

Brothers at Arms

The Road to War

On the surprisingly warm evening of February 10, 1763, a carriage bearing two officials, one from France and the other from Spain, clattered down rue Saint-Dominique on Paris's Left Bank, just a few blocks from the Seine. Amid rows of stately buildings, it entered under the round arch and through the double doors of a simple but dignified *hôtel particulier*, stopping in the courtyard. The officials disembarked, turned to the right toward the main entrance, walked through a series of rooms decorated with blue-and-white wallpaper "*à l'anglaise*" and into the red-draped reception hall where hung a portrait, not of the French king Louis XV, but of King George III of Britain. Walking across that short distance, the two men had left the comfortable French world they had known and were now effectively in British territory.

The two men were César Gabriel de Choiseul-Praslin, the French foreign minister, and Pablo Jerónimo Grimaldi y Pallavicini, the Spanish ambassador to France. The dignified Paris town house in which they stood was the residence and de facto embassy of John Russell, Duke of Bedford, who received them sitting down as he was suffering a recurrence of gout. Just five months earlier he had arrived in France as minister plenipotentiary—effectively an ambassador—to negotiate for peace. Together the three were about to sign a treaty that would formally end the ruinous war that had engulfed not just the three countries, but also most of Europe and nations as far away as India and in North America.

The Seven Years' War, as it became known, had begun in 1754 as a series of skirmishes between French and British forces in the Ohio Valley. Within two years it had spread to continental Europe and across the globe. The turning point in the conflict came in 1759, when Britain began a stunning string of victories at sea and on land, eventually decimating the French and Spanish fleets and taking control of their strongholds from Canada to the Caribbean to Asia.

By 1762, France and Spain had no choice but to sue for peace. Choiseul-Praslin led the negotiations on behalf of France. Spain sent Grimaldi at the request of the French ministers, a man with whom they previously had negotiated treaties and whom they saw as "supremely gifted in the art of reconciling political agreement with friendship in opposing parties." The British cabinet selected the enormously wealthy Duke of Bedford, whose social connections and consistent support of peace made it likely he would gain France's trust. The three men were of very different temperaments. Choiseul-Praslin was described as "sensible, laborious . . . [with a] dry manner, an almost impenetrable reserve . . . and total absence of graces." The Italian-born Grimaldi, by contrast, impressed the British historian Edward Gibbon, then on his Grand Tour of Europe, as a well-heeled socialite who "gives balls every week, the magnificence of which is only exceeded by their politeness & elegance" (the diplomats, in fact, had just attended one of Grimaldi's famous soirées the night before the treaty signing, which ended at ten o'clock in the morning). Gibbon was less impressed with Bedford, whose "stateliness and avarice," he claimed, "make him the joke of Paris." The French minister, for his part, found Bedford "a very good man, very polite, well-intentioned, anxious to conclude the peace treaty."

Although Bedford was certainly "anxious to conclude the peace treaty," he was scrupulous about acting only on his government's terms. He could afford to do so, for Britain held the high ground both literally and metaphorically. Over the course of several months, the three men hammered out a treaty that recognized Britain's supremacy and reset the world stage in its favor. Even as they were negotiating the details, Bedford was also furnishing his town house on rue Saint-Dominique with the latest trappings from London, from the exquisite silver service to the first water closets in all of Paris. This sumptuous redecoration was not "stateliness and avarice" on the British ambassador's part, but rather a political statement. When Choiseul-Praslin and Grimaldi crossed the

threshold of Bedford's residence on the evening of February 10, the Londonesque surroundings served as a reminder that they were now entering a new, British-dominated world.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR—A GLOBAL CONFLICT

The Seven Years' War was unlike any previous conflict those experienced diplomats had ever known. Every decade or so since 1625, Europe had been racked by wars that involved its major powers France, Spain, and England (Britain after the 1707 union with Scotland). Though the proximate causes for the wars varied from controlling seaborne trade to outright land grabs, they could all be traced to the prevailing political system known as "balance of power," which an eighteenth-century encyclopedia described as "a system of equilibrium used in modern politics in which each power contains the other, so that none will become so predominant in Europe that it threatens invasion and total control." In other words, when any one nation became too strong (say, Britain), weaker powers like France and Spain would ally to keep the stronger power in check. Allies and adversaries frequently changed sides from one war to the next as the balance of power shifted.

For most of the previous century and a half, the wars that resulted from these shifting alliances had rarely been decisive and had generally maintained the European balance of power, preventing any one nation from overwhelming the continent. One of the most consequential of these conflicts was the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14). When the Spanish king Carlos II of the Hapsburg dynasty died without issue in 1700, he willed his crown to his grandnephew the French Bourbon prince Philippe d'Anjou (who became Felipe V), setting off a war that pitted Britain, the Dutch Republic, and Austria against France and Spain for control of the Spanish crown. France and Spain emerged victorious, with the result that the Spanish Empire became aligned with the French Bourbon dynasty instead of the Austrian Hapsburg dynasty supported by Britain. Spain, however, lost to Britain its vital Mediterranean strongholds of Minorca and Gibraltar, though it retained its profitable overseas possessions in the Americas and the Philippines. More recently, the War of the Austrian Succession, in which many of the same belligerents had fought in roughly the same alliances from 1740 to 1748 with losses and vic-

tories on both sides, ended largely *status quo ante bellum*, with Louis XV reportedly declaring that he would hand back all the captured territories, "as he wished to conduct the peace, not as a merchant, but as a King."

The Seven Years' War, which actually lasted closer to nine years, began in part precisely because those previous conflicts had left the balance of power largely intact without actually resolving the underlying territorial disputes, particularly in North America. Spain was the first European power to establish a permanent North American colony, in Puerto Rico in 1508, followed in 1535 by the Viceroyalty of New Spain that eventually encompassed modern-day Mexico, Florida, and much of the western United States. France established its Viceroyalty of New France in 1534, though it did not establish permanent settlements in Canada and Louisiana until 1608 and 1686 respectively. Britain's first permanent settlement in 1607 at Jamestown gave rise to the thirteen colonies that by 1733 extended from the eastern seaboard to the Appalachian Mountains. As the three colonial powers expanded their territories across North America over the course of two centuries, fights inevitably broke out between them and with the Native American nations whose lands they were steadily usurping.

The immediate cause of the Seven Years' War was a conflict in the Ohio Valley, part of the undefined border between New France and the British colonies that was left unresolved in the haste to bring the War of the Austrian Succession to a close. Even though the region was inhabited by the Iroquois nations, France saw it as a strategic corridor that linked Canada and Louisiana, while Britain saw it as the natural western extension of its colonies that could be sold to farmers and land speculators.

The Ohio Company of Virginia was established in 1748 by Virginia plantation owners like Lawrence and Augustine Washington in order to profit from this westward expansion. Virginia's lieutenant governor, Robert Dinwiddie, who was also a major shareholder, granted the company a half million acres of the Ohio Valley. In 1752, the company signed a treaty with the Iroquois nations that allowed it access and the right to build a fort at the strategic confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers, at present-day Pittsburgh. The only problem was that Dinwiddie's counterpart, Michel-Ange, Marquis de Duquesne, the governor of New France, also had the idea to build fortifications in the same area.

In order to establish control over the region, both Duquesne and Dinwiddie began issuing a series of increasingly belligerent orders to

their troops that heightened tensions. Duquesne's instructions from France required him to stop the British by "preventing them from coming there to trade, by seizing their merchandise, and destroying their outposts." As he began building a series of forts to prevent the British from doing the same, Dinwiddie dispatched a letter to the French commander demanding their withdrawal. He charged its delivery to a new member of the Ohio Company, the twenty-one-year-old half brother of Lawrence and Augustine Washington. George Washington, already an experienced surveyor and a major in the Virginia militia, led a small party through the harsh winter landscape to Fort LeBoeuf on the shores of Lake Erie. The French commander sent Washington back with a short reply stating, "I do not think myself obliged to obey it."

In early 1754, Dinwiddie again sent Washington, now promoted to lieutenant colonel in the newly formed Virginia Regiment, to reinforce Ohio Company workers sent to build a fort at the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers. Washington soon learned that they had been evicted by a French garrison that was already constructing its own Fort Duquesne on the site. His orders from Dinwiddie regarding the French were quite clear: "in case of resistance to make prisoners of or kill & destroy them." Washington decided to ambush the French scouting party sent to look for him. On May 28, with the help of some Iroquois warriors, his troops descended on the French encampment and in fifteen minutes killed, wounded, or captured all but one of the soldiers.

The Battle of Jumonville Glen (named for the fallen leader of the French troops) was later identified as the spark that ignited the Seven Years' War and precipitated the War of American Independence. At that moment, Washington could not have imagined the global dimensions of that first war, nor have even dreamed that he would lead the second one. All he would have thought about was returning to his nearby Fort Necessity to prepare for the expected French counterattack. When it came on July 4, Washington (now a full colonel) was forced to surrender to the far larger French force and return to Virginia. News of the battles reached Europe later that summer. Britain and France began dispatching ships and soldiers to reinforce their colonies: a thousand British troops under General Edward Braddock to enter the Ohio Valley, and thirty-six hundred French troops to Canada. What had started as a series of frontier skirmishes was quickly escalating into a war between the two European superpowers.

