Autonomy and the Double Standard

Autonomy and the Double Standard

by Fatma Ayad -
Number of replies: 0

"The romanticization of man's quest for meaning presupposes that 'other people function primarily as obstacles to the realization of an individual's plans or goals,' thereby obscuring the fact that such endeavours are often only made possible by the invisible and domesticized labour of women who are left to support such endeavours in the background." 

This resonates because it names something I had sensed but never articulated. We celebrate the person who "broke free," but that story usually hides the people who made the freedom possible. It made me think autonomy is often measured by how visibly independent someone looks, rather than by what actually supported that independence. It also made me realize how easy it is to admire someone's freedom without asking who paid the cost for it.

"Individual preferences which are formed as adaptations to and for oppression have been articulated by some as morally problematic because they 'reinforce the social structures that oppress the group as a whole.' But Serene Khader demonstrates in her work that 'adaptive preferences' ought not to be treated as 'autonomy deficits,' given that doing so can for example justify inappropriate attitudes towards those with such preferences." 

This tension is compelling because it resists an easy answer. It would be simple to say anyone shaped by unjust conditions is not autonomous, but that framing risks dismissing the person's own judgment about their life. It pushed me to think harder about the line between recognizing constraint and disrespecting agency, especially since people rarely get to explain their own reasoning before being labeled one way or the other.

"Autonomous agents must thus be disposed to respond to justificatory challenges in 'dialog (of some form) with real or imagined others.'"

This idea of autonomy as dialogical rather than purely internal or external stuck with me. It reframes independence not as standing apart from others, but as being able to explain and stand behind your choices when questioned. That feels closer to how I actually experience making decisions, since most of my choices only start to feel fully mine once I have had to defend them to someone else.

How I relate this using my own experience:

I come from Libya, where women have far less autonomy than what is normalized here, and collective values often work against individual choice. A "mehrem" is a male guardian, usually a father, brother, or husband, whose approval a woman traditionally needs for major decisions, including travel. Leaving the country alone for my education at Bryn Mawr, without a mehrem, was seen by many in my community as scandalous. Abrams' discussion of Gauguin shows how a man's decision to leave everything behind for his own path is praised as artistic independence, while a woman making a similar decision is read as rebellion rather than achievement. My own experience follows that same pattern, the act of leaving on my own was interpreted as defiance simply because I am a woman doing it. But there is a paradox underneath this that the passage does not fully capture. Part of why I hold so tightly to my independence is because I am acutely aware of how my society judges it. My autonomy is not just about leaving, it is shaped in direct response to the expectations I am trying to escape, which means the very same society I am resisting still plays a role in defining what my independence looks like and why it matters to me.