath-taking, and visible forms of status and hierarchy. They allowed women to preach, and the sermons of male and female Quakers were full of apocalyptic warnings that the Day of God's Judgment was coming. Under Cromwell's government, Quakers were chained in underground cells, tortured, and executed.

The tide began to turn when Cromwell died in 1658, and King Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660. The king brought back the Church of England's bishops, its Book of Common Prayer, and its Thirty-Nine Articles, while bending slightly on its monopoly. Both Charles II and his brother and successor James II were willing to tolerate some Dissenters if it meant that they could also extend toleration to Catholics. This was a purely strategic and very limited toleration: the Stuart kings rejected Puritan and Presbyterian efforts to push for more Calvinist forms of church organization and worship. They actually struck particularly hard at a rebellion among these groups in Scotland, since they blamed the Calvinist Scots for the execution of their father Charles I. In 1685, the Privy Council authorized summary execution of those rebel 'Covenanters' who refused to acknowledge the king. While relatively few were actually executed, their deaths were dramatic, including a man shot in front of his children for refusing to acknowledge any king but Jesus, and two women tied to stakes in the Solway Channel to be drowned slowly by the rising tides. The suppression triggered a new wave of religious dissenters migrating to the American colonies who kept alive the story of British religious persecution. An eighteenth-century account of the suppression in Scotland described it as 'The Killing Time' and this became – and remains – the central event in Covenanter martyrology. The British government was in fact willing to allow a degree of toleration in America in order to promote settlements there. As a result, particular religious groups promoted settlement of particular areas and gave them a distinct religious character from the beginning that tended to be reinforced by later migrations. The Massachusetts Bay colonies became attractive to Calvinist Puritans; while Pennsylvania drew Quakers, German Mennonites, Amish, and Moravian Brethren; Catholics, Jews, and Quakers settled in Rhode Island, and Catholics moved to Maryland.

The idea that many of America's founders and early settlers came in search of religious freedom is largely an invented tradition. Distinctions between religious refugees and migrants quickly blurred in these colonies, and indeed most settlers had mixed motives for immigrating. Perhaps 21,000 had moved to the New England colonies in the first stage of Puritan migration from 1620 to 1640 when Charles I and the Church of England were making life difficult for Dissenters in England. Yet even more migrants were moving at the same time to colonies in the Caribbean and along the southern seaboard like Virginia. As new settlements opened up along the Atlantic seaboard, such as Delaware (1638), New Jersey (1660), the Carolinas (1653, 1670), and Pennsylvania (1682), settlers sought both religious toleration and economic stability. In some cases, the intolerance that they fought against was that of other religious refugees in America: New Hampshire began as a refuge from the religious intolerance of early settlers in Massachusetts Bay.

For two hundred years, Ireland and America would be the destination of most of Britain's religious migrants. As England's imperial reach expanded throughout this period, the tensions between the monarchs and the aristocracy came to be framed in particularly religious terms, with ongoing geopolitical results. The extended civil-religious war that had sent English puritans overseas from the 1620s to the 1640s, continued smouldering underground after the deaths of Charles I (1649) and Oliver Cromwell (1658). It complicated the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, and burst back into open flame in the 1670s and 1680s. King James II had converted to Catholicism long before his accession to the throne, and in 1688 his Catholic wife gave birth to a male heir. All too well aware of what had happened to their continental counterparts when powerful Catholic kings curbed noble privileges, some of England's most powerful aristocrats engineered a palace coup. They sent the king into exile and installed as queen and king his daughter Mary from an earlier marriage together with her husband William of Orange, the titular head of the Dutch Republic. In the 1690 Battle of the Boyne north of Dublin, William of Orange successfully repulsed James II's effort to return, and gave Ulster's Protestants the hero and holiday that Orangemen would turn into a powerful emblem in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Recently exiled French Huguenots were prominent among the officers in King William's army and among the pastors and bishops that he installed in Ireland in the years following his victory. They argued hard for suppressing Catholic worship and stripping Catholics of their lands and offices. They demonstrated no desire to bridge the confessional difference or the

tensions generated through over a century of forced deportations, plantations, and civil war, and the legacy of their actions helped keep Ireland's religious divisions raw until today.