France's determined defense of its New France colony had more to do with European politics than with colonial economics. The income from Canada's fur trade and the Acadian cod fisheries paled in comparison to the far more profitable sugar plantations in the French Caribbean islands of Saint-Domingue (Haiti), Grenada, Saint Vincent, Martinique, and Guadeloupe. Canada's growing season was so limited that it could barely feed its own populace, much less a surge of troops from France. Its seaward approaches were protected by the naval base of Louisbourg in Nova Scotia, one of the most expensive naval fortifications built in North America. The French author and polemicist Voltaire, always with his finger on the social pulse, frequently disparaged Canada as "a few acres of snow," not worth the massive investments France kept pouring into it.

New France, however, acted as a counterweight to the rich British colonies to its south, and marked France as a major power in the eyes of its European allies and adversaries alike; to lose it would, in the view of the French government, undermine France's standing in Europe and threaten its security. The British government equally believed that it needed to confront France's North American incursions in order to shore up its own standing in Europe.

The skirmishes of 1754 had been limited to colonial forces. In 1755, the armies of the two European powers collided head-on. Major General Edward Braddock marched on Fort Duquesne in July with British regulars as well as colonial troops, which included his aide-de-camp Colonel George Washington. Braddock suffered a crushing and bloody defeat at the Battle of the Monongahela by a French contingent heavily reinforced by Native American warriors (British colonials referred to the Seven Years' War as the "French and Indian War" because those were their primary adversaries). The French and Native Americans also turned back British soldiers in northern New York, while British troops drove out the French population in Acadia and Nova Scotia.

By 1756 it was clear in both London and Paris that the so-far-undeclared war in North America could unleash an attack by France on the northern German state of Hanover, which was under the protection of its native son, Britain's King George II, in order to hold that territory hostage in exchange for American lands. The political preparations for this eventuality became known alternatively as the "Diplomatic Revolution," "Reversal of Alliances," or, most poetically, the "Stately Quadrille," referring to the popular dance in which couples frequently changed part-

ners. The previous alliances that had held through the two previous wars of succession were quickly broken in favor of new ones. In January 1756, Britain signed a treaty with its former enemy Prussia to protect Hanover, while Prussia sought Britain's protection from a newly resurgent Russia. Several months later, Bourbon France allied with its old nemesis, Hapsburg Austria, so that French and Austrian forces could threaten Hanover while Austria could count on French help to regain the mineral-rich region of Silesia it had lost to Prussia in the previous war. As these new alliances took shape, France captured Minorca, which Britain had pried from Spain fifty years earlier. Britain declared war on France in May 1756; France reciprocated the following month. At this point, the conflict turned into a global war, roughly divided into two separate struggles—the first one between Britain and France that took place on the high seas and in their colonies, and the second one in continental Europe, primarily between Prussia and Austria.

The European conflict began first, just weeks after war was declared. In the opening stages, French troops defeated German and British troops to occupy Hanover, much to King George II's chagrin, while Austria achieved part of its goal by capturing Breslau in Silesia. As the war progressed, Prussia found itself fighting not just France and Austria but also Russia and Sweden. Time and again, Prussia's King Friedrich II ("the Great") proved himself a brilliant hands-on strategist as well as an innovative leader. Of Friedrich's Prussia it was later remarked that it "was not a country with an army, but an army with a country." Under his rule, Prussia became a highly militarized society—one person in fourteen was a soldier, compared with one in a hundred in France and Britain. Prussian soldiers were highly trained, spending three months of every year in military maneuvers, and their precision and discipline were rarely matched on the battlefield. Time and again during the Seven Years' War, Prussia was able to fight against long odds and superior numbers, ultimately retaining Silesia and eking out a draw with Austria.

By contrast, the conflict between France and Britain became decidedly one-sided in Britain's favor, despite some early victories by France. In 1757, France successfully repelled a major British assault on Louisbourg, built the strategically located Fort Carillon at the southern end of Lake Champlain in New York, and destroyed the British Fort William Henry on Lake George, just a few miles away. That same year, a new British government came to power, led by Prime Minister and First Lord

of the Treasury Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle, and William Pitt "the Elder," Earl of Chatham, who was secretary of state for the Southern Department, which at the time controlled defense and policy toward the American colonies. When it came to the conduct of the war, Pitt held the reins while Newcastle held the purse strings.

Pitt believed in taking the fight directly to the enemy. He first ordered a series of "descents" (amphibious assaults) on French ports and dockyards, but these were largely unsuccessful. In 1758 the fight began to turn in Britain's favor with the capture of Louisbourg in Canada and descents on the profitable French slaving settlements in West Africa. The British navy aggressively captured French warships and merchant ships, severely depleting the ranks of experienced sailors available to man its navy. In North America, Britain began clawing back territory it had lost in the previous two years. A British peace treaty with the Lenape (Delaware), Shawnee, and other Native American nations led to their withdrawing of support for the French in the Ohio Valley. Under Brigadier General John Forbes's command, British soldiers and a large contingent of colonial troops, including Colonel George Washington's First Virginia Regiment, immediately exploited this weakness by attacking Fort Duquesne, which the understrength French garrison blew up before retreating. On the same spot the British colonials built Fort Pitt and the surrounding settlement of Pittsborough (later Pittsburgh), named in honor of the statesman who had initiated the campaign.

The year 1759 was termed by London wags the *annus mirabilis*, but for France it was the *annus horribilis*—the beginning of a four-year string of British victories that threatened its possessions around the world and sealed its fate in North America. In the Caribbean, the British navy seized Guadeloupe, which would be followed by the fall of Martinique and Grenada. Farther north, French forts fell across the Ohio Valley, while the British captured Fort Carillon in the east, rebuilding it and renaming it Fort Ticonderoga. With Louisbourg neutralized, Britain began a siege of Quebec City, the capital of New France, which ended with a fierce fifteen-minute battle on the Plains of Abraham outside the city, pitting the British general James Wolfe against the French general Louis-Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm, both of whom would die in the battle. With the fall of Montreal the following year, New France would cease to exist as Canada was placed under British control.

These stunning defeats turned French strategy from fighting bat-

ties at the periphery to launching an all-out assault on Britain itself. The strategy was the brainchild of Étienne François, Duc de Choiseul, the younger but politically more powerful cousin of César Gabriel de Choiseul-Praslin. After a career as both soldier and diplomat, in October 1758 Choiseul was named secretary of state for foreign affairs. Louis XV, however, needed more than just a foreign minister to help him run his fractious government in time of war. He needed a chief minister, and the short, florid-faced Choiseul, whose boyish looks belied a keen political acumen and enormous appetite for work, assumed that role in all but name.

Like his counterpart William Pitt, Choiseul believed in taking the fight directly to the enemy. He planned to exploit the lack of troops stationed in Britain itself by carrying out an amphibious landing on its shores, diverting British resources from its Europe campaigns, while the blow to investor confidence would cripple its ability to raise war funds in the financial markets. More than three hundred boats were quickly built along the Atlantic coast to carry over forty thousand troops to Portsmouth, with additional troops to be sent in a diversionary raid in Scotland. But a British descent on Le Havre wrecked many of the boats, while a devastating naval battle in November 1759 at Quiberon Bay off Brittany destroyed the escorting warships. These twin events ended any hope of France invading Britain. The news from French India was also bad, with the capture and razing of the colony at Pondicherry (Puducherry) by forces under the British East India Company.

Choiseul soon assumed the role of minister of war while retaining his foreign affairs portfolio. Initial peace negotiations with Britain had failed, so he opened talks with the Spanish government about an alliance. The Spanish king Carlos III was actually the younger cousin of Louis XV, as both belonged to the Bourbon royal family. France and Spain had twice forged what were called Bourbon Family Compacts, in 1733 and 1743, which pledged mutual support and aid in the event of war as a bulwark against British hegemony. Now the two kings and their ministers believed that Britain was once again threatening the balance of power, and resolved to restore that balance. Madrid sent Jerónimo Grimaldi to negotiate the agreement, and the Third Bourbon Family Compact was signed by Choiseul and Grimaldi on August 15, 1761. It provided for Spain to declare war on Britain the following year provided no peace had been concluded, while France promised to support Spain if

the latter were attacked. France, however, was hardly in a position to do so, as its fleet was being mauled by the British navy, which outbuilt and outcaptured France's navy by a ratio of ten to one.

Word of the secret Family Compact leaked to Britain, which, despite Newcastle's misgivings about engaging in yet another campaign, preemptively declared war on Spain in January 1762. But Spain had already set its sights on invading Britain's ally Portugal, which had only half the troop numbers as Spain. However, Portugal's shrewd and powerful prime minister, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, Marquês de Pombal, had already requested British military assistance, and with its help turned back the Spanish army in what was later called the *Guerra Fantástica* (Miraculous War). Choiseul now proposed to Spain a combined amphibious invasion of Britain, but this too never happened as the two navies were unable to coordinate their actions. The final blows came later in the year, with the British capture of Manila and Havana. The loss of Havana was particularly devastating; the jewel in the Spanish crown, it boasted the finest and best-defended harbor in the Caribbean, and built more warships than any shipyard in Spain. Spain's rash decision to enter into the Seven Years' War had resulted in a harrowing string of losses that would cost it dearly in the peace negotiations to follow.

THE TREATY OF PARIS

The men who had conducted the war would not be the ones to sign the peace treaty. By 1762, Choiseul had taken over the Ministry of the Navy while still retaining the position of minister of war. His cousin Choiseul-Praslin, like himself a former soldier and diplomat, became the new foreign minister, though in fact they spoke with one voice. They faced a grim task; the French fleet was in a parlous state, largely blockaded in port and so cash-stricken that it was selling materiel just to make ends meet. Canada was lost, as were most of the colonies in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia. "Since we do not know how to make war," Choiseul admitted privately, "we must make peace."

On the other side of the English Channel, Pitt and Newcastle, the chief architects of the brilliant British campaign, were on their way out. In 1760, George II died, and his grandson George III succeeded him to the throne. The twenty-two-year-old king, although close with his

grandfather, made major changes to the government. He appointed as the new prime minister his longtime tutor, John Stuart, Earl of Bute, who was as anxious to make peace as Pitt was to make war. One of Bute's first actions after taking office was to formalize peace negotiations by exchanging diplomats with France, and the well-connected and influential Duke of Bedford was the obvious choice. Though most of the major decisions would be hammered out in Paris, Choiseul-Praslin selected Louis-Jules Mancini-Mazarini, Duc de Nivernais, to negotiate at the British court. In September, Bedford and Nivernais met at Calais before each went on to assume his post.

All sides understood that both France and Spain would have to pay a heavy territorial price for the war. Although Bute knew that the terms of peace had to be as generous as possible to avoid another conflict breaking out at a later date, Nivernais reported back that the prime minister was under enormous pressure by Pitt's still-powerful supporters to limit British concessions, so as to permanently hobble the French navy. Preliminary negotiations at Fontainebleau Palace stalled when Spain's ambassador, Jerónimo Grimaldi, appalled that British territorial demands would give it almost complete control of the Gulf of Mexico, refused to accept the peace terms offered. Choiseul was furious. "Does the king of Spain want war or peace?" he demanded of the French ambassador in Madrid, Pierre Paul, Marquis d'Ossun. "He must adopt the articles" or keep fighting, said Choiseul, "there is no middle ground." The impasse broke when news of Havana's fall arrived in October, and Louis XV offered French Louisiana to his cousin Carlos III in compensation for any territory Spain might lose in the peace negotiations, which would return to it at least some control over the Gulf of Mexico. Confronted with such a heavy loss and offered such a face-saving measure, the Spanish king relented. Choiseul-Praslin, Grimaldi, and Bedford signed the preliminary treaty at Fontainebleau on November 3. The same day, unbeknownst to Bedford, Choiseul-Praslin and Grimaldi agreed on a separate treaty handing Louisiana to Spain.

The three men negotiated the final terms between November 1762 and February 1763. France felt most keenly its loss of Canada, Acadia, and Nova Scotia to Britain. With Louisiana also gone, France was now almost entirely out of North America. It did, however, maintain access to the fisheries off Newfoundland and in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, and retained the small, rocky islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon for drying

and processing the fish. Their strategic importance went far beyond the provision of foodstuffs; the French navy's greatest weakness had historically been manpower, and these fisheries trained roughly one-third of the navy's sailors.

Britain returned to France the main sugar-producing islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, while retaining Grenada and Saint Vincent. It also cut France off from its former African trading posts, except the slave-trading island of Gorée off modern-day Senegal. French Indian territory was dramatically reduced to just a few trading posts, of which the largest, the beautiful white town of Pondicherry, would be rebuilt in just two years. France, in its turn, relinquished Minorca to British rule.

Britain was also generous in returning Manila to Spain, but demanded either Puerto Rico or Florida in exchange for Havana. Puerto Rico was too valuable to Spain, so instead Britain got Florida, which one politician huffed, was "an uninhabited country." Spain also had to allow Britain logging rights in the Honduras region of Guatemala in Central America. In Europe, the situation returned more or less to *status quo ante bellum*. The residual Spanish troops departed Portugal, while Prussia and Austria withdrew their remaining armies from each other's territories and signed a separate peace accord.

The final Treaty of Paris, according to Bedford, "succeed greatly beyond my expectations," as he made "no one concession contrary to my instructions." The unchanging physical landscape of Europe belied the tectonic shift that had upended its political geography. Although Britain had lost almost all its allies in Europe, they were now thought to be of little consequence, as the global balance of power was now overwhelmingly in its favor. Britain controlled most of North America, its worldwide colonies could trade unmolested, and for the first time Britannia could truthfully be said to "rule the waves," as the popular song claimed. Therefore, when Choiseul-Praslin, Grimaldi, and Bedford signed the treaty on the evening of February 10, it was fitting that the ceremony took place in a thoroughly British drawing room rather than in an anteroom in the royal palace at Versailles.

News of the treaty was celebrated in Britain with a spectacular fireworks display in London's Green Park. Perhaps surprisingly, France and Spain also celebrated the treaty with a series of fireworks in front of the Hôtel de Ville in Paris and in the Parque del Buen Retiro in Madrid. After the War of the Austrian Succession, the French people had coined

the phrase "as stupid as the peace" (*bête comme la paix*) in exasperation for having shed so much blood with nothing to show for it. Now, aware that the outcome could have been far worse than losing "a few acres of snow," there was a general sense that life could return to normal, even in the shadow of Europe's new superpower.

THE BOURBON STRATEGY OF REVANCHE

Life in France did appear to return to normal, as prices and trade quickly returned to prewar levels. Tourism rebounded in both directions across the English Channel. The celebrated Grand Tour that most young British aristocrats took to see the culture, history, and art of Europe (primarily in France and Italy) was seriously interrupted during the Seven Years' War. When fighting ended in late 1762, well-to-do gentlemen like the aforementioned Edward Gibbon quickly resumed the practice even before the peace treaty was signed. The postwar Grand Tour would, however, be more restrained than the previous lavish-spending ways of Britons on the Continent. The author of the *Gentleman's Guide, in His Tour through France* advised travelers "not to spend more money in the country of our natural enemy, than is requisite to support, with decency, the character of an Englishman."

The end of the war also sparked a reverse Grand Tour from France to Britain, with a sudden French fascination for all things British. The term "anglomania" was popularized to describe the sudden wave of British fashion on Paris streets, French plays about British life, and even the introduction of English-style natural landscaping into staid, formal French *jardins*. French tourists began descending on Britain in droves, causing one British aristocrat to complain that "London abounds in French." Frenchmen saw London in the way future generations of Americans would come to regard Paris, as the place to expand their horizons. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the writer and philosopher, immersed himself in botanical science, while the scientists Jérôme Lalande and Charles-Marie de La Condamine dined with famous British authors like Samuel Johnson. Johnson, for his part, attributed French anglomania to the recently concluded war: "We had drubbed those fellows into a proper reverence for us. . . . Their national petulance required periodical chastisement."

Not all French visitors acknowledged this idea of "periodical chas-

tisement," nor were they in Britain to absorb the culture. Almost before the ink was even dry on the Treaty of Paris, French military officers were spreading out across the south of England, undoubtedly hoping to pass unnoticed among the throng of foreign tourists while they gathered intelligence on the British navy and potential landing sites on the coast. Those officers were part of an invasion scheme secretly being devised in the halls of Versailles and in Madrid. France and Spain hoped to build on the hard-won experience of the previous failed attempts to make a new invasion a success.

Choiseul in particular had fixed on the strategy of invading England almost from the moment he entered high office. The first invasion attempt in 1759 had foundered because France was unable to match Britain's superior command of the seas. The second attempt in 1762 failed because France and Spain could not coordinate their fleets. The third time, Choiseul would have told himself, the situation would be very different. With his longtime ally Jérónimo Grimaldi now back in Spain as chief minister to King Carlos III, the two began planning a comprehensive Bourbon strategy of *revanche* (revenge) against Britain whose centerpiece would be a combined assault on England. The focus of planning was on their navies, for while Britain's coasts were protected by its "wooden walls" of warships, the island itself had only a smattering of regular troops and militia. If France and Spain could land their troops, Britain could easily be overrun.

Both Choiseul and Grimaldi knew it would take five or more years for both navies to rebuild a credible offensive capability against the British fleet. They therefore undertook two projects simultaneously—first, intelligence-gathering, and second, creating an effective, unified Bourbon armada—all the while pretending to the British that they were only interested in keeping the peace.

For its part, the British government was not fooled. The very first instructions to the Earl of Hertford, Bedford's successor as ambassador to France, demanded

constant information from you of every step that is taken in France which may tend to strengthen the military force of that Kingdom, and especially in what concerns the augmentation of their navy. . . . You will doubtless be entertained with the strongest declarations of their love of peace and their desire to perpetuate

it upon the foot of the present settlement, but . . . it is not easy to imagine that the Court of France as well as that of Spain, should not have thoughts of putting themselves in a condition to recover in time their lost possessions and retrieve the reputation of their arms. And though their ability to carry such views into execution may indeed be at a considerable distance, yet it equally behooves us to be upon our guard and to watch every motion that may have such a dangerous tendency.

It was therefore under intense British scrutiny that French spies began arriving in Britain to gather critical intelligence on the British navy and on potential landing sites. In 1764, Choiseul dispatched a young navy cadet, Henri Fulque, Chevalier d'Oraison, to enter the British naval bases of Plymouth and Portsmouth, as well as shipyards on the Thames. "Everything is closed to civilians and foreigners," he boasted, "although I showed that their vigilance is not infallible." He reported back on the number and type of ships under repair and construction, and on technical innovations that could potentially give the British ships an edge in battle.

At the same time as Oraison was visiting shipyards, military spies were reconnoitering the English countryside for landing sites and invasion routes. Jean-Charles-Adolphe Grant de Blairfindy, a Scottish officer in the French service, showed a keen sense of history when he recommended a town in Kent as the ideal landing spot: "It was at Deal where Julius Caesar, having been repulsed at Dover, debarked his army to conquer England." Another army officer, Pierre-François de Bévill, recommended attacking Portsmouth in order to cripple the navy, before moving on to London.