The so-called Glorious Revolution that deposed Catholic James II in favour of Protestant William and Mary was justified by supporters as necessary to protect 'liberty' in politics and religion. It included strict laws reinforcing the social and political status of the Church of England. No one could sit in parliament, graduate from Oxford or Cambridge, or enjoy various other privileges without being a full member of the Church of England. Monarchs were prohibited from marrying Catholics, a rule not lifted until the twenty-first century. An intense educational and propaganda effort followed. Babies learned from their nursery rhymes ('Rock a Bye Baby' commented on the male heir born to James II) and adults from their prints, popular songs, and commemorative teacups that England was a decidedly Protestant nation. The campaign was as intense and successful as the re-Catholicization campaigns then underway in Poland, Austria, and France, and turned England's Protestantism from a political position to cornerstone of popular patriotism.

It would not be easy to maintain this Protestant dynastic identity over the following decades, particularly when Mary and her sister Anne, who followed her as monarch, both died without heirs. Rather than allow James II's male heir to succeed, the British government looked to the continent for a new king and dynasty. The most eligible Protestant dynasty in Europe was in the German territory of Hanover, where Elizabeth, daughter of James I and widow of Frederick II, the short-lived king of Bohemia, had finally settled. It was stretching imagination to assert that the foreign and German-speaking George I was a more legitimate king of England than James Francis Edward Stuart, son of the deposed James II, and so the propaganda campaign emphasized Protestant purity over royal genealogy. James's son, Bonnie Prince Charlie, led an unsuccessful revolt from Scotland in 1745 and remained active in plots after that time.

Ongoing anxiety in London over the Stuart threat and Catholic loyalty became a factor leading to the last large religiously influenced expulsion of our period. From 1755 to 1760, more than 11,000 Acadians from the modern Canadian Maritime provinces were deported to other British colonies or to England, France, and French Louisiana. Acadians had fought with the French against the British in their protracted American wars, and the British believed that deportation was the only way to handle a group which, for ethnic and religious reasons, would not assimilate into the British Empire. This made the Acadians the last of the long line of Reformation refugees. By 1760, the

British forced the French out of Quebec, and the decision to grant a significant degree of self-government and religious toleration to the 70,000 Quebecois marked the start of a new British policy of handling ethno-religious difference within the Empire.


France When Henry IV converted to Catholicism, he was well positioned to use privileges and legal guarantees to bring Huguenots and Catholics together in a single French state religion. After he was assassinated by a Catholic priest in 1610, French Huguenots began worrying about the fate of the 1598 Edict of Nantes by which he had guaranteed their security. His widow and son soon began a process of re-Catholicization, pushing the Huguenots into open rebellion by 1620. A string of defeats ended in the 1628 loss of their main port city of La Rochelle after a fourteen-month siege that had left it with only a fifth of its earlier population. King Louis XIII and his chief advisor Cardinal Richelieu claimed that with the rebellion the Huguenots had forfeited their right to have separate fortified towns and armies, and they moved to further curb the anomaly of a separate and protected Huguenot state within the French nation. A small but steady number of Huguenots aimed to follow the example of English Puritans and voluntarily emigrated either to French colonies or to other parts of Europe. For a while a disproportionate number of settlers in New France were Huguenot, but the French Crown feared for their loyalty, and so tried to prevent their further immigration. It banned public Huguenot worship altogether in New France in 1627 and 1659.