Unknown to Choiseul, other French spies were also on the ground in England to scout the best invasion sites. The reason Choiseul, easily one of the best-informed ministers in France, was unaware of these agents was that they were operating under Louis XV's shadow network, the *Secret du Roi* (King's Secret). It had been started by the king twenty years earlier as a surreptitious attempt to obtain the Polish throne for his cousin Louis-François, Prince de Conti. The king bypassed his foreign minister and sent clandestine orders directly to key ambassadors in nations like Sweden, Poland, and Ottoman Turkey, in order to garner political support for his cousin. Although this subterfuge did not succeed in getting Conti the throne, Louis XV kept the *Secret du Roi* and enlarged

it so that he was soon passing orders to and getting intelligence from over two dozen ambassadors and embassy officers, all the while keeping his foreign ministers in the dark. In effect, there were now *two* foreign policies operating, the first under the secretary of state for foreign affairs, and the second under the king. With ambassadors and officers getting conflicting orders from Versailles, while at the same time depending upon clandestine agents of sometimes questionable loyalties, the *Secret du Roi* would prove to be a corrosive and ultimately destructive system.

Charles-François de Broglie, who had served as both an ambassador to Britain and a general during the Seven Years' War, was Louis XV's most trusted member of the *Secret*. De Broglie (pronounced *de Broy*; the original Italian family name Broglio means "intrigue") knew that after the Treaty of Paris was signed, the ambassador, the Duc de Nivernais, would return from London and that his place would be taken by the chargé d'affaires Charles de Beaumont, Chevalier d'Éon, another member of the *Secret*. De Broglie, like Choiseul, also hit upon the idea of planning a future invasion of England, but in his case the spies would work from the French embassy in London. Louis XV approved the project in 1765 but kept Choiseul out of the picture.

De Broglie sent to Britain one of his former army engineering officers, Louis-François Carlet de La Rozière, who in turn used a network of his own spies and paid British informants to map out potential invasion sites. La Rozière made detailed drawings and notes of more than one hundred miles of coastline and access routes to London, which he forwarded to de Broglie via d'Éon. Even though the invasion plot had to be kept secret, lest the British get wind of it and use it as an excuse for a preemptive assault, d'Éon kept copies of the correspondence for himself. At the same time, he began ingratiating himself with the British aristocracy, throwing lavish parties at the French embassy's expense. Also, he began dressing as a woman. De Broglie ignored d'Éon's increasingly aberrant behavior, while still badgering Louis XV to put his invasion plans into action. Finally, after years of inaction on the king's part, in 1768 de Broglie was finally allowed to contact Choiseul and send him his hard-won intelligence. Choiseul, in turn, quickly incorporated de Broglie's plans into his own.

Even as the first part of the invasion project—intelligence-gathering—was being finalized, the second part, creating an effective, unified Bourbon fleet, was already well under way. At the beginning of

1763, France had only forty-seven ships of the line (large warships that could fight in a line of battle against other fleets), while Spain had just thirty-seven, far short of the numbers needed. The French treasury after the war was deeply in the red—the portion of revenues that went to debt service and interest had doubled to over 60 percent—and at first Choiseul depended mostly on the program he had instituted during the war, called the *don des vaisseaux* (gift of ships). Individuals, towns, and entire cities were encouraged to donate money to build and outfit ships, accounting for over half of the thirty new ships added to the fleet over seven years. The massive ninety-gun *Ville de Paris*, which would become one of the flagships of the French fleet, was named in honor of the city that funded its construction. Spain was slower off the mark, building only eight ships in the same period.

Both Choiseul and Grimaldi also recognized that simply building more ships was insufficient to defeat the British navy, given the dismal showing of the Bourbon fleets. A wholesale reformation and integration of the navies on both sides of the Pyrenees was in order. In one of his last official acts as navy minister before he switched places again with his cousin Choiseul-Praslin and reassumed the post of foreign minister, Choiseul issued a sweeping Naval Ordinance in 1765 that streamlined the bureaucracy, enforced a strict series of "rates" that standardized the types and dimensions of ships so they would maneuver and fight as one unit, and set up the world's first professional corps of shipbuilders, whose task was to use scientific principles in the design and construction of vessels, with the goal of making each ship better than its British counterpart. These mechanisms of streamlining, standardizing, and fine-tuning the fleet would, Choiseul hoped, create a more effective navy without greatly increasing its cost.

Grimaldi's task, on the other hand, was to rebuild the Spanish fleet along the same lines as the French fleet, so they could operate in unison. That meant importing not just French technology but also French know-how. In 1765, Grimaldi asked Choiseul to send French engineers who could bring both Spanish shipbuilding and gun manufacture up to French standards. For the first request, Choiseul sent Jean-François Gautier, a midlevel shipbuilder, to be placed in charge of all Spanish ship construction. Gautier quickly discarded the older, sturdier Spanish designs and, starting with the seventy-four-gun *San Juan Nepomuceno*, began constructing lighter, faster warships in the French mode, fol-

lowing the instructions from Choiseul's Naval Ordinance. The French shipbuilder fully understood Grimaldi's objectives: "My duty is to regard French and Spanish vessels as forming a single Armada."

For the second request, Choiseul dispatched, also in 1765, the Swiss French artillery engineer Jean Maritz to Spain, where he established foundries that employed the same technique recently introduced in France of solid-casting the cannon and drilling the bore, which gave cannon greater power and precision. Maritz followed the new French guidelines for gun sizes and calibers, so that the older Spanish hodgepodge of naval guns was soon replaced by a standardized set of cannon that could fire more accurately and at longer ranges. These changes to hulls, masts, and guns meant that the new generation of Spanish warships would maneuver and fight identically to French ships of the line. Now, just a few years after the Treaty of Paris, France and Spain were well advanced in planning a war with Britain, and were on their way to having an armada that could accomplish it.

The war plan that was agreed to by both nations in 1767 called for a surprise assault by a combined fleet of 140 ships of the line (80 French, 60 Spanish) against Britain's 120 ships. The main force would escort a fleet of smaller landing boats to descend on Portsmouth and the Sussex coast, laying waste to critical parts of the naval infrastructure so that the British navy could no longer rule the waves. The invasion would stop short of a full-out assault on London, which could frighten other Continental powers and potentially destabilize France's careful web of alliances. Instead, French diversionary forces would attack Scotland, while Spanish forces would descend on Gibraltar with the aim of recovering the strategic territory that Spain had lost years earlier.

Choiseul outlined the grand strategy of such a war in a memorandum to Louis XV. He reminded his king that he "had been attacked in 1755 in America" by a nation intent on driving them out of the continent. The Treaty of Paris was an "embarrassment." There could be no peace in the foreseeable future: "England is the declared enemy of your power and your state, and will always be." Instead, France must now prepare for a new war against Britain. The objective of this war would not be to destroy the British nation, but rather the more limited goal of restoring the European balance of power. France should no longer seek to fight Britain on the Continent, which would be destabilizing, but should instead attempt to undermine its maritime supremacy. All France's foreign policy

would be bent to that aim, strengthening its European alliances—that with Spain above all—and exploiting any opportunity to weaken Britain on the world stage.

Toward the end of his memorandum, the French minister held out the hope that Britain could be weakened, not through a direct attack by France and Spain, but simply as a result of its own colonial policies in North America in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War. With phenomenal prescience, Choiseul predicted that "only the future American Revolution will consign England to a state of weakness where it is no longer feared in Europe," though he worried that "we will likely not see it. . . . This event is far away." His cousin Choiseul-Praslin expressed a similar thought regarding the recently concluded Treaty of Paris: "This peace is a remarkable epoch for the English monarchy, but its power is neither stable nor certain; it must either rise or fall. . . . The vast domains it has recently acquired may lead to its loss. . . . One day its colonies will be powerful enough to separate from London and found a state independent from the English crown." Though both men were certain that an American revolution would happen, and that it would topple Britain from its lofty perch, neither believed they could bet on it in the short term. Nevertheless, they decided to hedge that bet by sending a pair of military officers and a Scottish wine merchant to observe at first hand the effect of Britain's policies on its American colonies, and to report back on whether a revolution was in the offing or not.

FRENCH AGENTS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES

This first of France's agents in the American colonies, navy lieutenant François de Sarrebourse de Pontleroy de Beaulieu, disembarked in Philadelphia in early 1764. He signed on with an American merchant to command a cargo ship that plied the New England and mid-Atlantic coasts. As a ship's master, he could, unnoticed, make accurate maps and soundings of the principal ports, and could speak with other merchants and tradesmen to obtain a broad understanding of the American mind. Pontleroy had arrived just as the glow of victory celebrations was giving way to stirrings of unrest. Historians often quote John Shy's assertion that "Americans were never more British than in 1763" for good reason: The threat of French forces had been removed, the potential for west-

ward expansion seemed limitless, and Britain now controlled the major ocean routes, which meant more trade for the colonies.

The news in July 1763 that a confederation of Native American nations, led by the Ottawa chief Pontiac, was attacking forts on the western frontiers in response to heavy-handed British incursions, gave American colonists their first indication that they would not have unbridled access to the continent. Pontiac's War, as it became known, helped catalyze the British government to issue the Royal Proclamation of 1763 that attempted to bring order and stability to the continent. It created the colonies of Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, and Grenada, and established the western boundary of the original thirteen colonies with a line running down the Appalachian Mountains. According to London, the territory west of the Proclamation Line was given over to the Native American nations, and no British settlements could be made there. That put the investment plans of land speculators like the Ohio Company and George Washington's newly formed Mississippi Land Company in jeopardy.

A second blow to the collective American purse came in the form of taxation. For generations Britain had taken a largely hands-off approach to governing the American colonies, a policy later referred to as "salutary neglect," in keeping with the theory that fewer restrictions would allow the colonies to prosper and thus profit Britain as a whole. Where the average British citizen in 1763 paid twenty-six shillings per year in taxes (equivalent to \$200 today), the average American colonist paid just one shilling. Import taxes and trade restrictions with foreign powers went largely unenforced in the American colonies, and merchants from Boston to Charleston did a brisk trade with nations like Spain and the Netherlands and their Caribbean colonies. But the enormous debts incurred during the Seven Years' War—interest payments alone amounted to over 40 percent of revenue—changed that calculus for the British government. Ministers in London now argued that since the war had largely been fought on behalf of the American colonists, they should help shoulder the costs of their defense, which included stationing British troops in the territories.

For over a century, Britain had sought to prevent its colonies from trading directly with other European powers by instating a series of Navigation Acts that levied duties and restricted foreign commerce. The latest incarnation of these acts was the American Duties Act of 1764, which the

colonists quickly dubbed the Sugar Act. It clamped down on smuggling but also reduced the tax on sugar and molasses that the colonists paid for imports from British Caribbean plantations. Since they almost never paid those taxes, the Sugar Act's stricter tax collection and antismuggling measures meant a *de facto* tax hike and simultaneous reduction in trade. At the same time, Parliament passed the Currency Act that tightened the colonists' paper money supply, which was increasingly used due to lack of hard currency (*specie*) in silver and gold coin. These two acts created a currency shortage that worsened the effects of the postwar depression.

Despite these economic hardships, Pontleroy reported that the American colonies were prosperous, with productive land and spacious harbors, and were in the middle of a postwar baby boom. He also noted their resentment over the Sugar Act, in particular the sudden appearance of revenue ships that put a halt to their previously overlooked Caribbean trade. The Americans were eager to throw off these restrictions on trade and commerce that were cutting into their business. Nor did they see any need for continued British protection now that France no longer had a presence on the continent. Americans were restive, he concluded, and would one day revolt against their mother country. "England," he argued, "should expect a revolution, for it has hastened that occurrence by freeing the colonies from the fear of the French in Canada."

American colonists soon learned that the Sugar Act was a prelude to more severe measures. In early 1765, Parliament passed the Stamp Act and the Quartering Act, both of which were intended to help fund the estimated ten thousand British troops stationed throughout the colonies that London believed necessary for their protection. Where the Sugar Act incited heated grumbling, these acts resulted in outright revolts. Neither act was particularly onerous on its face. The Stamp Act imposed a relatively modest tax on legal documents, magazines, and newspapers, which fell primarily on lawyers and printers, a small, reasonably prosperous subset of the population. The Quartering Act actually exempted private homes from being used as temporary barracks, only authorizing the use of vacant buildings. The point at issue for the colonists was that Parliament should not have the right to levy taxes on them (the Quartering Act was seen as a tax in kind) because they were not represented in the legislature—"no taxation without representation," as the Boston minister John Mayhew had said as far back as 1750. Further, the Americans also argued that as there were no practical means for colonial

representation in a three-thousand-mile-distant Parliament, only their own representative assemblies should have the power to tax and to determine how those revenues were spent. The Stamp Act and the Quartering Act were widely seen as direct attempts by Parliament to circumvent the colonial legislatures, opening the door to future tax measures without their representation or consent. Street riots protesting the taxes broke out in Boston (where the homes of acting governor Thomas Hutchinson and stamp distributor Andrew Oliver were gutted), as well as in Newport and Philadelphia.

In May 1765, the House of Burgesses, Virginia's legislative body, met in Williamsburg to denounce the Stamp Act. A young representative named Patrick Henry led the charge with a series of pronouncements, the Virginia Resolves, which declared that only the state legislature, not Parliament, had the right to tax its colonists. His speech before the House of Burgesses compared the movement against the Stamp Act with Brutus standing up to Caesar and Cromwell to Charles I, a sentiment that other members saw as crossing the line of treason.

One of the eyewitnesses to Patrick Henry's inflammatory speech was Charles Murray, a Scottish representative for a London-based wine merchant. Having arrived via the French Caribbean to Charleston in early 1765, he made his way to New York with many stops along the way, selling barrels of "choice prime" Madeira to the likes of George Washington. At the same time, he was furiously taking notes that he sent back to the French government on the state of the American colonies. Those notes, written in English and French, did not reveal how or why he became a spy for France, though like many Scottish Catholics he may have had residual Jacobite leanings that favored France over the "perfidious English." They did, however, record the widespread anger, spilling over to rage, that the Stamp Act had provoked. Murray recounted Patrick Henry saying that his diatribe "must be attributed to the interest of his Country's dying liberty which he had at heart." He met a lawyer in Annapolis who, though loyal to the Crown, "would take up arms himself in defense of his liberty and property." And Choiseul, who undoubtedly read Murray's report, would have been heartened to learn of a group of Virginia taverngoers who proclaimed, "Let the worst come to the worst, we'll call the French to our succor."

The Stamp Act never fully took effect before Parliament, taken aback by the vehemence of the colonists' response, repealed it in early

1766. At the same time it passed the Declaratory Acts, asserting that it superseded colonial legislatures and had complete power to tax the colonies. Parliament stuck another finger in the colonists' eye the following year with the Townshend Acts, named for the chancellor of the exchequer, who proposed duties on colonial imports of glass, lead, paints, paper, and most notably tea, all of which were only available from Britain. Colonists chafed at these continuous infringements upon their rights and livelihoods. Although this time the response was neither as swift nor as violent as with the Stamp Act, resentment against the Crown continued to build.

Once again, an agent from France was in America to witness and report the colonists' response at first hand. Johann de Kalb was a Bavarian-born officer who had acquired his French nobiliary "de" while serving in the French army under Charles-François de Broglie during the Seven Years' War. De Broglie saw that de Kalb, although not part of the *Secret du Roi*, had the intelligence, discretion, and language skills requisite for espionage. In 1767, he proposed to Choiseul that de Kalb be dispatched to America "to identify the views of the American colonists towards Great



Johann, Baron de Kalb (1721–1780).
Charles Willson Peale, from life,
oil on canvas

Britain, and in the case that they envisage a rupture with London, what are their capabilities to wage war or defend themselves."

De Kalb arrived in January 1768, and spent the next four months assessing the revolutionary climate of the colonies from Philadelphia to Boston. This time, the climate was almost as cold as the icy marshes de Kalb braved overnight when soon after his arrival in America, his ship sank just off Staten Island. Compared with Patrick Henry's fiery rhetoric just three years earlier, the sentiment de Kalb heard most often was that of resignation. He reported to Choiseul on his return that yes, the residents were angry about the Townshend Acts, resentful at having to lodge soldiers in their towns and cities, and unhappy with the tight money supply and restrictions on trade that were cutting into profits, all of which could lead to an uprising. "There is no doubt that this country will liberate itself at some point," he speculated, but immediately dashed Choiseul's hopes for an immediate break with the mother country; such a revolution would only happen "when its population exceeds that of Great Britain," many years hence. More damning was his assessment of the chances for the French leading the rebellion. Even though the colonies had no navy and no arsenals with which to support a fight against the motherland, "they will never accept any foreign help, especially that of France, which they view with suspicion and alarm against their liberty; they would rather submit to the English Parliament for a while."

Choiseul, who had hoped for news of a French-led revolutionary war on the horizon, did not take de Kalb's report well, refusing to meet with him upon his return and denying him a long-sought promotion. Not only did it dash Choiseul's carefully thought-out plans for fomenting an American insurrection, it did not square with the previous reports from his spies. Yet de Kalb was reporting a real sentiment that the other observers had either missed or intentionally omitted—as much as the colonials hated the continuous barrage of taxes and trade restrictions, many were still proud to be part of the great British Empire and believed that this "family quarrel" could be resolved equitably. In the American colonies, allegiances did not line up neatly inside borders, as they seemed to do in Europe. Choiseul, who had mastered the European chessboard, was only beginning to understand how much more complex the American game would be.

SPANISH OBSERVERS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES

The American game was getting more complicated by the month as the effects of the Treaty of Paris became clearer. With the transfer of so much territory from one nation to another, a great reordering of the British, French, and Spanish population took place. From 1763 until the start of the War of American Independence, North America was a continent on the move. Émigrés came in record numbers from across Europe—Britain, Ireland, the German states—lured by the promise of land, resources, and relative peace. Landowners like George Washington put pressure on the British government to open up more western territory for settlement. The government responded by pushing colonial boundaries well past the Proclamation Line and ever closer to the Mississippi River, slowly encroaching on Native American territories.

Farther south, British efforts to populate the two Florida colonies were more disappointing. Spain had relinquished Florida to Britain, which then divided the territory into East Florida (primarily the peninsula, with the capital at Saint Augustine) and West Florida (from the current panhandle to the Mississippi, with the capital at Pensacola). Although Spanish inhabitants were allowed to remain and to practice Catholicism, they overwhelmingly chose to emigrate to Mexico and Cuba. The British government provided land grants to encourage settlement as a means of defense against the Spanish territories, but failed to attract more than a few thousand immigrants to each colony.