Throughout the course of the seventeenth century, French kings followed the example of England, Austria, and Poland, and shut out nobles and professionals who failed to follow the monarch's religion. This led many ambitious Huguenots to convert and/or marry into Catholic families, thereby robbing the minority community of its political and intellectual leadership. After decades of steadily limiting Huguenot civil rights and pressuring for conversions, Louis XIV formally revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685. This abolished all the rights guaranteed by Henry IV, gave Huguenot clergy two weeks to leave France (though without children over age seven), required that all Huguenot schools be dissolved and churches destroyed, prohibited Huguenots from gathering on pain of confiscation of goods by the state, and forced Catholic baptism on all newborns. It also prohibited Huguenots from emigrating, although in fact anywhere from 150,000 of a total Huguenot population of about 730,000 did leave France over the next few years, moving mainly to Switzerland, the Netherlands, England, German territories, the Americas, and South Africa. Huguenot

watchmakers turned up in Geneva, glassmakers in Denmark, silk weavers and financiers in London, and army officers in England and Prussia. Persecution of Huguenots in France carried on for century, including a military crusade against isolated communities in the southern Cevennes Mountains (1702-05), until Louis XVI again granted toleration in 1787. Protestants only gained formal equal rights as French citizens in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

Hungary and Transylvania After their victory at Mohacs in 1526, the Ottomans took the central part of Hungary, leaving a small Hapsburg client kingdom bordering Austria to the north, and a larger Transylvanian Principality with its own Diet to the east. Despite some early anti-Protestant legislation, the Hungarian Diets of 1557 and 1572 allowed toleration of Lutheran, Catholic, Calvinist, Unitarian, and Orthodox worship in a rare example of legal confessional pluralism. By the end of the sixteenth century, both Transylvania and lower Austria were about 70-80 percent Protestant, with a political class and intelligentsia oriented towards Calvinism. The strong Saxon community remained Lutheran, but the Ottomans favored Calvinists in part because both shared a common enemy in the Hapsburg Emperors. Under Ottoman supremacy, followers of different confessions sometimes shared single church buildings, and in 1639 the town council of Kosice (where three Jesuits had been killed two decades earlier) forbade religious debates in order to foster co-existence.

Imperial politics brought an end to this formal co-existence while also preventing full confessionalization. From the early seventeenth century, the noble Esterhazy family pushed a re-Catholicization campaign that targeted all opponents and denounced toleration itself as heretical. They worked primarily with the Jesuits and particularly with Peter Pazmany, a compelling missionary and former Calvinist noble who had converted to Catholicism and then joined the Society of Jesus. The Transylvanian vassal princes were able to play off various sides throughout the Thirty Years War and so increase their practical independence, but Ottoman control tightened again after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. The Ottomans failed to take Vienna in a siege of 1683, and by the end of the century they had been forced out of Southern Hungary and Transylvania. In 1692, the Habsburgs closed Calvinist churches, banned Calvinist catechisms, and sent Protestant clergy to prison or the galleys. Yet the intensity of their re-Catholicization campaign triggered a Hungarian uprising in 1705-1711. Though they were able to regain control, the Habsburgs then scaled back the campaign and allowed some discrete toleration until a formal Decree of Toleration in 1781.



20. Anonymous, *Expulsion of the Jews from Vienna* (1670). Art Resource NY

Austria Seventeenth-century Austria had a sizeable Protestant population, but a series of monarchs like the Hapsburg emperor Ferdinand II were determined to re-Catholicize their ancestral territory. Forms of co-existence emerged in some major cities like Vienna, where from 1577 Lutheran believers could walk outside the city walls to worship in a church which a group of nobles had purchased. In Salzburg, the archbishop held both spiritual power as a cleric and secular power as a prince, but the area that he ruled over was occupied by many thousands of Lutheran peasants. As many as 100,000 Protestants were displaced from Austria generally in the first decade of the Thirty Years War, and after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia the Jesuits mobilized a re-Catholicization campaign in the Salzburg area. Vienna's Jews were expelled in 1670 [Fig 20]. Missionary pressure led some Protestants to outwardly conform while continuing secretly to practice their own faith. Jesuit priests went on house-to-house visits to find and burn Protestant books, and there were a few small-scale expulsions in the 1680s. At this time they also began to expand the number of confraternities in the region, and particularly those promoting public processions or the use of outward signs of Catholic devotion, like the rosary (a string of beads used to order cycles of personal prayer) or the scapulary (two rectangular pieces of cloth joined to be worn like a cape on the chest and back). The confraternities were used to find and expose secret Protestants, triggering

sharp responses like the peasant who declared openly, 'I shit on the scapulary.'