Unlike in Florida, the French population of Canada largely chose to stay and live under British rule, though there continued to be some friction between their Catholicism and official Church of England policies. Nevertheless, a substantial minority of Canadians opted to move to Louisiana, a migration that had actually begun during the Seven Years' War when the Acadians were driven from their land. Spanish Louisiana, with its capital at New Orleans, was an enormous territory, twice the size of the thirteen American colonies. The new Spanish governor, Antonio de Ulloa, saw the French settlers as solid bulwarks against potential British encroachment from just across the Mississippi River, and encouraged this migration with transportation and land grants—Saint Louis, for example, was established in 1764 as a French city on Spanish territory.

Britain's occupation of Florida and its continued westward advance-

ment toward the Mississippi River represented a strategic threat to Spanish control of the region. Back in Madrid, the chief minister, Jerónimo Grimaldi, like his counterpart Choiseul, depended upon his intelligence networks to keep tabs on British activities in the Americas. However, he was much more concerned about the potential for surprise attacks on New Orleans and the Louisiana colony than he was about fomenting an American revolution. Part of the reason for concern was that the early years of Spanish Louisiana were fraught with political problems that left the colony potentially vulnerable. The first governor, Ulloa, more of a scientist than an administrator, was forcibly evicted in 1768 during an open rebellion against Spanish authority. He was replaced by the Irish-born Alejandro O'Reilly, who brutally quashed the rebellion. In 1770 a new governor, Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, finally brought some stability to the colony.

Unzaga served under Antonio María de Bucareli y Ursúa, the captain-general of Cuba, who was military and civilian commander for the northern Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. Together they developed a network of observers—not trained agents per se, but rather fishermen, merchants, and clergy, all likely to go unnoticed as they entered and departed British territory—who clandestinely reported on ports, fortifications, military garrisons, and fleet movements. The reports that came back to New Orleans and Havana were collected and sent on to Madrid, which helped shape Spain's policy of watchful neutrality toward Britain in the decade after the Treaty of Paris.

Cuba's fishing fleet became a particularly important source for intelligence-gathering and its means of transmission. Not only were fishermen able to observe and track British naval movements across the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, but they also carried messages back and forth to observers in the British colonies, including a group of Spanish priests in East Florida who monitored events in Saint Augustine. Meanwhile, Cuban merchants made regular trips to Pensacola and reported back to Bucareli on the buildup of fortifications around the bay.

Unzaga, meanwhile, was concerned about the British buildup along the Mississippi. Settlers were encouraged to move to the Ohio and Mississippi River valleys both by lack of enforcement of the Proclamation Line, effectively allowing settlement to creep westward, and by prospectuses such as the widely read *Present State of European Settlements on the Mississippi*, published in 1770, that painted a glowing picture of life in the

western territories. Wagons and flatboats were soon transporting large numbers of families to towns like Natchez and Baton Rouge.

The year 1770 also brought a political crisis that threatened all-out war and required even closer observation by Unzaga's network. Britain and Spain both maintained small settlements on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in the South Atlantic. Acting on orders from Madrid, the governor of Buenos Aires sent a large amphibious force to remove the British garrison. The two nations geared up for war. Madrid advised its overseas colonies to be vigilant against surprise attack, but not to make any hostile moves that might precipitate it. Meanwhile, Grimaldi called on France to honor the Bourbon Family Compact by coming to its aid. Although Choiseul (once again France's foreign minister) gave the Spanish ambivalent responses, Louis XV came down firmly against it. The crisis was defused the following year when Spain disavowed the military action and sidestepped the question of sovereignty.

Even though Unzaga detected no hostile British activities along the Mississippi as a result of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, he dispatched Jean Surriret, a French merchant and officer in the Spanish militia from near Baton Rouge, to travel to New York to follow up on vague rumors of British troop redeployments farther north, which he feared might be the prelude to an attack. Surriret arrived in 1772 to learn that Thomas Gage, the commander in chief of the British forces in North America, indeed had redeployed his troops from Canada to reinforce New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and other cities. This redeployment was not to threaten Spanish interests, Surriret learned, but was in response to the civil unrest that had developed over the Townshend Acts, which had already resulted in the 1770 Boston Massacre, where British troops fired into a crowd of civilians and killed five. Although both Unzaga and the ministers back in Madrid were reassured by their observers' report, they kept a close eye on the increasing numbers of British troops and ships coming to North America.

FRANKLIN IN THE COCKPIT

In 1768, Johann de Kalb had seen the American colonies generally resigned to British authority. By 1774, they were on the verge of rebellion. Although Parliament had largely repealed the Townshend Acts, it

retained the tax on tea and reinforced it with the Tea Act of 1773. Protesters in Boston responded in December 1773 with what contemporary accounts termed "the destruction of the tea," the dumping of a consignment of East India Company tea into Boston harbor, which sparked an uproar on both sides of the Atlantic. Back in London, the standings of the various colonial agents representing American interests to Parliament, which included Ralph Izard for South Carolina and Arthur Lee for Massachusetts, were irretrievably damaged—none more so than Benjamin Franklin, who had been representing Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and several other states for the past seventeen years, and had been influential in the repeal of the Stamp Act. In late January 1774, he was called before the Privy Council (the king's advisory body) to defend a petition for the removal of Hutchinson and Oliver from the Massachusetts government. Accompanied by his longtime friend Edward Bancroft, he donned an elegant Manchester velvet suit and entered the Cockpit, the Privy Council's chamber at the Palace of Whitehall. Instead of defending the petition, Franklin found himself accused of being the leader of a "secret cabal" intent on turning the American people against their legitimate government. He stoically bore the hourlong harangue, then left with barely a word. Only days before, he had believed that he was slowly accomplishing with Parliament an "accommodation of our differences." He was now convinced that these personal attacks underscored a deep-seated intransigence on Parliament's part that no amount of accommodation could overcome.

For its part, Parliament saw little use for such concessions. It replied to the rising colonial unrest with the Coercive Acts of 1774, which among other provisions closed the Boston port to trade, stripped Massachusetts of any self-governance, and ordered the quartering of troops in towns and cities. The British government directed Gage to enforce the Coercive Acts and suppress any open rebellion, believing that France would not interfere with British colonial affairs, given its lack of support for Spain during the Falklands/Malvinas crisis. The American colonies reacted by sending delegates to the First Continental Congress in Philadelphia in September 1774 to debate what actions could be taken in response to the acts. They also began forming and training militia to prepare for conflict.

In France, the men who had signed the Treaty of Paris would not be the ones to watch with concern as the American war unfolded. Louis XV had lost confidence in Choiseul after the Falklands/Malvinas crisis,

and sacked him soon after. Gone too was his cousin Choiseul-Praslin, and with them the rigid control that had dominated French foreign and naval policy for over a decade. The previous *revanche* strategy toward Britain was replaced with a more pacific tone, as French naval rearmament slowed and invasion plans for Britain were shelved. The crisis had also soured the Bourbon Family Compact and made Spain wary of further dependence on France.

In 1774, just as the situation in the American colonies was coming to a boil, Louis XV died, and his grandson Louis XVI succeeded him to the throne. The nineteen-year-old king, although having drawn close to his grandfather after his own father's death, nevertheless instituted major changes to the government. He brought in a former navy minister who had been out of favor for twenty-five years, Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, Comte de Maurepas, to be his principal minister. Upon learning from Charles-François de Broglie of the *Secret du Roi*, the king immediately disbanded it, bringing all diplomatic policy under his new foreign minister, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, himself a former member of the *Secret*. Unfortunately, there was one member of the *Secret* who remained at large, the Chevalier d'Éon, still in London with France's now-abandoned plans for invading Britain. If London learned of these plans, it could precipitate a war that the new king was hardly willing or prepared to undertake. As it happened, the solution to the d'Éon problem, hatched by Louis XVI and Vergennes, would lead France directly into the War of American Independence.

SPAIN

Asociación Bernardo de Gálvez, Málaga; Museo Naval, Madrid; Patrimonio Nacional, Madrid.

José María Blanco Núñez; Reyes Calderón Cuadrado; José Luis Cano de Gardoqui; Francisco Fernández González; Agustín Guimerá Ravina; Juan Hernández Franco; Sylvia Hilton; Lorena Martínez García; Valentín Moreno Gallego; Manuel Olmedo Checa; Gonzalo Quintero Saravia; Agustín Ramón Rodríguez González; José María Sánchez Carrión; Juan Torrejón Chaves; José Yaniz.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC; Daughters of the American Revolution, Washington, DC; Fred W. Smith National Library, Mount Vernon, VA; Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC; National Park Service; Regimiento Fijo de la Luisiana Española (Fixed Regiment of Spanish Louisiana); Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History, Washington, DC; Society of the Cincinnati, Washington, DC; Sons of the American Revolution, Louisville, KY.

Joshua Beatty; Eliud Bonilla; Michael Carroll; Thomas Chávez; Ellen Clark; John Cloud; Douglas Comer; Dennis M. Conrad; Michael Crawford; James Delgado; Héctor Díaz; Richard Doty; Jonathan Dull; James Garner; Martha Gutiérrez-Steinkamp; John Hattendorf; John T. Kuehn; Karen Lee; Cliff Lewis; Darren Lickliter; John R. Maass; Albert "Durf" McJoynt; David Miller; Brian Morton; Sarah Myers; Charles Neimeyer; Julia Osman; Elaine Protzman; Ray Raphael; Eric Schnitzer; Emily Schulz; Robert A. Selig; Donald Spinelli; Albert "Skip" Theberge; Anthony Tommell; Samuel Turner; Robert Whitaker; Glenn F. Williams.

Notes

NAMES, TITLES, AND GRAMMAR

I have used the Biblioteca Nacional de España (National Library of Spain) and the Bibliothèque nationale de France (National Library of France) as the sources for the accepted spellings of proper names. Where the person's title changes over the years (e.g., from *marquis* to *duc*), I have generally tried to use the person's best-known designation for consistency.

I have followed the guidelines of the Académie française (French Academy) and the Real Academia Española (Royal Spanish Academy) for style and grammar. The most noticeable example is the Académie française guideline that "de" is to be included in family names with only one syllable, but excluded when it has two or more syllables. Thus, François Joseph Paul, *comte de Grasse*, is referred to as "de Grasse," but Charles Gravier, *comte de Vergennes*, is simply "Vergennes."

Most navies of the era were royal, not just the British (e.g., France's *La Royale* and Spain's *Real Armada*), so I refer to all navies by their national designation.

Just as I translate original French and Spanish quotations into modern English, I have also updated spelling and punctuation to make it readable to the audience.

CURRENCY

I often translate the currencies of the era into modern equivalents to make their value understandable to the audience. This is a more fraught process than it would appear, as the economies of the late eighteenth century were vastly different than those of the early twenty-first century—horses versus cars, for example, and the fact that the relative cost of commodities like foodstuffs was far higher back then than today.

Nevertheless, economists have developed several ways of comparing the value of money across time. I have used two broad comparators depending upon what is being measured. When I am discussing the price of individual goods,

outlays, and salaries, I use the real price comparator that measures consumer goods and services and is based on the consumer price index (CPI). When I am discussing large national outlays like government projects, loans, and major arms deals, I use the economy cost comparator that is based upon the national gross domestic product (GDP) deflator. These give very different modern values, as GDP growth has been much faster than CPI growth over the past 240 years.

In general I have used 1775 as the basis year, on the grounds that it was the last year that prices were relatively stable in all nations, before the effects of the war resulted in varying inflation rates and instability in exchange rates. All exchange rates between currencies are based upon the values for that year: £1 (Britain) = \$5 (American) = 23.5 livres (French) = 6.3 pesos (Spanish).

Finally, all modern prices are keyed to the year 2010, and converted to U.S. dollars using purchasing power parity rates.

NATION	CURRENCY	REAL PRICE COMPARATOR	ECONOMY COST COMPARATOR
United States	Dollar (\$)	\$29.40	\$77,500 (1790 basis)
Great Britain	Pound (£)	\$149.00	\$13,127
France	Livre	\$6.30	\$560
Spain	Peso	\$24	\$2,083

Sources:

McKusker, John J. *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600–1775: A Handbook*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978.

Maddison, Angus. "Historical Statistics for the World Economy: 1–2003 AD," <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm>.

Measuring Worth: www.measuringworth.com.

OECD PPP: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) Data: <http://www.oecd.org/std/prices-ppp/purchasingpowerparitiespppsdata.htm>.

INTRODUCTION

- xvi hired regiments from the German states: Phillips, 1775, 387–91.
- xvi "to declare the colonies in a state of independent sovereignty": Cited in Ferling, *Almost a Miracle*, 114.

- xvi "immediately to cast off the British yoke": Cited in Ketcham, *James Madison: A Biography*, 70.
- xvi "the Army had not five rounds of powder a man": PBF, 23:237–38.
- xvii The standard account regarding the Declaration of Independence: Here I synthesize writings from my children's primary and secondary school curricula and textbooks from the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Department of Defense Dependents Schools; university-level textbooks; and several online encyclopedias.
- xvii The Declaration was not meant: Garry Wills makes similar arguments in his *Inventing America*, 325.
- xvii "is manifestly carried on": Bobrick, *Angel in the Whirlwind*, 156.
- xvii the Corsican Republic; the Act of Abjuration: Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence*, 41–45; Lucas, "The 'Plakkaat van Verlatinge': A Neglected Model for the American Declaration of Independence."
- xvii Stemming from British legal practice: Maier, *American Scripture*, 51; Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence*, 31.
- xviii adopted a series of declarations and resolves: See Shain, ed., *The Declaration of Independence in Historical Context*, 190–250, for a thorough accounting and analysis.
- xviii Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms; Olive Branch Petition: Ibid., 274–93.
- xviii Thomas Paine; *Common Sense*: Liell, 46 Pages; Ferling, *Independence*, 217–23; additional thanks to Ray Raphael for pointing out the coincidence with the arrival of George III's speech.
- xix "Every thing that is right or natural": Liell, 46 Pages, 174.
- xix "Nothing can settle our affairs so expeditiously": Ibid., 196.
- xx the scientific experiments of Benjamin Franklin: See Shachtman, *Gentlemen Scientists and Revolutionaries*, 47–63.
- xxi Calls for independence: Ferling, *Independence*, 258–77; Shain, ed., *The Declaration of Independence in Historical Context*, 438–59.
- xxi "America may yet owe her salvation": Potts, *Arthur Lee*, 148.
- xxi "I am clearly of opinion": Wills, *Inventing America*, 328.
- xxi "danger . . . may be prevented": Lee and Ballagh, eds., *The Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, 1:176–79.
- xxi "to concur with the delegates of the other Colonies": Alden, *The South in the Revolution*, 211.
- xxi "declare the united colonies free and independent states": Shain, ed., *The Declaration of Independence in Historical Context*, 462–64.
- xxii "We should be driven to the Necessity": Adams, ed. Adams, *The Works of John Adams*, 2:503.
- xxii "It is not choice then": Lee and Ballagh, eds., *The Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, 1:198.
- xxii three interconnected resolutions: Shain, ed., *The Declaration of Independence in Historical Context*, 461–62; Maier, *American Scripture*, 41–46. Ferling, *Independence*, 3–7; Wills, *Inventing America*, 325–33.
- xxiii "entangle us in future wars in Europe": Adams, ed. Adams, *The Works of John Adams*, 2:505.
- xxiv John Hancock, officially used the term "The United States": Nettles, "A Link in the Chain of Events Leading to American Independence," 36–37.
- xxiv The revised draft of the Declaration: Ellis, ed., *What Did the Declaration Declare?*, 15–21.

- xxiv a copy of the Declaration aboard a ship: Kite, "How the Declaration of Independence Reached Europe," 410.
- xxv He was reaching instead: Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 26–27.
- xxv "We hold these truths": Shain, ed., *The Declaration of Independence in Historical Context*, 490–93. For a comparison of Jefferson's text with George Mason's Virginia Declaration of Rights, from which he borrowed heavily, see Raphael, *Founding Myths*, 125–29.

CHAPTER ONE THE ROAD TO WAR

- 3 On the surprisingly warm evening: *Gazette de France*, no. 13 (February 14, 1763); Bedford, *Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford*, 3:190–96, 208; Evans, "The Embassy of the 4th Duke of Bedford to Paris, 1762–1763." Bedford's residence, the Hôtel de Grimberghen, 16 rue Saint Dominique, was demolished in the 1870s as part of Baron Haussmann's renovation of Paris. Its original site is now occupied by French government ministry offices at 244 boulevard Saint-Germain.
- 4 "supremely gifted in the art of reconciling political agreement": Bourguet, *Le duc de Choiseul et l'alliance espagnole*, 187.
- 4 "sensible, laborious": Bedford, *Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford*, 149.
- 4 "gives balls every week": Gibbon, *Private Letters of Edward Gibbon*, 1:28–29.
- 4 "stateliness and avarice": Ibid.
- 4 "a very good man": Blampignon, *Le duc de Nivernais*, 119.
- 5 "a system of equilibrium": Grivel, "Balance politique" (quote at 279). On balance of power in theory and practice, see Black, "The Theory of the Balance of Power in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century."
- 6 "as he wished to conduct the peace": Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XV*, 1:209.
- 6 The Seven Years' War: Among the many accounts of the Seven Years' War, I have made particular use of: Dull, *The French Navy and the Seven Years' War*; Baugh, *The Global Seven Years' War*; Anderson, *Crucible of War*; Szabo, *The Seven Years' War in Europe*; and Waddington, *La guerre de Sept Ans: Histoire diplomatique et militaire*.
- 7 "preventing them from coming there": Waddington, *Louis XV et le renversement des alliances*, 21.
- 7 "I do not think myself obliged to obey it": Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 45.
- 7 "in case of resistance": Ibid., 51.
- 8 "a few acres of snow": Although Voltaire most famously trotted out this phrase in chapter 23 of his novella *Candide*, he used variations of it in several letters and essays.
- 8 "Diplomatic Revolution": Black, "Essay and Reflection: On the 'Old System' and the 'Diplomatic Revolution' of the Eighteenth Century," 314–16; Szabo, *The Seven Years' War in Europe*, 12–15; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 128–29.
- 9 "was not a country with an army": Quote from Prussian minister Friedrich von Schrötter, cited in Szabo, *The Seven Years' War in Europe*, 21.
- 9 Prussia became a highly militarized society: Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe*, 113–14.
- 11 Choiseul . . . assumed that role in all but name: Waddington, *La guerre de Sept Ans*, 3:447.
- 12 outbuilt and outcaptured France's navy: Glete, *Navies and Nations*, 1:272.