At the lay level, both sides had accommodated each other for practical reasons for a long time, and some even migrated back and forth. Some of the Protestants even blended Catholic rituals like the rosary into their own religious practice. Yet authorities found this intolerable, and more intense investigations to root out Protestants began in 1727. Local Catholic shopkeepers and artisans protested without success that this was bad for business. In 1731, the archbishop of Salzburg gave the Protestants six months to leave, and over the next three years 20,000 exiles moved north through Germany to settle in Prussia, where they were welcomed by the Calvinist duke-elect. It was a Protestant cause célèbre, with more than 300 works published in Germany in 1732–1733 alone denouncing the archbishop's action. Propagandists predictably exaggerated the situation, with many comparisons to the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt. Yet the refugees did have to leave practically everything behind, and their departure left whole districts around Salzburg virtually deserted. They could take barely a tenth of their belongings, which were estimated at 2.5 million thalers. This windfall may help explain some of the motivations behind the last major religious expulsion to occur in continental Europe.

The sense of community and threat that developed through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries resulted in a wide range of responses. The four responses considered here – separation, enclosure, prosecution, and purgation – were driven by mixed motives but shared a common religious legitimizing discourse. These four responses underscore the intensity of their sense of the *Corpus Christianum* and the depths of their fears of the enemy and the alien. Yet they do not exhaust the forms and meaning of the Reformation – it was far richer and more varied. Others have written of the Reformation's more positive legacies in the form of representative political systems, spiritual and social psychological developments, and artistic innovations. To explore the more restrictive and negative sides of it here is not to suggest that the Reformation was itself entirely restrictive and negative, but rather to seek some means of understanding the question we started out with: why does religious exile become a mass phenomenon in this period? Why are so many individuals turned into refugees or involuntary migrants on account of religion?

Exploring the complicated dynamics driving religious exile and expulsion also underscores three central realities. First, these expulsions were most often the results of strategic actions by small elites working for their

immediate advantage. They seldom reflected broadly held animosities, at least at the beginning of our period. Second, although religious differences motivated the expulsions, it was governments who carried them out. Third, the expulsions and forced migrations did not decline in scale and scope over time, but grew. Tens of thousands at a time were being exiled in the 1490s, the 1570s, the 1610s, the 1680s, the 1730s, and the 1750s. There was no steady progress of religious toleration from the Reformation into the Enlightenment. If anything, the experiences of early refugees were refracted and expanded over the decades. They became part of invented traditions, legal settlements, and political campaigns that led to much larger expulsions of hundreds of thousands at a time. We may be right to be sceptical about the numbers, which propagandists regularly inflated. And we may question how intensely the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century elites behind the expulsions actually felt about the religious issues of the sixteenth century. At a certain critical level, the *Corpus Christianum* was evolving into the body politic of the nation-state. Yet the fact remains that religious language remained a powerful touchstone which authorities drew on deliberately and effectively. Well into the eighteenth century, authorities made this language central to their rhetoric and propaganda. They used arguments of religious purity, identity, and contagion to legitimate the purgative expulsion of populations on a major scale. It is sobering to realize that contemporaries often knew that the purgations would immediately and demonstrably harm the national economy, yet they persisted in undertaking this radical surgery on the social body.

Forced migration was a fundamental reality of the late medieval and early modern periods. But what other realities did it spawn? How did it shape people, and the places they were forced to?