- 12 Choiseul now proposed to Spain a combined amphibious invasion: Fernández Duro, *Armada española*, 7:53–58.
- 12 built more warships than any shipyard in Spain: Harbron, *Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy*, 15.
- 12 "Since we do not know how to make war": Flassan, *Histoire générale et raisonnée diplomatique française*, 5:376.
- 13 "Does the king of Spain want war or peace?": Blart, *Les rapports de la France et de l'Espagne*, 33.
- 13 The three men negotiated the final terms: Rashed, *The Peace of Paris 1763*, 159–200.
- 14 trained roughly one-third of the navy's sailors: Dull, *The French Navy and the Seven Years' War*, 249.
- 14 "an uninhabited country": Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution*, 8:307.
- 14 "succeed greatly beyond my expectations": Bedford, *Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford*, 190.
- 14 spectacular fireworks display: These are the subject of a series of watercolors in BNF Stamps and Photographs, LI-72 and QB-201.
- 15 prices and trade quickly returned to prewar levels: Riley, *The Seven Years' War and the Old Regime in France*, 12, 106.
- 15 "not to spend more money": Playstowe, *The Gentleman's Guide*, title page.
- 15 "anglomania": See Grieder, *Anglomania in France 1740–1789*.
- 15 "London abounds in French": Lennox, *The Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox*, 212.
- 15 Jean-Jacques Rousseau . . . immersed himself in botanical science: Damrosch, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, 472.
- 15 Jérôme Lalande and Charles-Marie de La Condamine: Lalande, *Journal d'un voyage en Angleterre*.
- 15 "We had drubbed those fellows": Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson*, 1:419.
- 16 Bourbon strategy of revanche: Abarca, "Bourbon 'Revanche' Against England."
- 16 "constant information from you": Wickham Legg, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, 86.
- 17 "Everything is closed to civilians and foreigners": Oraison, "Mémoire sur l'Amirauté anglaise."
- 17 military spies were reconnoitering: Morison, "The Duc de Choiseul and the Invasion of England."
- 17 "It was at Deal where Julius Caesar": Stanhope, *History of England*, 5:363–64.
- 17 *Secret du Roi*: See Perrault, *Le secret du roi*.
- 18 De Broglie . . . also hit upon the idea: De Broglie, "Plan de guerre contre l'Angleterre"; Lacour-Gayet, *La marine militaire de la France sous le règne de Louis XV*, 430–55; Patterson, *The Other Armada*, 6–12; Kates, *Monsieur d'Éon Is a Woman*, 91–94; Das, *De Broglie's Armada*, 4–21.
- 18 Finally, after years of inaction on the king's part: Perrault, *Le secret du roi*, 2:173–75.
- 19 France had only forty-seven ships of the line: Abarca, "Bourbon 'Revanche' Against England," 459; Dull, *The French Navy and the Seven Years' War*, 245–48.
- 19 the portion of revenues: Riley, *The Seven Years' War and the Old Regime in France*, 231.
- 19 Choiseul issued a sweeping Naval Ordinance: Ferreiro, *Ships and Science*, 286–87.

- 20 "My duty is to regard French and Spanish vessels": Sánchez Carrión, *De constructores a ingenieros de marina*, 236.
- 20 Jean Maritz: Valdez-Bubnov, *Poder naval y modernización del estado*, 312–19.
- 20 The war plan that was agreed to by both nations: Das, *De Broglie's Armada*, 18–20; Abarca, "Classical Diplomacy and Bourbon 'Revanche' Strategy, 1763–1770"; Scott, "The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the Strategy of Choiseul after the Seven Years' War."
- 20 Choiseul . . . a memorandum to Louis XV: Soulangue-Bodin, *La diplomatie de Louis XV et le pacte de famille*, 236–53.
- 21 "This peace is a remarkable epoch": Rain, *La diplomatie française d'Henri IV à Vergennes*, 257.
- 21 Pontleroy de Beaulieu: Agay, *La Provence au service du roi*, 2:582.
- 21 "Americans were never more British than in 1763": Shy, "The American Colonies in War and Rebellion, 1748–1783," 308.
- 22 For generations Britain had taken: Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen*, 12.
- 23 Pontleroy reported that the American colonies: ANF Marine, B4 106 folio 144, 1763; B4 107 folio 92, 1764; B4 folio 4, 1766. See also Lacour-Gayet, *La marine militaire de la France sous le règne de Louis XV*, 415; and Van Tyne, "French Aid before the Alliance of 1778," 24–26.
- 23 the Stamp Act and the Quartering Act: Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 641–51, 664–76. Additional thanks to Michael Crawford for his insights into the nature of colonial taxation.
- 24 selling barrels of "choice prime" Madeira: PGW, 7:458–59.
- 24 he was furiously taking notes: "Journal of a French Traveller in the Colonies, 1765"; Beatty, "The 'French Traveller,' Patrick Henry, and the Contagion of Liberty." The anonymous journal was unearthed in the Paris archives of the French navy in the early twentieth century, but the identity of the traveler as Charles Murray was not uncovered until 2011 with some particularly insightful sleuthing by Joshua Beatty.
- 25 Johann de Kalb: Perrault, *Le secret du roi*, 3:241–47; Kapp, *The Life of John Kalb*, 46–73; Zucker, *General de Kalb*, 65–79.
- 26 "There is no doubt": Kapp, *The Life of John Kalb*, 288.
- 27 North America was a continent on the move: Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen*, 57–61, 164.
- 27 British efforts to populate the two Florida colonies: Raab, *Spain, Britain and the American Revolution in Florida, 1762–1783*, 7–92.
- 27 the French population of Canada: See Imbeault, Vaugeois, and Veyssière, 1763: *le traité de Paris bouleverse l'Amérique*.
- 28 a network of observers: Cummins, *Spanish Observers and the American Revolution*, 6–26.
- 29 he dispatched Jean Surriret: Ibid., 22–24. On Surriret's militia service (where his name is sometimes spelled Juan Suriray), see Churchill, *Spanish Records*, 1:49, 93, 96, 114, 121, 123, 130, and 2:326.
- 30 "the destruction of the tea": Adams, ed. Adams, *The Works of John Adams*, 2:323.
- 30 "accommodation of our differences": Skemp, *The Making of a Patriot*, xi.

CHAPTER TWO THE MERCHANTS

- 32 The American insurrection; the Jacobite rising: Black, *War for America*, 13–18.
- 32 act in unison against their common adversary: Among the many histories of,

- and guides to, the War of American Independence, I have made particular use of: Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*; Bobrick, *Angel in the Whirlwind*; Dupuy and Dupuy, *An Outline History of the American Revolution*; Ferling, *Almost a Miracle*; Mackesy, *The War for America*; Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause*; and Middleton, *The War of American Independence*.
- 33 The Pennsylvania Committee of Safety: Brown, *Firearms in Colonial America*, 306.
- 33 a number of the militia volunteers: Lindgren and Heather, "Counting Guns in Early America," 1835; Churchill, "Gun Ownership in Early America," 626; Phillips, 1775, 296.
- 33 the colonists' access to local stockpiles of arms and powder: Raphael and Raphael, *The Spirit of '74*, 146–59; Bunker, *An Empire on the Edge*, 306–7; Russell, *The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies*, 52–53.
- 34 gunsmiths . . . across the thirteen colonies: Moller, *Colonial and Revolutionary War Arms*, 99–105; Brown, *Firearms in Colonial America*, 347–55. Additional information thanks to David Miller, associate curator in the Division of Armed Forces History, Smithsonian Institution National Museum of American History. Free population from Selesky and Boatner, eds., *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 2:922.
- 34 no cannon forges . . . not a single mill: Gordon, *American Iron, 1607–1900*, 202; Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776," 271.
- 34 "a prodigious amount for exportation": Fitzmaurice, *Life of William Earl of Shelburne*, 1:404.
- 34 little in the way of manufacturing: Peskin, *Manufacturing Revolution*, 56–57; McCusker, "British Mercantilist Policies and the American Colonies," 346, 352.
- 35 with an average household income: Lindert and Williamson, "American Incomes before and after the Revolution," 757–58.
- 35 Americans were in fact richer: McCusker, "British Mercantilist Policies and the American Colonies," 352.
- 35 "they experience neither famine nor barren harvests": Kapp, *The Life of John Kalb*, 292.
- 35 colonial merchants focused on domestic procurement and trade: Peskin, *Manufacturing Revolution*, 58.
- 35 "everybody has property": Marshall, "Travellers and the Colonial Scene," 20.
- 35 "By riches I do not mean gold": Crèvecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer*, 39.
- 35 The colonies had no mints: Lasser, *The Coins of Colonial America*, 1–5; Mossman, *Money of the American Colonies and Confederation*, 35–36, 58, 63, 93–94. Additional information thanks to Karen Lee and the late Richard Doty, curators in the National Numismatic Collection, Smithsonian Institution National Museum of American History.
- 36 American farmers: Buel, *In Irons*, 8–10.
- 37 "do not come into this port": Schulte Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic and American Independence*, 35.
- 37 Robert Crommelin, William Hodshon, and Isaac van Dam: Matson, *Merchants and Empire*, 147.
- 37 the Montaudouin firm: Rouzeau, "Aperçus du rôle de Nantes," 234; Martin, "Commercial Relations between Nantes and the American Colonies," 821.
- 37 Casa Joseph Gardoqui e hijos: Magra, *The Fisherman's Cause*, 166.
- 37 In the summer and autumn of 1774: Huibrechts, "Swampin' Guns and Stabbing Irons," 147–48.